Conceptual metaphor in syntax: sentence structure level

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Abstract
Metaphor is universally recognized as a means of structuring language and thought and has long been the subject of linguistic research. However the manifestation of metaphor at the sentence structure level has yet to be studied in detail. This paper deals with the peculiarities of conceptual metaphor instantiation in English syntax and focuses on conceptual metaphor as a tool of conceptualizing real-world situations – both abstract and physical – and as a factor determining the syntactical structure of an utterance about a situation. It investigates the mechanism of metaphorical transfer manifested at the level of syntax, its grounds, limits and types, and shows the metaphorical potential of sentence patterns.
Key words: Conceptual metaphor, situation type, propositional model, sentence pattern

1. Introduction

One of the most widely discussed and generously applied notions in modern philological research is that of conceptual metaphor. In linguistic studies the theory of conceptual metaphor, developed and popularized by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson 1980) and further elaborated by a great many scholars (see Kövecses 2002), is employed for analysis of diverse phenomena. The notion of conceptual metaphor, or conceptual transfer, is indispensable in the study of polysemy, development of lexical, lexico-grammatical and grammatical meanings, occurrence of linguistic units in unusual contexts, and, generally, in the analysis of concepts represented by linguistic units ranging from morphemes to texts. Yet insufficient attention has so far been given to syntactical signs – simple sentence patterns – as means of expressing metaphorical concepts.

Linguists have discussed the metaphorical potential of certain constructions which serve as simple sentence patterns in different languages – of the ditransitive construction like in *John gave him a book* and *John gave him a kick,* of the self-propelled motion and caused motion constructions: *She walked into the room* and *She slid into madness*, *She went mad*; *Joe kicked the bottle into the yard* and *Joe kicked Bob black and blue*; etc. (for analysis and further examples, see Goldberg 1995:88-89, 148-151, among others). On the other hand researchers have defined and instantiated by lexical, phraseological and syntactical units universal metaphors such as STATES ARE LOCATIONS, CHANGE IS MOVEMENT (and, more specifically, CHANGE OF STATE IS CHANGE OF LOCATION), CAUSES ARE FORCES, POSSESSION IS ACTION/LOCATION/EQUATION, etc. (Heine 1997; Jackendoff

1987, 1990, Lakoff 1993, Lakoff & Johnson 1980) which show the way certain aspects of event structure are characterized. This paper argues that not only the ones mentioned above, but all basic simple sentence patterns (such as the patterns Subject + Verb, Subject + Verb + Object, Subject + Verb (link) + Adjective/Noun, etc.) allow of metaphoric extensions and that the concepts (propositional models) represented by sentence patterns serve as regular sources for metaphorical interpretation of numerous types of relations (both abstract and physical) between real objects.

This assumption rests mainly on two facts. The first one is that the number of sentence patterns in a language is finite while the number of real-world situations (to say nothing of imaginary-worlds situations) which are described by utterances built in accordance with these patterns is practically infinite. The second one is that simple sentence patterns have emerged to reflect (through mental representations) a limited set of situation types − generalizations of individual prototypical situations essential to human physical experience ("humanly relevant scenes" (Goldberg 1995:39), "basic experiences", "stereotyped situations" (Heine 1997:90-91), etc.). Basic situation types derived from physical experience or, rather, their mental representations, are reduced to generalized propositions (propositional models) and encoded by the sentence patterns of a language. A wide range of individual situations requiring verbalization are represented as a limited number of situation types and denoted by an established set of sentence patterns. It is only logical to assume that this is due to the fact that propositional models of basic situation types are projected onto representations of different situations through the mechanism of metaphorical transfer. Thus the sentence pattern may be viewed as a sign for a metaphorical concept[1]. The purpose of this paper is to examine the mechanism of metaphorical conceptualization of a

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[1]This hypothesis seems to square quite well with usage-based theories of language and language acquisition popular in construction grammar (Bybee & Beckner 2010, Bybee 2013). These theories claim that grammatical meaning and grammatical form come into being through repeated instances of language use as well as a child masters abstractions gradually through experience with more and more exemplars. Obviously, categorization of real-world situations provides situation types and categorization of tokens for these situations creates generalizations or schemas (typical propositions and sentence patterns). We assume, from language users' perspective these might be treated as abstractions derived from frequent exemplars (whether the latter refer to prototypical situations of physical experience or non-prototypical, abstract situations – ones pertaining to the sphere of personal relations, or social relations or whatever is important for modern speakers and is frequently denoted by language tokens). Yet, it should be noted that from the diachronic, language history perspective, typical propositions are in the first place generalizations of basic experiences, prototypical situations of physical reality. Models of these situations are projected onto new fragments of reality and other domains of experience through the mechanism of conceptual metaphor. Typical propositions in this respect are not mere abstractions but also historically a tool of conceptualizing reality. As a result of conceptual transfer the same language token begins to be employed to denote more and more situations, thus more and more exemplars of a proposition and a sentence pattern are created. These exemplars, together with the prototypical ones, help learners to develop abstractions.

situation which is manifested by the syntactical structure of an utterance about a situation and thus to reveal the metaphorical potential of sentence patterns and, on the other hand, explore the syntactical means of metaphor manifestation. The linguistic data used to do this comes from examples supplied by native speakers and dictionaries.

2. Metaphorical conceptualization and syntactical representation of a situation

As the very term suggests, conceptual metaphor is viewed as a matter of thought rather than language, and is supposed to be a tool of conceptualizing the world. The mechanism of conceptual metaphor consists in mappings from one domain of experience (source domain) to another (target domain). That is, metaphor is defined as "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:5). Conceptual metaphor is revealed through a number of conventional language units. Thus the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is reflected in the language by expressions *Your claims are indefensible, He attacked every weak point in my argument, His criticisms were right on target, He shot down all of my arguments* and many others (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:4); the "conduit metaphor" (IDEAS (MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS. LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS. COMMUNICATION IS SENDING) singled out by Reddy (Reddy 1979) may be instantiated by a variety of expressions such as *to give somebody an idea, to put something into words, the content of speech*; the metaphor STATES ARE LOCATIONS is expressed lexically in *to be in love, to leap out of depression, deep sleep, to enter a state*; etc.

Metaphorical interpretation of a situation (which may include an entity and its property, activity or several entities standing in a certain relation) consists in "understanding" it in terms of another situation pertaining to another sphere of experience (with participants performing different roles and related in a different way). This means that the participants of a target situation are assigned roles of the participants of the source situation and that the relation between the target situation participants is viewed as the relation between the objects in the source situation. Thus, the situation of someone's being in a certain state (physical, emotional, etc.) is interpreted as a situation of someone's being in a certain place, in a container, to be specific: *He is in panic – Something is in a container*. The one who is experiencing a state is regularly referred to as an object located (in a container), the state corresponds to location (container): *He is in/out of love*; *He is in distress/despair*, etc.

Metaphorical conceptualization of a situation is revealed in the syntactical structure of the utterance. A situation is structured in terms of another situation type and is represented by the sentence pattern designed for this situation type. In the given example someone's experiencing a state is represented by the sentence pattern including the subject, the link verb *to be* and the locative complement (adverbial

expression with a spatial preposition). This pattern has emerged to denote object location in space – a situation type derived from immediate physical experience. The corresponding propositional model of object location ("something is in some place") has been projected onto other domains of experience. As a result the pattern has been metaphorically "extended" onto various abstract situations including someone's experiencing a state.

The propositional model may be projected onto one and the same domain of experience in different regular ways and, thus, there may be several types of mappings between the domains. For instance, a person experiencing a state (who may be referred to metonymically through a body part) may correspond to a location (container), and the state – to the object placed in it: *There was much pain in him*, *There was surprise in her eyes*, etc. The difference in correspondences across domains (distribution of "roles" between the participants of a situation), we assume, is explained by the participants' relative salience for the speaker (for the notion of salience, see, for instance, Schmid 2007:127-134) and, thus, by the purpose of the utterance – to put it plainly, by whether the speaker intends to tell about a person (being in a state) or a state (experienced by a person).

Metaphor is made systematic by a set of metaphorical entailments based on the knowledge about the source domain (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980:8-14). As far as relations between an object and a container are concerned, it is empirically obvious that something or someone is not only located inside a container or on the outside of it: something or someone may move into a container and go out of it, someone may put something in a container or take it out. Accordingly, one is not only in or out of a state, but one may move into a state or out of it (*He falls in and out of love with every pretty girl*, *The nation plunged into deep sorrow*, *You will be able to get out of depression*) and somebody may put a thing or a person into a state or take them out of it (*The news of her mother's death plunged Mary into grief*, *Take your computer out of hibernation*). This means that not a single situation (someone's experiencing a state or something being in a state) but situations of an object's state change, of somebody (something) influencing an object's state, are structured metaphorically.

Metaphors conveyed by sentence patterns (such as OBJECT'S STATE CHANGE IS OBJECT'S MOVING INTO/OUT OF LOCATION, CAUSED CHANGE OF OBJECT'S STATE IS OBJECT'S CAUSED MOVEMENT INTO/OUT OF LOCATION, etc.) are always composite ones since not a separate entity but a situation – a relationship between entities – is interpreted metaphorically. They are similar in that they are made up of more basic metaphors like STATES ARE LOCATIONS, CHANGE IS MOVEMENT. The latter are realized in a whole set of coherent sentence patterns (the ones including an obligatory locative complement).

3. Types of situations employed as sources in conceptual transfer
Individual situations whose concepts are mapped onto different domains of experience, as well as situations structured metaphorically, are next to incalculable. Yet certain *types* of situations involved in metaphorical projection can be distinguished.

Most general situation types derived from physically perceived reality are denoted by sentence patterns (taken in abstraction from individual words expressing their elements) and instantiated by utterances. A finite set of sentence patterns for the English language has not been established since different scholars refer to the main syntactic patterns of the language a different number of constructions (cf., for instance, Greenbaum & Quirk, 1998, Palmer 1971). For the purposes of this paper it will suffice to consider the patterns recognized by many grammarians.

3.1. Subject + Verb (link) + Adjective/Noun
The pattern has emerged to denote a situation in which something (someone) is characterized by some feature. Prototypically, a physical object is characterized as having a physically perceived property (*His cheeks were wet*) or a certain quality, identity (*These are cats*). In non-prototypical situations an object or an abstract entity is characterized as having an unobservable property, an abstract quality: *She is clever, The show was boring, She is a student, This is a problem, etc.* The prototypical and non-prototypical situations, certain differences notwithstanding, constitute one situation type – that of an object's having a certain property or quality. The model of an object's possessing a quality, "being equal to a thing" is projected onto situations of a different type – onto someone's experiencing a state, revealing personal traits or behaving in a certain manner, being an object of someone's feeling, attitude, etc.: *She was joy itself, He was honesty itself, He was her one true love.*

3.2. Subject + Verb
The situation corresponding to the SV pattern consists in something's / someone's activity which is not directed at another object. In the prototypical situation, which is the primary "meaning" of this pattern, a person or any other entity capable of acting intentionally performs an observable physical activity or a single action which is not directed at another object (*They were flying slowly, He nodded, etc.*). In non-prototypical situations the activity (action) of the participant may be non-physical, unobservable, unintentional, etc.: *She is teaching, She never lies, He smiled automatically, His heart beat faster, etc.* In examples like *He is grieving, Will this book sell?, He dressed quickly, They kissed, etc.* the model of an object's activity is projected onto situation types different from that of someone's activity or action (whether prototypical or non-prototypical): onto someone's experiencing a state (feeling grief), someone's doing something to an object (people's selling the book),

someone's taking part in a reciprocal action (like kissing and getting kissed), etc.

3.3. Subject + Verb + Object
In the situation denoted by this pattern something (someone) acts upon something (someone), or manipulates something (someone). Prototypical action upon an object consists in an intentional, observable physical action of an animate agent, a human being most obviously, on a physical object (patient): *I burnt that letter immediately*. For more details of prototypical action upon an object, or agent-patient relationship, see: Givón 1993:78; Lakoff & Johnson 1980:70-71; Langacker 1991:285-286. Non-prototypical action of an agent upon a patient may be unintentional (*She bruised her knee)* or unobservable, non-physical, involving abstract entities as participants: *They fired him, The government banned advertising of mobiles to children, etc.* Regardless of certain differences, all the utterances given here describe a single situation type – that of action upon an object. The model of object-directed action is projected onto other situation types – human speech activity, location in space, possession, etc.: *She said something, Lakes cover much of the state, He owns a cottage, etc.*

3.4. Subject + Verb + Indirect Object + Direct Object
This pattern (the so-called "ditransitive construction") denotes a situation in which someone gives someone something (or provides in a way for someone's receiving something): *She gave him a book, They promised him a new toy, She baked him a cake, etc.* The prototypical situation denoted by the pattern and thus the primary meaning of the ditransitive construction is obviously that of direct (physical) object transfer (*She gave him a book, He handed her a bill*) since that is the primary and most essential (basic) situation for human physical experience. The construction denotes a number of non-prototypical situations like the ones in which the agent does not cause someone to receive an object (whether material or abstract) directly. The agent intends to cause someone to receive an object by doing something else (like in *She baked him a cake*) or expresses intention to cause someone to receive something, attitude to someone's receiving something (*She promised him a new toy, She permitted him a candy, They refused him a visa, They grudged him his success, etc.*). Thus a non-prototypical situation consists of several sub-events and the construction integrates several frames.

It should be noted that the syntactic and semantic features of the ditransitive construction have been profusely discussed in linguistic papers (see, for instance, Goldberg 1995, Kay 2005, Polinsky 1998, Wierzbicka 1988), and a different number of meanings of the construction have been posited: six distinct meanings in Adele Golberg's model (Goldberg 1995:38, 78), for example, and three main semantic types of the construction in Paul Kay's monotonic construction grammar model (Kay 2005). The brief description of constructional meanings proposed here seems to

square with (certain differences notwithstanding) Kay's description of "the direct recipient construction" (like in *Joe gave Sally the ball*), "the intended recipient construction" (*She baked him a cake*) and "the modal recipient construction" (*She promised/permitted/refused him a toy*), with the latter comprising some types which are viewed as distinct in Goldberg's model. Yet what needs to be emphasized is that the analysis based on conceptual metaphor theory and proposed in this paper is not aimed at revealing the *variants* of a construction's meaning in the first place. It is rather employed to provide a still wider empirical coverage and explain *extensions* of the constructional meaning (in its different variants, whatever these variants are), that is explain why and how situations of obviously different ontological types are described in utterances built upon the same syntactic pattern. As it appears, just like propositional models represented by the other sentence patterns, the object transfer model represented by the ditransitive construction – in its prototypical and non-prototypical variants – is regularly mapped onto other domains of experience. The model of object transfer is projected, for instance, onto someone's physical action upon an object (*He struck him a blow, Give the rug a good beating*) or change of an object's properties, states (O*nly actions give life strength, This promised her peace*), someone's attitude to an object (*She gave her friend her complete confidence, Spare me a little of your love),* etc.

3.5. Subject + Verb (link) + Adverb (Location)
This pattern corresponds to the situation of something's (someone's) being in a place. Prototypically, a physical object is located in physical space; the situation consists in spatial relationship between the object and another physical object (landmark): *The book is on the table, There are some books in the box.* Non-prototypical object location is not observed directly and may consist in location of abstract entities in non-physical space: *The feel of spring was in the air, There are very high trees in the world, etc.* Object location is mapped onto such domains as human activity, an agent's action upon something, logical relation of inclusion, localization of an event in time, etc.: *We're at work, The incident is under investigation, There are 7 days in a week, The weather report is just ahead, etc.*

3.6. Subject + Verb + Adverb (Direction)
In the situation denoted by this pattern something (someone) moves to a place (from a place, through a place, etc.). The prototypical situation is that of an animate being's (person's) moving in physical space. The motion is self-propelled, intentional, observable: *He went there, She walked out of the room.* Non-prototypical motion is different from the prototypical situation in that it may be caused by a force, unintentional, unobservable: *He fell into a dark hole, The smell came from the pantry, etc.* The model of motion is projected onto someone's action upon an object, an

object's change of quality, event duration, etc.: *He pushed at the door, She grew into a lovely young woman, The dinner continued far into the night, etc.*

3.7. Subject + Verb + Object + Adverb (Direction)
This pattern has emerged to denote a situation in which something (someone) moves something (someone) to a place (from a place, through a place). Prototypically, a person intentionally and directly changes the location of a physical object in physical space: *He put the book on the table, She pushed him out of her room*. Non-prototypical caused motion may be unintentional (*He dropped it accidentally in a puddle, The wind blew his hat off his head*), indirect (*They ordered her out of the pub*), unobservable or abstract (*He inserted an extra sound into the word, They took his name out of the list*). The model of caused motion is projected onto situations different from change of location – human communication, someone's manipulating an object and many other types of real-world situations: *I asked him about it, They informed him of this rights, They put the device to use*, etc.

The examples of metaphoric mappings between the basic situation types listed above and different relations between objects were chosen quite at random: as a matter of fact many other instances can be provided. Everyday speech abounds in examples of metaphor since each propositional model is mapped onto various domains of experience. As a result the "meaning" of each sentence pattern is metaphorically extended.

4. Types of metaphorically structured situations and ways of their conceptualization
Types of situations conceptualized by means of metaphor are still more numerous than those employed as sources of metaphorical projection. Examples of utterances testify to the fact that metaphorically structured situation types include both physical situation types and types of abstract relations between objects.

It is assumed that conceptual transfer is typically directed from a concrete domain to a more abstract one (see Evans & Green 2006:298, Heine 1997:7, Lakoff & Johnson 1980:59-60, et al.). At the same time George Lakoff and Mark Johnson give instances of metaphorical elaboration of concepts "directly emergent from our experience" such as the concept of making (*I made a statue out of clay*). According to the authors, making as a change of a certain kind – from one state to another – is conceptualized in terms of the metaphor THE OBJECT COMES OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:73). At a more abstract level of sentence structure, regardless of the individual lexical meanings of words, as it appears, the situation of making is represented as a basic physical experience – that of caused motion. The situations of caused motion and making correspond in two regular ways: 1) someone causes something to move out of/from something – someone makes an

object out of/from a material: *I made a statue out of clay, The first man was molded from clay by some kind of god*; 2) someone causes something to move into something – someone makes a material into an object: *Grapes are made into wine.* Making is also interpreted as causing something to move up: *A district was built up with new blocks of flats*.

Analysis of other metaphor instantiations at the level of sentence patterns brings us to the conclusion that models of physical situations are extensively projected onto other situations of physical experience, including other "basic experiences", impose a certain structure on them and this way serve an instrument of their elaboration or reconceptualization.

Thus, the propositional model of caused motion is employed to structure, besides making, direct (physical) manipulation which leads to changes in the object's structure, form, size, temperature, color, state of aggregation, location, physical or physiological state (of an animate object) and so on, results in the object's destruction (death), or causes no irreparable changes in the object's state and properties: *They broke it into pieces, I smashed the bottle against the wall, He fired the next shot at the man, She nodded his head at him, My house was pulled/burnt down, They beat him up, We mustn't inflict pain on animals, He wore his shoes out, Cover yourself up*, etc. The structures of the source and target domains correlate in different ways: the agent (causer of movement) may be mapped onto the agent of action (factor causing a change); the moving object – onto the object, instrument (or means), result, separate manifestation of process; the location – onto the object, instrument, result, recipient of process. Of all the possible participants of the target situation two or three are simultaneously singled out by the speaker and get syntactical representation. Thus, sentence elements may relate to the subject and object of the action (*They beat him up, My house was pulled/burnt down*), subject, object and instrument (*I smashed the glass under my foot, He brought the hammer down onto them*); subject, object and result of process – the object's new state (*They broke it into pieces, We mustn't inflict pain on animals*); subject, object and instance of the process *(He fired the next shot at the man)*; etc. At that an object or an instrument or result of the action can correspond to both the moving object and location. "Role assignment" and representation of the participants by certain elements of the sentence pattern are determined by their relative salience for the speaker with the exception that the agent (apparently due to the agent's inherent salience) is always encoded by the subject of the utterance. When the speaker's intention is to "put" the agent "in the shadows" and "bring" the object, instrument, etc. "into the foreground", the passive construction can be used: *My house was pulled down*.

Another type of physical situations structured as caused motion is object transfer: *I gave most of my books away, I gave this book to my roommate, I took the book from him reverently*. The one giving somebody something (or taking it away) is

represented as the agent causing movement, the object of transfer – as the moving object, the recipient or sender – as location.

The model of caused motion also structures situations which do not necessarily imply manipulating physical objects but are still a part of physical experience. Sensory perception (feeling, hearing and listening, seeing and looking, smelling), for instance, can be represented as caused motion: *Her fingers felt out his face, Hear me out, He looked it over carefully, Dogs sniffed out the trail through the snow*, etc.

It appears that metaphorically elaborated concepts of physical situations, as well as directly emergent concepts, serve as source domains in the metaphorical conceptualization of abstract events. In other words, an abstract event may be structured as an observable, physical event which in its turn is structured as another physical event. For example, in an utterance like *She was crushed down by the news* an abstract situation (change of a person's emotional state caused by a certain event) is represented as physical action of a force upon an object which in its turn is viewed as forcing an object to move down.

On the other hand, an abstract event may be structured immediately as a basic experience: caused motion (*Could we move the meeting to Thursday?*), direct manipulation (*Anger seized him*), object transfer (*You gave me pain*), object location (*He was in panic*), etc.

In any case, conceptualization of abstract situations unlike that of physical events appears *inherently* metaphorical. Firstly, an abstract situation is structured in terms of basic event types and represented by syntactic patterns designed for these basic types. This means that any utterance about an abstract event is actually metaphorical regardless of the lexical units it is made up of. That is why there are reasons to suggest a few points for the description of the utterance *The chairman plowed through the discussion* given by Max Black in his famous book "Models and Metaphors" (Black 1962). The author states that the explanation of the metaphorical nature of this utterance lies in the word "plowed", which is called "the focus of the metaphor" (Black 1962:39). We argue that the metaphorical content of the utterance is made up not exclusively by the figurative use of the word *plow*, but by the "figurative meaning" of the sentence pattern as well. For that matter, utterances like *The chairman moved through the discussion*, *The chairman looked through/at/into the papers* are also metaphorical: discussing something and viewing documents are represented as motion through something. The difference is that such utterances express conventionalized metaphors and as a rule are not perceived as metaphorical by language speakers. The utterance *The chairman plowed through the discussion* is more likely to be perceived as figurative, image-bearing due to the figurative use of word "plow" which "adds" a second (and a more obvious) "layer" to the metaphorical content of the utterance. More abstract metaphors ACTION IS MOVEMENT, DIFFICULTY IN ACTION IS IMPEDIMENT TO MOVEMENT,

COPING WITH A DIFFICULTY IS OVERCOMING IMPEDIMENTS constitute a composite metaphor COPING WITH A DIFFICULTY IN ACTION IS OVERCOMING IMPEDIMENTS TO MOVEMENT which gets instantiated here as COPING WITH A DIFFICULTY IN MENTAL ACTION IS OVERCOMING RESISTANCE OF MATERIAL IN MOVING THROUGH AN OBJECT, and is further elaborated – the chairman's hampered action concerning the discussion is represented as moving through the soil, pushing one's way through it as with a plow.

Finally, the speaker may supply further individual metaphorical extensions adding another "layer" of metaphor to the content of the utterance and giving the utterance a personal touch of poetic or rhetorical character. For obvious reasons, it is next to impossible to obtain an example of individual metaphorical elaborations of the cited utterance. Instead, we can give another example. Thus, for instance, the situation of eliminating differences between abstract phenomena is represented in some languages as the situation of destroying barriers between objects. Breaking, as the prototypical way to destroy an object, is taken for the source domain: *to break the barriers, to break down the barriers* are conventional expressions. This metaphor of destruction is elaborated individually in the title of the song by James E.F Landau "Pulverize the colour barrier": eliminating differences is viewed more specifically as reducing barriers to fine particles and the idea is rendered through a nonconventional expression *to pulverize a barrier*.

Metaphorical conceptualization of an abstract situation employs the mechanism of ontological metaphor – projection of entity status upon mental phenomena (see Lakoff & Johnson 1980:26-32). Abstract phenomena are viewed as participants of situations due to ontological metaphor. In the example *The chairman moved through the discussion* an abstract process, that of discussion, is conceptualized as a tangible entity, a substance.

We would like to emphasize that apart from lexical units ontological metaphors as well as metaphorical concepts of situations are expressed and simultaneously sustained by means of syntax. Names of abstract phenomena fill positions in a sentence pattern which are associated with participants of a situation performing certain roles in it. The very fact that the name of an abstract phenomenon occurs in the position of the subject (agent of action), object, instrument, etc. suggests that this phenomenon is understood as a tangible thing. Obviously, due to regular use of their names in such positions, association of abstract phenomena with agents, objects for manipulation, instruments, etc. gets even stronger.

5. Grounds and limits of metaphorical conceptualization of situations
The mappings between source and target domains are to have grounds and therefore comply with certain limits. It is considered that cross-domain mappings are grounded in the perceived similarity between the structures of these domains or associations

arising from co-occurrences of two types of experience (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:155). An example of experiential similarity is LIFE IS A GAMBLING GAME: one experiences actions in life as gambles, and the consequences of those actions are perceived as winning or losing. An example of experiential co-occurrence is the MORE IS UP metaphor induced by the co-occurrence of two types of experiences: adding more of a substance and seeing the level of the substance rise (Ibid.).

We assume that for a situation type to be structured in terms of another situation type it is not enough for these situations to co-occur in experience. They are to possess similar generic structures (cf. Mandelblit 2000:202) by which we understand the minimum set of participants and most abstract relations between them like those between subject and object. A situation type with a certain generic structure is not mapped onto a situation type with a different generic structure, their co-occurrence in reality notwithstanding. This explains why object transfer or making can be represented as caused motion while object location, for instance, cannot even though the latter co-occurs with caused motion in experience (location is the result of motion and, on the other hand, at a particular moment a moving object is at a certain point in space). An object's location in space does not allow of a subject-object interpretation.

Individual situations involved in metaphorical transfer share the generic conceptual structure, which consists in a subject-object relation, and at the same time bear a more specific experiential similarity to each other – similarity of certain ontological and functional characteristics of participants, relations between them, reasons and results of process, etc.). Thus, for instance, a metaphor of creation – the interpretation of making an object as moving it up (*Johnny built up a fort*) – is obviously explained by the fact that while making an object one adds more substance to it, the level of substance rises and thus the object itself "goes up". On the other hand, interpretation of certain processes as an object's moving up (or down or in any other direction), may have a different empirical basis. An object's destruction, its violent separation into pieces, for example (*He broke it up*), is represented as moving up most probably due to the fact that in the course of violent destruction, like the one caused by an object's falling onto the ground, the object's parts move upward. In these cases, a part of the target event coincides with the structure of the whole of the source event and the events are associated in experience. Conceptualization of a situation in such cases is complemented by the mechanism of conceptual integration since besides the caused motion model projection it requires integration of several sub-events of which a complex target event consists (for the theory of conceptual integration, see Fauconnier & Turner 1995, 1996, for further development, see Mandelblit 2000). A causing sub-event (*for instance, someone's adding substance to the object, someone's applying force to the object or dropping it on the ground*) and an effected sub-event (*the rise in the level of substance in the object*, *the object's parts moving upward*) are integrated into a single complex event denoted by a simple

sentence pattern.

The similarity between an abstract and a physical event is supported by other types of metaphor. Thus, in the example *Should I put my faith in you?* an abstract situation – someone's attitude to someone, that of trust, is structured as caused motion and, in particular, as moving an object inside a container. The metaphor is based on the perceived similarity of situations: believing someone, entrusting oneself to a person is judged similar to putting a thing in a container, thus making it safely belong there, etc. The similarity is sustained by a number of archetypical ontological metaphors – interpretation of the human soul as a container, mental phenomena, feelings as discrete physical objects (for metaphor as source of similarity, see Lakoff & Johnson 1980:148-155). Metaphorical conceptualization of abstract situations is supported by ontological metaphors in the first place – that is, by understanding abstract phenomena in terms of physical entities: but for interpretation of abstract phenomena as tangible objects, and, further, as persons or inanimate things, they wouldn't be attributed roles like those of subject or object of manipulation, instrument, location, recipient, etc.

In some cases conceptualization of situations (both physical and abstract) in terms of other situations may be explained by cultural, mythological tradition rather than by direct experience with the real world. Instances are found at the level of less generalized situations (someone's being in a certain state, change of a certain state, a definite type of caused motion, etc.). A vivid example is metaphors for a state of death, for a person's dying or causing a person to die. Some of them are obviously rooted in physical experience, like the metaphors DYING IS GOING DOWN, KILLING SOMEBODY IS MOVING THEM DOWN (or, as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson put it in a generalized form, DEATH IS DOWN): "when you're dead, you are physically down" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:15). These metaphors are illustrated by expressions like *He fell dead* (vs *He rose from the dead*), *He shot the man down*; etc. Still other systematic metaphors for death are not likely to have empirical grounds. Thus, the fact that human death is represented as change of location and caused change of location (like in *He passed away; He has gone to the ancestors* and *Death took him away*, etc.) seems to have little to do with real experience; the situations (someone's dying and change of location) do not possess a common generic structure. Yet mythological and religious associations with the event have a structure common to self motion and caused motion: death is traditionally associated with leaving this world and getting into another world or being forced to do so. Death is personified (which is a universal ontological metaphor) and therefore is represented as capable of "taking a person away". Whether these mythological concepts are in any way induced by experience is a question beyond our knowledge.

6. Conclusion

This paper has discussed issues of conceptual metaphor instantiation in syntax. It has attempted to show that the syntactical structure of utterances about certain types of situations testifies to metaphorical conceptualization of these situation types and metaphorical extension of the corresponding sentence patterns. Metaphorical concepts of situation types have been characterized in this paper as composite, systematic and hierarchical. Interpretation of situations through metaphor has been shown to consist in several types of regular mappings between domains, to be grounded in experiential similarity of situations and cultural tradition and to be limited by compatibility of the situations' generic structures. Among the situations involved as targets in metaphorical transfer we have described both abstract and physical ones. As it appears, concepts of physical situations are regularly elaborated through metaphor, and abstract events are necessarily structured metaphorically either as directly emergent physical concepts or as metaphorically elaborated ones. Metaphorical concepts of abstract situations are supported by ontological metaphors and get further specified in utterances due to figurative use of words. Thus an utterance about an abstract situation is inherently metaphorical and may contain several layers and types of metaphor.

Conceptual metaphor proves to be manifested and sustained by syntactical means and being a tool of conceptualizing both abstract and physical events it determines, along with other factors, the range of syntactical structures for an utterance about a situation. Revealing peculiarities of metaphorical conceptualization and syntactical representation of real-world situations in a certain language, we believe, is indispensable to teaching the ways of building grammatically, culturally and communicatively adequate utterances.

Many other issues concerning metaphor realization at the level of syntax are yet to be further considered with the use of different types of linguistic data. For future productive research, we suppose, an attempt should be made to establish a verifiable set of sentence patterns and propositional models of different languages and to explore their metaphoric potential in more detail.

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