Over the past twenty years, many scholars have argued that the analytic philosophy of religion is unhealthy for the following reasons, among others: Most analytic philosophers of religion are Christian theists or are significantly influenced by Christianity more than by any other religion. Most of the field’s central problems have arisen through engagement with Christian beliefs. Most philosophical theories developed in defence of religious belief are proposed from a Christian perspective, and most arguments against religious belief are primarily targeted at Christianity. Until very recently, all the leading journals in the field were Christianity-oriented, and most of the major funded research projects centred on themes inspired by or formed in reaction to Christianity.
In recent years, a collective awareness has emerged among analytic philosophers of religion that the aforementioned biases and lack of diversity are prevalent in the field. Although there is no consensus on how harmful these issues are to the field, many philosophers of religion believe that change is needed anyway. Even if there is no agreement on its precise
Funding bodies must be receptive to projects planned to run from non-Christian perspectives. The Christianity-inspired majority should be open to the development of approaches that do not focus primarily on Christianity, whether in support or opposition, and must foster opportunities for such growth (e.g., by welcoming presentations inspired by underrepresented traditions at major philosophy of religion conferences, dedicating special issues of leading journals to papers on these traditions, publishing reviews and hosting symposiums on books written mainly from non-Christian viewpoints, and offering opportunities for philosophers inspired by different religious traditions to discuss similar topics from various perspectives).
The present symposium on Amir Saemi’s book,
This much, I believe, is enough to demonstrate the symposium’s importance. The insightful critical remarks by Imran Aijaz, Farbod Akhlaghi, Robert Audi, and Lara Buchak, along with Amir Saemi’s detailed responses to them, stand on their own and clearly reflect their depth and significance. They are needless to my further comments. Nonetheless, before concluding this editorial, I would like to say a few words about the importance of Samei’s book, without reviewing its content in detail or discussing my agreement and disagreement with his arguments.
Saemi’s book aims (1) to highlight a problem that arises when considering verses of the holy texts that issue divine commands and/or permissions, which appear to conflict with our strong moral intuitions (e.g., verse 34 of chapter 4 of the Quran, which apparently states that the wives must be obedient to their husbands, and that when the husbands find their wives rebellious, the men are permitted to beat their wives)
If
This problem is probably more challenging for Muslims than the followers of other religions for at least two reasons. First,
Exploring the strengths and weaknesses of various possible solutions to the problem in Question, Saemi considers the views of a broad range of medieval Muslim scholars on ethics, the reliability of revelation, and the compatibility of reason and revelation. Using the theoretical tools of analytic philosophy, Saemi reconstructs and evaluates the relevant ideas of various Ash’ari and Mu’tazili theologians and philosophers inspired by the Greek tradition. So, he puts contemporary analytic philosophy into dialogue, on the one hand with the contemporary mainstream understanding of Islam’s teachings and, on the other hand, with crucial components of the intellectual history of the Islamic world. And through this, the book offers instructive models of how analytic philosophy can be employed in engaging with the history of medieval Islamic philosophy and theology, and how the latter can serve as a valuable source of insights for tackling current issues in the former.
Finally, Saemi’s book represents an important step towards addressing a longstanding weakness in the work of Muslim thinkers. The history of Islamic philosophy and theology has been shaped mainly by inquiries into physics, metaphysics, and logic, while ethical questions have received considerably less philosophical attention. Saemi’s book aims to highlight this aspect of philosophical inquiry, often undervalued by Muslim thinkers, reminding those interested in the Islamic tradition that it faces significant ethical challenges which cannot be solved solely by relying on a philosophical heritage heavily obsessed with metaphysics. To address these challenges, we must certainly draw on the rich history of Islamic philosophy and theology, but we also need to recognise that this alone is not sufficient; much more work remains to be done.
These observations confirm that Saemi’s book yields several remarkable gains. They are, I believe, sufficient to highlight the book’s overall importance and encourage philosophers of religion, ethicists, and scholars of (the history of) Islamic philosophy and theology to engage with it. However, they do not capture the subtleties of the book’s arguments and their philosophical strength and significance. I am confident that these latter things will be evident to anyone who reads the book—or at least the papers collected in this symposium.
I thank Amir Saemi for writing this valuable book, and I also thank him, Imran Aijaz, Farbod Akhlaghi, Robert Audi, and Lara Buchak for their contributions to this symposium, all of which are thought-provoking and open up avenues for further development of the ideas in the book. The preparation of this symposium would not have been possible without the openness, patience, and support of Francis Jonbäck, editor of
See, for example,
For a discussion of these issues and a detailed list of relevant references, see
Global Philosophy of Religion Projects 1 (2020–2023) and 2 (2024–2027), funded by the John Templeton Foundation and hosted by the University of Birmingham, serve as good examples of initiatives designed to offer opportunities for philosophers inspired by underrepresented traditions. Additionally, the articles in
For two recent reviews of Amir Saemi’s book, see
See
These theses are quoted from
For a philosophical defence of the idea that the Quran can be the literal words of God, see Zarepour (2022).