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The History and Future of the Nordic Association for English Studies (NAES)

ARNE ZETTERSTEN

During the academic year 1979-80, Stig Johansson and Bjørn Tysdahl, University of Oslo, and Arne Zettersten, University of Copenhagen, started to discuss the idea of forming a Nordic Association for English Studies. This informal organising committee agreed on the planning of biannual or triannual English conferences in the Nordic countries according to a fixed rotation order. The English Department, University of Oslo, volunteered to organise the First Conference for English Studies at Lysebu, Oslo, on 17-19 September, 1980.

The original idea of the three "founding fathers" was that the new organisation should meet every three years and that papers should be presented within the areas of language, literature and civilisation. It was made clear that NAES was meant to work parallel to the well established Nordic Association for American Studies. The overall aim would be to promote research and co-operation in the Nordic countries and to encourage research projects which could lead to broader networks in and outside the five countries. Since the idea was that membership of the association should be open to any person working in the field of English Studies in all departments of English in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, it was clear that many young scholars, not yet fully established, would be encouraged to participate and to engage in scholarly co-operation.

At the first conference in Oslo, an interim constitution was agreed on. It was decided that five members of an executive committee should be elected for a period of three years, one from each country. The committee should consist of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer and one other member of the

Association. Arne Zettersten, Copenhagen, Håkan Ringbom, Åbo, Julian D'Arcy, Reykjavik, Bjørn Tysdahl, Oslo, and Gunnel Tottie, Uppsala, were elected to the Executive Committee for a period of three years. Arne Zettersten was elected President of the Association.

The first conference of NAES at the conference centre of Lysebu outside Oslo became quite a success with about 120 scholars from all the Nordic countries. From the beginning it was made clear by the organisers that it would be important for the conferences of NAES to invite a number of well-known guest-speakers, preferably reflecting the three major research areas, language, literature and civilisation.

Over the years the NAES conferences have taken great pride in inviting prominent international scholars who have participated actively in the conferences and contributed vividly to the scholarly debate. This has led to further international co-operation at the same time as it has made the conferences even more exciting events.

As an additional help to the enhancement of co-operation in research, Arne Zettersten, Copenhagen, had prepared a study of Nordic work in progress within English Studies in all the five countries. In this study all the members of all English departments had been asked to summarise all their research projects, so that individual scholars in the Nordic countries, or elsewhere, could look up areas of research in the index of the book and get in touch with scholars working in a similar field. Prospective Ph.D.-candidates could also use the survey of research in progress in order to avoid clashes and also to exchange views on a particular topic. An appendix to the 1980 study was published in 1984.

The papers from the First Nordic Conference for English Studies were published in 1981, edited by Stig Johansson and Bjørn Tysdahl. The editors said in their preface that "The present collection of papers cannot re-capture the atmosphere of friendly and vigorous discussion which prevailed at the Lysebu Conference". This was true enough and the same atmosphere has actually been characteristic of all the subsequent NAES conferences. They have all been of comparable size and they have continued in the same scholarly spirit.

The Second Nordic Conference for English Studies was organised at Hanasaari/Hanaholmen near Helsinki on 19-21 May, 1983. We could here notice the successful co-operation between Helsinki University and Åbo Academy in that the conference was organised by the English Department of Helsinki University, whereas the proceedings were published by the Research Institute of the Åbo Academy, edited by Håkan Ringbom, Åbo, and Matti Rissanen, Helsinki.

The Third Nordic Conference for English Studies in 1986 also showed an example of the kind of departmental co-operation that some of us had hoped for as NAES developed. Before the conference in Sweden in 1986, the English departments of Uppsala and Stockholm co-operated fruitfully, placing the conference at beautiful Hässelby Castle outside Stockholm. The proceedings from the Third Nordic Conference for English Studies were edited by Magnus Ljung, Stockholm, and Gunnel Tottie, Uppsala.

The Fourth Nordic Conference for English Studies was held at Elsinor (Helsingør), Denmark, on 11-13 May, 1989. This time no fewer than 160 scholars attended the conference, 96 of whom presented papers or research reports. The planning of this conference was carried out by a team of colleagues from the English departments of the University of Copenhagen, Handelshøjskolen and Denmark's Lærerhøjskole. The proceedings from the Fourth Nordic Conference for English Studies were edited by Graham Caie, Kirsten Haastrup, Arnt Lykke Jakobsen, Jørgen Erik Nielsen, Jørgen Sevaldsen, Henrik Specht and Arne Zettersten.

The Fifth Nordic Conference for English Studies was held at Reykjavik on 7-8 August, 1992. This time our members were also given the opportunity to attend the Nordic Association for American Studies Conference which was held on campus at the University of Iceland over the same period of time. At the General Meeting during the Conference, Arne Zettersten announced that he had decided – after 12 years as President, not to seek re-election.

Julian D'Arcy was elected President of NAES. At a later stage, at the Tromsø Conference, the Constitution was changed in accordance with the principle that a new President is always elected from the university and country organising the subsequent conference. The Proceedings of the Fifth Nordic Conference for English Studies were edited in 1993 by Julian D'Arcy.

The Sixth Nordic Conference for English Studies was held at Tromsø on 25-28 May, 1995. Members of NAES were delighted to visit the northernmost university in the world and to experience a memorable outing to Fløyfjellet with a splendid view of the midnight sun. The Proceedings of the Sixth Nordic Conference for English Studies were edited in 1997 by Gerd Bjørhovde and Gøril Rogne.

The Seventh Nordic Conference for English Studies was held in Turku/Åbo on 28-31 May, 1998. In the past our conferences had been attended primarily by members of English departments in the Nordic countries. This time the organisers could welcome participants also from the Baltic countries, Hungary, Japan and the United States. The Proceedings of the Seventh Nordic Conference for English Studies were edited in 1999 by Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen and Brita Wårvik.

The eighth Nordic Conference for English Studies was held at Göteborg on 24-26 May, 2001. Those members of NAES who had participated in all the conferences since 1980, recognised the same pattern of organisation. There was the usual mixture of young Ph. D.-candidates, experienced professors and mid-career scholars. There was the same "atmosphere of friendly and vigorous discussion" as had characterised the first Nordic Conference at Lysebu in 1980. The Proceedings of the eighth Nordic Conference for English Studies will be edited by Karin Aijmer. The next conference will be held at Aarhus in 2004. Tim Caudery, Aarhus, was elected President for the period 2001-04.

At an early stage in the planning of NAES activities in the 1980s the Board and organisers of the conferences made a point of keeping in touch with comparable associations outside the Nordic countries. Representatives of the German Anglicists' Association were, for example, invited several times. In the early 1990s, when the new European Society for the Study of English (ESSE) was founded, NAES participated in the planning process from the very beginning. NAES became officially a member of ESSE at the board meeting in Brussels in 1990 and has had one seat on the Board of ESSE ever since. The first ESSE conference was held at Norwich on 4-8 September, 1991, and the plan from the beginning was to hold a conference every two years.

At the beginning of the 1990s, there were 12 members on the board of ESSE, all being members of the European Community (later EU), namely Belgium, Denmark (NAES), France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. ESSE was founded as a federation of associations within the European Community, but there was from the start a clear determination within the Board to invite all European scholars of English to all future conferences and to encourage membership from more countries in the future. Today there are 30 members on the board of ESSE.

ESSE has been publishing a newsletter since 1990, called the *European English Messenger*, with the purpose to disseminate information and views about English Studies in Europe. It is distributed free to all members of the society's constituent associations and appears twice a year. This newsletter serves as an obvious help to all members of NAES, since members are free to write informative or argumentative articles on matters concerning university affairs, and to make announcements of forthcoming conferences and other events. During the last few years a new scholarly journal has been launched, called, *The European Journal of English Studies*, which also increases the possibility for members of NAES to publish articles in a European context.

The next ESSE conference will be held on 30 August – 3 September, 2003 at the Marc Bloch University of Strasbourg. At ESSE conferences members of NAES will always have the opportunity to make proposals for seminar and panel topics as well as plenary and semi-plenary lectures and informal sessions. In fact, the role that NAES has in the organisation of ESSE makes it possible to keep much more in touch with international developments within our respective fields of interest than before ESSE existed. With ESSE's about 8000 members, all NAES members can find experts and research colleagues much more easily through the new channels that ESSE provides.

As from the year of the NAES conference at Helsinki, 2000, Finland has formed a separate Association within NAES with a seat on the Board of ESSE for a Finnish representative. The other board member of NAES represents Scandinavia, meaning Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden. So far the membership fees within ESSE (6 or 7 Euros) have been covered by block payment by the individual English departments of English in the Nordic Countries. Nearly all of the other associations base their activities on individual payment of fees. Countries like Spain, France and the United Kingdom have all more than a thousand members.

According to the latest calculations, the membership figures of ESSE appear as follows: Albania (prospective member): 5, Austria: 86, Belgium: 121, Bulgaria: 82, Croatia: 80, Cyprus: 16, Czech Republic: 57, Estonia: 4, Finland: 80, France: 1685, Germany: 538, Greece: 92, Hungary: 157, Ireland: 190, Italy 296, Latvia: 6, Lithuania: 29, Macedonia: 39, Netherlands: 121, Scandinavia: 269, Poland: 253, Portugal: 267, Romania: 271, Russia: 157, Slovakia: 17, Slovenia: 50, Spain: 1099, Switzerland: 101, Ukraine: 115, United Kingdom: 1186, Yugoslavia: 105. The total sum of NAES members of ESSE is 349, which means that NAES is the fifth largest association in ESSE.

These figures certainly indicate that there are great possibilities for NAES to continue to build up numerous research links in all member countries. One way of starting to find out more about ESSE activities for individual NAES members is to search the two home pages of ESSE: http://www.mshs.univ-poitiers.fr/esse/esse.htm and: http://gean5.pfmb.uni-mb.si/esse

These web-sites also provide information on the 2002 ESSE conference at Strasbourg. The Autumn issue of *The Messenger* has included the preliminary registration form. All these obvious connections of NAES to ESSE make the future prospects of NAES brighter than ever. The new *Nordic Journal of English Studies* will contribute greatly to keeping Nordic scholars more closely together. There is no doubt about the fact that future co-operation between Nordic scholars of English Studies will be alleviated by the ESSE connection and the new *Nordic Journal of English Studies*. Since ESSE regularly meets every two years and NAES every three years there is ample opportunity for Nordic scholars to meet and set up research links or research projects.

It seems clear that some major changes have occurred at various stages in the history of NAES. During the first cycle of five conferences in the five Nordic countries in the period 1980-1992, the Nordic meetings were characterised by a firm conviction that there was a Nordic identity in research and teaching in respect of English studies. We could call this the first phase of the history of NAES.

The second phase started about the time when ESSE became established and NAES found its position as an important Northern unit and integral part of ESSE. This was around 1992 when ESSE consisted of twelve member countries only. Then ESSE started to grow year by year and at the turn of the millennium, the membership of ESSE had grown towards about 30 members.

The first conference in a Nordic country was held in Helsinki in 2000 and Finland had become a new separate member of ESSE, however still belonging to NAES in a Nordic context. This is where we can talk about the third phase in the history of NAES. At the beginning of this third phase, the planning of the new *Nordic Journal of English Studies* started and we may now find a fresh way of keeping our Nordic identity together in scholarly matters.

We may keep this Nordic identity in spite of the fact that our own research has a much wider, global span than it may have had about 1980. Much research in the Nordic countries is based on the funding provided by research councils and other institutions in the individual countries. In such cases research partners or project members are usually colleagues from the same Nordic countries. In addition the Nordic Council also provides funding for a good number of Nordic projects every year. Due to the situation of the Nordic research funding we find project-oriented research just as Nordic as ever, even if the research topics are probably much more diversified and global.

It is, on the other hand, much easier for Nordic scholars to find new research associates and research links, if all opportunities produced by the ESSE networks are made use of. Quite a number of such research links may be generated through more permanent use of, for example, the ESSE database and the ESSE bibliography on CD-ROM. If all members of NAES contribute new data to the ESSE database as often as possible we shall certainly know much more about ongoing research in the future and how to get access to it. With these developments in mind, the new President of NAES, Tim Caudery of Aarhus, can only be congratulated on taking on the task of developing NAES even further.

University of Copenhagen

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Tracing Historical Sound Change from Modern Evidence: The Development of Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/, /ʊ/ + Intervocalic /r/ in Northumbrian English

KURT RYDLAND

1. *Introduction*

This paper is concerned with the historical development of Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/ before intervocalic /r/ in Northumbrian English dialects. The modern Northumbrian dialect area is situated in the northeast of England, and comprises Northumberland, most of Tyne & Wear and a small part of Co. Durham. The extent of the Northumbrian area is indicated in Figure 1. The southern boundary by and large coincides with the original southern limit of the so-called Northumbrian Burr, that is, a uvular or velar realisation of /r/ (=[ʁ], [ʀ], etc.) (see further 2.2f).

Words with Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/, /ʊ/ + intervocalic /r/ constitute three small lexical sets, which will here be referred to as SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY. The SPIRIT set comprises words such as *mirror*, *squirrel* and *syrup*, as well as *spirit* itself (Middle English /ɪ/); MERRY comprises words like *bury*, *herring*, *merry* and *terrible* (Middle English /ɛ/); and WORRY includes words such as *currant*, *Durham*, *furrow* and *worry* (Middle English /ʊ/).[1] The present classification of lexical items is based on what appears to have been their normal vowel in Northern Middle English, and takes no

[1] As here defined, the lexical sets SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY include only words which are attested in Middle English. A somewhat wider definition is given in Rydland, forthcoming, where SPIRIT, MERRY, WORRY comprise all words with modern Standard English (Received Pronunciation) /ɪ/, /e/, /ʌ/ before intervocalic /r/, including words of post-Middle English origin (e.g. *America, hurricane*).

account of Middle English variants with other vowels, such as /ɪ/ in *bury*, *merry* and /eː/ in *herring*.[2]

Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/ before intervocalic /r/ have a great variety of reflexes in the modern Northumbrian dialects. In the sources for this study (see 2.1), Middle English /ɪ/ in SPIRIT has a total of seven phonemic reflexes, /ɛ/ in MERRY has as many as nine, and /ʊ/ in WORRY has five. The number of phonetic reflexes is even higher, as three of the phonemes have two or more distinct realisations. Table 1 lists the Northumbrian vowel phonemes of SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY, and specifies the principal cases of phonetic variation. The table also indicates the relative frequency of each phoneme in the source material (see 2.2 for more information about the modern material).

Table 1. Northumbrian reflexes of Middle English /ɪ/ in SPIRIT, /ɛ/ in MERRY and /ʊ/ in WORRY

Phonemes & major variants	SPIRIT	MERRY	WORRY
/ɪ/	++	(+)	
/ɛ/ [ɛ~æ]	+++	+++	
/a/ [a~ɑ]	+++	+++	
/ɔ/ [œ~ɔ]	+++	++	++++
/ʌ/			+
/ʊ/	(+)	(+)	++
/ə/	++	+	++
/aː/		+	
/ɑː/		+	
/ɔː/	+	+	+
Attestations (no. of words/localities)	7/32	26/49	15/37

++++ vowel very common; +++ vowel common; ++ vowel less common; + vowel rare; (+) vowel rare, and apparently restricted to specific words

[2] Middle English /eː/ in *herring* is the source of the modern Northumbrian forms with [iə] (see Orton et al. 1978: Ph22 and Rydland 1998).



Figure 1. The Northumbrian dialect area

A – B: southern boundary

Small dots indicate localities represented in the material

Table 1 clearly demonstrates that Middle English /ɪ/ in SPIRIT, /ɛ/ in MERRY and /ʊ/ in WORRY have had a much more complex development in Northumbrian dialects than in Standard English. In this paper, I shall try to identify and describe the historical processes by which the modern Northumbrian vowels have evolved. The paper represents the first attempt at a complete and systematic description of this particular aspect of Northumbrian historical phonology. The account is based mainly on the evidence provided by the modern forms, as there is little relevant historical material, but also draws on the standard descriptions of historical English phonology.

2. *Sources and Material*

2.1 The modern Northumbrian material dates from the mid-twentieth century (*c.*1930–*c.*1970), and represents a form of traditional vernacular speech which shows little influence from Standard English. At the turn of the twenty-first century, this particular variety of Northumbrian is no longer in general use.

The principal sources are the Orton Corpus (see Rydland 1998), Orton 1935–39 and the Survey of English Dialects (SED) (Orton & Halliday 1962–63; SED 1950, 1953–55, 1953–74). Together, these account for about 90% of the material. In addition, small amounts of data have been excerpted from the following sources: Berger 1980; Borgis 1936; Fenwick 1956; Grenfell Smith 1971; Halliday 1972; Linguistic Survey of Scotland n.d.; Viereck 1966; Voges 1948; Walsh 1963. The sources cover some fifty localities in various parts of the Northumbrian dialect area (see Figure 1). The size of the material from each locality varies from only one word to over thirty words.

In spite of the large number of sources examined, the total amount of material is relatively small (see Table 1). The reason is that none of the sources investigate SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY systematically, but simply record a few arbitrary items, which are treated together with other words with Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/. In consequence, the lexical as well as the geographical coverage is very uneven.

2.2 Below follows more detailed information about the modern Northumbrian material (a complete survey of the material is given in Rydland, forthcoming).

a. Some of the vowels recorded in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY are geographically restricted. First, /ʌ/ occurs only in the northernmost parts of the Northumbrian area (see 3.2.3); second,

/ɑː/ is absent in the southwestern corner of Northumberland (which thus has no contrast /ɑː/ • /aː/; see Rydland 1993: 44–5, 50 and 3.3.2 below); third, the phonetic types [æ] (=/ɛ/), [ɑ] (=/a/) and [œ] (=/ɔ/) (see Rydland 1995: 567–8) are absent in southwest Northumberland, and [œ] seems to be lacking also in the border districts in the far north (see Rydland 1999: 2).

b. There is a fairly clear preference for certain vowels in each of the three lexical sets: /ɛ/, /a/ and /ɔ/ predominate in SPIRIT; /ɛ/ and /a/ are prevalent in MERRY; and /ɔ/ is the normal vowel in WORRY. The other vowels recorded are relatively infrequent by comparison, but may be common in specific words.

c. All three lexical sets to some extent have different vowels in different words. In the set SPIRIT, for example, *spirit* itself appears with /ɪ/, /ɛ/, /a/, /ɔ/, /ə/, while *syrup* has /a/, /ɔ/, /ɔː/. Similar discrepancies are found in MERRY (e.g. /ɛ/, /a/, /ɑː/ in *errand*, the same three plus /ə/, /aː/, /ɔː/ in *herring*) and WORRY (e.g. /ɔ/, /ɔː/, /ʌ/, /ʊ/ in *currant*, the first two plus /ə/ in *Durham*). Some of the differences between words of the same set are undoubtedly due to the dearth of material (see 2.1) rather than actual usage. Thus it is likely that a systematic investigation of SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY would have shown a greater variety of vowels in many words; for instance, *syrup* in all probability has /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ə/ in some forms of traditional Northumbrian speech, and *spirit* may well have /ɔː/.

d. A number of lexical-incidential usages in SPIRIT, MERRY, WORRY appear to belong predominantly to specific parts of the Northumbrian area, that is, they may be regional features within Northumbrian English. An example is the use of /ɔ/ in MERRY, which is attested mainly in the southeast (see further 3.2.1).

e. Some of the forms with long vowels (/aː/, /ɑː/, /ɔː/) have very unusual structures: they show Burr Deletion, that is loss of the intervocalic /r/ (=[ʁ] etc.), and Schwa Loss (/ə/ > Ø) is also common, so that several forms are in fact monosyllabic. Examples with long vowels include the following: /bɔːɪk/ *Berwick*; /kɔːn(t), kɔːrənt/ *currant*; /dɔːm/ *Durham*; /ɑːnd/ *errand*; /haːn, hɑː(ə)n, hɔː(ə)n/ *herring*; /mɔː(r)ɪ/ *merry*; /sɔːrəp/ *syrup*; /tɑːbl, tɔːbl/ *terrible*; /wɔːɪ/ *worry*.

f. /r/ in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY usually appears as a burr ([ʁ, ʀ]) in the material. Apical /r/ occurs above all in southwest Northumberland, parts of which may never have had the burr (see Påhlsson 1972: 22). Besides, apical /r/ alternates with the burr on Tyneside, along the Scottish border in the far north and in Durham near the southern boundary of the Northumbrian area.

3. Developments and Processes

3.0 The great variety of modern Northumbrian vowels in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY is the outcome of several different historical processes, which together span a period of about six hundred years. The earliest changes can be dated to late Middle English, more specifically, the fourteenth century. Further changes took place in early Modern English, in the nineteenth century, and finally in the early 1900s. I shall discuss the various developments in chronological order.

3.1 Late Middle English

The late Middle English period saw a number of changes in the vowels of SPIRIT and MERRY. These changes were not specifically Northumbrian, but are known from other regional varieties as well, including the predecessor of Standard English. There were two main processes, both of which involved variable lowering of front vowels, /ɪ/ and /ɛ/, in the environment of a following intervocalic /r/. The two changes were chronologically separate, and may be referred to as *Early Lowering* and *Later Lowering*. These processes are illustrated in Figure 2. A third change, much less widespread, resulted in raising of /ɛ/ in the same environment.

3.1.1 Early Lowering

Early Lowering affected the original /ɪ/ of SPIRIT, which tended to be replaced by /ɛ/ from about 1300 (see Dobson 1968: 570–71; Jordan 1974: 234–5). This change is the source of modern Northumbrian /ɛ/ in SPIRIT. Since the change was variable, the original /ɪ/ was kept, and SPIRIT words accordingly came to have alternation /ɛ/ ~ /ɪ/ in late Middle English: forms in /ɛ/ were adopted in some districts and by some speakers, while other districts and speakers kept the original forms in /ɪ/. In the Northumbrian area, Early Lowering seems to have been common in most districts north of the River Tyne, but was apparently rare or perhaps absent in the southernmost districts.



Figure 2. The Northumbrian development of original Middle English /ɪ/ and /ɛ/ before intervocalic /r/

3.1.2 Later Lowering

Later Lowering involved late Middle English /ɛ/, which was variably lowered to /a/ from about 1350 (see Dobson 1968: 562–3; Vikar 1922: 156). The change evidently affected the recently developed /ɛ/ in SPIRIT (see 3.1.1) as well as the original /ɛ/ of MERRY, and therefore yielded /a/ in both sets. This development is the origin of modern Northumbrian /a/ in SPIRIT and MERRY.[3] Because the change was not categorical, the original forms in /ɛ/ survived, and both SPIRIT and MERRY therefore show alternation /a/ ~ /ɛ/ from the late fourteenth century onwards (SPIRIT also had /ɪ/; see Figure 2). To judge from the modern evidence, Later Lowering occurred in most parts of the Northumbrian area, though in SPIRIT it is attested only in the districts which had formerly been affected by Early Lowering (see 3.1.1).

In early Modern English, Northumbrian /a/ was sufficiently common in SPIRIT and MERRY to serve as a model for the pronunciation of new words with Standard English /ɪ/ or /ɛ/ + intervocalic /r/. Both /ɪ/ and /ɛ/ were sometimes replaced by /a/ in such words in Northumbrian dialects, as is clear from modern /a/ in for instance *irritate*, *terrace* and /ɑː/ in *America* (/əˈmɑːɪkə/). In the latter word, /ɑː/ depends on an earlier form in /a/ (see 3.3.1–2).

Later Lowering was an extension of the common fourteenth-century change /ɛ/ > /a/ before non-prevocalic /r/, in words such as *dark*, *far*, *starve* (< *derk*, *fer*, *sterve*). The latter change occurred with great regularity in late Middle English (see Luick 1964: 477–9; Dobson 1968: 558ff), while lowering before intervocalic /r/ was very infrequent, and apparently confined to northern dialects (see Orton et al. 1978: Ph22–3).

3.1.3 Raising of /ɛ/

Late Middle English /ɛ/ underwent occasional raising to /ɪ/ in various phonetic contexts (see Luick 1964: 376–8; Dobson 1968: 567–9). Raising before intervocalic /r/ is documented in *cherry*

[3] But Northumbrian /a/ in *errand* may derive from early Middle English /a/ < Anglian shortened *ǣ*; (see Luick 1964: 348, 351).

(Middle English *chiri(e)* etc.; see *Middle English Dictionary*), and may have occurred in other MERRY words as well. The modern Northumbrian material includes sporadic /ɪ/-forms in *cherry* and *terrible*, both of which may have developed /ɪ/ by Middle English raising of /ɛ/.

3.2 Early Modern English

The Northumbrian vowels of SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY were subject to several changes in the early Modern English period. It is necessary to distinguish three different processes, all of which were evidently variable. Two of them occurred in all three sets, and resulted in a partial merger of /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/. These changes will be referred to as the *First Merger* and the *Second Merger*. The third development comprises lowering and unrounding of original /ʊ/ in WORRY. The relative chronology of the changes is not entirely clear, but the modern evidence suggests that they were contemporaneous rather than consecutive. The general development may be illustrated as shown in Figure 3.

3.2.1 The First Merger

The First Merger comprises three different changes, which are numbered 1a–1c in Figure 3. The input vowels were /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/, all of which became Northumbrian /ɔ/ before an intervocalic /r/. However, there appear to have been certain regional differences. Changes 1a and 1b, which produced /ɔ/ in SPIRIT and MERRY, seem to have occurred mainly in the southeastern districts, south of the River Coquet (see Figure 1). By contrast, change 1c, which yielded /ɔ/ in WORRY, apparently took place in most parts of the Northumbrian area, the only exceptions being the southwestern corner and the extreme north.



Figure 3. The Northumbrian development of early Modern English /ɪ/, /ɛ/, /ʊ/ before intervocalic /r/

Changes 1a (/ɪ/ > /ɔ/) and 1b (/ɛ/ > /ɔ/) seem to have been exclusively Northumbrian, while 1c (/ʊ/ > /ɔ/) probably occurred in other northern dialects as well, as suggested by modern /ɔ/ in WORRY in various parts of the north (see e.g. Wright 1905: Index; Klein 1914: 123; Orton et al. 1978: Ph 57a). In the Northumbrian area, all three changes may have been initiated by the Northumbrian

Burr, which was probably firmly established by the early 1600s. Burr-conditioned backing and lowering of vowels are well documented in the later history of Northumbrian (see 3.3.2–3), but there is no evidence of pre-burr rounding.

The First Merger offers a straightforward and economical account of the development of modern Northumbrian /ɔ/ in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY. The process was part of a more extensive Northumbrian change of short /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/ in pre-/r/ environments: all three vowels in fact tended to become /ɔ/ also before a *non-prevocalic* /r/, in words such as *first*, *perch* and *hurt*. The latter change is the Northumbrian equivalent of the contemporary pre-/r/ centralisation (> /ə/) in Standard English (see Dobson 1968: 746ff). Owing to later lengthening (see 3.3.1), seventeenth-century /ɔ/ before non-prevocalic /r/ commonly appears as /ɔː/ in modern Northumbrian (/fɔːst/ *first*, /pɔːtʃ/ *perch*, /hɔːt/ *hurt*; see Rydland 1998).

Orton (1933: 262ff) and Dean (1962: 351–3) propose a different path of change for modern Yorkshire /ɔ/ in the *first* and *hurt* classes: it is assumed that early Modern English /ɪ/ and /ʊ/ before non-prevocalic /r/ first became /ə/, which was then retracted and rounded to /ɔ/. However, Northumbrian /ɔ/ in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY can hardly be a further development of earlier /ə/, as such a change would be very difficult to reconcile with the modern distribution of /ɔ/ and /ə/ in the three sets.

3.2.2 The Second Merger

The Second Merger involves centralisation of /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/ before an intervocalic /r/ (see Figure 3, changes 2a–2c), and yielded /ə/ in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY. This process was apparently rare in Northumbrian, but seems to have occurred sporadically in various parts of the area, above all in the southeast. However, some examples of modern Northumbrian /ə/ may be borrowings from the neighbouring dialects of Cumbria and Durham, which commonly use /ə/-type vowels in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY (see Hedevind

1967: 98, 114, 142; Rydland 1982: 159–61; Orton et al. 1978: Ph22–3, 32, 57a).

The Second Merger was an extension of the usual seventeenth-century centralisation /ɪ, ɛ, ʊ/ > /ə/ before non-prevocalic /r/ (see 3.2.1). Centralisation before intervocalic /r/ seems in the main to be a feature of regional dialects, but also occurred sporadically in Standard English, though here the change has later been reversed (see Dobson 1968: 748, 752, 757).

3.2.3 Lowering and unrounding of /ʊ/

In a small part of the Northumbrian area, seventeenth-century /ʊ/ in WORRY underwent the same change as in Standard English: it was lowered and lost its lip rounding, becoming /ʌ/ (see Figure 3, change 3). This development was evidently confined to northernmost Northumberland, more specifically, the districts north of Wooler and Lowick (see Figure 1). In contrast to other northern dialects, this area also has modern /ʌ/ from Middle English /ʊ/ in such words as *butter*, *son* and *thunder* (see Kolb et al. 1979: 227, 230ff). The evidence indicates that Northumbrian /ʌ/ in WORRY evolved by a native change, and is not due to influence from Standard English.

3.3 The nineteenth century and later

The principal Northumbrian changes in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY in the nineteenth century include Pre-/r/ Lengthening and certain realisational modifications. The latter were due to influence from the Northumbrian Burr, the uvular quality of which tends to cause backing and/or lowering of neighbouring vowels, especially preceding ones (see Påhlsson 1972: 20; Rydland 1995: 567ff). There were also a couple of minor changes, which were confined to a small number of specific words. From about 1900, Burr Deletion gave rise to a phonemic split of one of the lengthened vowels.

3.3.1 Pre-/r/ Lengthening

Pre-/r/ Lengthening in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY was a sporadic change, which seems to have occurred almost exclusively in Northumbrian dialects (but see below). The vowels affected were /a/ and /ɔ/, which became /aː/ and /ɔː/, respectively. Lengthening of /a/ is attested only in MERRY (e.g. /harən/ *herring* > /haːrən/), but is likely to have occurred in SPIRIT as well. This change is the immediate source of infrequent /aː/ in a few MERRY words (see 2.2e). Lengthening of /ɔ/ is found in all three sets (e.g. /sɔrəp/ *syrup* > /sɔːrəp/, /mɔrɪ/ *merry* > /mɔːrɪ/, /kɔrənt/ *currant* > /kɔːrənt/), and has given rise to the modern variants in /ɔː/ (see 2.2e). It is assumed that Schwa Loss in such forms as /hɑːn/ *herring* and /kɔːn(t)/ *currant* post-dates lengthening, as indeed suggested by the frequent preservation of /ə/ after long vowels in the modern material.[4]

Northumbrian lengthening of /a/ and /ɔ/ before intervocalic /r/ can be tentatively dated to the first few decades of the nineteenth century. The change was probably contemporaneous with lengthening of /a/ and /ɔ/ before non-prevocalic /r/, in such words as *dark*, *hard*, *far* and *fork*, *north*, *storm*. The latter development appears to have occurred at a very late date in Northumbrian English: if we can trust the evidence of Ellis 1889 and Wright 1905, it cannot have begun much earlier than 1800. Northumbrian Pre-/r/ Lengthening does not seem to have been a burr-conditioned change, as it also took place in the districts where /r/ was apical (see 2.2f). The change must therefore be considered as independent of the phonetic quality of /r/.

Outside the Northumbrian area, lengthening in SPIRIT and MERRY is attested sporadically in various parts of the north (see e.g.

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[4] It should be mentioned that lengthening /a/ > /aː/ and /ɔ/ > /ɔː/ is also evidenced in other words with intervocalic /r/, such as *barrel*, *carry* and *borrow*, *orange* (modern Northumbrian forms with long vowels include /baːl, bɑːl, baːrəl/, /kɑːi/ and /bɔːrə/, /ɔːndʒ/; see Rydland 1998).

Reaney 1927: 105; Rydland 1982: 160, 298; Rydland 1998, *terrible*).

3.3.2 Pre-Burr Backing of /aː/, Burr Deletion and the emergence of /ɑː/

In most of the Northumbrian area, /aː/ < /a/ in MERRY (also in SPIRIT?) was soon modified by a realisational change, which may be referred to as *Pre-Burr Backing*. This process involves the retraction of front vowels in the environment of a following burr, and turned front /aː/ (=[aː]) in MERRY into a back [ɑː]-type vowel ([haːʁən] *herring* > [hɑːʁən], etc.) (see 3.3.3 for Pre-Burr Backing of short /a/). The same development took place before the non-prevocalic burr, as in *dark*, *hard*, *far* (e.g. [daːʁk] *dark* > [dɑːʁk]). The data in Ellis 1889 suggests that Pre-Burr Backing of /aː/ began about the mid-nineteenth century. The change was clearly very common, and must have been categorical in many speaker groups; however, it was generally absent in the extreme southwest of the Northumbrian area (see below), and may have failed occasionally in other districts as well.

Pre-Burr Backing of /aː/ was a purely phonetic development, and had no phonemic implications: the new back [ɑː] was a contextual variant of the phoneme /aː/, as long as the conditioning burr was kept ([hɑːʁən] *herring* = /haːrən/, [dɑːʁk] *dark* = /daːrk/, etc.). It should be noticed that Northumbrian /aː/ continued as an [aː]-type vowel in non-pre-burr environments in such words as *fall*, *draw* and *cold*, *snow*, all of which have /aː/ in traditional Northumbrian (/faː(l)/, /draː/, /kaː(l)d/, /snaː/). At this point Northumbrian /aː/ thus had two distinct realisations, [aː] and [ɑː], the latter of which was used only before the burr. From about the turn of the twentieth century, however, the non-prevocalic burr was gradually deleted (e.g. [dɑːʁk] *dark* > [dɑːk]), and there was also a tendency to drop the intervocalic burr after long vowels (e.g. [hɑːʁən] *herring* > [hɑːən] or, with Schwa Loss, [hɑːn]). When this happened, back [ɑː] was no longer confined to pre-burr environments: it now occurred in the same phonetic contexts as front [aː] = /aː/, and contrasted with it in numerous minimal pairs (e.g. /kaːd/ *cold* • /kɑːd/ *card*, /faː/ *fall* • /fɑː/ *far*, /dʒaː/ *jaw* • /dʒɑː/ *jar*, /aːnd/ *owned* • /ɑːnd/ *errand*). Burr Deletion thus brought about a phonemic split of original /aː/: the back variant [ɑː] now acquired phonemic status, becoming a separate phoneme /ɑː/.

Front /aː/ before /r/ (in MERRY and the *dark*, *far*, *hard* set) did not undergo backing in the southwestern corner of Northumberland, where the burr was rare or absent (see 2.2f). Traditional speech in this district has /aː/ corresponding to general Northumbrian /ɑː/ and uses /oː/ in words such as *fall*, *draw* and *cold*, *snow* (see Rydland 1993: 48–50).

3.3.3 Realisational changes of /ɛ/, /a/ and /ɔ/

In modern Northumbrian, /ɛ/ and /a/ have optional variants, [æ] and [ɑ], in pre-burr environments (see 2.2a for regional variation), as in [fæʁət (~fɛʁət)] *ferret* and [bɑʁi (~baʁi)] *bury* (see Rydland 1998). These variants are clearly due to burr-conditioned lowering and backing, respectively. Pre-burr lowering of /ɛ/ and backing of /a/ can be assumed to have begun in the mid-nineteenth century, about the same time as /aː/ was retracted in the same context (see 3.3.2). Both processes appear to have been much less regular than Pre-Burr Backing of /aː/. As far as can be determined, both [æ] and [ɑ] have always had the status of optional variants, while [ɑː] soon became virtually the only possible pre-burr realisation of /aː/.

Northumbrian /ɔ/ has two main variants, back rounded [ɔ] and front (centralised) rounded [œ] (the latter is absent in certain districts; see 2.2a). Historically, [œ] is the younger of the two, having developed by fronting [ɔ] > [œ] at a date which cannot be precisely ascertained (see Rydland 1999: 13). However, the fronting appears to have been prevented, or at least impeded, by a following burr. In SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY, Northumbrian /ɔ/ is predominantly realised as [ɔ] in pre-burr contexts, while [œ] is common in forms with alveolar /r/; thus [hɔʁi], [hœɹi] *hurry* (but see 2.2a). The same is the case in other words with /ɔ/ before /r/, such as *borrow*, *porridge*. Since [ɔ] is the original form, it may be assumed that the effect of the burr on the realisation of /ɔ/ was not to cause retraction of an existing front vowel (compare /a/ > [ɑ]), but rather to preserve the original back variant [ɔ].

3.3.4 Minor changes

Under this heading I shall comment briefly on the sporadic development of Northumbrian /ʊ/ in a few words belonging to SPIRIT and MERRY.

In SPIRIT, /ʊ/ is attested only in the word *squirrel*. The modern /ʊ/-form does not derive from the infrequent Middle English variants in /ʊ/ (*scurel* etc.; see *Middle English Dictionary*), but no doubt arose by contextual rounding and backing of /ɪ/ after labio-velar /w/. This is in fact a common Northumbrian development, which is well documented in words such as *whip*, *whisper* and *widow* (see Wright 1905: 70; Kolb 1966: 65; Rydland 1995: 572–3, 582). The date of the change is uncertain, but the paucity of *u*-spellings in early northern sources suggests that it was relatively late in most of the words concerned.

In MERRY, /ʊ/ is found in two words with orthographic *u*, namely *bury* and the second part of the place-name *Rothbury* (probably < Middle English *-bery*; see Mawer 1920: 169), each of which has one /ʊ/-form in the material. Since /ʊ/ is highly unlikely to derive from any of the earlier Northumbrian vowels of MERRY, the two /ʊ/-forms are best explained as occasional spelling pronunciations, both of which are probably of recent origin.

3.4 Retention of Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/, /ʊ/

In spite of the various historical developments which have occurred in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY, the original Middle English vowels in some cases survive in modern Northumbrian with little or no change. Thus it is a fair assumption that modern /ʊ/ in WORRY descends directly from Middle English /ʊ/. Modern /ɪ/ in SPIRIT and /ɛ/ in MERRY, too, are likely to be continuations of the corresponding Middle English vowels, though some examples of /ɪ/ and /ɛ/ in these sets may be standardised forms, which are likely to be fairly recent innovations. The preservation of Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/ in the face of a number of phonological processes was made possible by the fact that the changes concerned did not take place regularly, so that the input vowels survived in at least some forms of Northumbrian speech (see e.g. 3.1.1–2, 3.2.1–3).

4. *Summary and conclusions*

This paper has tracked the Northumbrian development of Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/ before intervocalic /r/ in the lexical sets SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY. It has been shown that all three vowels have been subject to substantial changes in the history of Northumbrian. The first changes occurred in late Middle English, and include Early Lowering (3.1.1), Later Lowering (3.1.2) and sporadic raising of /ɛ/ (3.1.3). The early Modern English period saw three major developments: the First Merger (3.2.1), the Second Merger (3.2.2), and lowering and unrounding of /ʊ/ (3.2.3). These were followed in the nineteenth century by Pre-/r/ Lengthening (3.3.1), Pre-Burr Backing of /aː/ (3.3.2), realisational modifications of /ɛ/, /a/, /ɔ/ (3.3.3) and various minor changes (3.3.4). The most recent developments are Burr Deletion and the accompanying phonemicisation of back [ɑː], which seem to have begun about 1900 (3.3.2). Together, these changes account for the vast majority of the modern Northumbrian vowels in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY. The exceptions are modern /ɪ/ in SPIRIT, /ɛ/ in MERRY and /ʊ/ in WORRY, which continue the Middle English ancestral vowels (see 3.4).

Some of the Northumbrian changes in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY are described here for the first time. The most important of these are the First Merger, Pre-/r/ Lengthening, the emergence of

/ɑː/ by Pre-Burr Backing and Burr Deletion,[5] and the various burr-conditioned modifications of /ɛ/, /a/, /ɔ/. The identification and description of these changes are based entirely on data from the modern Northumbrian dialects.

Most of the vowel changes in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY can be attributed to the influence of the intervocalic /r/. Surprisingly, few of the changes seem to have been conditioned specifically by the Northumbrian Burr. The only certain exception is the recent Pre-Burr Backing of /aː/. In addition, the Northumbrian Burr may have been the precipitating factor in the First Merger, that is, the early Modern English development of Northumbrian /ɔ/ from earlier /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/.

As far as can be decided, all the modern Northumbrian vowels of SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY have developed by native phonological processes. There may have been some influence from other northern dialects (see 3.2.2), but hardly any from Standard English.

I have emphasised throughout that the Northumbrian vowel changes in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY did not occur with complete regularity. As a consequence, the input vowels did not disappear, but continued to be used alongside the new vowels. The inconsistent nature of the changes is the principal reason for the great variety of vowels in SPIRIT, MERRY and WORRY in the modern Northumbrian dialects. Moreover, the Northumbrian development of Middle English /ɪ/, /ɛ/ and /ʊ/ in these lexical sets is a good example of the linguistic variability which must have characterised the past states of many non-standard dialects.

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[5] The development /a/ > /aː/ > /ɑː/ before *non-prevocalic* /r/ is discussed in Rydland 1993.

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Causal Subordination in English and Norwegian

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1 Aim

Causal relations are central to the way humans perceive and interpret the interplay between states of affairs in the everyday world. This is revealed in the multitude of forms the expression of a causal relationship can take in different languages.

The purpose of the present article, which is based on my MA thesis (see Meier 2001), is to compare and contrast causal linkage in a corpus material of original and translated English and Norwegian texts. The main focus is on the various correspondences of English causal subordinators in Norwegian, and the correspondences of Norwegian causal subordinators in English; in other words, what happens when the causal links are translated from one language into the other? More specifically, I aim to answer the following questions:

- How is the causal link represented in translation?
- To what extent is the syntactic construction and causal ordering of the original text retained in translation, and what contextual factors intervene to bring about changes?
- To what extent do the causal links differ with respect to the sequencing of causal members, information structure, and their ability to express indirect reason?

2 Material and method

In order to allow for a proper treatment of the examples analysed, the scope of the study has been restricted to cases where the causal relation is explicitly realised by a subordinator. More specifically, I will compare the English causal subordinators *because*, *since* and *as* with the Norwegian causal subordinators *fordi*, *siden* and *ettersom*. Other possible forms of causal linkage will be discussed to the extent that they appear as correspondences of the causal subordinators in the translated texts. All examples with *since* (115), *as* (56), *siden* (44) and *ettersom* (12) found in the corpus original texts have been included in the study. Of the 547 *because*-clauses and 423 *fordi*-clauses found, a representative subset of 100 examples of each type has been included. Regrettably, the Norwegian subordinator *da* is not included in the study. As will be shown later, it proved to be much more frequent as a correspondence of the English subordinators than was originally believed.

The examples used in this study are taken from the English-Norwegian Parallel Corpus (ENPC) (see Appendix and http://www.hf.uio.no/iba/prosjekt/ for more information). The ENPC is a 2.6-million-word computer corpus of English and Norwegian text samples with their translations to the other language. 30 original fiction samples and 20 original non-fiction samples in English and Norwegian are included, each containing 10,000-15,000 words. The texts are aligned so that each orthographic sentence, or s-unit, in the original text is paired with the equivalent s-unit in the translated text. This allows for easy identification of correspondences across the languages.

Comprising both original and translated texts in English and Norwegian, the ENPC can be employed in several different types of studies. In addition to various types of translation studies, the corpus can be used for contrastive studies based on parallel original texts, as well as contrastive studies based on the original texts and their translations (Johansson and Ebeling 1996, 4). As a basis for contrastive studies, the corpus is a good source for establishing cross-linguistic equivalence, since it relies not so much on the analyst's subjective intuition as on the combined judgements of a range of language-users, as revealed by the choices made in translation. In this study of causal expressions I have compared English and Norwegian original texts with their corresponding translations.

The methodological approach taken in the study is that of contrastive analysis (CA). Briefly defined, CA can be said to be "a systematic comparison of the linguistic systems of two or more languages" (Ringbom 1997, 737). Traditionally a method used for predicting learner difficulties in second language acquisition, in areas where languages differ markedly (cf. James 1980), contrastive analysis has been increasingly used for more theoretical work and as a means of uncovering language-specific characteristics that are not as easily discovered in monolingual studies.

A central problem in CA is how to compare languages that might be divergent in ways we are yet unaware of. There is a need for some sort of cross-linguistic constant to ensure that the objects juxtaposed in the investigation are comparable. In this study, comparability is established on the basis of translation equivalence. Following Ebeling, we can say that "if two constructions [...] are the most frequent translations of each other, then they are the closest equivalents in the two languages in the text types represented in the corpus" (Ebeling 1999, 22).

3 Theoretical background

3.1 Causal relations

As a working definition for this study, a causal relation will be said to exist between two states of affairs when the occurrence of one state of affairs, henceforth referred to as the cause, is perceived by the speaker/writer as leading to the occurrence of another state of affairs, henceforth referred to as the result. The cause and the result will both be referred to as members of the causal relationship.

As Altenberg (1984, 20) has shown, the En glish language allows for the members of the causal relation to be encoded as phrases, subordinate clauses, or as independent clauses. The following examples will serve to illustrate this:

3.1 *Because of* the rain, the leaves of the shrub are wet.

3.2 *Because* it has been raining, the leaves of the shrub are wet.

3.3 It has been raining. *Therefore* the leaves of the shrub are wet.

In the above examples, the causal relation has been explicitly marked, through a prepositional construction (3.1), a subordinator (3.2) or a cohesive adverb (3.3). Altenberg refers to this linguistic marker as a "causal link" (1984, 21). In some cases, the causal link is integrated into the main clause structure itself (clause-integrated linkage), as in 3.4, where the causal link is realised as the subject in a copular construction.

3.4 Next, for her own good, Marie-Louise demanded that her daughter jump to the floor from a table, several times. *The only result* was exhaustion and despair in the victim. (RDA1)

Verbs may also serve as causal links:

3.5 She *caused* his death.

Norwegian and English have very similar inventories of causal links available to the speaker/writer. Some differences do exist, however. In English, cohesive adverbials can only be used to link two causal members in cause-result order, as in example 3.3 above. By contrast, Norwegian has a cohesive adverb, *nemlig*, which allows independent clauses to be linked causally in result-cause order:

3.6 Bladene på busken er våte. Det har *nemlig* regnet.
[The leaves of the shrub are wet. It has (nemlig) been raining.]

A further formal difference between English and Norwegian concerns the cognate pairs *so/så* and *for/for*. Whereas *for* and *så* are seen as coordinators in Norwegian, the English *so*, while proving notoriously difficult to classify, is most often seen as an adverb, and *for* is usually included among the subordinators (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 928).

Although the causal relation may be signalled by a causal link, the causal relation in itself is a semantic relation between propositions, and needs not be overtly marked (Altenberg 1984, 21). In the following examples, the causal relation is implied through coordination (3.7) and juxtaposition (3.8):

3.7 It has been raining, *and* the leaves of the shrub are wet.

3.8 It has been raining. The leaves of the shrub are wet.

Finally, the ordering of the causal members may be varied (Altenberg 1984, 21). The cause may precede the result, as shown above, or the result may precede the cause.

3.9 The leaves of the shrub are wet *because* it has been raining

Similarly, both the reason and the result clause may be marked for subordination.

3.10 It has been raining, *so* the leaves of the shrub are wet.

Causal relations, besides having a wide variety of possible formal realisations, also bear affinity with several other types of semantic relationships that can hold between clauses. I will not go into detail on this point here, but the following examples are meant to serve as an illustration.

Causal vs. temporal relation (ambiguous)

3.11 He found his fellow conscripts charming (his favourite adjective), and, *as* he listened to their plans for the future, he began to dwell on the possibility of making plans of his own. (AB1)

Causal (a) vs. purposive (b) relation

3.12a He left both doors open, *so* he heard her when she called last night.

3.12b He left both their doors open, *so that* he could hear her if she called in the night. (AB1)

Causal (a) vs. conditional (b) relation

3.13a When he got back it was to hear Mrs Lessner's rather petulant voice: "*Since* the police are mixed up in this they must think poor Brandt's dead."

3.13b When he got back it was to hear Mrs Lessner's rather petulant voice: "*If* the police are mixed up in this they must think poor Brandt's dead." (EG2T)

Causal (a) vs. concessive (b) relation

3.14a They cannot have been flesh and blood, *since* they lived God knows how long ago.

3.14b They must have been flesh and blood, *even though* they lived God knows how long ago. (ABR1)

3.2 Reason clauses and information structure

Previous linguistic work on the use of causal links has shown that the information value of the reason clause influences both its position in relation to its associated main clause, and the choice of the introductory causal link itself (Altenberg 1984, 54-55, Vandepitte 1993, 87). Central in this respect is the perceived dichotomy between given and new information.

Several attempts have been made to arrive at a definition of given and new information. Usually, these terms have been defined in psychological and cognitive terms. Chafe focuses on the notion of consciousness. He claims that

> Given (or old) information is that knowledge which the speaker assumes to be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterance. So-called new information is what the speaker assumes he is introducing into the addressee's consciousness by what he says. (Chafe 1976, 30)

Halliday takes a somewhat weaker stance. Given information does not have to be in the consciousness of the listener at the time of speaking; it is presented by the speaker/writer as being "recoverable" to the listener, either from the preceding discourse, or from the extralinguistic situation. Or it may be "something that is not around at all but that the speaker wants to present as given for rhetorical purposes" (Halliday 1994, 298). New, or non-recoverable, information may be previously unmentioned, or "something unexpected, whether previously mentioned or not" (Halliday 1994, 298).

The notion of recoverability is reminiscent of the idea of "manifestness" advanced by Sperber and Wilson:

> A fact is *manifest* to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true.

And:

> To be manifest, then, is to be perceptible or inferable. (Sperber and Wilson 1986, 39)

Vandepitte expounds on this idea of manifestness, claiming that the speaker/writer will assess to what extent a fact or assumption is manifest to the listener before making an utterance (1993, 88). In other words, the givenness, or manifestness, of the facts presented in an utterance can be said to be listener-oriented, but speaker-selected (Halliday 1994, 298).

Although the representations of givenness and manifestness given by Halliday, Vandepitte and Sperber and Wilson seem similar in nature, they differ with respect to the entities to which their distinctions apply.

Certain writers, such as Chafe and Halliday, focus on the distinction between new and given elements within information units, i.e. the information value of lexical units like nouns and verbs. On the other hand, Sperber and Wilson, as well as Vandepitte, apply the distinction between new and given information to what they speak of as facts or assumptions, i.e. the proposition underlying a clause or sentence. In other words, in a sentence like *I saw your father yesterday*, the main point is not whether *your father* is assumed to be familiar to the listener, but whether the whole clause proposition *saw your father yesterday* can be considered new. The new information is not conveyed by the lexical units alone, but by the relationship between them (Krogsrud 1980, 22).

In the present study, I follow Vandepitte and Sperber and Wilson, and apply the distinction between given and new information to causal clause propositions, and not their lexical clause elements.

3.3 Position and information structure

Although various factors intervene in the linear arrangement of a text, most linguists agree that in its basic, or unmarked, form a text unfolds

> by proceeding sequentially from the known ('given') to the unknown ('new'), thus forming a chain in which what was unknown becomes the known point of departure towards a further unknown item. (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 1430)

Quirk *et al.* refer to this tendency as the Principle of End Focus, noting that "it is common to process the information in a message so as to achieve a linear presentation from low to high information value" (1985, 1357). A full treatment of this topic falls outside the scope of this study, but in short, the prediction can be made that, in most cases, given reason clauses will occur in initial position, and clauses presenting new information will be found in final position.

3.4 Direct and indirect reason

Clauses of reason usually express a direct causal relationship between the two causal members in the subordinate clause and the main clause:

3.15 My bank account is empty *because* I spent all my money.

The reason clause *because I spent all my money* gives the direct reason for the phenomenon expressed in the main clause. Vandepitte refers to this as a formal causal relation, "in which the propositional forms of the sentences are causally related" (Vandepitte 1993, 115).

In contrast, reason clauses may also express an indirect causal relationship, where "the reason is not related to the situation in the matrix clause but is a motivation for the implicit speech act of the utterance" (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 1104):

3.16 My bank account is empty, *because* I checked it this morning.

Here the reason clause does not provide the actual reason why *my bank account is empty*. The bank account did not suddenly become empty just because I checked it. Rather, the reason clause gives the reason why the speaker/writer can <u>know</u> or <u>say</u> that the bank account is empty. In other words, the propositional forms of the reason and the result clause are no longer causally related.

Vandepitte refers to indirect causal relations as an attitudinal causal relations, claiming that what is conveyed is the relation between a cause and an implicit expression of the speaker/writer's propositional attitude (Vandepitte 1993, 115). The speaker/writer's propositional attitude is "the extent to which a speaker regards a given state of affairs as true or desirable" (Hasselgård 1995, 125). In example 3.16, the reason clause justifies the speaker/writer's belief that his bank account is empty. By rewriting this as a direct causal relation, and thus explicitly expressing the speaker/writers's propositional attitude, we can bring the underlying causal relationship into the open:

3.17 *I know* that my bank account is empty *because* I checked it this morning.

Vandepitte divides the attitudinal causal relations into two categories, depending on whether the result clause contains an implicit expression of the speaker/writer's propositional attitude of belief (as in example 3.16), or an implicit expression of the speaker/writer's propositional attitude of desire. If the result clause contains an implicit expression of the speaker/writer's propositional attitude of desire, the speaker/writer either desires to know whether something is true or not, or he desires that somebody does something. In the first case, the result clause is normally interrogative, in the latter it is usually imperative (Vandepitte 1993, 125). These two types are illustrated in 3.18 and 3.19, respectively:

3.18 *As* you're in charge, where are the files on the new project? (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 1104)

3.19 Don't think about it, *because* it's over and done with. (TH1)

4 Analysis

In this part of the study I will present the findings of my investigation of the ENPC corpus material. First, the Norwegian correspondences of *because*, *since* and *as* will be presented and discussed, and then the English correspondences of *fordi*, *siden* and *ettersom*. Next, I turn to an investigation of information structure and indirect reason, as reflected in the material.

4.1 Correspondences

In order to reveal any influence the positioning of the reason clause might have on the choice of correspondences, each subordinator type has been treated separately in initial, medial and final position in the causal clause complex.

The correspondences have been categorised according to whether they retain the causal meaning of the original link (Causal) or not (Non-Causal). Causal links are subclassified into categories based on their formal properties. Non-causal links include cases where the causal link corresponds to a link from another semantic category (e.g. temporal; cf. 3.1, above), as well as cases of zero correspondence, i.e. instances where there is no form in the translated text that corresponds to the link in the original text.

Table 1. Norwegian correspondences of *because*, *since* and *as*

Correspondence type	CAUSAL									NON-CAUSAL	
	Fordi	Siden	Ettersom	Da	Coord.	Prep.	Adv.	Clause-integr.	Verb	Other link	Zero
Because											
Initial	4									1	
Medial	1										1
Final	50	2			20	3	1	6	4	2	5
TOT	55	2			20	3	1	6	4	3	6
Since											
Initial		23	7	3	2	1				3	5
Medial			1								
Final	10	26	11		13	2	1			2	4
TOT	10	49	19	3	15	3	1			5	9
As											
Initial	2	6	6	3	2						2
Medial											2
Final	2	8	8	4	5					2	4
TOT	4	14	14	7	7					4	6
GRAND TOTAL	69	65	33	10	42	6	2	6	4	12	21

Table 1 surveys the correspondences of the English subordinators *because*, *since* and *as* in the Norwegian ENPC translations (horizontal axis), and indicates whether the original reason clause occurred in initial, medial and final position in the causal clause complex (vertical axis). Note that those instances where the part of the text containing the causal construction was left out of the translation are not included (three instances with *because* and one with *since*).

Because corresponds most frequently to the causal subordinator *fordi*. Including clause-integrated *fordi*-clauses, *because* is rendered by *fordi* in 60% of the examples analysed. The predominance of *fordi* is not surprising, as it resembles *because* in many respects. *Fordi* is the most frequent causal subordinator in Norwegian, it is stylistically unmarked, and shows roughly the same tendencies as *because* as regards position and information status (see below). It is therefore the most likely candidate for translation equivalence with *because*. In 4.1, the original clause-integrated *because*-clause corresponds to a clause-integrated *fordi*-clause in the Norwegian rendering:

4.1a "I don't see how sawdust can help you to sell second-hand cars, daddy."

"*That's because* you're an ignorant little twit," the father said. (RD1)

4.1b – Jammen jeg skjønner ikke hvorfor det er så nyttig med sagflis når du selger brukte biler, pappa. – *Det er fordi* du er en uvitende liten tufs, svarte faren.

The only other sizable correspondence type with *because* is the causal coordinator *for*, which occurs in 20% of the Norwegian translations. Faarlund *et al.* note that *for*-clauses, in contrast to clauses introduced by *fordi*, display a main clause word order pattern, and normally only contain new information (1997: 1140). This is confirmed by the ENPC results. All in all, the coordinator *for* occurs as a correspondence of *because*, *since* and *as* in 39 cases. On all occasions the original reason clause contains new information.

Teleman points out that the Swedish causal coordinator *ty*, normally replaced by *för* in spoken language, is frequently used with indirect reason (1976, 393-395). This seems to be the case with the Norwegian coordinator *for* as well. Of the 39 occurrences of *for*, 5, or 12.8%, are translations of indirect reason clauses. One example of this will be given here:

4.2a Do you ever forget about them, the parents, for a moment?

They are always there in the hesitations – whether you will obey or defy – the opinions – where did you get them from? – that decide what you're doing. *Because* even while you defy the parents, deceive them, you believe in them. (NG1)

4.2b Glemmer man sine foreldre, om bare for et eneste øyeblikk?

De er alltid tilstede enten du velger å lystre eller å trosse, i meningene dine – for hvor har du fått dem fra – som avgjør ditt valg. *For* selv når du trosser dine foreldre eller lurer dem, så har du tiltro til dem.

In 4.2b, *for* corresponds to *because* in the original text. Besides illustrating the correspondence, the above example also shows how reason clauses in some cases can be given a global, text-structuring, scope. The *because*-clause, as well as its Norwegian counterpart, seems to qualify both the rhetorical question being asked in the first sentence of the example, and the opinion or belief being expressed in the following declarative sentence.

Since is most often rendered by the causal subordinator *siden*, although there is more variation in the types corresponding to *since* than was found with *because*. *Siden* occurs in 42.6% of the translated examples. It is not surprising that *siden* is the most frequent single correspondence of initial *since*; they are similar in form, and correspond closely as markers of temporal subordination as well. Moreover, *siden* appears to be preferred as the Norwegian correspondence of *since* with indirect reason:

4.3a "*Since* you mention it, yes, I'd noticed." (AH1)

4.3b "*Siden* du nevner det... jo, jeg har lagt merke til det."

A number of instances of the subordinator *ettersom* (16.5 %) and coordinator *for* (11.3%) were also found. In 8.7% of the examples, *since* is translated by *fordi*.

As displays a highly varied pattern of correspondence. *Siden* and *ettersom* are the two dominant correspondence types, both occurring in 25% of the Norwegian translations. It should be noted though that, as correspondences of *as*, *siden* is predominantly used in fiction texts (in 12 of the 14 occurrences), whereas *ettersom* mainly occurs in non-fiction texts (in 11 of 14 cases). This might suggest that *ettersom* is somewhat more formal than *siden*. Compare:

4.4a I couldn't forewarn anyone *as* I didn't know the names, let alone the phone numbers, of the people who worked for him. (DF1)

4.4b Jeg kunne ikke varsle noen på forhånd, *siden* jeg ikke visste navnene på noen av dem som arbeidet for ham, og slett ikke telefonnumrene deres.

4.5a Pino said that he was not in a position to give details *as* he was not an official spokesman for the bank. (LT1)

4.5b Pino sa at han ikke hadde anledning til å oppgi detaljer *ettersom* han ikke var offisiell talsmann for banken.

The causal subordinator *da* is used on several occasions (12.5%), and there were also a number of occurrences of *for* (10.7%).

These are the main correspondence types found in the material. There is a lot to be said about the other, and less frequent types of correspondence, but there will be room for only a few examples here.

In the first example, the causal subordinator *because* has been rendered by a prepositional construction in the Norwegian translation, and the propositional meaning conveyed by the original *because*-clause has been encapsulated in a nominal *at*-clause:

4.6a The rich were incensed *because* they did not get their money, the poor were incensed *because* they got no land. (JH1)

4.6b De rike var opprørt *over at* de ikke fikk pengene sine, de fattige var opprørt *over at* de ikke fikk noe jord.

In the original sentence, the information conveyed in the *because*-clause is already given in the preceding context. The nominalised clause seems to make the underlying proposition more noun-like, like a thing or an already established fact. It thus appears that the givenness of the original *because*-clauses is emphasised more strongly in the Norwegian texts. A translation with an adverbial *fordi*-clause would also be possible.

The close connection between reason clauses and other adverbial clause types is seen clearly in some of the correspondences that fall within the "Other link" category. In 4.7 the *since*-clause is probably ambiguous, and can be interpreted either as a temporal clause or, as is more likely, a reason clause. The corresponding Norwegian expression *etter at* introduces a temporal clause, although a causal relationship between the two clauses is still felt to be present.

4.7a *Since* his wife had started going to evening classes, he preferred to prepare something for himself. (AB1)

4.7b *Etter at* hans kone hadde begynt å ta kveldsundervisning, foretrakk han å lage i stand noe til seg selv.

Turning now to the Norwegian subordinators, table 2 presents the correspondences of *fordi*, *siden* and *ettersom* in the English ENPC translations. Three untranslated examples with *fordi* and one with *siden* are not included.

Table 2. English correspondences of *fordi*, *siden* and *ettersom*

Correspondence type	CAUSAL							NON-CAUSAL	
	Because	*Since*	*As*	Other subordinator	Preposition	Clause-integr.	Verb	Other link	Zero
Fordi									
Initial	5			1					
Medial	1								
Final	65	2	1	4	3	8	1	3	3
TOT	71	2	1	5	3	8	1	3	3
Siden									
Initial	1	14	8	1				3	2
Final		7	2	2				3	
TOT	1	21	10	3				6	2
Ettersom									
Initial		1	1	2				1	
Final		4	1	2					
TOT		5	2	4				1	
GRAND TOTAL	**72**	**28**	**13**	**12**	**3**	**8**	**1**	**10**	**5**

Overall, there is less variation in the correspondence types than with the English subordinators. *Fordi* corresponds to a very high degree to *because* in the translated texts, with 71 occurrences. If we add to that a number of prepositional (*because of*) and clause-integrated expressions (*this is because*), different forms of *because* make up 81 % of the total correspondences of *fordi*.

In addition to *because*, a number of other subordinating expressions were found as correspondences of *fordi*, although none were very frequent. Among these are *as* (1.1%) and *since* (2.2%). *Not that* is used in two cases when the original *fordi*-clause is negated:

4.8a Med Bente begynte en ny tilværelse, forfriskende, broket og anstrengende på samme tid. Det var som det alltid sto et vindu åpent og det trakk inn. *Ikke fordi* Bente selv laget bråk – hun hører til dem som kan bo i en ryggsekk og trives. (EHA1)

4.8b With Bente there a new life began, refreshing, varied, strenuous – all at once. It was as if there were always a gust blowing through an open window. *Not that* Bente herself caused a fuss – she's the sort who can live out of a knapsack and thrive.

The small category of prepositional linking consists of three instances where *fordi* is rendered by the prepositional phrase *because of*. In all cases, the information conveyed by a full clause in the original version (*hun er syk*) has been condensed into a noun phrase in the translation (*illness*):

4.9a Hvis mor må være borte fra arbeidet *fordi* hun er syk under svangerskapet, regnes det som vanlig sykefravær. (SI1)

4.9b If the mother has to stay at home from work *because of* illness during her pregnancy, this is regarded as normal absence due to illness, and must not be reckoned as part of the leave entitlement in connection with the birth.

Interestingly, in the "Other link" category, a prepositional manner expression was also found as a correspondence of final *fordi*. Here, it seems, the manner expression renders explicit an aspect of the meaning of the original reason clause, which there is only implied. The fact that the subordinator *fordi* could easily have been replaced by the manner expression *ved at* shows just how closely these interpretations are related.

4.10a De beseiret ofte en overlegen fiende *fordi* de brukte list. (SH1)

4.10b They often defeated a superior enemy *by their cunning.*

Siden is predominantly rendered by *since* (42.6%) in the English texts. However, bearing in mind the correspondence pattern found with the English subordinators, it is not surprising that *as* occurs in a number of translations as well (22.7%).

The subordinator *in that* is used in the next example:

4.11a Nerdrums *Hermafroditt* fra 1992 er i særlig grad av interesse *siden* han her så direkte utformer en helhets- og fullkommenhetssymbolikk. (JEEH1)

4.11b Nerdrum's *Hermaphrodite* from 1992 is especially interesting *in that* he so directly develops a symbolism of wholeness and perfection here.

Besides designating a reason clause, in that signals the point of view taken by the speaker (Quirk et al. 1985, 1105). That is, Nerdrum's Hermaphrodite from 1992 is especially interesting from the point of view that he so directly develops a symbolism and perfection here. Some of the same meaning appears to be conveyed by the adverb phrase i særlig grad in the Norwegian original.

As for the "Other link" type, three conditional correspondences were found in the English translations of Norwegian *siden*. In all cases the original *siden*-clause introduces a premise for the conclusion reached in the following resultive main clause. In example 4.12a, the necessary connection between cause and result is reinforced by the addition of *så* as a marker of the resultive clause.

4.12a Da han kom inn i stuen igjen, hørte han fru Liens litt barnslige stemme: "*Siden* politiet er blandet opp i dette, *så* må dere vel tro at stakkars Brårud er død?" (EG2)

4.12b When he got back it was to hear Mrs Lessner's rather petulant voice: "*If* the police are mixed up in this they must think poor Brandt's dead."

Ettersom is the least frequent of the causal links investigated, with only 12 occurrences in the Norwegian originals. In translation, *ettersom* is most often rendered by *since* (5 examples), while *as* is found in 2 examples. In 4.13, the causal clause expresses indirect reason (belief).

4.13a Det ser ut til at nordmennene er rede for alternative løsninger, *ettersom* det planlagte antall abonnenter på senterets tjenester på 3.500 personer er nådd. (ABJH1)

4.13b It seems as if Norwegians were ready for an alternative plan *since* the full, initial quota of 3,500 subscribers was reached quickly.

In one instance, there is no overt causal marker in the translation. Instead, the causal relation is structurally marked by means of a supplementive *ing*-clause in medial position.

Since they contain no overt marker of the semantic relationship expressed, clauses of this type can be used in a variety of functions, and the specific meaning of each clause must be interpreted from its context. However, when the *ing*-participle verb is realised by a stative verb, as in the following example, the clause usually has a causal function (Quirk *et al.* 1985, 1124).

4.14a Nordmenn ønsker å leve etter idealer om sosial rettferdighet, men *ettersom* de er menneskelige, ønsker de selvsagt også å realisere sine egne individuelle mål. (ABJH1)

4.14b Norwegians want to live by socialist ideals but, *being* human, they want to fulfill their individual ambitions.

A final point should be made as regards the structural stability of the original construction in translation. This is illustrated in table 3.

Table 3. Structural stability in translation

	E→N	N→E
Syntactic construction preserved (including coordination with *for*)	80.8%	80.1%
Order of causal members preserved	99.3%	95.5%
Causal relation preserved	95.2%	95.5%

Although there is some variation, the syntactic realisation of the causal relationship is very stable across the languages. The formal difference between subordination and coordination seems to be of little importance here. It is also interesting to note that the linear ordering of the causal members found in the original texts has been preserved in an overwhelming majority of cases.

Reinforcing this image of cross-linguistic structural stability is the fact that the causal relationship as such is retained in all but a few instances. Even though a non-causal link occurs sporadically in the translated text, the causal relation is often implied even where another semantic relationship is explicitly marked. Presumably, this reflects both the importance of the causal relation in the successful processing of the text as a coherent whole, and the translators' desire to remain faithful to the content of the original text.

4.2 Information structure

The pattern of correspondences found for each link type is related to the typical position and information structure of the clauses it introduces. All original reason clauses have been categorised as given or new, taking into account both linguistic and extralinguistic information. Clauses are said to be given when they contain information that can be derived from the preceding context of the clause, either through literal repetition or paraphrase of the preceding discourse, or through implication. In addition, clauses containing situational reference, information which is shared by persons in a particular situation, or information which is assumed to be general knowledge, have been classified as given. Table 4 correlates the English causal link types with the position and information status of the reason clauses examined.

Table 4. Position and information status of *because-*, *since-* and *as-*clauses in the ENPC

Type	New	Given	TOT
Because			
Initial	3	2	5 (%)
medial	2	0	2 (%)
final	85	8	93 (%)
TOT	90 (%)	10 (%)	100 (%)
Since			
Initial	16	29	45 (39.1%)
medial	0	1	1 (0.9%)
final	48	21	69 (60%)
TOT	64 (57.7%)	51 (44.3%)	115 (100%)
As			
Initial	13	8	21 (37.5%)
Medial	1	1	2 (3.6%)
final	26	7	33 (58.9%)
TOT	40 (71.4%)	16 (28.6%)	56 (100%)

As table 4 shows, *because-*clauses occur almost exclusively in final position (93%). *Since-* and *as-*clauses show a greater propensity for initial position (39.1% and 37.5%, respectively). As for information structure, there is a relatively clear disparity between the predominantly new *because-*clauses (90%) and the more frequently given *since-* and *as-*clauses (44.3% and 28.6% given, respectively).

Altenberg, who observed the same positional tendencies in material from the London-Lund Corpus of Spoken English and the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus of British English, attributes the differences in placement to a principle of thematic ordering. *Because-*

clauses are usually asserted, and present new information. As a consequence, they are naturally more frequent in final, focused or rhematic position. *Since-* and *as-* clauses, on the other hand, typically present information that is presupposed, i.e., assumed to be known to the addressee. They therefore show a greater preference for initial placement (39.1% and 37.5%, respectively), and function as a given premise to the conclusion in the following main clause (Altenberg 1984, 54). This point is also emphasised by Krogsrud, who claims that preposed *because-*, *since-* and *as-*clauses "provide information that is assumed to be either known/given to the addressee or to have less information value than the subsequent main clause" (Krogsrud 1980, 77), thereby providing a background for the more salient main clause which follows. The correlation between position and information structure is very clear in the ENPC material. Overall, 39 out of 71 (54.8%) initial reason clauses are given, compared to only 36 of 159 (18.5%) final clauses.

Following the same procedure, all original Norwegian reason clauses in the material were marked for position and information status. The results of this survey are presented in table 5.

Table 5. Position and information status of *fordi-*, *siden-* and *ettersom-*clauses in the ENPC

Type	New	Given	TOT
Fordi			
Initial	1	5	6 (%)
Medial	1	0	1 (%)
Final	77	16	93 (%)
TOT	79 (%)	21 (%)	100 (%)
Siden			
Initial	10	20	30 (68.2%)
Final	8	6	14 (31.8%)
TOT	18 (40.9%)	26 (59.1%)	44 (100%)
Ettersom			
Initial	2	3	5 (41.7%)
Final	5	2	7 (58.3%)
TOT	7 (58.3%)	5 (41.7%)	12 (100%)

We note that *fordi*-clauses are predominantly found in final position (93%), while *ettersom*-clauses, and particularly *siden*-clauses, are much more frequent in initial position (41.7% and 68.2%, respectively).

The pattern of placement of the Norwegian causal links resembles the pattern found with the English causal links in table 4. *Fordi* and *because* are strongly right-tending (both 93% final), and *ettersom* shows roughly the same positional tendencies as *since* and *as* (39.1% and 37.5% initial, respectively).

What is interesting to note, however, is the strong inclination towards initial position found with *siden*-clauses compared to the English subordinators. Related to this is a notable tendency for *siden* to introduce given information. Of the 44 occurrences of causal *siden*-clauses in the corpus, 26 (59.1%) are given. This is considerably higher than the corresponding figures found for *since* and *as* (44.3% and 28.6%, respectively). A possible interpretation would be that *siden* has a more restricted function within the set of Norwegian causal subordinators than is the case with *since* and *as* in English, and that it is more specialised towards a thematic anchoring function within the causal clause complex.

A point should also be made as regards the information status of *ettersom*- and *fordi*-clauses. *Ettersom* shows largely the same pattern as *since* and *as*, introducing given material in 41.7% of the examples analysed.

Fordi-clauses, although predominantly new, still have a higher propensity for givenness (21%) than was found with *because* (10%). As was shown above, the Norwegian causal coordinator *for* is often found as a correspondence of *because* in clauses with new information, and it is regularly employed as a causal link in Norwegian. In an investigation of spoken Norwegian, Guldal found four times as many occurrences of *for* (591) as of *fordi* (141) (Guldal 1977, 162). The fact that as high a proportion as 21% of all *fordi*-clauses found in the corpus convey given information may indicate that *for* is preferred in place of *fordi* in many instances when the reason clause introduces new material.

4.3 Indirect reason

Following the method proposed by Vandepitte (1993, 120), all original examples in the material have been tested in order to see whether they express direct or indirect reason. For each causal relation, the following question was asked:

> *Why* + proposition expressed in the result clause?

If the question could not be answered by means of the reason clause, the propositional forms of the reason and the result clause were considered not to be causally related, and the causal relation was classified as indirect. Furthermore, all indirect clauses were subdivided according to whether the result clause was found to express an implicit propositional attitude of belief, or an implicit propositional attitude of desire (cf. 3.4 above).

During this investigation, a number of problems, both expected and unexpected, cropped up. Firstly, a number of examples proved to be impossible to classify. This was only to be expected, as Vandepitte had the same experience during her investigation (1993, 122). Of more concern was the fact that a number of occurrences, although undoubtedly showing some sort of indirect reason, did not appear to fit into the categories proposed by Vandepitte. Consider the following example:

4.15 "And *since* you inquired on my wheretos and whereabouts..."

"I did no such thing."

He continued as if she hadn't spoken, "I'm on my way to the low ground to pick me some wild herbs. And then I plans to stop by the Morgans' sugar cane field near the levee." (GN1)

This excerpt is taken from a stretch of dialogue between the two characters Butch and Mattie. Butch, who is the first speaker, uses an initial *since*-clause to justify the main clause, which follows after an interruption by Maggie. Here, the *since*-clause does not provide the reason for the claim expressed in the related clause. The reason why

Butch is *on his way to the low ground* is not that Mattie has inquired *on his wheretos and whereabouts,* which she even denies having done. The *since*-clause does not express direct reason, but it does not appear to be related to an implicit propositional attitude in the main clause either. In fact, it seems totally unrelated to the content of the second clause. Rather, the reason clause in this example serves to justify the fact that Butch is speaking at all. For another example of this type, see example 4.3 above.

All in all, six examples of this type were found in the material, and all in the English originals. Four are introduced by *since*, and one each with *because* and *as*. In this study, the examples of this type have been included among the indirect reason clauses and are referred to as the Utterance type.

In all, 37 occurrences of indirect reason were found. Ten occurrences were left undecided. The results of the survey are presented in table 6.

Table 6. Indirect reason

Type	Belief	Desire	Utterance	Total	% of link type	N
Because	2	1	1	4	4	100
As	3	1	1	5	8.9	56
Since	11	4	4	19	16.5	115
Fordi	0	0	0	0	0	100
Siden	2	3	0	5	11.4	44
Ettersom	4	0	0	4	33.3	12
TOT	22	9	6	37		

Since seems to be the preferred subordinator with indirect reason in English, with 19 instances. Of the 115 *since*-clauses in the corpus, 16.5% express indirect reason. It is interesting to note, though, that all the English subordinators can be used to express all types of indirect reason.

On the whole, the number of indirect reason clauses found is lower in the Norwegian material (5.8% of all clauses) compared to the English texts (10.3%). No occurrences of the Utterance type were found, and, interestingly, neither were any occurrences with *fordi*.

Ettersom and *siden* are the only Norwegian subordinators used with indirect reason in the material. The fact that as many as one third of the occurrences of *ettersom* in the corpus convey indirect reason suggests that this may be one of the main functions of this causal subordinator. In this respect, *ettersom* resembles the Swedish subordinator *eftersom*. Teleman *et al.* claim: "För att ange talarens skäl till att anta något eller till att utföra en viss språkhandling används hellre *eftersom* än *därför att*"[1] (Teleman *et al.* 1999, 630).

Only *siden* is used to introduce a causal relation where the result is an implicit propositional attitude of desire. All types found are illustrated below.

The result is an implicit propositional attitude of belief:

4.16 The system is not entirely failsafe, *as* ichthyologist Ted Pietsch recently found a male of one species attached to a female of a different species – a fatal mistake in evolutionary terms [...]. (SJG1)

4.17 Har man store lese- og skriveproblemer, så utfordrer jo dette oppfinnsomheten, og *ettersom* Leonardo i høy grad var en oppfinner, klarte han vel etterhvert å takle sine rent praktiske problemer. (ANR1)

The result is an implicit propositional attitude of desire:

4.18 I said, "Could you ask him to leave me a prescription somewhere, *because* I've fallen on my ankle and twisted it, and I'm running out of Distalgesic." (DF1)

4.19 Hva var det nå med dette kvinnemennesket som skulle ha den, *siden* tante Linn tok slik på vei? (KF2)

---

[1] "In order to state the speaker's reason for believing something, or for performing a certain speech act, *eftersom* is preferred to *därför att*." My translation.

The result is a justification of an utterance act:

4.20 "If you wants the bus depot, you walkin' in the wrong direction, *'cause* nobody in their right mind would be trying to walk to the train station." (GN1)

Fordi is not found with indirect reason clauses in the corpus, not even in translation. This substantiates the claim made by Guldal that, whereas *for*-clauses can express both direct and indirect reason, *fordi*-clauses are only used to express direct reason. By way of illustration, replacing *for* by *fordi* in the following examples of indirect reason would not be possible (both quoted from Guldal 1988, 137):

4.21 Da var vi i marka. En av markene. *For* det var i grunnen like mye Østmarka som Vestmarka og Nordmarka.

4.22 "Hvorfor i all verden har dere lagt til dere den tjukke fæle l-en? *For* nå kommer jeg fra Vålerenga", sa jeg, "og vi har aldri snakka på den måten, vi."

5 Conclusion

The causal clauses analysed show a remarkable structural stability in translation. In the great majority of cases, the translation preserves the syntactic construction, the order of the causal members and the causal relation. There are, however, some notable differences between the causal links in the two languages. Figures 1 and 2 attempt to capture the main correspondences graphically.

The figures help to illustrate what appears to be two somewhat different paradigms of causal conjunction, as the bulk of the causal constructions are realised by a larger set of causal conjunctions in the Norwegian translations than in the English ones. This certainly seems to give the Norwegian language-user a wider range of stylistic alternatives, but presumably also leads to a more restricted or specialised function for each of the Norwegian link types. This is seen particularly with *siden*, which is more specialised as an initial marker of background information than *since*, and with *fordi*, which, due to the availability of the causal coordinator *for*, is more restricted than *because*.

Figure 1. Norwegian correspondences of because, since *and* as



Figure 2. English correspondences of fordi, siden *and* ettersom



As for the English causal subordinators, the limited number of unmarked alternatives gives each of the three link types a somewhat wider range of typical uses. It should be noted, though, that the total number of subordinating link types found actually exceeded the number of subordinator types in the Norwegian translations. A number of types occurred in addition to *because, since* and *as*: *not that, that, now that, in that* and *with*. However, their low frequency suggests that their use is limited, and they all appear to be stylistically marked, often blending the meaning of circumstantial reason with another semantic relationship (cf. example 4.11).

The present study is limited to causal relations explicitly realised by one of the subordinators *because, since, as, fordi, siden* and *ettersom*.

In future work it would be desirable to extend the comparison to the full range of causal connectors in the two languages.

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Appendix

Primary sources

Only works cited are listed here. For a full list of the ENPC corpus texts, see the web page on http://www.hf.uio.no/iba/prosjekt/.

Fiction texts

Author Translator	Title original Title translation	Publisher original Publisher translation	Place and year of publication orig./trans.	Code
English originals:				
Brink, André Malde, Per	The Wall of the Plague Pestens mur	Faber and Faber Ltd H. Aschehoug & Co	London, 1984 Oslo, 1984	ABR1
Brookner, Anita Jahr, Mette-Cathrine	Latecomers Etternølere	Jonathan Cape Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS	London, 1988 Oslo, 1990	AB1
Dahl, Roald Dahl, Tor Edvin	Matilda Matilda	Puffin Books Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS	London, 1988 Oslo, 1989	RD1
Davies, Robertson Neshagen, Erik	What's Bred in the Bone Den gamle Adam	Penguin Books Ltd Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS	Harmondsw. 1985 Oslo, 1987	RDA 1
Francis, Dick Kolstad, Henning	Straight Dødelig arv	Michael Joseph Ltd Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS	London, 1989 Oslo, 1991	DF1
Gordimer, Nadine Bang, Karin	My Son's Story Min sønns historie	Penguin Books Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS	London, 1991 Oslo, 1991	NG1
Hailey, Arthur Seeberg, Axel S.	Strong Medicine Sterk medisin	Michael Joseph Ltd Dreyers Forlag AS	London, 1984 Oslo, 1985	AH1
Hayden, Torey Nergaard, Jan	The Sunflower Forest Solsikkeskogen	Grafton Books Hjemmets Bokforlag AS	London, 1984 Oslo, 1986	TH1
Heller, Joseph Kari & Kjell Risvik	Picture This Se det	G.P. Putnam's Sons J. W. Cappelens Forlag AS	New York, 1988 Oslo, 1989	JH1
Magorian, Michelle Jakobsen, Ole Skau	Goodnight Mister Tom Godnatt Mister Tom	Puffin Books Den norske bokklubben	London, 1981 Oslo, 1990	MM1
Naylor, Gloria	The Women of Brewster Place	Hodder & Stoughton	London, 1980	GN1

Lange, Mona	Kvinnene på Brewster Place	Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS	Oslo, 1982	
Norwegian originals:				
Faldbakken, Knut Sutcliffe, H & T. Støverud	Insektsommer Insect Summer	Gyldendal Norsk Forlag AS Peter Owen Publishers	Oslo, 1977 London, 1991	KF2
Griffiths, Ella Cowlishaw, J. Basil	Vannenken The Water Widow	Grøndahl Quartet Books Ltd	Oslo, 1977 London, 1981	EG2
Haslund, Ebba Wilson, Barbara	Det hendte ingenting Nothing Happened	H. Aschehoug & Co The Seal Press	Oslo, 1981 Seattle, 1987	EHA1
Non-fiction texts				
English originals:				
Gould, Stephen Jay Johansen, Knut	Hen's teeth and Horse's Toes Hønsetenner og hestetær	W.W. Norton & Company J. W. Cappelens Forlag AS	New York, 1983 Otta, 1995	SJG1
Timberlake, Lloyd Larsen, Finn B.	Only One Earth - Living for the Future Bare én jord - Å leve for fremtiden	BBC Books/Earthscan J. W. Cappelens Forlag AS	London, 1987 Oslo, 1987	LT1
Norwegian originals:				
Bryne, Arvid & Joan Henriksen Bryne, Arvid & Joan Henriksen	Norge fra innsiden Norway behind the Scenery	J. W. Cappelens Forlag AS J. W. Cappelens Forlag AS	Oslo, 1986 Oslo, 1986	ABJH1
Hansen, Jan-Erik E. Nichols, Francesca M.	Odd Nerdrum – malerier Odd Nerdrum – Paintings	H. Aschehoug & Co. H. Aschehoug & Co	Oslo, 1994 Oslo, 1995	JEEH1
Røsstad, Anna Zwick, Ann Clay	Leonardo da Vinci - I gåtens form Leonardo da Vinci: The Man and the Mystery	Solum Forlag AS Solum Forlag AS	Oslo, 1993 Oslo, 1995	ANR1
Statens informasjonstjeneste Statens informasjonstjeneste	Småbarnsforeldres rettigheter The Right of Parents of Small Children	Statens informasjonstjeneste Statens informasjonstjeneste	Oslo, 1994 Oslo, 1994	SI1

Evidence of Lexical Re-Borrowing in the Spoken English of First Generation Finnish-Australians

GREG WATSON

1. Introduction

Lexical borrowing from one language into another is a natural consequence of any language contact situation and has been extensively discussed. The earliest seminal work for the latter half of the previous century is that of Haugen (1950) and Weinreich (1953). Lexical borrowing occurs when a speaker needs to account for some form of semantic gap in either L1 or L2. For instance, a Finn who has emigrated to Australia will have been confronted with new cultural experiences. S/he will have promptly needed to acquire a broadened vocabulary, using words that may not have a Finnish equivalent. Hence, various words are borrowed from Australian English into the Finnish spoken at home, or with other Finnish immigrants, when discussing a particular cultural difference at hand. Equally so, Finns will bring new concepts with them that they will introduce into Australian culture. For instance, amongst English speaking people it is a little known fact that *sauna* derives from Finnish.

Instances of borrowings, where the minority language group consistently borrows from the host language group and vice versa, are well documented. However, little attention, if any, has been paid to the phenomenon of re-borrowing, where, for example, a word originally borrowed from Australian English into Finnish is then re-used (re-borrowed) in the spoken English of the Finns, albeit in a slightly different phonological and/or morphological form, when conversing with native speakers of Australian English. There have been documented cases of re-borrowing that have taken place over an extended period of time (for instance, Yiddish borrowed from Old Hebrew which was then re-borrowed back into Middle Hebrew) but no published data seems to exist which notes this behaviour during a much shorter period, within the space of 20 years or less (that is, less than one generation), which is the case with my informants. The remainder of this paper will offer a more extensive discussion of conventional borrowing before further describing the concept of re-borrowing and offering a detailed investigation into this language pattern by first generation Australian Finns who speak English.

2. Lexical borrowing

Lexical borrowing has been extensively researched in the past. Particular attention has been paid to contact situations between English and other languages. For example, work related to English in contact includes that of Stoffel (1981), who pays attention to the adaptation of loan-words from English in New Zealand Serbo-Croation; Fisiak (1985), who looks at the adaptation of English loan-words, verbs in particular, in Polish; Diensberg (1986), who examines phonological aspects of French loan-words in English; Jokweni (1992), who studies English and Afrikaans loan-words in Xhosa; Eggarter (1995), who examines the influence of English loan-words in German; and Rees-Miller (1996), who investigates morphological adaptations of English loan-words in Algonquian.

Apart from English, much work has also been conducted in other areas of language contact. Schogt (1987) is interested in the integration and adaptation of foreign loan-words in Dutch; Evans (1992) looks at how Macassan words have found their way into the native Australian Aboriginal languages of the north of Australia; and Pavlou (1993) examines how semantic shift has taken place in a number of originally Turkish origin words in Cypriot-Greek. He classifies these words of Turkish origin into three categories. (1) Culturally borrowed, those that introduce a new concept into Cypriot-Greek and have no purely Greek equivalent; (2) doublets, those words which are used in Cypriot-Greek as synonyms for Greek words and (3), those words which have undergone a change in definition, most often resulting in a narrower meaning than the original meaning. Baldi (1995) examines Arabic loans in Yoruba; Milani (1996) looks at the role of morphological and phonological adaptation among North American people of Italian origin; and Shi (1997) investigates loan-words in the Chinese Sui language.

The typology of lexical borrowing is a complex matter. In the most straightforward of cases a word is borrowed as a whole unit, both morphologically and phonologically. But borrowing is not always this simple. For instance, one important distinction can be made between *imported* borrowings and *substituted* borrowings. An imported borrowing entails bringing a particular pattern into the language. Substitution involves replacing part of a loan-word from another language with a native pattern of the recipient language.

(1) Menen *shoppinki* ostamaan vähän *appelsia*[1].

(I'm going shopping to buy some apples.)

In (1) we see quite a complex example of borrowing in the Finnish language. Both *shoppinki* and *appelsia* are English loan-words and both are instances of importation. However, within these importations we can also see that substitution has taken place. Changes have occurred. The participle *-ing* in shopp**ing** has been phonologically and morphologically transformed to shopp**inki** and the English plural *-s* in apple**s** has been changed to the Finnish singular partitive case in appels**ia**.

By using the distinction between importation and substitution Haugen (1950) devised other structuralist definitions of different types of borrowings. He, along with Appel and Muysken (1987,

[1] This example was given to me by Deborah Ruuskanen, Helsinki University. One anonymous reviewer points out that the standard Finnish expression would be *menen ostamaan* (I am going shopping to buy…) and the *-ia* ending added to the English plural form appels could also be a plural rather than a singular form (cf. *Omen-ia* 'apples'). In both instances, there appears a double marking for what the speaker is trying to say. This could be interpreted in two ways. Either we have a speaker of English whose command is only limited, or a speaker who is consciously code-switching using foreign words for particular effects. The author tends to think it is the former.

165) and Lehiste (1988), differentiates between *loan-words*, *loanblends* and *loanshifts*. A loan-word entails morphemic importation without substitution. This is the most typical, and simplest, kind of borrowing. However, this category can be further sub-divided between cases where there has been substitution at the phonemic level and those where there has not.

(2) From the Norwegian name Quisling we have acquired *quisling*, which means collaborator with an occupying enemy power.

(3) From Hindi we have borrowed *coolie*, which means labourer performing extremely hard physical work under conditions of exploitation.[2]

Loanblends, however, entail both morphemic substitution and importation. Lehiste (1988, 21) refers to these as "hybrids". "These arise when several processes apply at the same time: a loan morpheme may be filled into native models, one element of a compound may be imported and so on" (Lehiste 1988, 21).

(4) Speaker 1: Ja sitte tuolla, missä nuo miehet istuu?

(And then there, where those men are sitting?)

Speaker 2: Aa, istumaruuma.

(Ah, sitting-room.)[3]

(5) Ground floor in Pennsylvanian German becomes *Grundfloor*, and plum pie becomes *Blaumepai*. (Lehiste 1988, 21).

The use of *istumaruuma* in (4) is an interesting example of hybriding. The latter part of the compound, *ruuma*, is an established loan from the English *room*. *Istuma* is an obvious loan translation from the English word *sitting* (istua = to sit). This compound

[2] Source: Lehiste (1988, 19-20).

[3] Souce: Määttänen and Nissi (1994, 109).

appears to have become established in American Finnish, along with its companion word *istumahuone* (huone = room). The correct Finnish word for sitting-room is *olohuone*. Virtaranta (1992, 73-74) expands further upon this.

With loanshifts it is only the meaning which is imported, the forms remain native. Loanshifts are also referred to as *literal translations* by Tarone (1983, 62) and Pietilä (1989, 138). Määttänen and Nissi (1994) refer to them as *loan translations*. Lehiste (1988, 20) refers to them as *calques*. For example, the German *Wolkenkratzer*, French *gratte-ciel*, and Spanish *rasca-cielos* are all based on the English word *sky-scraper* (Appel & Muysken 1988, 165). Sometimes there can be a slight shift in the meaning or then additional meaning might be attributed to the new loanshift. For example, in Finnish the meaning for computer has been adopted but translated into Finnish as *tietokone*, (which literally translates into *knowledge machine*). Equally so for aeroplane, which has become *lentokone* (*flying machine*) and washing machine which is referred to as *pesukone* (*washing machine*).

(6) *Livraria* in American Portuguese means library rather than bookstore. The original Portuguese for library is *biblioteca*. (Lehiste 1988, 20).

Appel and Muysken (1987, 165) discuss the distinction, first raised by Albó (1970), between *substitution* and *addition* of vocabulary. It is substitution if the borrowed item is used for a concept which already exists in the culture, but it is addition if the borrowed item is used to express a new concept.

(7) Jos olette *ympärillä*, tule kaffille.

(If you are *around* come and have coffee.)[4]

In (7) we see an example of substitution. The English word *around* has several meanings, one being *nearby* or *in the vicinity*. However, in Finnish *ympärillä* has a more restricted meaning, (it is a preposition which literally means "wrapped around something") yet, in this instance the meaning has been extended to include the more

[4] Source: Määttänen and Nissi (1994, 110)

abstract English understanding of the word. Another example of substitution comes from the French *cul-de-sac*, which is often used in preference to *no through road*, or *dead end* because *cul-de-sac* is perceived to be more prosaic in form.

The borrowed item *sauna* is an example of semantic addition to the English language. In English we had no other word to adequately describe this concept. In this we see a typical case of addition being used to express a new concept for the recipient culture found borrowing the word. Yet another example of *addition* borrowing from Finnish is *kantele*, which is a special musical instrument akin to a harp. Other, more common, sources of addition often come from food. English has borrowed heavily in this semantic field. For instance, *espresso*, *cappuccino*, *pizza*, *camembert* and *brie* are all well-known cases of borrowed words from other languages. They are also all cases of addition. Other examples of more established, hence usually less recognised, loans include *tulip* (Turkish), *sky* (Scandinavian) and *yacht* (Dutch).

To this point, I have only concentrated upon typology but we also need to consider other factors when discussing lexical borrowing, such as the social and cultural determinants of borrowing and grammatical constraints. Weinreich (1953) provides several reasons why words may be borrowed: (1) cultural influence; (2) rare native words are lost and replaced by foreign words; (3) two native words sound so much alike that replacing one by a foreign word resolves potential ambiguities; (4) there is a constant need for synonyms of affective words that have lost their expressive force; (5) through borrowing, new semantic distinctions may become possible; (6) a word may be taken from a low-status language and used perjoratively; and, (7) a word may be introduced almost unconsciously, through intensive bilingualism (Appel & Muysken 1987, 165-166).

In relation to grammatical constraints, general consensus has it that certain categories of the lexicon are more easily and frequently borrowed than others. Sanskritist William Dwight Whitney (1881) suggested the following hierarchy:

(9) Nouns - other parts of speech - suffixes - inflection - sounds

Haugen (1950) elaborated upon this with his work with Norwegian immigrants in the United States:

(10) Nouns - verbs - adjectives - adverbs - prepositions - interjections - ...

Yet others devised slightly different but still comparable hierarchies. Singh (1982), who studied English borrowings in Hindi, arrived at the following:

(11) Nouns - adjectives - verbs - prepositions

And Muysken (1981) arrived at the following from his work with Spanish borrowings in Quechua:

(12) Nouns - adjectives - verbs - prepositions - co-ordinating conjunctions - quantifiers - determiners - free pronouns - clitic pronouns - subordinating conjunctions

As Appel and Muysken (1987) point out, it is difficult to make conclusive observations from the above studies, due, predominantly, to the different typologies at hand. Certain languages use different elements of language in different quantities. They claim that the most important reason for borrowing "is to extend the referential function of a language... Since reference is established primarily through nouns, these are the elements borrowed most easily" (Appel and Muysken 1987, 171).

Appel and Muysken (1989) make an interesting distinction between paradigmatic and syntagmatic coherence as being important to the form of switching and borrowing which may take place:

> Paradigmatic coherence is due to the tightness of organisation of a given subcategory: the pronoun system is tightly organised, and it is difficult to imagine English borrowing a new pronoun to create a second person dual in addition to second person singular and plural.

> For this reason determiners, pronouns, demonstratives, and other paradigmatically organised words are rarely borrowed. Syntagmatic coherence has to do with the organisation of the sentence: a verb is more crucial to that organisation than a noun, and perhaps therefore it is harder to borrow verbs than nouns. (Appel and Muysken 1987, 172)

Thus far, I have only paid attention to "conventional" borrowing, but what of re-borrowing? Put simply, my discussion of all forms of conventional borrowing, to this point, has entailed the taking of a word from Language A and the use of this word in Language B. However, with re-borrowing, in a language contact environment, we see this process extended yet another step. The minority language borrows a word from the target language (e.g., an immigrant Finnish speaker borrows an Australian English word) but this same word, or a very close derivative of it (that is, in a slightly different phonological and/or morphological state[5]), then re-emerges in a re-borrowed form back into the target language, as spoken by the minority group (that is, the Australian English spoken by Finnish immigrants). The re-borrowed word may have changed in meaning during this process, or then it may not. In addition, successful communication will depend upon the listener's interpretation of the re-borrowed word. If that listener is a native speaker of Australian English and the re-borrowed word has changed too dramatically from its original form (be it phonologically or morphologically) communication may break down. If the listener is a fellow immigrant Finn s/he is probably aware of this usage and feels comfortable with it.

To date there appears to be no published data on the phenomenon of re-borrowing. Extract 13 depicts one example of this form of speech.

[5] It is this different phonological and /or morphological state which alerts the listener to the peculiarity of the usage.

(13) that the surgical team is waiting and ready, if anything goes wrong they put a, put straight away in to the operation **theatteri** and, we, I thi..., I think I was within 5 minutes I was underneath when ah, under the [anaesthetic].......... (FAEC 1A54)[6]

Firstly, note that the word *theatteri* has been spoken here in a compromised form, with a combined phonology, beginning with the English |θ| but concluding with Finnish phonology and Finnish stress. Secondly, note that the equivalent Finnish word *teatteri* (a loan-word in itself) is normally only used in the context of staged theatre when spoken in Finnish. The appropriate Finnish word in the above context is *leikkauspöytä* (operating table), or *leikkaussali* (operating room). So, what does one label this? On the surface it may appear to be a nonce (for it to be a nonce it needs to be a Finnish word being used under recipient language (RL) grammatical conditions), but the Finnish word in question is actually inappropriate should it have been used in Finnish discourse. Is it, then, an integrated loan? If deemed so, it is not fully established in the recipient language, at least not phonologically. It is also quite unusual to be using an English word as an integrated loan when English is the recipient language.

However, there is at least one possible explanation for this interpretation. If *theatteri* is used as a loan word, perhaps even an integrated loan, in the Australian Finnish of the discourse community of this speaker, it would go some way to explaining its presence and the unusual phonology in the Finnish Australian English discourse. That is, perhaps it has been re-borrowed back into this example of Finnish Australian English[7].

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[6] FAEC = Finnish Australian English Corpus. See Watson (1996) for full description.

[7] However, I have found no collaboration for this point within the FAEC, that is, I cannot categorically claim that the use of *theatteri* is common among Finnish Australian. This would require further investigation involving a separate study which would try to elicit this language in natural discourse. If this would prove to be the case, it would add credence to my claim. This same logic also applies to all other examples of re-borrowing within this paper. At present, there appear to be no common items amongst my informants.

The following section will propose a methodology for exploring and categorising this phenomenon more closely.

3. *Methodology*

The method of classification proposed below was applied to the Finnish Australian English Corpus (FAEC), which contains a total of 120 recorded interviews. Of these there are 60 1As (first generation Finns), 30 1Bs (children of that first generation) and 30 2NDs (second generation Finns born in Australia). All 60 first generation interviews have been fully transcribed and digitised. Both sexes are equally represented in this generational group. All interviews were conducted by a native Australian. Watson (1996) presents a more detailed description of the FAEC.

This paper is primarily concerned with the spoken English of first generation Finnish emigrants living in Australia, that is, the 1A group. Each interview consists of approximately 6,000 words. Hence, the total, approximate size of the corpus being examined here is 360,000 words. A computer search of this corpus isolated all instances of Finnish. Any instances of Finnish which may have been inadvertently initiated or prompted by the interviewer were disregarded. I also disregarded other cases where the speakers referred to proper nouns for which there are no English equivalents. For example, the following refers to a type of Finnish folk dance:

(1) And quite a few of them haven't been there before so they want to learn little of **Jenkka** and these Finnish dances before we go.

(FAEC 1A53)

The remaining instances were then classified as either code-changes, code-mixes, nonce loans or integrated loans according to the criteria presented in Watson (1999), see this for a detailed discussion of code-switching and borrowing amongst first generation Finnish Australians. However, not all instances neatly fitted this system of classification. It is these outstanding instances, which eluded initial classification, that this paper is predominantly most interested in.

All samples were cross-checked by a Finnish assistant. After this initial search, all findings were then sub-classified according to gender. Other extralinguistic criteria, such as social network membership, age, ethnic identity, reported bilingual ability, educational level and age of L2 acquisition, are virtually homogenous for this group under study, hence sub-classification according to these criteria would prove fruitless. As a group, the Finnish immigrants under study all arrived in Australia in their late 20s to mid 30s during the 1960s and 1970s (their mean age upon arrival was 30 and their current mean age is 59), they interact at all social levels with other Finns, identify strongly with the local Finnish community and Finland, and recognise that their fluency is not equal to that of *balanced bilinguals*, most having not known English at all upon arrival to Australia. Collectively, most of the informants have had no further schooling than lower secondary school.

Apart from studying the frequency of occurrence of these instances of re-borrowing and their distribution between the sexes, the next most likely area of investigation pertains to the grammatical categories that these instances fall into and the related question of whether there is paradigmatic or syntagmatic coherence present. The following section presents the results for these areas of investigation.

4. Results

Table 1: Total number of re-borrowings.

% of informants who re-borrowed	Total no. Of re-borrowings
20%	65

Table 2: Gender distribution of re-borrowing.

	No. Of informants who re-borrowed	% of total re-borrowing
Male	8	49.2%
Female	4	50.8%

Table 3: Distribution of re-borrowing for male informants.

Informant	Instances of reborrowing	% of total no.
Male 1	6	9.3
Male 2	1	1.5
Male 3	1	1.5
Male 4	1	1.5
Male 5	20	30.9
Male 6	1	1.5
Male 7	1	1.5
Male 8	1	1.5

Table 4: Distribution of re-borrowing for female informants.

Informant	Instances of re-borrowing	% of total no.
Female 1	29	44.8
Female 2	1	1.5
Female 3	1	1.5
Female 4	2	3

Table 5: Grammatical classification of re-borrowings.

		Overall total	% of total no.
Nouns	Male 26		
	Female 12	38	58.6%
Verbs	Male 5		
	Female 13	18	27.7%
Pronouns	Male 0		
	Female 5	5	7.7%
Adjectives	Male 1		
	Female 2	3	4.5%
Prepositions	Male 0		
	Female 1	1	1.5%

Table 6: Distribution of grammatical classifications for male informants.

Informant	Nouns	Verbs	Pronouns	Adjectives	Prepositions
Male 1	3	3	0	0	0
Male 2	1	0	0	0	0
Male 3	1	0	0	0	0
Male 4	0	1	0	0	0
Male 5	19	0	0	1	0

Male 6	0	1	0	0	0
Male 7	1	0	0	0	0
Male 8	1	0	0	0	0

Table 7: Distribution of grammatical categories for female informants.

Informant	Nouns	Verbs	Pronouns	Adjectives	Prepositions
Female 1	10	12	5	1	1
Female 2	1	0	0	0	0
Female 3	0	1	0	0	0
Female 4	1	0	0	1	0

Fig. 1: Overall distribution of grammatical categories.



Fig. 2: Distribution of grammatical categories according to gender.



5. Discussion

Table 1, Total number of re-borrowings, indicates that of the 60 informants studied, examples of re-borrowing were found with 12 of them. Hence, twenty percent of the informants had re-borrowed. This tends to suggest that the use of re-borrowed words among this generational group is not simply a random act. In all, there were 65 separate instances of re-borrowing but they were not evenly distributed. Some individuals had a greater propensity to re-borrow than others.

Table 2, Gender distribution of re-borrowing, shows us that of the 12 informants, 8 were male and 4 female. This initially suggests that men re-borrow more often than women. However, the 4 women accounted for 33 separate instances of re-borrowing, that is 50.8% of the total data, whereas the men accounted for the remaining 49.2%. Hence, it seems that, on average, although fewer women re-borrow, when they do so they tend to re-borrow more frequently than men.

As we examine the distribution of re-borrowing amongst the male and female informants (see Tables 3 and 4), certain patterns arise. As previously stated, women tend to borrow, on average, more frequently than men, 8.25 instances to 4 instances respectively. A ratio just over 2:1. However, most of the informants (66.66%) re-borrowed infrequently. Of the twelve who did re-borrow, eight re-borrowed only once. The remaining four individuals accounted for 88% of the data. Male informant no. 5 and female informant no. 1 re-borrowed most heavily. The following extracts offer some examples from these two very interesting cases.

(1) (Okay, so how did you get over this homesickness?) Um, it just ***weari***[8] away. I won't go to the Finland now. (FAEC 1A1, female no. 1)

[8] Note that the pronunciation of my informants' Finnish Australian English is very heavily influenced by their native Finnish. The phonology of their speech has not been transcribed in the FAEC. Those words emboldened within this paper have only been done so to highlight them for the point under discussion. See Watson (1996) for further information regarding the transcription process of the FAEC.

(2) Um, + it was to the ++ I had two children in Finland and I had a good [job] and ah then I fell the pregnant with my third child and um ++ I thought so that with two I can ***kouppi*** in Finland but I can not bring to the three children + up by myself. So... (FAEC 1A1, female no. 1)

(3) Um, at the time we thought so it's the time when the children were to school. We thought so that it's to the good to the children point of view and our eldest daughter start to ***lookki***, um, some help for the study for the ***kovernmentti*** and so on, we thought so that, um, we have to be in Australian citizens before then. (FAEC 1A1, female no. 1)

(4) I notice that my children need me a lot now because they have a young oneses ((SHE USES A FORM OF DOUBLE PLURAL HERE)) and I have to ***babisitti*** probably two days a week or maybe two days a fortnight or whatnever. When they need it, somebody's sick, um? (FAEC 1A1, female no. 1)

Extracts (1-4) have been taken from female informant no. 1. Of the five highlighted examples four are verbs, a fact which helps to emphasise the higher usage of verbs among my female informants, see below. All of these examples, and those below have been phonologically nativised by the informants. In relation to this shift in pronunciation, we can also see with ***weari***, ***kouppi***, ***lookki***, ***kovernmentti*** and ***babisitti*** another process taking place, that of stem formation. Most Finnish words, particularly nouns and verbs, end in a vowel so that they may be more easily inflected, Finnish being an agglutinative language. This process is clearly taking place and lends credence to my claim for the category of re-borrowing. For example, ***cope*** becomes ***kouppi*** in Australian Finnish and is then re-borrowed from Australian Finnish back into Finnish Australian English as ***kouppi***.

Extract (3), ***kovernmentti***, lends further weight to the argument that re-borrowing is taking place among the group under study. In

Australian English it is quite common in everyday speech to refer to the government, be it federal, state or local, in an off-hand, almost irreverent manner. Hence, it is fair to assume that after having lived in Australia for a fair duration the Finnish community will have started to use the word government in their Australian Finnish, rather than the correct Finnish word ***hallitus***. But they will not have done so without the use of Finnish stress, phonology and morphology, hence we arrive at ***kovernmentti***, which we then see being re-used in their Finnish Australian English.

Borrowing usually occurs when there is a lexical gap which needs to be filled. Yet, one interesting point highlighted by the examples presented, both above and below, is that the concepts being covered by the words under scrutiny are rather mundane and simple. This leads one to ask why such borrowing even takes place? Why are my informants borrowing these words into their Finnish in the first place? This question is worthy of further investigation but outside the scope of this paper, perhaps their behaviour may be linked to word frequency or phonological structure. However, regardless of why it is that they choose these words, there is still the fact that they are then re-borrowing the English loan-words back into their Finnish Australian. It also seems that they are unaware of this behaviour. It must also be noted that this type of re-borrowing does not normally take place among acrolectal bilingual speakers, it seems to be found more among basilectal speakers. This phenomenon has been noted by others as well, for example Tent (1999) has noticed similar behaviour amongst the speakers of English in Fiji. Another interesting point is that with the majority of the words under study here there appears to be no obvious shift in meaning or nuance. Yet, Tent (1999) has noticed some shift:

boss	***boso***	***boso***
English	Fijian	Fiji English
gallon	***qaloni***	***galen***

The word ***boso*** in Fijian refers to any person that you want to ingratiate yourself with, as it does in Fiji English. ***Qaloni*** means a container for liquids, as it does also in Fijian English. It could, perhaps, be argued that there have been these semantic shifts because they involve concepts that may not have existed in Fijian before contact with English, but this is only a tentative claim.

(5) We can not go back to ***Finlandia*** but I would, I, we like [just] to go for visit 'bout two, [three] month. That we like to next, next ss..., summer. (FAEC 1A51, male no. 5)

Extract (5) is from male informant no. 5. The use of ***Finlandia*** is worthy of discussion. ***Finlandia*** is neither a Finnish nor English word. It appears to be part of this speaker's idiolect[9]. It is, however, the brand name of a particular vodka currently on market. This speaker was particularly weak in speaking English. He speaks of not going back to ***Finlandia***, of not returning to Finland. I have labelled this a case of re-borrowing because I have assumed that by ***Finlandia*** he means Finland. It is as if he has borrowed the English word Finland (Finland in Finnish is *Suomi*) and then added a Finnish partitive ending to it (Finland-ia). I cannot categorically state that the informant does this in Finnish, for I am only studying the spoken English of these informants, but it would be highly unusual to be using this form in his everyday English, without there being some influence from his spoken Finnish. This usage was not an isolated incident. This informant used the word ***Finlandia*** on 16 separate occasions.

One of the aims of this paper was to examine the data in relation to grammatical categories for potential paradigmatic (that is, the tightness of a given sub-system, e.g., pronouns, determiners, demonstratives) or syntagmatic (that is, the organisation of a

[9] Professor Lauttamus, University of Oulu, Finland, has informed me that the use of the word Finlandia is not uncommon amongst Finnish Americans and that it is sometimes used in a jocular fashion. This offers additional support to my argument regarding re-borrowing. Note, however, that my informant repetitively used this word in earnest, not in jest. It has also been suggested (by an anonymous reviewer) that the informant might be making a connection with the prestigious piece by Sibelius entitled Finlandia, often used as a semi-official national anthem.

sentence) coherence. It seems that the results presented here tend to agree with Appel and Muysken (1987, 172) that "paradigmatically organised words are rarely borrowed". Table 5, Grammatical classification of re-borrowings, shows us that only 6 words were paradigmatic, accounting for a total of only 9.2% of all the re-borrowing. However, there was a clear syntagmatic dominance, accounting for 90.8% of the data.

A closer look at this syntagmatic data, through Tables 5, 6 and 7, and Figs. 1 and 2, offers some other patterns. As a collective group, my Finnish informants tend to re-borrow nouns (58.6%) more frequently than verbs (27.7%) which are, in turn, re-borrowed more frequently than adjectives (4.5%). This propensity to borrow nouns more frequently again concurs with Appel and Muysken (1987, 172): "a verb is more crucial to that organisation (syntagmatic) than a noun, and perhaps therefore it is harder to borrow verbs than nouns." Lauttamus (1990, 40) also found that his informants favoured the use of nouns (59%) rather than verbs (2.7%). Lauttamus' view (1990, 47) that Finns do not use switching or borrowing as common discourse modes, and that any switching found within the community can be best characterised as *emblematic* helps to explain why both the Australian Finns and their American counterparts use nouns so frequently, in comparison with other grammatical constituents. It might also go some way towards explaining why re-borrowing even exists among these communities.

If we examine this syntagmatic data according to the sex of the speaker (Tables 6 and 7) different patterns arise. The men clearly used more nouns than they did verbs than they did adjectives. They used no pronouns or prepositions whatsoever. The females, however, differed somewhat in their usage. They used marginally more verbs than nouns and considerably more verbs than the men (a ratio of 2.6:1), but then, unlike the men, they used pronouns. They also used more adjectives than the men and some prepositions. This difference in usage raises many questions and warrants further investigation. For example, do the women have a greater propensity to use more verbs because they are more expressive? Do they tend to use verbs to refer to process more than men do? Or, conversely, have the men been better able to learn the English verbs and hence have no need to resort to re-borrowing techniques? These are interesting questions but they lie outside the scope of this present study.

> (6) I'm not sure that, but I think so that time, because there is a..., then is uh, plenty uh, Finnish people. Not, not now, they are not, not that much, what, that time, because, *maini* take the employments. + Mhm. I think so that it is. Because there is a + Finnish community what we working there. You know, social life, you know. Mhm. (FAEC 1A16, female no. 2)

Extract (6) is an interesting example which again helps to support my argument for the existence of the special category of re-borrowing. Määttänen and Nissi (1994, 42, 124) state that ***maini*** is a fully established integrated loan in American Finnish. This claim is supported by Virtaranta's dictionary of American Finnish (1992). Virtaranta claims that ***maini*** is the most often used integrated form for the English word *mine*. So, it is fair to assume from this that ***maini*** is an integrated loan in Australian Finnish, initially borrowed from Australian English and then borrowed back into the Finnish Australian in its new form. It has, essentially, been re-borrowed.

> (7) It was, ((SIGHS)) I've been driving, driving something over fifty years and uh I have been once [earlier] in a, it wasn't accident, one woman driving Finland <   > completely <   > service, service car. It was a, this transport ***komppaniin*** service vehicle. This one women drive it .... (FAEC 1A36, male no. 3)

Extract (7) is interesting because of the manner in which the speaker has mixed both grammars. He also uses Finnish phonology. Instead of using the English possessive [s] (komppanii's) he has used the Finnish genitive ending - [n] (komppanii-n). I have categorised this as a re-borrowing because the original English word is spoken with Finnish phonology and stress and has incorporated Finnish grammar, yet it is found in the Finnish Australian speech.

(8) Why because we had that time big family and I working and, and now I can stay home and I can do what I want and no any problem, ***finanssi*** or anything like that, it's easy life. (FAEC 1A49, female no. 4)

I have included extract (8) because of the ambiguity of the word *finanssi*. It could be argued that this is a noun or then that it is an adjective. I have determined it to be an adjective because I believe this suits the surrounding discourse most appropriately. The woman is discussing her life in retirement. If she were to be using correct Finnish, the most appropriate noun in this context would be ***rahaongelmia***, whereas the adjective would be ***taloudellisia***.

(9) (Her occupation, what was her last occu..., occ..., last job?)
Uh, she was al..., also ***masinisti***. (FAEC 1A57, male no. 7)

Extract (9) is another clear case of the re-borrowing process. The speaker is talking about his wife's last occupation. We are told she was a ***masinisti***, that is, that she was a machinist. However, if one was to use correct Finnish, a machinist, if we consider heavy industry, would be ***koneenkäyttäjä***, or, if we are referring to a seamstress, it would be an ***ompelija***. It seems quite apparent that the speaker has borrowed the English form into his Australian Finnish and then re-borrowed it back from his Australian Finnish into his Finnish Australian.

(10) That's right yes. There was a one Finnish, um, family there and then they went to the another hydro-***vilitsi*** so there was no Finnish people except what we got, got to the visitors coming from Hobart, Finnish people. Oh a but every day there wasn't none. (FAEC 1A1, female no. 1)

Finally, extract (10) offers an interesting use of the compound noun hydro-village. During the 1950s through to the early 1970s, many of the Finnish immigrants and their families lived in specially established villages in the Snowy Mountains whilst working on the construction of the Snowy Mountain Scheme, a vast hydro-electric system. This informant (on more than one occasion) refers to one of these villages as a hydro-*vilitsi.* She uses English phonology for hydro but Finnish phonology and morphology for village, that is, *vilitsi.* However, the Finnish word for village is *kylä.* Once again, it seems rather apparent that she has borrowed the English word village into her Australian Finnish and then re-borrowed it back into her Finnish Australian.

6. Conclusions

The natural language presented and discussed in this paper clearly supports the claim that re-borrowing is a concrete phenomenon. It is a category of borrowing most likely to be found amongst the speech of non-fluent bilinguals and, for the group under study, is predominantly syntagmatic in nature. The informants' overall propensity to mostly re-borrow nouns indicates the predominantly emblematic nature of this category.

The existence of this unusual category of borrowing is difficult to dispute but it does lead one to question how this category comes into being. Is it a fossilised remnant of the speakers' initial interlanguage? If so, why is there no progress beyond this level towards improved fluency and why do women tend, as a whole, to re-borrow verbs more so than the men? Is this re-borrowing a manifestation of the dual lexicon hypothesis (Paradis 1983, Bokamba 1989), where the use of re-borrowed words suggests an overlap between these lexicons? If so, why is the speaker unable to correctly separate between these lexicons? These and other related questions are worthy of further investigation.

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Review Article: English Influence on the Scandinavian Languages

STIG JOHANSSON

Harriet Sharp, *English in spoken Swedish: A corpus study of two discourse domains.* Stockholm Studies in English 95. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. 2001. ISBN 91-22-01934-0.

1. Introduction

The development of English is truly remarkable. 400 years ago it was spoken by a mere 4 to 5 million people in a limited geographical area. Now it is the native language of several hundred million people in many parts of the world. It is a second language in many countries and is studied as a foreign language in every corner of the world. English is a *global language*, to quote from the title of a recent book by David Crystal (1997).

The role of English is frequently debated. English has been described as a *murder* language, threatening the existence of local languages. The spread of English was described as *linguistic imperialism* in a book by Robert Phillipson (1992). The role of English is a topic frequently raised in the press. 40 years ago the readers of *Dagbladet* in Norway could read the following statement by a well-known publisher (quoted in translation):

> The small language communities today are in danger of being absorbed by the large ones. Perhaps in ten years English will have won the day in Iceland, in thirty years in Norway.

In Norway there have been several campaigns against unwanted English influence and for the protection of the linguistic environment (*språklig miljøvern*). A couple of years ago there appeared a book in Denmark with the title: *Engelsk eller ikke engelsk? That is the question* (Davidsen-Nielsen et al. 1999). A plan for the protection of Swedish has recently been worked out by *Svenska språknämnden: handlingsplan för det svenska språket.* Similar work is going on in Norway under the auspices of *Norsk språkråd.*

Considering the frequency and the heat of debate, there have been surprisingly few major studies that systematically survey the use of English in Scandinavia and the influence of English on the Scandinavian languages, although there has been a tendency in recent years to pay more attention to the topic. The first major study was Aasta Stene's (1945) thesis on English loanwords in Norwegian, based on material collected before the war. It took half a century before the next major works on English influence on Norwegian appeared: Anne-Line Graedler's (1998) thesis on *Morphological, semantic and functional aspects of English lexical borrowings in Norwegian* and the Anglicism dictionary by Graedler and Johansson (1997). Both focus on direct loans in written texts. The situation in Norway is discussed in a new book by Johansson & Graedler (2002).

English influence on Danish has been studied particularly by Knud Sørensen, who has published two monographs on English borrowings in Danish (1973, 1995) and an Anglicism dictionary (1997), which differs in important respects from its Norwegian counterpart, notably in paying a great deal of attention to translation loans and semantic loans. Like the Norwegian studies mentioned above, Sørensen's work is chiefly concerned with the written language. The most significant recent contribution is Bent Preisler's (1999) book on *Danskerne og det engelske sprog*, which reports on a large-scale sociolinguistic survey of the use of English and attitudes to English and also includes an in-depth study of the role of English in five subcultures where the English language was assumed to be an important defining element. Preisler concludes:

> Subkulturerne [hiphop, computere, rockmusik, dødsmetal og amatørradio] ... er hver for seg en variant af en ophavskultur som er international, med rod primært i USA. De er derfor karakteristiske ved at deres betydnings- og værdisymboler først og fremmest er *sproglige*, i form af engelske ord og udtryk og i det hele taget regelmæssig kodeveksel til engelsk. Subkulturens skrevne tekster, fx. programmer eller manualer, er ofte helt på engelsk. Engelsk er endvidere et nødvendig kontaktsprog i kommunikationen med udenlandske grupper inden for den samme subkultur. ... Man erhverver seg sin posisjon på subkulturens rangstige ved at vise hvor dyktig man er til at tilegne sig og beherske det subkulturelle betydningsunivers, som det symboliseres i livsstil, sociale adfærdsmønstre, påklædning, kropssprog og især den verbale sprogbrug. (Preisler 1999: 231-232)

According to Preisler, the strong position of English in Denmark is the result of a combination of forces from below (*nedenfra*), through the subcultures, and forces from above (*ovenfra*), through the educational system, business, and attitudes among the population in general.

The first comprehensive investigation of the role of English in Sweden was initiated by Magnus Ljung in the 1980s. The most important part of his "English in Sweden" project was a sociolinguistic survey of attitudes to English and to English influence on Swedish. There were a number of interesting findings: differences in reaction due to age, sex, and region; differences as regards the type of borrowing, etc. (see Ljung 1985, 1988). Not surprisingly, age turned out to be the strongest factor; English is favoured particularly by the young. Another major study is the thesis by Judith-Ann Crystal on *Engelskan i svensk dagspress* (1988). This is different in many respects from Ljung's investigation. It is based on printed texts, and it deals with loanwords only, and only with direct loans; semantic loans, translation loans, and the like are excluded.

But it is a highly interesting study of the extent to which English loanwords are used and the factors which determine their integration into Swedish. As for Norwegian and Danish, there is also a dictionary of English loanwords in Swedish, produced by Bo Seltén (the latest version published in 1993).

In addition to the works mentioned above, there have been more detailed investigations, such as Barbro Söderberg's (1983) monograph on the *s*-plural in Swedish, and a host of minor studies. Altogether, we now have much better documentation on the role of English in Scandinavia than a couple of decades ago. There is one important gap, however. Until the publication of the new book by Harriet Sharp on *English in spoken Swedish*, which sparked the present review article, we had very little documentation on the influence of English in speech.

2. English influence in speech

The study of speech has been greatly facilitated in recent years by the access to computer corpora of transcribed speech. For English we have a number of available corpora, but for her work on spoken Swedish Harriet Sharp had to compile her own corpora. She decided to focus on two domains where "the speakers would be prone to use a considerable number of English lexical items as their contact with the English language is intense, their English language proficiency is good, and their attitudes towards its use might be presumed to be positive" (p. 35). These points should be kept in mind in evaluating the results of the investigation.

3. Corpora and research questions

The two discourse domains examined by Harriet Sharp are: conversation of business meetings and casual conversation of young adults. For each there is a corpus:

> The Cool Corpus: business meetings from Cool Carriers, where the author worked in the 1980s. Video

recordings of 12 meetings, a core group of 12 speakers (including 3 women), aged 30-54. Approx. 6 hours. Total number of words: approx. 72,000.

The Visby Corpus: casual conversation of young adults. From a docusoap series recorded for television *The Real World – Visby*. 34 tapes selected from 800 video tapes. 7 young adults, aged 19-25 (4 men, 3 women, including one Norwegian!). Approx. 10 hours (after non-verbal material had been excluded). Total number of words: approx. 76,000.

The two corpora will be referred to below as the COOL corpus and the VISBY corpus, respectively.

The whole material has not been transcribed, but rather "all periods containing embedded code-switches to English" (p. 44); incidentally, the term 'period' is not defined explicitly, but this does not seem to have hampered the investigation. A code-switch is defined with reference to six criteria (p. 52):

1. They [the English expressions] can be found in, or are derived from, the lexical items entered in a comprehensive dictionary of the English language,
2. they have their etymological roots in the English language and are believed to have entered Swedish after 1850,
3. or they originate in other languages but have been imported from English,
4. they are used by a Swedish speaker,
5. they may be in the form of an English proper noun or name,
6. and they constitute an English code-switch of any length (number of component elements).

We notice immediately that 'code-switch' is used here in a very broad sense, and we shall come back to this point later.

The transcription is basically orthographic, with ordinary punctuation, but it includes some extra features, such as: pauses, indications of special emphasis, and notes on other features which might be important for the interpretation of the text. The transcription includes a time column which makes it possible to calculate the time between code-switches. The author has also estimated the total number of words in the two corpora.

The research questions are defined as follows in the opening chapter (p. 3):

1. How frequently is English used in the corpora?
2. What are the formal and discourse functional characteristics of the English expressions used?
3. How are these expressions used from a code-switching perspective?
4. To what extent are the English expressions integrated in the Swedish discourse?

We turn now to the first question.

4. *Frequencies*

Estimating the frequency of English elements is far from easy. Do we include all words regardless of their age and regardless whether they are completely established and do not differ from native words (e.g. Swedish *jobb*)? Do we include all types of borrowings/code-switches? Do we include words which have been borrowed from English, but derive originally from other languages (e.g. Swedish *jungel* through English *jungle* from Hindi *jangal*)? What do we do with international words like Swedish *frustration* and *signifikant* from English *frustration* and *significant*? And, not least, what types of texts are we talking about? We may get different results depending upon how we answer these questions.

Most frequency estimates focus on direct loans and are limited to relatively new words, e.g. in the case of Chrystal (1988) words that were not recorded in *Svenska Akademins ordlista* (9^{th} edition, 1950). Chrystal found that there were on average 2.5 English words per thousand words of running Swedish newspaper text. There was a marked difference between advertising and ordinary newspaper text: on average 5.9 vs. 1.3 words per thousand.

Other studies agree in finding a surprisingly low frequency of English elements. The main variable is the type of text. These are some results from studies of English elements in Norwegian, measured in words per thousand (quoted from Johansson and Graedler 2002):

Fiction	1.9
Articles from newspapers and magazines on fashion and beauty	12.0
Newspaper articles on football	19.2
Articles from newspapers and magazines on pop music	23.0
Electronic chat groups	34.3

It is necessary to keep in mind the problems in making such counts, but the results no doubt give a fairly good indication of the frequency of English elements. The frequency is low if we turn to fiction, news reportage, leading articles in newspapers, and many other types of written texts. It is only if we turn to special text types that the proportion of English elements rises markedly. What happens in spontaneous speech? For the first time, we now have reliable documentation on this, due to Harriet Sharp.

At the outset, one might perhaps have expected a very high frequency of English elements in the two corpora, as speech is produced off the cuff and without giving the speaker much time to choose his/her words, and particularly considering the way the two speaker groups were picked out (cf. what was said above).

Interestingly, Harriet Sharp gives frequency figures both in terms of time intervals and in relation to the number of words. The average time between code-switches was 14 seconds for the COOL group and 58 seconds for the VISBY group. The former produced

28 English words per thousand, the latter 22 words per thousand. The overall frequency is approximately ten times the overall figure reported by Chrystal (1988) for Swedish newspaper text. There is a need for a great deal of caution, however; the figures are not comparable, because:

- unlike Chrystal, Harriet Sharp includes names, and
- she includes a lot of of old established loanwords which are excluded by Chrystal.

Examples of such words are: *jobba* (55 instances), *jobb* (21 instances), *träna* (16 instances), *film* (13 instances).

In Table 1 I have recalculated Harriet Sharp's figures to make them more comparable with the frequency counts for written texts. As a code-switch may consist of more than a single word, the number of English words is higher than the number of code-switches. Each lexical item is registered as a record, but the number of records is higher than the number of words, as some multiword items have been registered as a single record (e.g. *of course* or *thank you*). If we eliminate all names and all items that are 'standardised', i.e. recorded in *Svenska Akademins ordlista*, the English elements in the COOL corpus go down to 758 and in the VISBY corpus to 391, or 10 vs. 5 words per thousand running words. In other words, the relative proportion of English words is rather low compared with some types of written texts.

Table 1 The frequency of English elements in two corpora of spontaneous speech

	The COOL corpus	The VISBY corpus
Total number of words	72,000	76,000
Number of English words	2,025	1,675
Number of code-switches	1,550	623
Number of records	1,679	811
Number of records minus names	1,031	735
Non-standardised records	758	391

Harriet Sharp makes the point that "Proportionately speaking, English words ... play a very minor role in the spoken discourse of the investigated domains" (p. 61), and her case could in fact have been made even stronger, as I have shown. She adds that "It is my contention that the reason people assume that there are more English words than there actually are has to do with the *perceptual salience* of English borrowings (or code-switches)" (p. 62). In other words, they stand out from the surrounding text and are more easily noticed.

How do we account for the surprisingly low proportion of English elements in spontaneous speech? Partly, this has no doubt to do with the low lexical density of spontaneous speech, i.e. the low proportion of lexical words in relation to function words, and it is well-known that function words are rarely borrowed; the most typical loanwords are nouns and, much less frequently, adjectives and verbs. Moreover, conversation has a restricted and repetitive repertoire (Biber et al. 1999: 1049) and is typically planned in sequences, with less room for variation than in writing.

In motivating her focus on spoken material, Harriet Sharp mentions "the reported observation that linguistic change originates in speech rather than writing" (p. 35), with reference to Milroy & Milroy (1999). What these authors actually say about this topic is that "Linguistic change, *especially in phonology and grammar* [my highlighting], originates in speech rather than writing" (Milroy & Milroy 1999: 55). The present thesis, however, deals with lexical innovations. Moreover, it is highly likely that the types of innovations due to language contact are tied to the type of contact situation. To take an example, the influence on the language of the Norwegian immigrants in America (as described by Haugen 1953) is quite different from the influence of English on contemporary Norwegian. In the latter case, the written language plays a crucial role, as suggested by the frequency figures reported above.

5. Analytic choices

In the second chapter of her book, Harriet Sharp discusses the problematic distinction between borrowing and code-switching and points out that "it has hitherto been impossible to draw a distinct line between them" (p. 12). "It is thus probably best," she says, "to see the concepts as representing degrees on a continuum, describable in terms of a cline rather than fixed points" (ibid.). This is the background for the broad definition of code-switching referred to above. The reader has to keep in mind that it includes everything from clear instances of code-switching to just as clear instances of borrowing, such as completely established loanwords. Even words which could not by any stretch of imagination be defined as examples of code-switching are included and form a substantial part of the material, e.g. *jobba,* as in:

> [From a phone conversation between Truls and Elisabeth]
>
> T: Men ni *jobbar* båda två?
>
> E: [Nods] Ah.
>
> T: Näh hon *jobbar* inte idag.
>
> E: Jo [pause] - Jo hon ska *jobba* idag. (p. 63)

Jobba is of course derived from the direct loanword *jobb,* but has no corresponding verb in English.

Although borrowing and code-switching are not distinguished at the outset, a distinction is made later in the analysis between mixed and unmixed utterances. This corresponds in many cases to the distinction between borrowing vs. code-switching. Compare:

> Mixed: *Peaken* var inte bra på *spotmarknaden.*
>
> Unmixed: *I do not believe it!* (p. 101)

Later in the analysis, a distinction is also made between standardised and non-standardised elements, the latter representing material that has not been recorded in *Svenska Akademins ordlista.*

The broad definition of the material means that all expressions which derive from English are included, provided that they conform to the criteria quoted above. An alternative choice would have been to focus on non-standardised elements, excluding names. The material would then have been greatly reduced (cf. Table 1 above), but the author would not have been able to show the consistent differences between the two speaker groups. These are well brought out in the analysis.

6. Differences between the two discourse domains

The detailed analysis reveals that the English elements do not just differ in frequency between the two speaker groups, but are used quite differently. The main differences are summarised in Table 2.

Table 2 Main differences in code-switching behaviour between the two speaker groups

	The COOL corpus	The VISBY corpus
Structure of code-switch	approx. 80 % nouns (approx. half were names)	approx. 40 % nouns (approx. 10 % were names)
	10 % verbs	20 % verbs
	5 % interjections / discourse markers	approx. 20 % interjections / discourse markers
Incorporation strategy	6 % unmixed (English)	40 % unmixed (English)
Frequency of flagging of non-standardised elements	approx. 20 %	approx. 50 %
Types of flagging devices:		
Linguistic	48 %	7 %
Pausal	39 %	10 %
Other paralinguistic	13 %	84 %

The differences between the two speaker groups must be seen against the background of the communicative purposes in the two situations. In the case of the COOL corpus, the purpose is *transactional* (p. 41), i.e. to get something done. Language is used to transfer information, and the referential function is in focus. Hence there is a high proportion of nouns, including a lot of names. These are mostly used in mixed utterances, as in:

> Jag har också tittat på *quartered beef* från *Queensland* till Moskva [short pause] på *liner terms*. (p. 85f.)

Flagging, i.e. explicit signalling of the language shift, is comparatively rare in the COOL corpus, and where it occurs, it most typically takes the form of linguistic flagging devices, e.g. metalinguistic comments or explanations. This is consistent with the predominantly referential function. The main purpose is to convey a message.

In the VISBY corpus, the purpose is primarily *interactional* (p. 42), aimed at the maintenance of social relationships rather than the transference of information. The relative proportion of nouns is half of that in the COOL corpus, while there are twice as many verbs (and presumably shorter and less complex clauses). Interjections and discourse markers are common, e.g. to mark back-channelling, in agreement with the interactional function. A high proportion of the English elements (40 %) is found in unmixed utterances, i.e. English language islands which are not integrated syntactically into the Swedish text. Flagging is very common and is most often paralinguistic, primarily shown by means of voice modification, laughter, and giggling. The speakers signal that they take on a different role, as in playing a game. This may take the form of what Harriet Sharp calls the Quoting Game (p. 117), where the speakers play a kind of verbal pingpong using sequences from films, television programs, songs, computer games, and the like:

> [Ken's girlfriend sees the camera crew and wonders what is going on. Gorm and Ken offer an explanation]
>
> G: Du har hamnat på en porrfilmsinspelning [Laughs] *Okay* då kör vi igång! [Starts taking his shirt off]

K: *Congratulations this is* dolda kameran! [Laughs]

G: *Smile! You are on Candid Camera!* (p. 118)

Altogether, the code-switching behaviour is remarkably different in the two corpora. Very few words were found in both corpora, in fact only 24 different words. The English elements used by the VISBY speakers were to a large extent established loanwords of long standing or they were very basic words making up unmixed utterances, i.e. real cases of code-switching. The COOL speakers rarely resorted to unmixed utterances and used far more non-standardised elements (cf. Table 1), typically embedded as single-word switches. Harriet Sharp interprets the difference between the two speaker groups in terms of Communication Accommodation Theory (p. 113). There is a convergence in language use within the two speaker groups, shown for example through the Quoting Game in the VISBY group and among the COOL speakers in the use of English shipping jargon and geographical names.

7. English – a threat to the survival of the Scandinavian languages?

The analysis and interpretation of the differences between the two speaker groups are the main strengths of Harriet Sharp's book (and there is more to say than the points taken up above). Additionally, it is significant that we have now for the first time reliable documentation on English influence in two domains of spoken discourse. This is a considerable achievement.

To what extent can we generalise from Harriet Sharp's investigation? Does English pose a threat to the survival of Swedish? The author is very clear on this point:

> It is my contention that the influence on Swedish syntax and lexis of the young adults' use of English expressions is negligible. Swedish is, and will remain, the language spoken in Sweden.

> It is my firm belief that English does not pose a threat to the survival of Swedish. Although English is present in many different contexts, it is in principle used as an auxiliary language for specific purposes in Swedish discourse domains. In this capacity it enriches our lexical stock, enables stylistic variation, adds expressivity and signals certain interpersonal relations and values. English words are thus an asset rather than a liability for Swedish speakers. (p. 199)

Here the author jumps to conclusions. These are some issues that could profitably have been taken up in the concluding discussion:

- To what extent might the results have been different if other discourse domains had been selected?
- Why is the influence stronger in some types of written texts than in the two spoken discourse domains (if the frequencies are re-calculated in the way I have shown above)?
- As the younger generation has previously been shown to be most positive as regards the use of English and attitudes to English in Sweden (cf. Ljung 1985, 1988), why is the frequency of English elements lower in the VISBY group (age: 19-25) than in the COOL group (age: 30-54)?

It would also have been interesting if Harriet Sharp had related her results to the findings in Preisler's (1999) study and to his theory of influence from above and below.

Last but not least, borrowing and code-switching are not the main threat to the Scandinavian languages, but rather the fact that English seems to be taking over in some domains, e.g. in business and research. Cf. the following comment in a recent article from *Aftenposten*:

> Norsk skriftspråk (særleg bokmål) vil truleg tapa område for område – næringsliv, reiseliv, forsking, marknadsføring, børs, bank. Lengst vil norsk skrift halda seg i grunnskole, massemedia, politikk, litteratur.

> ... det kan godt hende at det ikkje er mykje norsk skrift att om 100 år. I alle fall er det lite dristig å spå at vi nærmar oss ein dagleg tospråkssituasjon med raske steg – der intimsfæren er munnleg og norsk, og yrkessfæren er skriftleg og engelsk. (Sylfest Lomheim, "Vil norsk overleve", *Aftenposten* 12.3.01)

Any discussion of the threat to the survival of the Scandinavian languages is incomplete unless it also considers the potential loss of domains (*domänförlust, domenetap*).

8. Where do we go now?

Harriet Sharp's study shows very clearly that the influence of English may be quite different depending upon the particular domain. If we want to understand the role of English in Scandinavia (and, as a result, perhaps take some action in support of the Scandinavian languages), we need more studies of this kind. Much remains to be done. There is a need to study more domains in depth, and to investigate both use and attitudes. Some important areas are: computing, business, advertising, pop music, fashion and beauty, film and TV, sports. Needless to say, any linguistic study of this kind is incomplete without considering the wider cultural context.

Most of what has been done so far has focused on direct loans (*importord*). There is a need for more work on semantic loans and on possible areas of syntactic influence; for some examples of syntactic influence, see the opening chapter in Johansson & Graedler (2002). One channel that deserves to be investigated more fully is the influence on the Scandinavian languages through texts translated from English; see e.g. Gellerstam (1986) and Johansson (2001).

The major studies of English in relation to other languages have generally, though not exclusively, been carried out by English language specialists (Aasta Stene, Magnus Ljung, Knud Sørensen, etc.; Judith-Ann Chrystal is a notable exception). A significant recent publication is *A dictionary of European Anglicisms* edited by the German Anglicist Manfred Görlach (2001), where there is a comparison of Anglicisms across sixteen European languages, including Norwegian (contributor: Anne-Line Graedler). Large-scale comparative projects involving all the Nordic languages are currently under way, initiated by researchers specialising on the Nordic languages. Unlike the studies carried out by English language specialists, which have had a descriptive slant, these new projects are more concerned with the maintenance and preservation of the Nordic languages, both issues to do with borrowing and the loss of domains. With the works that have appeared in the last couple of decades and the results the ongoing projects can be expected to yield, we will be in a much better position than before to evaluate the role of English in Scandinavia and possible effects on the Scandinavian languages.

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Seeing is Believing: Power and the Gaze in Charles Dickens's *The Adventures of Oliver Twist*

JEREMY HAWTHORN

Behind the misleadingly singular term 'the gaze' a set of disparate and at best loosely related bodies of theory can be found sheltering. Within present-day social psychology the term has a purchase that is more literal than metaphorical, and makes reference to studies of looking behaviour in groups and dyads, often focussing upon the varieties of such behaviour that are appropriate to different social circumstances or that are associated with individuals from different social or cultural backgrounds. Within the humanities, and especially within literary or film studies, the term evokes a complex body of theory emanating from a number of sources. First amongst these is Michel Foucault's metaphorical extension of Jeremy Bentham's 'Panopticon', an extension used to describe that condition of internalized surveillance to be found (according to Foucault) at the heart of modern western culture.[1] A more diffuse tradition that develops Jacques Lacan's critique of Jean-Paul Sartre is represented in its most influential manifestation by Laura Mulvey's 1975 article 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema'. Mulvey attempts to link looking behaviour in the classic Hollywood film with forms of gendered audience identification and viewpoint – and further with the ideological position that these support.[2]

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[1] See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* Trans. Alan Sheridan. First publ. in French 1975. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, pp. 195–201.

[2] Laura Mulvey, 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema'. First publ. 1975; written 1973. Reprinted in Laura Mulvey, *Visual and Other Pleasures.* London, Macmillan, 1989, 14–26. For Sartre and Lacan, see Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology.* First published in French 1943; first published in English 1958. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. London: Methuen, 1969, pp. 258–97, and Lacan, Jacques, *The*

From these and other roots has grown a critical tradition that typically relates the forms of looking depicted within texts to aspects of the narrative positioning of readers or viewers, and also to techniques of ideological interpellation. The tradition is not without its critics; in her recent book *The Distinction of Fiction* (1999), for example, Dorrit Cohn has a concluding chapter entitled 'Optics and Power in the Novel' in which she builds on Gérard Genette's dismissal of the term 'omniscience' as inappropriate to discussion of fictional narrative. Cohn argues that

> such terms as 'surveillance,' 'discourse of power,' or 'panoptic vision' make sense only when they are applied to relationships that are potentially reversible: master/slave (cf. Hegel), police/criminal, prison-guard/prisoner, parent/child, teacher/pupil, man/woman, and many more. They make no sense at all – no Foucauldian sense, at any rate – when they are applied to an author's (or heterodiegetic narrator's) relationship to his fictional characters.[3]

One of the things that this leaves out is the *reader*'s relationship to fictional characters. A narrator who sees into the hearts and souls of characters acts as a reader surrogate, allowing the reader to assume a perspective on these fictional beings that is impossible with real people. Cohn's cold logic also leaves out an element testified to by author after author – that sense of characters' independence of their creator. (Were we to accept Genette's and Cohn's injunctions we would presumably also have to stop talking about – for example – an author's or narrator's sympathy for a character or characters.) And, finally, Cohn's argument fails fully to engage with the way in which the relationship between author and/or narrator and characters can

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Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Trans. Jacques-Alain Miller. First published in French 1973, and in English 1977. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, pp. 67–90.

[3] Dorrit Cohn, *The Distinction of Fiction.* Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 171. For Genette's dissatisfaction with 'omniscience', see Gérard Genette, *Narrative Discourse Revisited.* Trans. Jane E. Lewin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 74.

model and evoke actual or desired forms of relationship between institutions of political power and the subjects of that power in the larger extra-fictional world.

In the present article I will seek to establish that in one text (Charles Dickens's *The Adventures of Oliver Twist* – henceforth just *Oliver Twist*) – there are links between (i) looking relations *in* the novel (between characters), (ii) the ways in which readers are situated by the narrative in relation to characters by a particular set of narrative choices ('point of view'), and (iii) an ideological agenda that seeks to underwrite new methods of social knowledge and control in the England of the 1830s (*Oliver Twist* was first published 1837–9).

References to looking and to the eye in *Oliver Twist*[4] have small chance of functioning as dead metaphors; the novel is crammed with acts of literal looking and seeing, and with descriptions of material eyes and physical faces.[5] Characters exchange glances and they avert their eyes, they spy upon one another and they read each other's expressions, they attempt to deceive but reveal the truth through their looks and their countenances. When we are told of Mr Bumble's relation to the paupers, subsequent to his marriage to Mrs Corney, that he 'was degraded in their eyes' (328) the phrase has a literal force: we witness Bumble actually being looked at and mocked by the paupers. Shortly after this humbling, Monks, 'looking keenly into Mr Bumble's eyes', asks Bumble: 'You have the same eye to your own interest, that you always had, I doubt not?' (330). Mr Bumble's eyes are indeed literally devoted to the pursuit of his own interest. The very many idioms involving sight and the eyes ('strike me blind', 'before my very eyes', 'damn your eyes') that the novel contains have a force on the literal plane of meaning as well as on their more familiar metaphorical one. Take for example

[4] All references are to Charles Dickens, *The Adventures of Oliver Twist.* Ed. Peter Fairclough. Introduction by Angus Wilson. Reprint of Penguin English Library edition, 1966. Penguin Classics. London: Penguin, 1985. Page numbers are given in brackets after quotations.

[5] An electronic search of the Chadwyck-Healy database of the text gives 289 hits for <eye*> in *Oliver Twist,* the overwhelming majority of which are for 'eye' and 'eyes'. This is high even for Dickens, whose novels consistently make repeated reference to eyes and seeing.

the following comment: 'I promise you that in that case, if the truth is forced from him, there the matter will rest; there must be circumstances in Oliver's little history which it would be painful to drag before the public eye, and if the truth is once elicited, they shall go scot free' (412). The final court-room scene involving Fagin's trial demonstrates that in the world of *Oliver Twist* 'the public eye' is not a dead metaphor: it involves being looked at, in public, by lots of eyes.

In view of the fact that metaphors involving looking and the eye are so relentlessly exposed to the pressure of the literal, it might be expected that *Oliver Twist* is a novel that keeps us close to the truth of the physical world, of those 'facts' that Dickens was later to treat with such suspicion and disdain in *Hard Times* (1854). But literalism is not the same as truth, nor are the literal-minded immune from fanciful beliefs or ideological confusions. Indeed, as *Hard Times* demonstrates, those committed to the primacy of hard facts are likely to be more rather than less subject to misperceptions and blindnesses. At the heart of *Oliver Twist* lies a fundamentally ideological belief in the power of the eye to both perceive and display the truth. It is ideological because it is based upon what Dickens would like to be the case rather than upon what he has observed is the case. Time and time again in the novel characters perceive truths by literally seeing something; time and time again characters reveal and display the truth of their own character, personality, history, and morality through their eyes and in their faces. In a world full of secrecies and immensely complex chains of mediation (in space as well as in time), we are assured that the truth can nevertheless be *seen*.

First published in 1837–9, the novel engages with and reflects a society moving from the basic unit of the small, rural community to a domination by the sprawling urban conglomeration, and at its ideological heart lies the implicit claim that what we can term the 'moral technology' of this new order is identical to that of the old: in both orders, direct interpersonal contact between two individuals mediated by the eye is what makes it possible to distinguish good from evil, and truth from falsehood. The only words that are given to Oliver's mother prior to her death in the opening pages of the novel are, 'Let me see the child, and die' (46). Her request is granted, and her seeing initiates a chain of looks that allow evil to be exposed and right to triumph by the end of the novel. But if the humanist ideology which underpins *Oliver Twist* rests on a belief that the ills of the big city and of a new urban society can be solved by those interpersonal skills developed in a now obsolescent pre-industrial society, it nevertheless has to offer some explanation as to how these traditional skills and their moral accoutrements can be adapted to the England of the 1830s. The substantially increased potential for secrecy to be found in the big city must be challenged by a vastly increased force of looking and surveillance, by a benevolent but in the last resort despotic system of panoptical knowledge attained through spying. Paradoxically, then, in arguing for the old, Dickens's novel is forced to underwrite some rather new forms of surveillance and control.

That insistence upon the bedrock of the literal that we find in *Oliver Twist* thus has its forward-looking and its backward-looking aspects. On the one hand it measures the life of the expanding urban and industrial England against a morality based on direct human interpersonal contact – and finds it lacking. But on the other hand its assertion that moral truths founded upon and emanating from such interpersonal contact are adequate to the task of regulating behaviour in the London of the 1830s is nostalgic and idealistic.

A window on the soul

In chapter 14 of the novel Mr Brownlow notices that Oliver surveys the shelves of books in his house (which reach 'from the floor to the ceiling') with curiosity, and he makes Oliver a promise: ' "You shall read them, if you behave well," said the old gentleman kindly; "and you will like that, better than looking at the outsides, – that is, in some cases; because there *are* books of which the backs and covers are by far the best parts" ' (145). But if the literal truth of the saying that one cannot tell a book from its cover appears here to be asserted, its more usual metaphorical implication is not: so far as the characters of the novel are concerned, truths about their moral and existential selves *can* generally be read from their physical appearances, and, especially, from their faces and their eyes, and the tales told by faces and eyes are implicitly believed. Thus at the workhouse, when after three months of starvation a tall boy hints to his companions that 'unless he had another basin of gruel per diem, he was afraid he might some night happen to eat the boy who slept next him, who happened to be a weakly youth of tender age', the response of his companions is revealing. 'He had a wild, hungry eye; and they implicitly believed him' (56).

Much more seriously, in one of the best-known scenes in the novel, it is what can be read from Oliver's face by the 'old gentleman' magistrate rather than anything that Oliver says that saves him from being signed over to the horrifying Mr Gamfield.

> 'And this man that's to be his master – you, sir – you'll treat him well, and feed him, and do all that sort of thing, will you?' said the old gentleman.
>
> 'When I says I will, I means I will,' replied Mr Gamfield doggedly.
>
> 'You're a rough speaker, my friend, but you look an honest, open-hearted man,' said the old gentleman: turning his spectacles in the direction of the candidate for Oliver's premium, whose villainous countenance was a regular stamped receipt for cruelty. But the magistrate was half blind and half childish, so he couldn't reasonably be expected to discern what other people did.
>
> 'I hope I am, sir,' said Mr Gamfield, with an ugly leer.
>
> 'I have no doubt you are, my friend,' replied the old gentleman, fixing his spectacles more firmly on his nose, and looking about him for the inkstand.

> It was the critical moment of Oliver's fate. If the inkstand had been where the old gentleman thought it was, he would have dipped his pen into it, and signed the indentures, and Oliver would have been straightway hurried off. But, as it chanced to be immediately under his nose, it followed, as a matter of course, that he looked all over his desk for it, without finding it; and happening in the course of his search to look straight before him, his gaze encountered the pale and terrified face of Oliver Twist: who, despite all the admonitory looks and pinches of Bumble, was regarding the repulsive countenance of his future master with a mingled expression of horror and fear, too palpable to be mistaken, even by a half-blind magistrate. (65)

Even such an inadequate observer as the old gentleman – whose need for glasses and his literal short-sightedness ('half-blind') is clearly equated with moral and human short-sightedness – is forced to read the truth written on Oliver's face, just as Oliver has read the message so clearly displayed in Gamfield's visage. Not so very long after this scene takes place, even the morally corrupt beadle is similarly affected by Oliver's face and the undeniable truth of that which it displays: 'Mr Bumble regarded Oliver's piteous and helpless look with some astonishment for a few seconds; hemmed three or four times in a husky manner; and, after muttering something about "that troublesome cough," bade Oliver dry his eyes and be a good boy' (73).

Not only does Oliver's look reveal an incontrovertible truth: it is also possessed of existential moral force, a force which imposes a human and moral burden upon whoever observes it – even if that someone is Mr Bumble. We are not surprised to learn, shortly after this exchange, of Mr Sowerby's view that Oliver 'would make a delightful mute' (79). A child with such an expressive face hardly needs the power of speech.

Oliver Twist offers several instances of what was to become a recognizable topos in Dickens's fiction: the face (actual or represented) which presents a message at first only partially decoded by a puzzled observer.

> 'There is something in that boy's face,' said the old gentleman to himself as he walked slowly away, tapping his chin with the cover of the book, in a thoughtful manner; 'something that touches and interests me. *Can* he be innocent? He looked like. – By the bye,' exclaimed the old gentleman, halting very abruptly, and staring up into the sky, 'God bless my soul! Where have I seen something like that look before?'
>
> After musing for some minutes, the old gentleman walked, with the same meditative face, into a back ante-room opening from the yard; and there, retiring into a corner, called up before his mind's eye a vast amphitheatre of faces over which a dusky curtain had hung for many years. 'No,' said the old gentleman, shaking his head; 'it must be imagination.'
>
> He wandered over them again. He had called them into view, and it was not easy to replace the shroud that had so long concealed them. There were the faces of friends, and foes, and of many that had been almost strangers peering intrusively from the crowd; there were the faces of young and blooming girls that were now old women; there were others that the grave had changed to ghastly trophies of death, but which the mind, superior to its power, still dressed in their old freshness and beauty, calling back the lustre of the eyes, the brightness of the smile, the beaming of the soul through its mask of clay, and whispering of beauty beyond the tomb, changed but to be heightened, and taken from earth only to be set up as a light, to shed a soft and gentle glow upon the path to Heaven. (119)

'[T]he beaming of the soul through its mask of clay' is, on a literal level, the recalling of a person's soul after their death by means of a picturing of their face, but given the conventional association of 'clay' with 'flesh' the phrase also suggests that the face is indeed a window through which the truth of the soul can shine.

Even the distortions and corruptions of the face have their own story to tell. In *The Three Cripples* Inn, we are told, it

> was curious to observe some faces which stood out prominently from among the group. There was the chairman himself, (the landlord of the house,) a coarse, rough, heavy built fellow, who, while the songs were proceeding, rolled his eyes hither and thither, and, seeming to give himself up to joviality, had an eye for everything that was done, and an ear for everything that was said – and sharp ones, too. Near him were the singers: receiving, with professional indifference, the compliments of the company, and applying themselves, in turn, to a dozen proffered glasses of spirits and water, tendered by their more boisterous admirers; whose countenances, expressive of almost every vice in almost every grade, irresistibly attracted the attention, by their very repulsiveness. Cunning, ferocity, and drunkenness in all its stages, were there, in their strongest aspects; and women: some with the last lingering tinge of their early freshness almost fading as you looked: others with every mark and stamp of their sex utterly beaten out, and presenting but one loathsome blank of profligacy and crime; some mere girls, others but young women, and none past the prime of life; formed the darkest and saddest portion of this dreary picture. (237)

The truth is there to be read upon these and other faces, but such reading requires the sharp eye of the landlord – or of the narrator.

Accurate reading of the testimony written on the face or in the expression requires sharpness and attention (unless it is so glaringly obvious that even a half-blind magistrate can decipher it), but it also requires moral rectitude and disinterest. Oliver is lucky to meet with all of these, and of him it can be said that, literally, his face is his fortune.

> 'Queer name!' said the old gentleman. 'What made you tell the magistrate your name was White?'
>
> 'I never told him so, sir,' returned Oliver in amazement.
>
> This sounded so like a falsehood, that the old gentleman looked somewhat sternly in Oliver's face. It was impossible to doubt him; there was truth in every one of its thin and sharpened lineaments. (130)

Doubt is *impossible*, and what is read in Oliver's face are not facts, but *truth*. (Later on in the novel, Oliver's 'earnest face' convinces Harry Maylie and Mr Losberne that he has seen Fagin [313].)

Oliver is thus used to present a clearly ideological argument: the concealments and corruptions of a modern society, in which people are forced to deal with those they do not know, can be resolved though the use of those skills of interpersonal perception that serve to distinguish truth from falsity in a small community. A corrupt individual such as Monks can hide *in* the city, but he cannot conceal his corruption *from* his face. In the course of Monks's first meeting with both Mr and Mrs Bumble – when the revealing topic of conversation is that of the ability of women to keep secrets – Monks suddenly removed his hands from his face, and 'showed, to the unspeakable discomposure of Mr Bumble, that it was much distorted, and discoloured' (337). In the world of *Oliver Twist*, if you are shrewd and upright then you *can* tell a book by its cover. In the final courtroom scene of the novel, Fagin is condemned not so much by proffered evidence as by the collective gaze of those observing him.

Misreading is still possible, but only if those doing the looking project their own shortcomings on to what they see.

> Men who look on nature, and their fellow-men, and cry that all is dark and gloomy, are in the right; but the sombre colours are reflections from their own jaundiced eyes and hearts. The real hues are delicate, and need a clearer vision. (307)

Thus when the doctor tells Rose that although he believes Oliver's story, he does not think that 'it is exactly the tale for a practised police-officer', she asks him why. '"Because, my pretty cross-examiner," replied the doctor: "because, viewed with their eyes, there are many ugly points about it; he can only prove the parts that look ill, and none of those that look well"', and after detailing the suspicious circumstances surrounding Oliver's account he asks Rose: 'Don't you see all this?'.

> 'I see it, of course,' replied Rose, smiling at the doctor's impetuosity; 'but still I do not see anything in it, to criminate the poor child.'
>
> 'No,' replied the doctor; 'of course not! Bless the bright eyes of your sex! They never see, whether for good or bad, more than one side of any question; and that is, always, the one which first presents itself to them.' (276–7)

The exchange works in two directions. On the one hand it repeats a conventional view of the lack of logic possessed by women, but on the other hand, of course, the reader knows that Rose is correct in what she 'sees' and that the police officers are not. Deciding to attempt to deceive the police, Mr Losberne declares that 'All I know is . . . that we must try and carry it off with a bold face' (277). In a world of bold faces, one might assume that truths are not unproblematically to be read by the observer, but so far as Oliver is concerned it seems that Dickens believes that innocence has the power to distinguish itself from the 'bold face' of an assumed appearance.

Reciprocity and the look

> The girl [Nancy] drew closer to the table, and glancing at Monks with an air of careless levity, withdrew her eyes; but as he turned his towards Fagin, she stole another look, so keen and searching, and full of purpose, that if there had been any bystander to observe the change, he could hardly have believed the two looks to have proceeded from the same person. (354)

Human interpersonal looking is naturally reciprocal. We *exchange* looks. Even when we avert our eyes, we signal something to an interlocutor or observer. In person-to-person communication we *inter*act. We both receive and transmit information non-verbally in a cumulative process of reciprocal exchange. Human beings often want to gather information without paying the reciprocal price of providing information about themselves to others– including the information that they want to gather information. The numerous acts of looking that take place in *Oliver Twist* fall naturally into two categories: the reciprocal and the one-way. There are those that are genuinely interactive and there are those that – like the look of the voyeur or the spy – resist and evade reciprocity. As we will see, reciprocity is associated with the honest, the natural, and the true, while the one-way is at least initially associated with the unnatural, the perverted and the false. But this picture is far from being absolutely consistent, and as the novel proceeds the right to engage in one-way looking is progressively transferred from the bad to the good.

Reciprocity in looking may be natural but it is not necessarily pleasant, as the early example of Mr and Mrs Sowerberry illustrates.

> Mr and Mrs Sowerberry – the shop being shut up – were taking their supper in the little back-parlour, when Mr Sowerberry, after several deferential glances at his wife, said,

> 'My dear – ' He was going to say more; but, Mrs Sowerberry looking up, with a peculiarly unpropitious aspect, he stopped short.
>
> 'Well,' said Mrs Sowerberry, sharply.
>
> 'Nothing, my dear, nothing,' said Mr Sowerberry.
>
> 'Ugh, you brute!' said Mrs Sowerberry. (78)

The unsophisticated pun by which their marital name is constituted tells the whole story, the fruits of this marriage are indeed far from sweet. Sweetness is not to be found, either, in the relationship between Fagin and Sikes, but there is a reciprocity of evil in their looks nevertheless.

> 'Hear me speak a word,' rejoined Fagin, laying his hand upon the lock. 'You won't be –'
>
> 'Well,' replied the other.
>
> 'You won't be – too – violent, Bill?'
>
> The day was breaking, and there was light enough for the men to see each other's faces. They exchanged one brief glance; there was a fire in the eyes of both, which could not be mistaken.
>
> 'I mean,' said Fagin, showing that he felt all disguise was now useless, 'not too violent for safety. Be crafty, Bill, and not too bold.' (421)

In both of these cases, looks speak more fully and eloquently than do words, and it is for this reason that, on a number of occasions in the novel, eyes are averted. But such averting of the eyes is also communicative: in a situation of interpersonal communication it is indeed impossible not to communicate.

> 'Yes. I have come from Bill,' replied the girl. 'You are to go with me.'

> 'What for?' asked Oliver, recoiling.
>
> 'What for?' echoed the girl, raising her eyes, and averting them again, the moment they encountered the boy's face. 'Oh! for no harm.'
>
> 'I don't believe it,' said Oliver; who had watched her closely.
>
> 'Have it your own way,' rejoined the girl, affecting to laugh. 'For no good, then.' (198)

Once again, Nancy's eyes speak more truthfully than do her words. There is indeed a sort of moral double-take in this passage: although Nancy lies to the boy, the fact that she has to avert her gaze bears witness to the fact that she cannot lie with her eyes, and this inability betokens an inner honesty beneath her corrupt exterior (of which her words at this stage form a part). Oliver, we may note, is here no innocent abroad: he watches Nancy closely, and he knows what her avoidance of eye contact betokens. His skills are shared by Mr Brownlow, and seem generally to serve as a badge of moral goodness.

> *This* circumstance, at least, you know already.'
>
> 'Not I,' said Monks, turning away his eyes and beating his foot upon the ground, as a man who is determined to deny everything. 'Not I.'
>
> 'Your manner, no less than your actions, assures me that you have never forgotten it, or ceased to think of it with bitterness,' returned Mr Brownlow. (436)

Even the underworld characters display gradations of moral corruption in their ability or inability to maintain eye contact; after the murder of Nancy, when Sikes visits Fagin's den, '[i]f an eye were furtively raised and met his, it was instantly averted' (447). Finally even Sikes, facing Charley's horror-struck gaze, is stared down: '[t]he man stopped half-way, and they looked at each other; but Sikes's eyes sunk gradually to the ground' (448).

At the same time, one of the advantages of communicating by means of looks rather than by words is that looks can be used to exclude as well as to inform.

> Bill Sikes merely pointed to the empty measure. The Jew, perfectly understanding the hint, retired to fill it, previously exchanging a remarkable look with Fagin, who raised his eyes for an instant, as if in expectation of it, and shook his head in reply; so slightly that the action would have been almost imperceptible to an observant third person. It was lost upon Sikes, who was stooping at the moment to tie the boot-lace which the dog had torn. Possibly, if he had observed the brief interchange of signals, he might have thought that it boded no good to him.
>
> 'Is anybody here, Barney?' inquired Fagin; speaking, now that Sikes was looking on, without raising his eyes from the ground.
>
> . . .
>
> Now, whether a peculiar contraction of the Jew's red eyebrows, and a half-closing of his deeply-set eyes, warned Miss Nancy that she was disposed to be too communicative, is not a matter of much importance. The fact is all we need care for here; and the fact is, that she suddenly checked herself, and with several gracious smiles upon Mr Sikes, turned the conversation to other matters. In about ten minutes' time, Mr Fagin was seized with a fit of coughing; upon which Nancy pulled her shawl over her shoulders, and declared it was time to go. (155–6)

Fagin's ability to target his looks and to shield any tell-tale elements in his eyes from those he wants to exclude from a circle of knowledge bears testimony to his skill in restricting communicative reciprocity. But it is a skill that in the dog-eat-dog underworld of the novel can also be used against him.

Given the natural reciprocity of eye-contact, a look can both offer and canvass emotional succour and recognition of a shared humanity. The doomed child Dick tells Oliver that he dreams 'so much of Heaven, and Angels, and kind faces that I never see when I am awake' (96–7). It is because of her wish to escape or be spared the mute appeal posed by Oliver that Nancy wishes him away from her.

> 'The child,' said the girl, suddenly looking up, 'is better where he is, than among us; and if no harm comes to Bill from it, I hope he lies dead in the ditch, and that his young bones may rot there.'
>
> 'What!' cried the Jew, in amazement.
>
> 'Ay, I do,' returned the girl, meeting his gaze. 'I shall be glad to have him away from my eyes, and to know that the worst is over. I can't bear to have him about me. The sight of him turns me against myself, and all of you.' (239–40)

Nancy can meet Fagin's gaze, but she wishes Oliver away from her eyes. She is able morally to confront the eyes of Fagin, but not those of the innocent and abused child.

However it is Nancy's own eyes which pose the most powerful moral challenge in the novel. Sikes himself has to deny himself the sight of his own act of murder: Dickens's narrative presents us with a 'ghastly figure': '[t]he murderer staggering backward to the wall, and shutting out the sight with his hand, seized a heavy club and struck her down' (423). But that which he wishes to shield himself from pursues him: after her death, in one of Dickens's most powerful extended sequences, he cannot escape from Nancy's accusing eyes, just as, after the murder, even Sikes's dog can read his own threatened fate in Sikes's eyes. The last words uttered by Sikes are, 'The eyes again!' (453). There is no clearer demonstration of Dickens's reliance upon the look as active guarantor of knowledge and of justice.

Even the look of defiance or aggression enters into reciprocal exchange.

'... Mrs Bumble, ma'am.'

'Well,' cried the lady.

'Have the goodness to look at me,' said Mr Bumble, fixing his eyes upon her. ('If she stands such a eye as that,' said Mr Bumble to himself, 'she can stand anything. It is a eye I never knew to fail with paupers, and if it fails with her my power is gone.')

Whether an exceedingly small expansion of eye be sufficient to quell paupers, who, being lightly fed, are in no very high condition; or whether the late Mrs Corney was particularly proof against eagle glances; are matters of opinion. The matter of fact is, that the matron was in no way overpowered by Mr Bumble's scowl, but, on the contrary, treated it with great disdain, and even raised a laugh thereat, which sounded as though it were genuine.

On hearing this most unexpected sound, Mr Bumble looked, first incredulous, and afterwards amazed. He then relapsed into his former state; nor did he rouse himself until his attention was again awakened by the voice of his partner. (323-24)

The genuine reciprocity of this exchange is in marked contrast to the assumed reciprocity of the contrived *oeillades* involved in Mr and Mrs Bumble's earlier courtship manoeuvrings.

Who owns the look of power?

Acts of one-way looking within the story of *Oliver Twist* fall into two dominant categories: the look of lust or voyeurism, and the look of the spy or of surveillance. Both of these forms of looking are more interested in possession and power than in interaction, both treat the person or persons surveyed as object for use rather than as human being to be respected. But, as the novel progresses, ownership of the one-way look of power is progressively transferred from the morally corrupt and the criminal to characters who are both 'good' and associated with official power – with the police or the judiciary.

The clearest example of the gaze of lust or voyeurism is that directed by Fagin at young Oliver. The rather obvious suggestiveness of Dickens's insistence on calling (only) Charley Bates 'Master' is one of a number of hints associating the boys with tabooed forms of sexuality. After his recapture by Fagin's gang, Oliver is given a warning by 'that gentleman' that he will be given up to be hanged unless he cooperates. Oliver is particularly struck at this point by Fagin's scrutiny of him.

> As he glanced timidly up, and met the Jew's searching look, he felt that his pale face and trembling limbs were neither unnoticed nor unrelished by that wary old gentleman.
>
> The Jew, smiling hideously, patted Oliver on the head, and said, that if he kept himself quiet, and applied himself to business, he saw they would be very good friends yet. (178)

The statement that Fagin 'relishes' Oliver's 'trembling limbs' has an inescapably sexual set of connotations. When Noah Claypole is fed oysters by Charlotte, he takes them with 'intense relish', and this scene plays heavily on both the aphrodisiacal properties of oysters as well as on the popular association between the oyster and the female genitals. As with Fagin's lustful gaze at Oliver, this earlier scene also associates sexuality with looking: Charlotte tells Noah that, 'I like to see you eat 'em, Noah dear, better than eating 'em myself', something that Noah finds 'queer' (251). At any rate, Fagin's 'relishing' of Oliver's pale face and trembling limbs, and his promise that Oliver and he will, if Oliver behaves, become 'very good friends', attach a clearly voyeuristic and lustful character to his scrutiny of Oliver. Later on in the novel, Bill Sikes poses a revealing question.

> 'And wot,' said Sikes, scowling fiercely on his agreeable friend, 'wot makes you take so much pains about one chalk-faced kid, when you know there are fifty boys

> snoozing about Common Garden every night, as you might pick and choose from?'
>
> 'Because they're of no use to me, my dear,' replied the Jew, with some confusion, 'not worth the taking. Their looks convict 'em when they get into trouble, and I lose 'em all. (192)

The answer is not wholly implausible, but the fact that Fagin's answer is delivered 'with some confusion', along with his familiar use of the term 'my dear' to a man, provide a clear indication that there is more to the matter than he admits.

In itself this characterization of the look of lust as objectifying, demeaning, and non-reciprocal is unremarkable. But the two characters primarily responsible for such forms of looking – Fagin and Noah Claypole – are also the two characters who are most associated with spying: the most important form of non-reciprocal looking in the novel. *Oliver Twist* is a work riddled with the activities of spying and surveillance at the story level; it even includes a story about an 'active officer' named Jem Spyers. Fagin, moreover, represents a classic example of Foucault's power-knowledge with its attendant machinery of clandestine information-gathering. (The potentiality for a punning double-meaning in the repeated references to his 'pupils' smoulders throughout the novel, as the boys do indeed serve as his eyes.) The Cripples public house provides a striking example in miniature of a Benthamite panopticon – except that we can presume that the subjects of the controlling gaze are generally unaware that they are being watched. When 'Morris Bolter' (Noah Claypole as was) and his 'wife' (Charlotte) enter the public house they are shown into a back room.

> Now, this back-room was immediately behind the bar, and some steps lower, so that any person connected with the house, undrawing a small curtain which concealed a single pane of glass fixed in the wall of the last-named apartment, about five feet from its flooring, could not only look down upon any guests in the back-

> room without any great hazard of being observed (the glass being in a dark angle of the wall, between which and a large upright beam the observer had to thrust himself), but could, by applying his ear to the partition, ascertain with tolerable distinctness, their subject of conversation. The landlord of the house had not withdrawn his eye from this place of espial for five minutes, and Barney had only just returned from making the communication above related, when Fagin, in the course of his evening's business, came into the bar to inquire after some of his young pupils. (380)

There is a loving quality to Dickens's detailing of the physical detail of this secret observation point, one that solicits the reader's own excitement in being made a party to the observations that it renders possible. This drawing of the reader into the act of surveillance constitutes a significant move in the progressive legitimation of surveillance, even though at this point the reader shares his or her secret view with characters such as the landlord and Fagin. The point is not so much who is doing the spying in the world of the novel, but more that the reader finds the shared experience pleasurable.

We are also provided with a very detailed description of the vantage point from which Claypole's spying is conducted, one which is almost as lovingly detailed as is the 'place of espial' in the public house.

> These stairs are a part of the bridge; they consist of three flights. Just below the end of the second, going down, the stone wall on the left terminates in an ornamental pilaster facing towards the Thames. At this point the lower steps widen: so that a person turning that angle of the wall, is necessarily unseen by any others on the stairs who chance to be above him, if only a step. The countryman looked hastily round, when he reached this point; and as there seemed no better place of concealment, and, the tide being out, there was plenty of room, he slipped aside, with his back to the pilaster,

> and there waited: pretty certain that they would come no lower, and that even if he could not hear what was said, he could follow them again, with safety. (408)

The use of the present tense at the start of this passage marks a further move in the involvement of the reader in surveillance activities, and it also enacts a largely unremarked shift from inside to outside of the diegesis: these stairs *are* part of the bridge and they *consist* of three flights – not just in the imaginative world of the novel but in the world of Dickens's contemporary readers. Here the author underwrites his realist imperative by sliding almost imperceptibly into non-fictional description: even the present-day reader assumes, on his or her encounter with this passage, that there really was a London bridge which really did have these characteristics. (The description of the secret vantage point in the public house, in contrast, is given in the standard narrative past tense.)

We are being moved, in other words, in the direction of the extra-fictional world in this passage, just as Noah Claypole is being moved slowly and surely in the direction of incorporation into the legal machine. By the end of the novel he has become an Informer, reporting publicans whom he has lured into dispensing brandy during church time. As Mr Brownlow's private surveillance of Monks reaches a natural conclusion, the formal machinery of law and order appropriates Noah Claypole to its own uses. Surveillance, which for most of the novel has appeared to be the prerogative of the criminal classes, is ultimately incorporated into the shady outer suburbs of authority – and we the readers have in turn been incorporated into these same acts of surveillance. We are thus positioned to accept the surveillance of the state as something in which we participate.

Another clear way in which Dickens integrates the illicit surveillance activities with the forces of established authority is, appropriately, in the final trial scene. Here Fagin the watcher becomes Fagin the watched, the objectifier objectified.

> The court was paved, from floor to roof, with human faces. Inquisitive and eager eyes peered from every inch of space. From the rail before the dock, away into the sharpest angle of the smallest corner in the galleries, all looks were fixed upon one man – the Jew. Before him and behind: above, below, on the right and on the left: he seemed to stand surrounded by a firmament, all bright with gleaming eyes. (466)

Sikes has been pursued by imagined eyes – and has succeeded in hanging himself and sparing the judicial system the effort – while Fagin is surrounded by actual eyes: he is reduced to an object of vision, unable in any real way to interact with those who look at him or to reciprocate their gaze.[6] And these eyes are all looking at – at what we, too, are observing.

The panoptical narrative

The prospect of interpersonal visual interaction with Fagin in the condemned cell is too terrible for a single warder: '[Fagin] grew so terrible, at last, in all the tortures of his evil conscience, that one man could not bear to sit there, eyeing him alone; and so the two kept watch together' (470). But the sight of the conscience-racked Fagin is certainly not deemed too terrible for the reader to contemplate, indeed there is a palpably sadistic indulgence in Dickens's prolonged description of Fagin's suffering that calls to mind Fagin's earlier sadistic relishing of Oliver's trembling limbs. Too terrible for a warder to contemplate, Fagin's exposure to the objectifying gaze of the crowd – and the reader – is stretched out over eight pages in a chapter with a title that clearly evokes the genre of the sensational prison account or confession:

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[6] It is well-known that Dickens used accounts of Jonathan Wild's career in constructing the character of Fagin. Lucy Moore quotes interestingly from *Mist's Weekly Journal* of 29 May 1725, describing the vast crowds that turned out to witness Wild's execution: 'In all that innumerable crowd, there was not one pitying eye to be seen, nor one compassionate word to be heard; but on the contrary, wherever he came, there was nothing but hollowing and huzzas, as if it had been on a triumph'. See Lucy Moore, *The Thieves' Opera: The Remarkable Lives and Deaths of Jonathan Wild, Thief-Taker, and Jack Shepherd, House-Breaker*. London: Viking, 1997, p. 254.

'Fagin's Last Night alive'. The whole chapter invites surrender to the sadistic gaze, and to indulgence in that spirit of the lynch mob that is condemned when Oliver is chased by the crowd after Mr Brownlow's pocket is picked.

I have suggested that at the heart of *Oliver Twist* there is a paradox. On the one hand, the reader is presented with an ideologically directed belief in the power of the eye to both perceive and display the truth, a belief that skills of interpersonal perception and acuity are sufficient to pierce and subdue the concealed crimes and secrecies of a burgeoning industrial society and its urban conglomerations. But at the same time the novel progressively underwrites the judicial appropriation of techniques of surveillance that would not be necessary were it the case that truth and villainy are displayed for the honest citizen to read off the faces of the good and the bad.

It is also the case that the narrative techniques and perspectives of the novel contribute to this legitimation of judicial surveillance by inviting participation in forms of seeing which are non-reciprocal and which mimic the activities of the voyeur and the spy. Fagin has relished the powerlessness and fear of Oliver: we are invited to relish the powerlessness and fear of Fagin. Fagin uses spies: Mr Brownlow has subjected Monks to comparable forms of surveillance the results of which are offered to the reader to enjoy along with Monks's discomfiture. Fagin peers through a concealed window at those who are unaware that they are being watched and overheard – just as the reader sees and overhears Dickens's characters at their most private moments and when they are presented as believing themselves to be alone and unobserved.

> The house to which Oliver had been conveyed, was in the neighbourhood of Whitechapel. The Jew stopped for an instant at the corner of the street; and, glancing suspiciously round, crossed the road, and struck off in the direction of Spitalfields.
>
> The mud lay thick upon the stones, and a black mist hung over the streets; the rain fell sluggishly down, and

> everything felt cold and clammy to the touch. It seemed just the night when it befitted such a being as the Jew to be abroad. As he glided stealthily along, creeping beneath the shelter of the walls and doorways, the hideous old man seemed like some loathsome reptile, engendered in the slime and darkness through which he moved: crawling forth, by night, in search of some rich offal for a meal. (186)

Seemed to whom? The passage is a disturbing one for a number of reasons. For a modern reader it strikes immediate chords with anti-semitic Nazi films in which cuts between shots from Jewish ghettos and shots of swarming rats make a similar identification as is made between 'the Jew' and 'some loathsome reptile' in the quoted passage. The phrase 'such a being as the Jew' has a generalizing effect and seems to grope towards 'such a being as a Jew'. Reading this passage myself I am very conscious of being positioned in a 'looking-down' relation to Fagin; Genette's and Cohn's objections notwithstanding I find the concept of omniscience unavoidable here. And the omniscience of the narrative focus appears to go along with a sense of physical elevation. I am not sure quite why this is – perhaps because we assume that reptiles are low on the ground so that to picture Fagin as reptile is suggest that we are looking down upon him from a height.

At the same time, a phrase such as 'everything felt cold and clammy to the touch' implies physical presence, for we do not, surely, assume that it is Fagin's sense of the cold and clammy that is being evoked: he is at one with his surroundings, whereas 'we', as readers, have a reaction to the cold and clammy atmosphere and objects because we, along with the narrator, are *not* at one with them. The passage thus positions the reader in a dry, clean, warm, superior position, looking down on, and reacting with horror to, the wet, clammy, cold and loathsome.[7]

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[7] Susan R. Horton includes this passage among a number of others from a range of Dickens's works, in all of which words such as 'seems' or 'appears' are used to indicate an exact match between how the observer interprets something, and what is actually the case. Regarding the passage in question, Horton comments, 'again what seems to be is what feels true to the spirit'

We are now in a position to outline an 'economy of the gaze' in *Oliver Twist.*

1. Good and evil are displayed on the face and are impossible to conceal.
2. Good people can be divided into two categories:

   The innocent good, especially pure women and children, whose main function is to be seen rather than to see; although they can perceive wickedness and good, they can also be deceived.

   The wise good, normally men, or women like Nancy who have lost their innocence, whose active gaze searches out and punishes wickedness, who are hard to deceive, and who generally see rather than are seen.

3. The wicked do all in their power to avoid being observed, especially by the wise good. The eyes of others are recognized as a principal danger by all the evil characters, who seek to avoid them. As a result, the forces of good need a machinery of surveillance.
4. Moral rectitude is associated with being the subject rather than the object of the look, especially at the end of the novel when the spies are incorporated into the legal system and villains such as Sikes and Fagin become the objects of a moral-judicial avenging gaze. The plot and its resolution in the novel consist of a gradual transference of the active gaze from the wicked to the good, and a gradual passivization and visual objectification of the wicked. This process allows the reader to share the narrator's voyeurism and scopophilia with a clear conscience, and to feel part of – incorporated in – the machinery of judicial surveillance outlined in the novel.

(see Susan R. Horton, *The Reader in the Dickens World,* London: Macmillan Press. 1981, p. 51). But as I have argued, the question is: seems *to whom?* As no other character is present, it can only be to the narrator, who, as Cohn reminds us, knows as much about Fagin as the author (who has created them both) decides. The passage clearly appeals to pre-existing prejudices in *readers:* men like Fagin (or, worse, Jews) are as bad as they look.

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John Brenkman has recently argued that a 'paradox inherent in novel writing' is that '[t]here is no novel without omniscience, yet every omniscience is limited; therefore, there is no omniscience'[8]. Well, one can see what he means, of course, but there is a sense in which recent dissatisfactions with terms such as 'omniscient narrator' can, if we are not careful, obscure an important set of distinctions. What a narrator knows about his or her characters, and even more what a reader knows about them *and how this knowledge is obtained*, together constitute a vital element in the chain that links 'what characters know' at one end with 'what ideological position the work as a whole reflects and underwrites' at the other. If we are unhappy with the phrase 'what a narrator knows' then we may replace it with something such as 'what a narrative allows the reader to know and what it hides from him or her'. But the example of *Oliver Twist* demonstrates the important links between a number of levels of both metaphorical and literal looking that can be found in a novel. These include: (i) what characters see and how they look; (ii) what the narrator sees and how he or she 'looks'; (iii) what the reader sees and what acts of looking he or she is encouraged to identify with and partake in; and, finally, (iv) what forms of looking and surveillance a culture sanctions, and what forms it proscribes.

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[8] John Brenkman, 'On Voice'. *Novel: A Forum for Fiction* 33(3), Summer 2000, 281–306, p. 288.

"Lessons in the Art of Instruction": Education in Theory and Practice in Anne Brontë's *Agnes Grey*

CECILIA WADSÖ LECAROS

Anne Brontë's first novel *Agnes Grey* (1847) has often been seen as a rewriting of the author's own experience as a governess. Although there is no reason to dispute autobiographical references, the generic qualities of Agnes's experience must not be reduced to individual episodes. The 1840s brought forward an intense interest in education, evident in the publication of numerous educational tracts, as well as in the establishment of new bodies of education for women, and in an active debate in the press. The educational issues brought up in *Agnes Grey* adhere closely to those emphasised in the contemporary debate. This article therefore proposes that Anne Brontë's novel should be viewed as a deliberate contribution to the discussion on female education in the 1840s.

Recent scholarship on *Agnes Grey* has examined the didactic intentions of the story. Elizabeth Langland, for instance, argues that "*Agnes Grey* is foremost a novel dealing with education; it is a novel *of* education (Agnes's) and *about* education (her attempts as governess to educate her charges) whose goal is to bring about an education in the reader" (1989: 97). Maria Frawley likewise writes, "Brontë's rhetoric enables her to emphasize the issues of autonomy and self-understanding at stake in Agnes's quest to define herself through her experiences as a governess" (1996: 85). Both Langland and Frawley classify Brontë's novel as a female version of the *Bildungsroman*, and although their arguments are convincing, the notion of development in the novel needs to be expanded to incorporate contemporary pedagogical aspects. In the character and actions of her protagonist, Brontë found a way to examine the common mortifications of the governess, and to discuss the actual difficulties of conveying instruction and being a successful pedagogue. I will therefore argue that the novel is not only structured to delineate Agnes's personal and professional development, but also in a way conducive to an examination of central aspects of nineteenth-century female education.

Agnes Grey is a representative example of the governess novel genre in the sense that the middle-class heroine takes up work as a direct consequence of her father's bankruptcy; she suffers the disobligingness of upstart and snobbish mistresses, and is ultimately relieved of the governess yoke by marriage to a clergyman (see Wadsö Lecaros 2001). The novel includes several key concepts of the genre, such as social and physical marginalization, female development, and discussions of motherhood and femininity.

More important for my argument here, however, are some deviations from genre conventions. For instance, the contemporary reader would most likely note with some astonishment that Agnes actually desires to go out as a governess. Anna Jameson wrote only the year before *Agnes Grey* was published that the "occupation of governess is sought merely through necessity" (1846: 6), and the reluctance of taking up work was emphasised in many governess novels as well as in the contemporary debate. The Greys oppose Agnes's taking up governess work, but their opposition is based on her youth and unsuitability for the task, rather than on moral or class-related reasons. Another significant digression from genre conventions is that, unlike most governess heroines, Agnes turns out to be a poor teacher who gains but little influence over her charges. By presenting Agnes as a flawed heroine, Brontë manages not only to highlight the precarious situation of governesses but, more importantly, to demonstrate some shortcomings of the contemporary educational system.

In order to identify and discuss central educational aspects in *Agnes Grey*, this article will focus on the multifaceted character of the novel. I will argue that, although seemingly a straightforward account of a young woman's mishaps in a consecutive chain of events, Brontë's novel is studded with paradoxes. My argument will be based on the assumption that the dialogic relation between the different layers of the text reveals important contradictions and inconsistencies concerning educational ideals and maternal roles. As this article aims to show, the debate on female education of the 1840s furnishes us with the tools needed to bring the covert text up to the surface and thereby to disclose and analyse the paradoxes embedded in *Agnes Grey*.

Nineteenth-century female education

All through the nineteenth century, critics were resolute and unanimous in their disapproval of the condition of female education. One core issue in the debate concerning female education was the keenly felt discrepancy between an educational ideal and the perceived reality. From writers such as Priscilla Wakefield, Hannah More, and Elizabeth Hamilton at the turn of the century, to later critics as diverse as Sarah Ellis, Dinah Mulock Craik, Elizabeth Sewell and Bessie Rayner Parkes, it was unanimously claimed that female education was not serving its purpose. It was contended that the future lives of young girls were not taken into consideration in their education. Instead of being trained for household management and maternity, they were educated purely for the marriage market. In 1843, Sarah Stickney Ellis quite typically argued, “the present education of the women of England does not [...] convert them from helpless children, into such characters as all women must be, in order to be either esteemed or admired” (1843: 62). Two decades later, another educational writer maintained that girls were trained “for the mere effect of husband-hunting” instead of “the art of husband-keeping” (Mair 1866: 109).

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, social development and the rise of the middle classes created an increased interest in and need for education for professional reasons. Since they lacked signs of power such as titles and landed wealth, the middle classes based their increased power on aspects of productivity and ability (cf. Levy 1991: 24n). To some extent, education therefore served as a means of social advancement. The fact that middle-class parents sought to furnish their daughters with an education that would enable them to marry well should be seen in this light, marriage being the only way of upward social mobility open to women at the time.

In connection with the social importance of female education, its division into so-called 'sound education' and 'accomplishments' is relevant. Sound education primarily included English in all its branches – that is, reading, writing, spelling, and grammar – history, geography, and arithmetic. Sometimes science, in the form of botany and geology, was also included. The accomplishments, on the other hand, consisted of French and other foreign languages, drawing, music, dancing, and fine needlework. The division of subjects into two separate categories manifests two distinct educational aims. The chief reason why accomplishments were given prominence over intellectual training in many families was their high social value, especially on the marriage market. The reciprocal aspects of the two groups should not be underestimated, however, and sometimes the two components were overlapping. When science for women became fashionable, botany almost became an accomplishment, and, vice versa, there were girls who studied foreign languages for the express purpose of making use of their skills as translators or teachers.

In *Agnes Grey*, the two components of female education are juxtaposed on several levels, and the differences in education between the protagonist and her pupils are surface in social standing as well as ambitions. All through the book, Agnes's own educational background comes into conflict with the focus on accomplishments as a means of social advancement. Since the Greys have not furnished their daughter with an accomplished education, she faces trouble having to teach and practise these subjects. At the beginning of the story she admits, "I had not been taught to cut out a single garment; and except plain hemming and seaming there was little I could do" (67). Therefore, having to take charge of Mary Ann Bloomfield's clothes is troublesome for Agnes, as seen in her constant worry that the little girl will ruin her clothes. Later, with the Murrays, Agnes admits that "[o]f fancy-work I knew nothing but what I gathered from my pupil and my own observation" (122), thus revealing her lack of knowledge of fine needlework, which is actually one of the accomplishments Mrs Murray wishes her daughters to perfect. As will be further discussed below, Agnes is juxtaposed with her pupil Rosalie Murray in a way that enables Brontë to play on the discrepancy between the sound education and the accomplishments in an unexpected way.

Agnes's lack of training in accomplishments is primarily explained by her own family's social standing – Mr Grey is a clergyman living in fairly poor circumstances. However, there is another significant reason, namely the fact that Agnes's parents have shielded their daughters from any association with upper-class life, where accomplishments would have been in focus. Having broken with her own family upon marrying the poor Mr Grey, Mrs Grey has rejected the kind of life sought after by most people Agnes comes across in the course of the novel. Being the disowned daughter of a squire, Mrs Grey offers a contrasting image to the urge for social mobility found in both Agnes's mistresses, Mrs Bloomfield and Mrs Murray. To some extent, she is a victim of circumstances, however, since her background has not provided her with the education needed to properly educate her daughter for governess work.

Agnes's problem

Drawing on the perceived incongruity between the rational educational ideal as presented in contemporary educational writing and the perceived reality among many middle and upper-class families, Anne Brontë places her inadequately educated heroine in the difficult position of defending an ideal she is not capable of embodying. Through the obstacles that Agnes encounters, Brontë can offer a critique of contemporary female education.

Like conduct books, didactic fiction to some extent has the function of providing examples, held up to the reader either as warnings or as standards to follow. The opening lines of *Agnes Grey* assert that "[a]ll true histories contain instruction" (61), and by emphasising the proposed accuracy and the didactic aspects of the story, Brontë sets a tone of realism and provides a sense of direction.

Whose instruction the story proposes to retell is not stated, however. Purporting to disclose the narrator's own painfully gained experience, it lacks the model behaviour often presented in didactic writing. The fact that there is neither an ideal governess in the novel, nor any ideal mothers, is a significant deviation from the governess novel genre. The importance of this aspect becomes apparent as the story unfolds, since Brontë's strategy is to expose problems rather than to offer advice or answers. Although contemporary reviews did not pay attention to this aspect of the novel, readers' responses suggest that her method was successful and that the novel indeed was perceived as useful. In the 1860s, Lady Amberley (Bertrand Russell's mother) noted in her diary that she would "like to give [*Agnes Grey*] to every family with a governess" and that she would "read it through again when I have a governess to remind me to be human" (quoted in Thomson 1956: 53).

From the very opening of the novel there are signs of Agnes's unsuitability as a governess, although she does not voice any awareness of this herself until later in the novel. Her reaction to her first setbacks harbours a certain amount of self-defence, since she claims that things will be better once she has adjusted to the situation. Soon, however, she is forced to admit her lack of control and she becomes more explicit concerning her own limitations. Agnes says, "[m]y task of instruction and surveillance, instead of becoming easier as my charges and I got better accustomed to each other, became more arduous as their characters unfolded" (84). Here, it is clear that she does not acknowledge her own responsibility in her pupils' formation. Brontë's contemporary Mary Maurice, a sister of F. D. Maurice, argued the necessity for teachers to adapt to the individual needs of her pupils: "A wise governess will not only study the characters of her pupils, but also their tastes, and will adapt her instructions accordingly" (1849: 84). All through the novel, Agnes's difficulties are to a large extent based on her inability to adapt.

Reflecting on her work as a governess, Agnes states, "my design [...] was not to amuse, but to benefit those whom it might concern [...] if a parent has, therefrom, gathered any useful hint, or an unfortunate governess received thereby the slightest benefit, I am well rewarded for my pains" (94). The rhetoric of the nineteenth-century conduct book is apparent in this phrase. In the preface of manuals and other kinds of advice books, the author typically expresses a wish that her advice will be of help to the reader. Likewise, in manuals explicitly dealing with governess work, the writer usually leans on her long experience when recommending young readers to certain approaches or pedagogical methods.

Long before Agnes reveals that she actually has an educational "design", it has become apparent that a plan and structure is exactly what she lacks. Brontë exposes the inadequacy of her protagonist through this contradictory statement, and the pedagogical discussion comes into sight, as these paradoxes are uncovered. Unlike Cates Baldridge, who argues that *Agnes Grey* "is a pedagogic treatise of sorts, though the author herself doesn't fully realise it" and that "the text's true subject is so difficult to pin down because its pedagogical concerns are not 'narrow' at all" (1993: 39), I would argue that Anne Brontë's discussion on female education should be seen as highly specialised, and, furthermore, highly cognisant. To verify this, I propose to bring up and examine three issues connected to discipline and maternity that come under scrutiny in the novel. The first and perhaps most important topic concerns the discipline and responsibility of the teacher herself; the second one is the assumption that there is a relation between discipline and motherhood; and the third issue is based on the idea that regularity and discipline are necessary for educational improvement.

The discipline of the teacher

Instead of depicting a pedagogical model, Anne Brontë chose to equip her protagonist with characteristics that the contemporary debate identified as vital parts of the problem of female education. Agnes's lack of preparation for her task is presented as the root of her disciplinary difficulties. M. A. Stodart's *Principles of Education Practicably Considered* (1844) outlined some of the perceived deficiencies as depending on the low professional quality of teachers in England. Pointing out that many governesses were badly educated, too young and too inexperienced, and therefore acting without any system, Stodart expressed a representative attitude at the time. She described the problem of young governesses in the following way:

> [Y]oung persons are necessarily little acquainted with the depth of wickedness in their own hearts; this fearful truth discloses itself in its length and breadth as we travel along our pilgrim-way. Without a knowledge of the wickedness of our own hearts, we know not the difficulty, and we are unable to exercise the habit of self-control; and how is it possible to control others, if we have not learned to control ourselves? (1844: 11)

If Stodart's reasoning is applied to the novel, a link between Agnes's lack of self-control and her initial lack of self-realisation can be established. Before going out as a governess, her naïve perception of teaching and education makes her underestimate her future troubles: "How delightful it would be to be a governess! [...] Whatever others said, I felt I was fully competent to the task: the clear remembrance of my own thoughts and feelings in early childhood would be a surer guide than the instructions of the most mature adviser" (69). By thus connecting Agnes's perception of teaching to her own childhood reminiscences, Brontë shows that Agnes cannot differentiate between herself and the educational context she finds herself in as a teacher.

Not having "learned to control" herself, as Stodart put it, and therefore not able to distance herself from her own immediate feelings, Agnes is unable to distance herself from her own childhood recollections. At Wellwood, Agnes on several occasions refers to her own childhood when reflecting on her pupils' disobedience. When she threatens to punish Mary Ann for her naughtiness by not helping her, Agnes finds the child's lack of emotional reaction incredible. Thinking about herself, Agnes ponders, "[w]ith me, at her age, or under, neglect and disgrace were the most dreadful of punishments; but on her they made no impression" (88). By considering herself as a behavioural norm, Agnes is blind to any individual needs of her pupils.

Her lack of self-knowledge therefore leads her right into the lion's den of unruly charges and unaccommodating employers. Initially using "great labour and patience" (81) to make the Bloomfield children work, her persistence quickly flags, and she soon contemplates more drastic methods. Agnes's lack of self-control becomes increasingly evident as she reports her futile attempts to curb her pupils. Although claiming that "[p]atience,-firmness and perseverance were my only weapons; and these I resolved to use to the utmost" (85), her thoughts on suitable ways of penalizing her charges reveal her frustration at her own powerlessness. Thus, she reasons, "[a] few boxes on the ear" (84) or "a good birch rod would have been serviceable" (85), and before long she shakes six-year-old Mary Ann "by the shoulders, [...] pull[s] her long hair, [and] put[s] her in the corner" (88). Unlike most novelists depicting governess work, Brontë is explicit about the physical violence Agnes resorts to. Although it may be assumed that corporal punishment was commonly used in Victorian schoolrooms, educational advice books were generally explicit in their condemnation of this. Herself a governess, Emily Peart, for instance, advised fellow teachers never to show they had lost their temper (1868: 49), since that would expose a weakness the pupils could easily turn into an advantage.

Back again at the parsonage after her dismissal from the Bloomfields, Agnes's own filial defiance is referred to. Having at this point begun to reflect on her own situation, Agnes asks her mother whether she was an obedient child herself and is told, "[g]enerally, but [...] you were somewhat faulty in regard to temper". Agnes defines her difficulties with the Bloomfield children as based on their lack of emotional response to her disciplinary efforts: "I should have been glad to see these children sulky sometimes [...] for then I could have understood them". Mrs Grey points out that children's characters are not their own fault, telling Agnes, "you cannot expect stone to be as pliable as clay" (111). By linking children's behaviour to the manners and attitudes of their parents, Mrs Grey expresses a common attitude at the time. As Amanda Wicks wrote in *Education; or, The Governesses' Advocate*, "Until PARENTS *feel* their real position, and the importance and responsibility attached to it, the Governess will not be appreciated [...] according to her merits; for if the child is neglected by them, she must not expect consideration" (1846: 11). The binary opposition between parents and governesses was a common issue in the governess debate all through the nineteenth century, but what makes this interesting in *Agnes Grey* is the way Brontë represents the responsibility of parents and governess respectively. Agnes is not capable of fulfilling her share of the arrangement, and her criticism of the Bloomfields therefore to some extent reflects back on her own inability.

Discipline and motherhood

Books on education from the mid-nineteenth century, some of which were either written by or specifically directed to mothers, often state a connection between maternity and the implementation of discipline. According to the anonymous mother behind *Hints on Early Education: Addressed to Mothers*, the responsibility of education ought to rest with parents, since they brought the children into this world "and transmitted to them their own evil disposition and temper" (1852: 4).

Apart from hereditary influence, any lack of a judicious execution of the maternal mission was assumed to be visited on the children in one way or another. *Agnes Grey* suggests such a connection between the maternal characteristics of a woman and the discipline displayed by her children. In the form of three examples – Mrs Grey, Mrs Bloomfield, and Mrs Murray – the novel proposes that mothers who shield their children from life and its potential difficulties do them harm, since they thereby fail to prepare them for life. By weaving an elastic web of maternal figures, each one casting reflections on the others, Anne Brontë examines different views of the matter. Maternity is invariably questioned in the novel, and even the surrogate mother herself – the governess – seems to lack the necessary qualifications. To contemporary readers, this kind of depiction of a governess would presumably be interpreted as severe social criticism on the part of the writer; most governess heroines display maternal and pedagogical skills that surpass those of the biological mothers of the novel.

Brontë's novel implies that maternal indulgence leads to a lack of discipline in the children. By demonstrating parallels between the Greys and the families in which Agnes works, certain focal points are highlighted. In most governess novels, the heroine's family is set off from the employers in order to depict them as vastly superior on a moral, albeit not financial, level. In *Agnes Grey*, however, attention is drawn to certain similarities between the two agents on the governess market.

This is especially striking in the portrait of Mrs Grey. At first glance, the picture given of Mrs Grey seems to be close to a feminine ideal, most significantly in her capability as mother and teacher to her daughters. Being "at once highly accomplished, well informed, and fond of employment" (62) she combines three important nineteenth-century domestic virtues in a way that no other female character of the book does. Being a hardworking woman is also what ultimately serves to redeem Mrs Grey in the novel, but she nevertheless comes under attack for not having prepared her daughters sufficiently for life. The reader is told that, "being so clever and diligent herself, she was never tempted to trust her affairs to a deputy, but on the contrary, [...] whatever was the business in hand, she was apt to think that no one could do it so well as herself" (66). Agnes's elder sister Mary has admittedly been taught needlework and other household chores, but Agnes herself professes total ignorance of these matters. She carefully notes that, since she was not accepted as a helper by her mother and elder sister, her "idleness was not entirely without excuse" (67). This statement is significant, since it acknowledges Agnes's awareness of her own deficiencies.

Mrs Grey's shortcomings serve to prepare the reader for the maternal attitudes that prevail in the novel. Agnes's subsequent frustration with her mistresses' treatment of their children must therefore be seen in relation to Mrs Greys' way of treating her youngest daughter in the first part of the novel. Although they are differently positioned in life, misdirected maternal concern nonetheless characterises all mothers in the novel. Brontë's disapproval of overprotective mothers seems clear; Mrs Grey's shielding Agnes from labour is paralleled in Mrs Bloomfield's exclamations that her little darlings have hitherto been too young for a governess and Mrs Murray's demand that education should be as easy and as little troublesome as possible for her children. At the very end of the novel, the circle is closed when Agnes herself gives reason for concern, stating that her children "shall want no good thing that a mother's care can give" (251). Whether she by this time has learned the true basis for maternal care is not disclosed.

The lack of preparation for life is detrimental for all children in the novel, although most explicitly manifested in Agnes herself and in Rosalie Murray. The teacher and the pupil are parallels, both having been spoilt by their mothers and both being victims of bad education. Due to their different stations in life, their prospects differ, however; while Agnes has to go out to work, Rosalie is destined for a successful marriage. Nonetheless, Brontë makes their histories correspond in a significant way. The young women are both around eighteen when their lives take a dramatic turn. Agnes decides to go out as a governess to help her family after her father's financial misfortunes, and Rosalie makes up her mind to catch Sir Thomas Ashby since he is the richest man in the neighbourhood. Both girls are driven by prospects of an improved financial situation, and they are stubbornly set on their ventures.

Neither of them realises what the future holds, however. Agnes says, "I should like to be a governess [...] I'm sure I could manage delightfully" (68), while Rosalie exclaims, "I *must* have Ashby Park, whoever shares it with me" (172). Both girls are incapable of recognizing the potential dangers of their decisions, and interestingly enough, their mothers do not hinder them from carrying through their ventures. After having initially been opposed to Agnes's plans, Mrs Grey soon actively helps her daughter to find a situation and she thereby supports her in her decision. Mrs Murray is even more vigorous in helping her daughter in her pursuit. The main difference between Mrs Grey and Mrs Murray is that the latter is blinded by the promising prospects of having her daughter well married and therefore does not realise the dangers of her daughter's ideas. Agnes is shocked at how her employer is rushing her daughter into marriage: "I was amazed and horrified at Mrs Murray's heartlessness, or want of thought for the real good of her child" (194), but significantly enough, she never shows the same surprise at her own mother's willingness to send her out as a governess.

It is well known that mothers in Victorian fiction seldom function as helpers to their daughters (see e.g. Manheimer 1979, Shuttleworth 1982). If they are not conspicuously absent, mothers tend to be either foolish or dangerous for their offspring. The narrative function of an 'unmotherly' mother is to give room for the heroine's development, and Anne Brontë uses this device in an unexpected manner. In contrast with Charlotte Brontë's governess heroine Jane Eyre, who is motherless and brought up under the influence of a fairy-tale-like evil stepmother in the shape of her aunt, Agnes Grey's mother is alive, well-meaning and supportive. Nonetheless, her way of mothering Agnes leads to problems, which the young governess seems unable to alleviate.

Due to her social background and her children's young age, Mrs Bloomfield is in a different position than the other mother characters of the novel. To some extent, the Bloomfields may be seen as prefiguring the Murrays, but more importantly, Mrs Bloomfield's attitude should be connected with her social background, which is vastly different from that of either Mrs Grey or Mrs Murray. The upstart Mrs Bloomfield, who lacks both knowledge and interest in education and childrearing, employs a governess to take the children off her hands and because she realises that a nurse will not be sufficient to raise her children to social respectability. A prime example of social mobility of the 1830s and 1840s, Mrs Bloomfield thus engages a governess to perform the work she is not capable of herself, but which she nonetheless realises is necessary for social advancement.

Discipline and regularity

In line with the nineteenth-century struggle for progress and development, educational writers stressed the virtues of time-management and a methodological approach to studies and schoolroom work. According to Anna Jameson, "[t]he methodological arrangement and conscientious discharge of [the] daily duties" (1846: 46) was of essential importance in the schoolroom, and Mary Maurice declared that "[o]rder, method, and punctuality, are the three secret springs on which education should move" (1849: 44). The mechanical metaphor used is typical and enhances the view of education as an active process of formation and of progress.

Educational manuals decreed that in order to prevent disorder the first thing a governess ought to do upon entering a situation was to introduce a plan for her pupils' education. Stodart, who deplored that "[f]ew women engaged in instruction are acting on any system, or have so much as a system formed in their own minds" (11-12), urged governesses to put a schedule on the wall for the children and their parents to see, and to adhere to it. Sarah Ellis in a similar manner discussed the importance of laying out a plan of the work proposed in the schoolroom and elsewhere. Although not wishing to regulate every hour of life, she stipulated some general rules, the first being "to accustom yourselves every morning to say what you are intending to do; and every night, with equal faithfulness, to say what you have actually done during the day" (1842: 33).

Many nineteenth-century didactic novels depict early risers who work efficiently, always putting duty before pleasure. In *Agnes Grey*, a discussion on issues such as regularity and time-management is present, but instead of depicting the protagonist as a model in this respect, Brontë shows us what happens when there is no regularity. Especially at Horton Lodge, Agnes repeatedly refers to the irregular manners of her pupils:

> Sometimes Matilda and John would determine 'to get all the plaguy business [i.e. their lessons] over before

> breakfast,' and send the maid to call me up at half-past five, without any scruple or apology; sometimes, I was told to be ready precisely at six, and, having dressed in a hurry, came down to an empty room and after having waited a long time in suspense, discovered that they had changed their minds, and were still in bed. (127)

At a later point, Agnes laconically comments, "where everything was left to the caprices of Miss Matilda and her sister, there could be no order or regularity" (157). So prominent is Rosalie's lack of regularity that she actually coquettes about it when circumventing Hatfield's advances as he asks her when he might see her again: "if I would, I could not inform you, for I am so im-methodological, I never can tell to-day what I shall do to-morrow" (171).

Not only the ways of the Murray girls, but also the fact that their governess is not in a position to take charge over them deserves attention. By depicting Agnes as passive and failing to maintain any order or regulation at all, Brontë discloses the inaptness of the governess. Although both the Bloomfields and the Murrays are opposed to their children having to exert themselves, and especially Mrs Murray's ideas prevent Agnes from exercising an authoritative influence, Agnes is never told not to work according to a system or to follow a schedule. The result of her own shortcomings – lack of order and method – is that her pupils belong to "a class of young persons [...] who rise every morning trusting to the day to provide its own occupations and amusements", as Ellis put it (31). It could therefore be argued that by excluding the concept of regularity – perhaps the most common issue in mid-nineteenth-century educational manuals – from Agnes's pedagogical awareness, Brontë manages to show her incompetence in a deliberate way. Just like Agnes's inability to control her pupils at Wellwood can be connected to her not having learned to control herself, her lack of success concerning regularity can be traced back to her childhood. It is clear that Agnes has not been trained according to the contemporary educational model of order and regularity. Neither has she been entrusted with work. As will be remembered, Mrs Grey is initially referred to as a woman who "was never tempted to trust her affairs to a deputy" (66). Not until the end of the novel, when Agnes sets up a school with her mother, does Mrs Grey see her as capable, and accepts her as her co-worker. At this point, her painfully gained experience has given her an insight into the art of instruction.

Conclusion

By way of summing up my argument that *Agnes Grey* should be seen as a deliberate contribution to the contemporary educational debate, Anne Brontë's novel will be briefly compared with Eliza Cheap's *The Nursery Governess*, which was published in 1845. Cheap belongs to the plethora of nineteenth-century writers of whom not much, if anything, is known. An author of didactic religious books, she wrote, for instance, *The Week, or the Practical Duties of the Fourth Commandment* and *My Station and Its Duties: A Narrative for Girls Going to Service,* both of which went through numerous editions in the 1830s and 1840s.

The Nursery Governess is a novel with an overshadowing didactic message. In a more overt, and according to modern taste perhaps less subtle, manner than Brontë, Cheap discusses key issues in connection with female education. The plot revolves around the establishment of a Miss Egmont, who educates governesses. Miss Egmont has all that Agnes Grey lacks: experience, maturity, and wisdom. Her good judgement is transferred to her young students who learn to be good teachers although they, just like Agnes, face difficulties at the outset. The book ends with a section of advice for educators, thereby blurring genre conventions. Through the presence of a plot, the book is a novel, but its didactic message is so strong that it almost becomes an advice book.

Already in the *Preface*, Cheap makes her intention clear:

> The design of this little narrative is to show by facts derived from long observation, the nature and value of the system recommended to the notice of parents, and of nursery governesses, who should go hand in hand, in

> one prayerful, sincere, and upright purpose of seeking in faith the best, and the eternal interest of children. (1845: xvi)

As for contents, this statement could serve as an epigram for *Agnes Grey* too. Like Eliza Cheap, Anne Brontë appears to have intended to bring up certain educational issues for discussion. However, while Cheap chose to share her knowledge in a very straightforward way by presenting model examples to follow, Brontë presented her version of contemporary educational difficulties through the inherent contradictions embedded in her story.

As will be remembered, Agnes states, "my design [...] was not to amuse, but to benefit those whom it might concern [...] if a parent has, therefrom, gathered any useful hint, or an unfortunate governess received thereby the slightest benefit, I am well rewarded for my pains" (94). Like Cheap, Brontë introduces employers and fellow governesses as expected beneficiaries of her text. However, there are several statements in Cheap's *Preface* that are powerfully contrasted in *Agnes Grey*. The "long observation" Cheap bases her narrative on is demonstrably absent in Brontë's novel, since Agnes is forced into difficulties having neither experience nor guidance. Brontë offers no assistance from a Miss Egmont, and Agnes's subsequent failure is demonstrably underlined by this want of guidance. Additionally, there is no perceptible "system" recommended, either in the Grey family or in any of the other families in the novel. By making educational practices the results of whims rather than of structured routines, Brontë emphasises the undefined position of the governess. As I have shown, this lack of system is partly Agnes' fault, but could to some extent have to do with her parents' and employers' actually hindering her from implementing such a system.

Furthermore, while Cheap advocates cooperation between teacher and parents, this is unattainable in Agnes' case. At first, her mother excludes her from the working community of the parental home by considering her too young, and later her employers are not interested in sharing an interest in their children's welfare with her. The last aspect mentioned by Cheap is the importance of religion, and although Agnes is a clergyman's daughter, her faith is not a vital part of her struggle with her situation. Unlike a number of governess novels, *Agnes Grey* does not perceive religion as the answer to the governess's problems.

This article has shown that Anne Brontë's writing was more intricately related to the pedagogical debate than has hitherto been acknowledged. *Agnes Grey* should be seen as a conscious contribution to the debate in the 1840s, not only concerning the plight of the governess, but also concerning female education in general.

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Narrative and Knowledge: On a Motif in Ross Chambers.[1]

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The question of literature's purpose has received a range of answers centred on the basic elements of instruction and delight. Didacticism and hedonism go hand in hand in the theories of, for example, Horace, Sidney, and Dryden. Similarly, for nineteenth century readers and writers of novels, Anthony Trollope' s idea of fiction as "'Rational Amusement'" is a central one.[2] Just as often, though, the issue is polarised. For instance, Allen Tate regards literature as a kind of knowledge in its own right. Thus, in an essay originally published in 1941, Tate concludes that literature, his example is *Hamlet*, is of "the mythical order."[3] Tate relies on I. A. Richards's conception of myth, which holds that myths "are no amusement or diversion to be sought as a relaxation and an escape from the hard realities of life. They are these hard realities in projection, their symbolic recognition, co-ordination and acceptance (. . .) . The opposite and discordant qualities in things in them acquire a form."[4] Another non-hedonistic idea of literature, is Kenneth Burke' s attempt to treat verbal works of art as "'proverbs

[1] I presented an early version of this paper entitled "Iconicity, Narrative, and Cognition" at the 5th European Conference for English Studies, University of Helsinki, 25-29 August, 2000. I'm grateful for comments and suggestions from the audience.

[2] See Robert A Colby, "'Rational Amusement': Fiction vs. Useful Knowledge", *Victorian Literature and Society: Essays Presented to Richard D. Altick*, second impression, ed. James R. Kincaid and Albert J. Kuhn (Ohio, 1985).

[3] Allen Tate, "Literature as Knowledge", *Essays of Four Decades* (Chicago, 1968), p. 104.

[4] I.A. Richards, *Coleridge on Imagination*, pp. 171-72. Quoted in Tate, "Literature and Knowledge", p. 104.

writ large'."[5] They are considered as "strategies for selecting enemies and allies, for socializing losses, for warding off evil eye, for purification, propitiation, and desanctification, consolation and vengeance, admonition and exhortation, implicit commands or instructions of one sort or another,"[6] but not strategies for the achievement of delight.[7] In contrast, Oscar Wilde's concluding statement in the "Preface" to *The Picture of Dorian Grey*, "All art is quite useless",[8] manifests a wholesale hedonism. Similarly, post-structuralism highlights literature's pleasure principle. For instance, Wlad Godzich, taking as his point of departure the undermining of the distinction between fabula and sjuzhet accomplished by post-structuralist narratology, severs narrative's etymological relation to knowing completely by regarding the knowledge claims of narrative (both fictional and non-fictional) as non-existent. More particularly, Godzich pronounces that "a narrative may give us pleasure or hold our interest, but it is useless from the point of view of cognition: it offers no reliable knowledge about that which it purports to relate."[9]

The work of Ross Chambers, at least since the publication of his *Story and Situation* in 1984, forms a succession of attempts at recovering some of narrative's cognitive potential and at considering it in combination with narrative's promise of pleasure. While recognising Chambers' concern with seduction, this essay deals particularly with the motif of knowledge in his work. I try to map

[5] Kenneth Burke, "Literature as Equipment for Living", *Critical Theory Since Plato*, ed. Hazard Adams (New York, 1971), p. 944.

[6] Ibid., p. 947.

[7] Apart from Tate and Burke, who exemplify attempts to think about literature=s relation to knowledge and related concepts from a literary point of view, there is also a tradition relying on basic philosophical concepts, for instance, David Novitz, "Fiction and the Growth of Knowledge", *Grazer philosophische Studien: internationale Zeitschrift für analytische Philosophie* 19 (1983), 47-68 and Peter McCormick, "Moral Knowledge and Fiction", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 41 (1982), 399-410. However, while it may appear natural to look towards the field where these issues are traditionally discussed, the dependence on the conceptualisations of knowledge in *philosophy* does not automatically guarantee the explication of knowledge in *literature*.

[8] Oscar Wilde, "The Preface", *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (Paris, 1905), p. vii.

[9] Wlad Godzich, "foreword", Ross Chambers, *Story and Situation: Narrative Seduction and the Power of Fiction* (Minneapolis, 1984), p. xiv.

out his interest in the cognitive powers of narrative fiction by addressing in turn his idea of narrative wisdom, his attempt at theorising oppositional narrative as an essentially Socratic mode of intellectual and moral midwifery, and lastly, his relatively strong cognitive claim with regard to the kind of narrative that he calls loiterature.

I

Story and Situation[10] explores, among other things, how modern art tales, and narrative fiction in general, succeed in seducing readers by releasing and restraining the possibility of their interpretation. Ultimately, according to Chambers, seduction appears to involve the acquisition of narrative experience and wisdom on the reader's part. In order to understand how Chambers manages to introduce the notion of wisdom into his study of narrative seduction, it is necessary to begin by outlining some of his central ideas concerning narrative communication.

As the title of his book indicates, story and situation are intimately connected components of meaning in Chambers's universe. His concept of narrative point encapsulates the interconnectedness of the two. Narrative point is the idea that the meaning of a story depends upon the situation in which it is told and that storytelling has the capacity of influencing human situations, including the storytelling situation, either by reinforcing or reversing them (p. 7). Story and situation are engaged in an ongoing process of reciprocal influence from which meaning arises.

Relying on Walter Benjamin's distinction between traditional storytelling and modern novels,[11] Chambers differentiates between two kinds of storytelling situations: On the one hand, a fundamentally didactic situation, and, on the other, its opposite, a

[10] Ross Chambers, *Story and Situation: Narrative Seduction and the Power of Fiction* (Minneapolis, 1984). Further page references will be given parenthetically in the text.

[11] Walter Benjamin, "The Storyteller", *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York, 1969).

hedonistic non-situation. The former is the traditional mode characterised by immediacy and "use value" (p. 12): narrative is "a mode of direct communication of some pre-existing knowledge" (p. 11) between a teller with significant personal experience to convey and an audience characterised by "a 'natural' thirst for information." The former is said to manifest "narrative authority" (p. 51) in contrast to the latter, which displays "narratorial authority" by abandoning the function of conveying information in favour of "the arousing of 'interest'" (p.11). This move from didacticism to hedonism involves narrative's turning "'artistic'" or "'text'", that is, narrative becomes a form of communication involving a high degree of specialisation and autonomisation. In this mode narrative exists independently of specific tellers and listeners; it is "freed from the intentionality of an authorial subject and from the determination resulting from a specific recipient" (p. 12, henceforth abstracted into the concept of 'the reader'). Such a text is now "alienated" and a part of "the system of exchange value." The exchange value of a text, "its significance, or worth, is a function of its interpretability as a complex sign for which other discursive signs can be substituted." Being useless, these texts are forced to rely on seduction in order to achieve an audience. Successful seduction involves the text's kindling of the reader's curiosity through the promise of interpretability - the promise, for instance, that a high degree of pleasure may be derived from solving its enigmas and discovering its secrets (pp. 214-15).

At this stage, then, Chambers seems to opt for a hedonistic notion of narrative fiction: narrative traffics in pleasure, and its value depends on the amount of pleasure it is capable of conferring on its readers. But in his discussion of how modern narrative, having become thoroughly alienated, specialised, autonomised, and non-situationalised, not only manages to mean, but manages to mean specific things, Chambers brings back an element of didacticism by regarding the process of reading as an experience for the reader. He holds that the texts he is addressing are

> *situationally* self-referential and that these texts have recourse to a form of self-referentiality that analyses

> them in their communicational function and actualizes them as communicational acts, specifying the conditions – the necessary understandings between reader and text – for them to be successful as acts of literary communication. (pp. 25-26)

Certain examples of modern literary narrative, then, point out their own narrative situation by providing what Chambers also calls "models" and/or "antimodels" (pp. 30-31) of themselves as communicational acts. And the reader has to implement these models in order to access the meaning of a narrative. Although modern narrative does not contain any use value in the traditional sense by not allowing the extraction of a particular knowledge from the tale of the teller's own experience, it, nevertheless, becomes an experience for the reader. Reading becomes an encounter, that is, a process where the reader has to familiarise himself with the conditions of meaning of a text - an experience which, for Chambers, is related to the reader's acquisition of some form of knowledge. In the following I focus on two of Chambers's examples of this process without going into details with his intricate and elaborate analyses.

In his reading of "Sylvie", Chambers demonstrates how the seductive aspects of Nerval's narrative "lead the reader imperceptibly along (. . .) into union with the narrator 'I'" (p. 116). The reader's union or identification with the narrator "I", moreover, "takes the form of *experiencing the narration as the narrator has experienced his life*, that is, as an initiation into wisdom" (p. 116) which consists of the reader's evolution from illusion to reality. Here Chambers utilises his idea of reading in which the text is the operative part, "specifying the conditions" and acting out a particular design on its reader. The reader, on the other hand, is cast as the essentially passive beneficiary of the text's bringing about the fusion of the reader with the telling subject. Successful fusion involves an act of imitation on the reader<s part: the way in which the reader experiences the narration echoes or mirrors the way in which the narrator experienced his life. More precisely, it is the initiation into wisdom, that is, the transition from illusion to reality, which is

mirrored. Similarly, Chambers's reading of Henry James's "The Figure in the Carpet" explicitly stresses the theme of "'the getting of wisdom'" (p. 174) in relation to both the narrator and the reader of the story. The wisdom in question concerns the ironic stance, or "comic vision" (p. 174), which narrator and reader acquire and which allow them to distance themselves from the delirious quest for Vereker's secret - a quest that is representative of the other characters in the story. "The empirical reader" must go through a particular "evolution" in order to live up to the demands of the "projected audience" of the text:

> A victim, like the narrator, of 'unappeased desire,' this reader's 'consternation' should, in turn, produce a distancing effect that will make the reader a more suitable audience for the narrator-writer, with his comic vision of the melodrama of critical involvement. The reader's evolution, in short, mimes that of the narrator, who thus stands, in this sense also, as the figure of his own text. (pp. 174-75).

As was the case in the reading of "Sylvie", wisdom is not transmitted directly from narrator to reader in the form of an explicitly formulated moral or message. It is the benefit which results from an act of imitation on the reader's part of the narrator's evolution from a naive stance of involvement to a stance of ironic distance. Wisdom is the result of the empirical reader's successful acceptance of the influence exerted by the story on its reading situation. The story changes, in the sense of reverses, the reader's way of reading from deep involvement in the solving of the enigma of the story to a distanced ironic stance towards his previous involvement. In short, the reader of James's text, during the experience or process of reading, is, first and foremost, taught how to read "The Figure in the Carpet" by adopting a distanced point of view and abstaining from enigma hunting.

With particular reference to Chambers's reading of James's art tale, Godzich, in his "Foreword" to *Story and Situation*, extends Chambers's ideas and outlines the dramatic consequences of this wisdom: "What is undone is the critic's reliance upon the model of subject-object cognition that presupposes that the path to knowledge for a subject requires the appropriation and 'thesaurization' of the object."[12] In fact, according to Godzich, James's text produces the lesson of post-structuralism since its wisdom deconstructs, and forces the reader to abandon, the scientific model of cognition. In its place, according to Godzich's commentary, the acquired wisdom asks the critic to concentrate "on his or her relation to others" by producing "a story that will indeed relate him or her to others." Godzich's summary of the lesson that Chambers reads from James's story confers substantial privileges on the notions of narrative experience and wisdom since they are construed as having the power of releasing us from our scientific modes of knowing, almost as if we experienced a kind of Copernican revolution. I want to point out that Godzich's claim hinges on the fact that the reader of "The Figure in the Carpet" perceives a relation of similarity between the mode of reading criticised by James's text and our scientific model of cognition - a relation of similarity which the text does *not* indicate or point out explicitly. It seems to me, then, that Godzich is over-dramatising the effects of undoing resulting from Chambers's reading of James's short story. However, a closer look at the concepts of experience and wisdom will, nevertheless, confirm their counteractive capacity. We saw that reading, according to Chambers, involved the narrative's production of an imitation of the narrator on the reader's part. Reading, then, is neither experience in the sense of observation as the source of knowledge, nor is it experience in the sense of the knowledge that results from observation. Rather, reading, I want to suggest, is experience in Walter Benjamin's sense of the word. In a fragment, he states that:

> Experiences [*Erfahrungen*]are lived similarities [*gelebte Ähnlichkeiten*].

[12]Wlad Godzich, "Foreword", p. xx.

> There is no greater error than the attempt to construe experience - in the sense of life experience [*Lebenserfahrung*] - according to the model on which the exact natural sciences are based. What is decisive here is not the causal connections established over the course of time, but the similarities that have been lived.
>
> Most people have no wish to learn from experience. Moreover, their convictions [*Überzeugungen*] prevent them from doing so.[13]

Although Benjamin is talking about lived similarities between different events in the life of one subject where Chambers, when he is claiming that the reader imitates the narrator, is dealing with similarities between the lives of different kinds of subjects, the fundamental analogy between reading as imitation and life experience as lived similarity is fairly clear. I suggest therefore that we understand reading according to Chambers, that is, reading as experience in terms of Benjamin's notion of lived similarity.

The Benjaminian notion of experience is helpful for other reasons as well. The last part of the above quotation brings together the notions of experience and conviction and their relation to knowledge. Benjamin seems to be saying that, although experience furnishes us with knowledge, we do not benefit from it becausewe have no desire to do so and, simultaneously, because we are barred from it anyway. Thus, our experiences, our lived similarities, are defeated by our convictions, that is, our firmly held truths and beliefs, for instance. This contrast between experience and conviction also helps us understand Chambers's notion of wisdom. According to the *OED* wisdom involves the "capacity of judging rightly in matters relating to life and conduct."[14] And there is no

[13] Walter Benjamin, "Experience", *Selected Writings*, ed. Michael W. Jennings et al., trans. Rodney Livingstone, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., & London, 1999), II, 553. The German original is taken from Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), VI, pp. 88-89.

[14] *OED*, definition 1.a.

reason why this ability should not rely upon both experience and conviction. Chambers's notion of wisdom is a narrow one since it appears to exclude and counteract our convictions, for instance, our convictions concerning how to read texts.

Benjamin's distinction between those who learn from experience and "most people" who do not raises the important question concerning the identity of Chambers's reader: who is the beneficiary of narrative wisdom according to Chambers? The answer is any empirical reader who is willing to become "a suitable" audience of the fictional narrative, that is, any reader who accepts the conditions of meaning specified by the text.

In short, in *Story and Situation*, Chambers relates the didactic and hedonistic aspects of narrative fiction by forwarding a notion of reading as Benjaminian experience, or lived similarity. The latter concept involves the reader's initiation into or getting of wisdom, that is, a kind of knowledge that challenges the reader's convictions, first and foremost concerning reading, secondly, and only by implication, concerning modes of scientific cognition in general.

II

Room for Maneuver: Reading (the) Oppositional (in) Narrative[15] is an attempt by Chambers to explore how reading influences and changes readers in ways both different from and similar to the notions advocated in *Story and Situation*. In relation to the motif of knowledge, Chambers develops a conception of reading as an activity of being "taught" and "a matter of self-education" (xvii). But in contrast to his earlier position, the issue of didacticism is no longer necessarily dependent upon an understanding of narrative fiction as involving seduction. How education is accomplished is now considered as a work specific rather than genre specific

[15] Ross Chambers, *Room for Maneuver: Reading (the) Oppositional (in) Narrative* (Chicago and London, 1991). Further references will be given parenthetically in the text.

phenomenon. In the following I focus specifically on his notions of narrative education as soothsaying and self-recognition.

The fact that the mode of narrative education changes from work to work is Chambers's point in the chapter entitled "Graffiti on the Prison Wall: Writing Under Dictation." Here three Latin American novels dealing with "metaphorical imprisonment" (p. 175) are analysed. The novels differ in several ways in their relation to knowledge. For instance, in conclusion to his analysis of Miguel Angel Asturias's novel *El Señor Presidente*, he states: "Thus, the novel's attempt at witnessing resolves into an enactment of universal complicity, making inescapable the denunciatory realization that both it and its reader are ineluctably part of the presidential system" (p. 212). This novel, then, functions as an enactment in both senses of the word: the sense of an action or process involving the performance or dramatisation of its message of universal complicity, as well the sense that this action is a laying down of the law, a decree, which, in accordance with its nature, is destined to produce one and only one realisation or understanding in the reader's mind. Chambers goes even further in his suggestion that the novel has strong biblical affinities. He points out motifs of soothsaying incarnated by "a toothless old lottery seller" (p. 200) and another character "significantly called 'El Ticher' ['the Teacher']" (p. 202), and describes the "vision" of the novel as "prophetic, illuminatory, and apocalyptic" (p. 210).

In contrast to this predominantly didactic knowledge-as-soothsaying model, where the promise of interpretability is no longer the bait that seduces readers, Chambers theorises a model involving seduction and Socratic *re*cognition rather than prophesy and teaching in his reading of Manuel Puig's novel *El beso de la mujer araña*:

> Puig's novel, as a maieutic text does not tell 'how it is,' does not dictate its vision, and does not adopt a denunciative tone [in contrast to *El Señor Presidente*]. It leads us, like Valentín [one of the novel's main characters], to an act of self-recognition, a recognition of

> *what we knew* but could not acknowledge. In that recognition we see that we are ourselves - again like Valentín - *both* victims of the carceral system *and* its administrators. As prisoners we are in desperate need of comfort and empowerment; but there can be no ultimate liberation unless and until we cease ourselves to be agents of oppression and sites of selfrepression. (. . .) what we have learned is what we already knew but needed to be *seduced* into discovering. And the implication of that knowledge is that, like Valentín, we must change the nature of our alienating and self-alienating desire. But to acknowledge *that* is already to have changed our desire. (pp. 231-32)

Chambers's notion of narrative maieusis contains the familiar notion of reader passivity. As in the case of narrative wisdom, the reader is lead by the narrative. Moreover, being guided by the text involves imitation. The fact that readers now imitate a character (in this case the character of Valentín) is arguably immaterial. But the nature of the gain that results from this act of imitation is slightly different. In contrast to wisdom, which counteracted our convictions by making us emerge from states of illusion into reality on the basis of new knowledge, that is, knowledge about something we did not already know, maieusis involves self-recognition: the becoming fully conscious of ideas, norms, and values that are already known, but unacknowledged in our minds. Narrative maieusis works by allowing the reader to live a similarity not only between himself and a fictional character, but also, because of the notion of *re*cognition, between himself and another part of himself.

This idea of narrative as the midwife of knowledge, seductively leading its readers towards self-recognition, forms an extension of Chambers's attempt to think about narrative wisdom. The concept of narrative self-recognition is more persuasive than narrative wisdom since it is more modest: it does not depend upon the dramatic shifts in identity between, for instance, illusion and reality, or confused involvement and ironic distance. And it certainly does not involve the Copernican revolution of demolishing an established mode of cognition, which characterised Godzich's reading of Chambers's claims. But in spite of its modesty the idea of narrative fiction as maieusis does claim a specific status for its knowledge potential. In contrast to other forms of knowledge, it brings the reader into a dialogue with earlier selves, long gone experiences, and states of consciousness that he otherwise wouldn't be able to access. For instance, in the case of Puig's novel, its reading involves, among other things, the reader's *re*cognition of the fact that gender is a social construct. We already know this from our experience of living within the confines of either masculinity or femininity and from having to live up to the norms and values of these categories. But most of us tend to forget it in our everyday lives where we act from our convictions rather than our experiences as Benjamin pointed out.

Another interesting aspect of Chambers's idea of Puig's novel as an intellectual midwife concerns its text specificty. In contrast to his totalising claims concerning narrative wisdom, Chambers explicitly contrasts narrative self-recognition with narrative soothsaying or teaching as I outlined in the beginning of this section. Maieusis, then, is a potential that individual narratives may or may not activate.

In *Room for Maneuver*, then, Chambers forwards two ideas of narrative knowledge: soothsaying and self-recognition. Where the former presents a kind of fundamentalist strategy forcing the reader into acknowledging its truth by blocking his possibilities of interpretation, the latter relies on its seductive aspect to lead the reader into an experience of self-recognition - a Benjaminian lived similarity between the reader's selves.

III

Apart from the fact that *Room for Maneuver* also deals with narrative soothsaying, it complements *Story and Situation* as Chambers himself points out (p. xviii). I have suggested that they form a mutual project by combining considerations of seduction and knowledge, in particular in terms of narrative experience, wisdom, education, and the notion of the maiuetic text. Chambers's most recent book[16] can be seen as an attempt to deal much more explicitly with the motif of knowledge. As a consequence, I think, the overt concern with seduction is toned down. Although it still figures as an important aspect of the relation between narrative and reader, the concept of knowledge is massively foregrounded as is evident from the index where it is one of the most conspicuous entries. Accordingly, Chambers's claims for narrative's cognitive potential have increased markedly, especially in relation to the concept of fringe knowledge he detects in what he calls loiterature. But before I outline these ideas it is necessary first to consider his basic notion of narrative in *Loiterature.*

Chambers theorises narrative as governed by two complementary rather than contradictory logics that exist in permanent tension with each other. On the one hand, it embodies the progressive, unidirectional principle, which drives towards "the closed structure of story, marked by the cohesive linking of a beginning and an end" (p. 86). On the other, narrative also manifests a tendency to "*di*-gression that is the characteristic feature of *dis*-course" implying "dispersal and, if not exactly directionlessness, at least some uncertainty of direction" (p. 297, n3). Narrative, then, is a twisted cord since it involves the tension between progressive and digressive strands. According to Chambers, the relationship between the two threads is hierarchised with progression as the discursively superior strand. Yet, while digression tampers with unidirectionality, it is not regarded as a transgression or violation of narrative's progressive aspect. Progression tolerates digressive material, which is held "to be discourse's (. . .) *natural* proclivity" (p. 86), which is represented as "secondary yet in some sense relevant, not fully cohesive but admissible." However, progressiveness must also limit and control digressiveness "because it represents an emergence of the natural within the order of the cultural" (p. 87). Digressiveness, according to Chambers,

[16] Ross Chambers, *Loiterature* (Lincoln and London, 1999). Further page references will be given parenthetically in the text.

demonstrates a similarly ambiguous attitude to its discursive superior. While it manifests a rupture of progressiveness, it tones down its challenge "by a certain performance of harmlessness" (p. 89).

Loiterature is the name Chambers assigns to narratives that parade their digressiveness, "playing a quite delicate game" (p. 90), on the one hand "flirting with the potential for transgression" while, on the other, respecting "the (of course, undefined) limit beyond which flirtation with the possibility of transgression becomes transgression *tout court.*" According to Chambers, then, narrative is a cord consisting of a superior progressive strand, which extends a particular kind of circumscribing tolerance to its discursive inferior, which, in turn, masks its challenge of rupture in an air of harmlessness. In contrast, loiterature is a twisted cord in the sense that it wrings out of shape or distorts the complex relation between the progressive and digressive strands by foregrounding the latter without abolishing the former's sovereignty. By distorting the relation between progression and digression of mainstream narrative, it furnishes knowledge about the exclusive nature of this kind of unidirectional discourse and the kind of knowledge it lays claim to. It does so by creating a discursive space for what Chambers calls the loiterly subject and his distinctive approach to particular kinds of knowledge. In the following I take a closer look at Chambers's ideas of the loiterly subject and his unique forms of knowledge.

Chambers's notion of the loiterly subject stresses his "somewhat marginal membership in the social 'family'" (p. 56). Moreover, he is defined as having a particular relation to the two separate worlds of centre and periphery since he has access to both, existing "on the cusp of a dominant social context and its other" (p. 57). The loiterly subject's peripheral relation to his surrounding contexts is one of both disadvantage and privilege. Among the advantages enjoyed by the loiterly subject is "access to a certain kind of knowledge" (p. 59). Loiterly

> texts affirm the existence of 'fringe knowledge' that is inaccessible to more disciplined subjects, who are too close to the seat of power and the cultural main stream,

> but is available to loiterly subjects by virtue of their own peripheral position, with its advantages and drawbacks. Such fringe knowledge is defined as knowledge of the social fringe, of which those whose lives are lived closer to the social 'centre' are necessarily ignorant, knowledge of an other that is scorned, not only by disciplinary subjects but also by the disciplinary modes of knowledge ... to which loiterly subjects are so unsuited (pp. 59-60).

In the fundamental division and conflict that Chambers construes between the disciplinary modes of knowledge and fringe knowledge, the familiar distinction from *Story and Situation* and *Room for Maneuver* between conviction on the one hand, and wisdom and self-recognition on the other, reappears.

Moreover, Chambers's idea of the peripheral position of loiterly subjects and their distinctive approach to knowledge as a kind of worldly omniscience owes something to the notion of education as soothsaying, teaching, and prophecy developed in his reading of *El Señor Presidente*. More particularly, it can be regarded as a further secularisation of these notions. As worldly prophets and soothsayers, loiterly subjects have certain advantages in the acquisition of knowledge. In contrast to the objective exponents of disciplinary knowledge, who rely on the conviction or scientific model that separates knower from known, Chambers figures them as readers situated on the verge of different contexts (p. 61). As such they manifest a unique capability for movement between contexts, which is responsible for the privileged nature of their knowledge. In fact, Chambers's way of conceptualising their distinctive capability for movement confers a kind of secular omniscience and omnipresence upon them. Their "motility (. . .) is, thus, simultaneously, social (a to-and-fro between dominant and marginalized class attachments), temporal (a sense of the intermingling of temporal moments), and spatial (a sense of the close proximity of here and elsewhere)" (p. 62).

Further, this worldly omnipresence and omniscience means that loiterly subjects are capable of reading "in two directions" (p. 61) and producing "critical" knowledge of the centre as well as "empathetic" knowledge of the periphery. The concept of critical knowledge concerns knowledge which relativises or counteracts "mainstreams society's own self-absorbed indifference to, and ignorance of, otherness", that is, the term incarnates an aspect included in the notions of narrative wisdom and self-recognition; more particularly, the one concerned with the reader's realisation of the inadequacy of his own convictions. By empathetic knowledge I take it that Chambers understands knowledge that results from the process of feeling into, identifying with, and participating in that which one is inquiring into. Empathetic knowledge, then, is closely related to Benjamin's notion of experience as lived similarity and Chambers's notions of wisdom and self-recognition, which excluded conviction. But, in contrast to narrative wisdom resulting from the union between narrator and reader, and in contrast to the idea of self-recognition establishing relations between the reader's selves, empathetic knowledge involves the relation between the loiterly subject and *something existing independently of the reading situation*, that is, the social fringe to which the narrative must, necessarily, somehow *refer*. Chambers's idea of empathetic knowledge, then, activates the referential function of narrative (otherwise we wouldn't know what or who the empathetic knowledge in question was about). At the same time, the notion relies on the story - discourse distinction, the dismantling of which formed the point of departure of Godzich's totalisation of narrative's hedonistic aspect as I pointed out in the introduction.

Another important aspect of Chambers's notion of fringe knowledge is the fact that it is the privilege of a loiterly subject which is textual *and* empirical at the same time. The relation between the flesh-and-blood author and the textual subject is stressed by Chambers repeatedly. For instance, this is the way in which he introduces his chapter "Loiterly Subjects":

> I'll consider Gérard de Nerval's self-representation in *October Nights* (*Les Nuits d'Octobre*, 1852) as an amiable flâneur, Colette's semi-autobiographical representation of 'a new woman,' Renée Néré - she of the chiasmatic

> and oddly bigendered name - in a loosely episodic novel *The Vagabond* (*La Vagabonde*, 1910), and, finally, Neil Bartlett's engaging study, in *Who Was That Man?*, of the difficulty for a contemporary gay man of piecing together a community of those banished by homophobia to society's fringe. (p. 57).

While the genres of flâneur realism (Nerval) and historiography (Bartlett) help to justify the claim of identity between author and narrator with reference to the conventions of specific non-fictional contracts, Collette's novel, traditionally, is barred from doing just that since the fictional contract split the two beyond reconciliation. But in relation to the genre of loiterature, Chambers maintains that it makes sense to consider them together. In the vocabulary of *Story and Situation*, then, loiterature manifests a kind of narrative authority. Chambers develops his notion of a relation between the textual and empirical aspects of the loiterly subject, by conceptualising him as a traveller. But it is a particular kind of traveller that Chambers has in mind since he "scarcely needs to move at all, or to move very far" (p. 62) and his movements have the character of "strolling" (Nerval), "touring" (Colette) or "cruising" (Bartlett) (pp. 66-82) between centre and periphery. Importantly, Chambers turns to Walter Benjamin's essay "The Storyteller" in order to ground the notion of travelling and "appropriate" the idea of "*Erfahrung*" (p. 64) for the traveller's experience. This allows Chambers to flesh out the notion of fringe knowledge as *Erfahrung* by differentiating it from "*Erlebnis*, referring to the experience of those whose life (*Leben*) is lived on the spot rather than under the sign of movement" (p. 65), and "*Erkenntnis*, knowledge":

> *Erfahrung*, then, is knowledge of a kind that knowledge itself - let's call it foundational knowledge - *can't have* ... it's knowledge that has learned not to trust itself as knowledge (because it is always incomplete), but which can't trust foundational knowledge either (because it is always exclusionary). (p. 65)

Knowledge as *Erfahrung* or experience, then, is empathetic knowledge of the social fringe, that is tentative knowledge open to infinite supplementation. Moreover, it is critical knowledge of the centre, manifesting a corrective function, reminding us of the fact that *Erkenntnis* or foundational knowledge is always partial.

In contrast to the earlier appearances of *Erfahrung* where it represented the potential experience of lived similarity awaiting any empirical reader, the concept is now narrowed down considerably by being linked to an actual class of loiterly subjects characterised by a high degree of motility. *Erfahrung* is transferred from the domain of the potential reader to that of the actual writer.

Chambers's notion of fringe knowledge, then, both continues and departs from some of his central ideas and assumptions in *Story and Situation* and *Room for Maneuver*. The fundamental distinction between two kinds of knowledge, that is, foundational and fringe knowledge, sustains the earlier divisions between conviction and Benjamin's notion of *Erfahrung* or lived similarity in terms of wisdom and self-recognition. Similarly the notion that knowledge gathered from *Erfahrung* challenges our convictions in important ways is a fundamental one in Chambers's thought. The aspect of fringe knowledge that is called empathetic knowledge, although the basic idea of lived similarity remains the same, marks a new point of departure. Where *Story and Situation* and *Room for Maneuver* concerned the question of knowledge in relation to two components, that is, narrative and empirical reader, *Loiterature* operates with four: empirical subject, narrative, social context (centre and periphery), and empirical reader. For the concept of empathetic knowledge to work, Chambers has to rely on the idea of narrative authority, that is, of an empirical subject who warrants the fringe intelligence, and he has to maintain the validity of the story - discourse distinction, more particularly, the notion that story precedes discourse: the excluded social fringe produces loiterature and not the other way around.

Speculations concerning the general nature and purpose of narrative or anything else for that matter, are always open to arguments that take their point of departure from counter examples. But, although I think that it is possible to come up with examples of narrative that would formally qualify as loiterature by manifesting a high degree of digressiveness while also dismantling the notions of privileged subjectivity and knowledge, it is to Chambers's credit that he tries to formulate a point of departure which explicitly sends him outside the hedonism of post-structuralism. Instead of triumphantly totalising a particular narrative function, the historical fact that narrative has been used for hedonistic as well as didactic purposes in a wealth of different contexts ought to make us consider narrative's functional capacities along these lines. To this end, Chambers's attempts to think about loiterly subjects, discourses and various kinds of knowledge are important contributions.

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Echo: Reading *The Unnamable* Through Kant and Kristeva

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Do we really know how to respond to Beckett's writing? Or are we still grappling with it, poorly, clumsily, from an unnecessary remove? The following essay will stage yet another attempt to close in on one of Samuel Beckett's most elusive texts: *The Unnamable*. We will try to close in on it by way of a figure: the echo. Echo—in evoking this term, from the beginning, are we not just proposing yet another name for that which must remain unnamable? Perhaps. It is not only a name, though, but also resonates as a deposit—a depositing which returns only what has been invested in it: Do you read me? If so, you find yourself. The name you give me, I don't deny it—I repeat it, I echo it. Like a child echoing, for instance: the echolalia of incomprehension. Overcome, baby talk repeats the Name of the Father. Or, according to another route, it repeats unknowable Reason. Or like a woman spurned, call her Echo, her body renounced by a treacherous child-god who finds and founds himself in the mirror of the Other. Only the music of her voice would remind us, only that voice would be a remainder. Or like a lessness less than the voice: a mark, no, a mark of a mark receding even as we speak—unreadable, unnamable.

This essay will try to listen to that muffled non-sense of the unnamable by way of Immanuel Kant's "Analytic of the Sublime" and Julia Kristeva's *Powers of Horror*. Our itinerary will first bring us to the sublime (Kant), and then to its psychoanalytical inversion (Kristeva). Ultimately, in our third and final step, we will approach Samuel Beckett's novel *The Unnamable*—listening to the vexing of its voice before we release it from a plethora of names and readings. For no nickname, not even the "sublime" or the "abject," will nick the unnamable.

A Sublime Story

We will try to listen to the unnamable by way of the sublime. Throughout its many theoretical articulations, the sublime has always been directed towards something that is beyond, or on the verge of, extreme limits: *sub-limes.* Longinus, the first theoretician of the sublime, insisted that the sublime "takes the reader out of himself."[1] A radical ek-stasis would move or affect the subject (hence Longinus' interest in e-motions and affects) so that it was literally beside itself. This moving force *(dynameis)* had a cause, Longinus believed, namely the author. Therefore a detailed exploration of rhetorical devices utilised by such an author was necessary. This "rhetorical sublime," as it is usually dubbed, was followed in the 18th century by the "natural sublime." Following the interest awakened by Boileau's translation of Longinus (1674), the moving power was now identified as belonging to certain typical landscapes (which ultimately witnessed to God's creative powers). The sublime was identified with waterfalls, mountain peaks and the like. Burke's *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1757) was of vital importance in establishing a clear differentiation between the sublime (the overpowering and terrifying, which threatens one's self-preservative passions) and the beautiful (which is subject to one's own power, and congenial to one's social passions). Kant's theory of the sublime inherits and modifies this distinction.

After Kant, and the following efforts by Schiller and Hegel, interest in the sublime dropped. In 1843, John Ruskin was symptomatic for a general watering out of the concept, when he claimed that "Anything which elevates the mind is sublime."[2] The concept was subsequently relegated to the backwaters of aesthetics, where it stayed until the emergence of post-structuralism. The most

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[1] Longinus 1957, 4. Longinus' treatise, titled *Peri Hypsous* in the original, was either written in the first or the third century A.D. (See ibid., xvii-xxi).

[2] Ruskin's *Modern Painters* (Book I, section II, chapter 3) quoted in Wilton 1980, 9.

emphatic revival of the sublime belongs undoubtedly to Jean-François Lyotard, who has identified postmodernism as a basically sublime venture in its attempt to present the unpresentable and in its denial of "the solace of good forms."[3] There has also been a return to something like Longinus' rhetorical sublime, with the added twist that the uncontrollable nature of the literary work is not accredited to the powers of the author, but to the indeterminate nature of language.[4]

Reasoning the Edge: Kant

Kant's "Analytic of the Sublime" is found in the last of his three critiques, *The Critique of Judgement* (1790). Each of Kant's three critiques allocates, according to a juridical and political metaphor, a distinct territory of objects to the jurisdiction of a certain mental faculty. The first critique gives the Understanding the rule of the domain of natural objects. The second critique gives Reason the rule over the suprasensible, ethical domain. This domain of the free will is completely outside of the natural, causally determined territory of the first critique. Thus Kant enables ethics and science (i.e. Newtonian physics) to operate side by side, rulers of their own distinct kingdoms who never interfere with each other. This peaceful coexistence is, however, rendered problematical by an inner exigency of Kant's ethics. For in order to follow the moral law, reasonable beings must believe it is possible to attain a perfect society—a "kingdom of ends" where each individual is an end in himself. But the possibility of such a society is problematical, since the ethical (suprasensible) domain is fully heterogeneous to the natural (sensible) world. *The Critique of Judgement*, as its introduction points out, is

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[3] Lyotard 1991, 81. Lyotard's position on the sublime is anticipated, on some major points, by Adorno. See Adorno 1970, 292-296.

[4] See for instance Neil Hertz's book *The End of the Line* for readings that, somewhat reductively perhaps, show how close certain strands of post-structuralism are to the sublime.

meant to bridge the gulf between these two (36-37).[5] Both the beautiful and the sublime are such bridge-like structures. They are the two forms of the aesthetic judgement, both connecting two of the transcendental faculties. Kant's sublime builds upon interplay between the Imagination and Reason, rather than between the Imagination and the Understanding as is the case of the beautiful. The critique's aim of connecting the sensible world (where the Imagination functions as a faculty of representation) and the suprasensible (which is under the jurisdiction of the moral faculty of Reason) is thus accomplished more immediately by the sublime than by beauty (which goes via the Understanding). Hence the two faculties involved in beauty are described as reaching harmony through "concert," while the harmony of the sublime is attained through "conflict" (107).

The sublime reveals Imagination's "inadequacy" or *Unangemessenheit* (92; 136) before the ideas of Reason. Between these two faculties, a natural scene typical of 18th century notions of the sublime (stormy seas, huge mountains, cathedrals, etc.) functions as a mediating object. It is a representation *(Darstellung)* sought out by the Imagination in order to represent the suprasensible. The domain of the suprasensible is not immediately apparent. The realm of Reason is a "substrate underlying the intuition of the world as a mere phenomenon" (103)—submerged below it, as it were—and it has to be uncovered *(entdeckt).* Such a process of unveiling is only possible subsequent to a failed representation: the Imagination attempts to present an adequate sensory equivalent to the absolutely great (the ideas of Reason) and fails.

Thus the first step of the sublime is of a semiological nature: the signifier (the natural representation) is not adequate to the signified (the ideas of Reason). The arbitrariness of this juxtaposition is, however, not simply accepted—as it is in Saussurean linguistics. The manifestation of the truth of the sublime is a possibility following the desertion of this model of *adequatio:* in Heideggerian terms the

[5] All English quotations given directly in the text of this section of the essay refer to Kant 1952. All German quotations refer to Kant 1963. If two page references are given, the first is to the English text and the second is to the German.

truth of the sublime is one of uncovering, of *aletheia.* The underlying ideas of reason, the basis for our sensible world of appearances, are unveiled—but only in an intermediate fashion through an awakening of a moral feeling (respect) which is an effect of Reason's moral law.[6] The latter is, as are all of Reason's ideas, a *Noumenon,* or a thing in itself, and not accessible to direct knowledge. Even the effects of Reason, though, are not uncovered by everyone: some people do not grasp this possibility, according to Kant. Some—the uncultivated, "untutored man" (115)—see an absence rather than the hidden effect of Reason: they see an "abyss" or *Abgrund* (107; 155-156) rather than the "highest principles" or *Grundsätze* (111; 162) of Reason. This inability to see a hidden foundation (a *Grund*) is declared, by Kant, to be a mistake. However, the displacement which the third critique has permitted with regard to what we might call the "hero" of the critical story, makes the mistake fully understandable. In Kant's previous ethical works, the sensory side of reasonable beings (*Sinnlichkeit*) was described as heterogeneous to them, while their true, autonomous centre was identified as Will or practical Reason. In the third critique, however, a slippage has occurred whereby the sensory side, this time represented by the Imagination, has been granted as much psychological liveliness as Reason. The extreme point of this slippage may be found in Kant's "General Remark" immediately following the "Analytic of the Sublime": there, Imagination is said to make itself Reason's instrument by "depriving itself of its own freedom" (120). Strangely enough, the Imagination has been granted its own freedom here—thus contradicting that freedom solely belongs to Reason, as is elsewhere claimed by Kant. Thanks to this slippage, Imagination stands before Reason almost as a separate individual. In fact it is a relationship to an alter ego, a doppelganger (neither identical nor simply other) who tries to subjugate the Imagination through force.

[6] In Kant's second critique, respect is defined as a *Wirkung*, or effect, of the moral law belonging to Reason. See Kant 1961, 123-124.

Thus the Imagination and Reason soon seem like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, if one keeps to the perspective of the Imagination. Indeed, in a sense it is a "perspective" or a "focalisation" (to use Genette's terminology) since the relationship between the two faculties plays itself out very much like a fictional narrative. In this tale, the Imagination seeks out a threatening natural scene due to a demand from an agency it is "not always conscious of" (112). It seeks out terror, sacrifices itself, not knowing for what cause it does so (120). It is in fact subject to a hidden master. The master's wish is not shared by the Imagination, and therefore an affective ambivalence ensues: it is like "a rapidly alternating *repulsion* [for the Imagination] and *attraction* [for Reason] produced by one and the same Object" (emphasis added, 107).

So far we have not differentiated between the two forms of the sublime: the dynamical and the mathematical.[7] The dynamical sublime involves a relation to any *fearful* natural object, and inherits Longinus' reference to a moving force. Kant gives the mathematical sublime a more complex elaboration. It, too, is based upon a basic demand for representation coming from Reason. Reason asks for the comprehension of its own absolute magnitude through a presentation of infinity in one sensible experience. Imagination seeks out a fitting sensible object (St. Peter's cathedral is Kant's most striking example) and then starts receiving impressions. This process of impressions—this "apprehension" (99)—keeps going, though, and the imagination cannot achieve a "comprehension in one intuition" (102) of all the impressions. The *aesthetic* comprehension, unlike one of mere numerical comprehension (a mathematical kind belonging to the Understanding) is limited. Once it reaches this limit the Imagination attempts to proceed, but this is a "fruitless effort" and it "recoils upon itself" (100). Despite the attainment of a certain extension of its powers, the Imagination has failed—and fail it must, since the infinite totality of the ideas of Reason is by definition incommensurable with a sensible presentation. Thus Imagination, as in the dynamical sublime,

[7] The two forms are intertwined and, arguably, confused by Kant. He tends towards giving the dynamical kind precedence and assimilating the mathematical to be a particular manifestation of it. See for instance his descriptions of the sublime in the later "General Remark" (especially 120-121).

is subjugated to Reason in a power relation: it feels "displeasure," while Reason, assured of its supremacy, feels "pleasure" (106).

What is needed in order to go beyond this terrible lock, the Imagination's aporia of the abyss, is, in fact, a kind of identification. A certain "awakening of a feeling of a suprasensible faculty within us" (97), an understanding of that Reason is our "vocation" (106), can only take place through a transference of perspective where the oppressive force is identified as the true self. "Transference," "identification": my use of these terms announces what has already been at work, implicitly, throughout my explication: a *rapprochement* between Kant and a psychoanalytical register. I will now present Kristeva's theory of the abject, before comparing it to the Kantian sublime.

Repression and Reversal: Kristeva

The fluid style of Julia Kristeva's *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* (1980), and its eclectic borrowing from both Lacan's systematics (the real, the imaginary, and the symbolic) and Freud's second topography (the id, the ego, and the superego) may lead one to believe that hers is a somewhat anarchic approach. The basic opposition of the semiotic and the symbolic, which permeated Kristeva's doctoral thesis *Revolution in Poetic Language*, is however still present, albeit in a new guise: the unnamable topos of the mother's pre-Oedipal body is now contrasted with the nameable surface of differentiated society (the realm of the Name of the Father). The specific topos explored by Kristeva here, and entitled "the abject" by her, is a pre-Oedipal phase situated between the original, autoerotic, "oceanic" unity with the mother, and the later narcissistic phase where libidinal drives are auto-cathected.[8] Her later study *Black Sun* (1987), focuses on regressions to the latter, narcissistic position.

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[8] Kristeva has called the abject both a "*precondition of narcissism*" and an instance of "primal narcissism" (Kristeva 1982, 13 and 62), as well as "pre-narcissistic" (Kristeva 1986, 259).

The abject regressions of *Powers of Horror* take place "at the crossroads of phobia, obsession, and perversion" (45).[9] Phobias represent the first, fundamental articulation. The real "object" of object phobias is no concrete thing, but a horrifying return to a pre-subjective (and hence also pre-objective) relation where the child cannot clearly delimit the boundaries between his (the main emphasis is on males) body and that of the mother. The child is a stranger to himself at this juncture, riveted to the mother's body yet also rejecting it due to a "Third Party" (9) who functions as an alter ego. A full identification with the paternal function, already at work in that third party, is what later enables the child to draw itself out of the abject impasse.

The mother, the father, and the son—their story is the truth, the ultimate reference, of the abject. Phobias represent lapses back to this forgotten territory, the phobic, repulsive object becoming a hallucinatory representative for that ambivalent relation which gives both "pleasure and pain" (61)—a fundamental "uncertainty" of both "borders" and "affective valency" (63). That object is only an outer representative for an inner complication—a complication which cannot really be solved via object relations. Instead it relates back to a want and an aggressiveness prior to such relations (cf. 5 and 39): before desire there is *jouissance*, before the pleasure principle there is the death drive. The phobic person joys in the pre-Oedipal unity with the mother, whilst simultaneously rejecting it from the (Oedipally erected) vantage point of the "symbolic, paternal prohibition" (39).[10] Abject perversions add an extra twist to the phobic scenario, by eroticising the phobic object. The obsessive discourses of certain narcissistic egos represent another elaboration of the phobic situation. There, the phobic *object* is replaced by the linguistic "*process*" (43).

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[9] All page numbers given directly in the text of this section, refer to Kristeva 1982.

[10] Hence the imaginary father of individual pre-history, present in the original abject relation, has been replaced by the symbolic father in all phobic regressions.

In later chapters, Kristeva investigates how the abject is contained by more general societal structures.[11] She endorses Levi-Strauss' claim that the prohibition of incest founds the symbolic order (which is any social order, insofar as it is a hierarchical structure of differences), but does not—as Lacan does—root this prohibition exclusively in the Oedipal drama. She sees it as a denial of the pre-Oedipal, abject mother—a denial necessary for the establishment of all societies. Society represses this maternal power through cleansing rituals and taboos, which maintain the *corps propre* (cf. viii and 65) of the subject. Defilement rituals take care of "excremental and menstrual" objects, while food remainders are kept taboo—all of these bearing witness to the "semiotic authority" of the pre-Oedipal mother (71 and 73). Kristeva grants psychoanalysis a cathartic status, too, but not one of simple purification. She defines the goal of analysis, somewhat elusively, to be "rebirth with and against abjection" (31). During treatment, the analyst taps into the pre-symbolic resources of language, in a mimetic identification with the patient. Such resources are the same as those utilised by writers.

"The writer is a phobic," claims Kristeva (38). Thus she identifies literature, or at least certain manifestations of it (Céline, Joyce, Artaud, etc.) with these "borderline cases" (47), with these patients to be analysed. The semiotic resources of language are displayed through an accentuation of its musical potential (making a language of pure signifiers), through disruptions of syntax, or by any disruption through "breaks in discourse" (30). Language is then no longer a process of signification, but something which "points to" (91), or shows like an "incarnate" metaphor (70), the semiotic processes of the maternal chora.[12] Literature is, however, not completely lost in these maternal folds: "contemporary literature [...] propounds, as a matter of fact, a sublimation of abjection" (26).

[11] Only chapter three ("From Filth to Defilement") is of relevance to us, here. Hence I will not delve into Kristeva's interpretation of Biblical food taboos (chapter four), or her Hegelian reading of Christian sin (chapter five).

[12] The latter definition, especially, represents a surprising about-face for Kristeva, who previously described modern thought as turning "From Symbol to Sign" (Cf. the essay of that name in Kristeva 1986).

Thus this literature makes the same movement as the sublime, according to Kristeva, which consists in "naming" the abject, sublimating it, keeping it "under control" (11). Are these two, then, the same thing? Is Kristeva claiming, like Lyotard but with a psychoanalytic twist, that contemporary literature is, in fact, sublime? Later mentions of the sublime, in her analysis of Céline in the second half of *Powers of Horror*, indicate rather that the sublime is being seen as a second stage of a two-step process. First, there is a confrontation, a regression, which is a "coming face to face" (75) with the abject horror. Then, secondly, there is a sublime withdrawal, an example of which Kristeva finds in the "angelic idealisation" of Céline's "sublime" Molly (162).[13] Both the encounter and the withdrawal are inherent in language itself:

> The abject lies [...] in the way one speaks; it is verbal communication, it is the Word that discloses the abject. But at the same time, the Word alone purifies from the abject [...]. (23)

There are two steps at once, then, for language—the sublime would be isolated to the second step, the retreat. But is the sublime really reducible to such a defensive withdrawal from the abject? Is not Kristeva really closer to the sublime—specifically the Kantian sublime—than she admits? Like a slip of the tongue, like an echo from afar, the systematics of the sublime are repeated in Kristeva's theory.

The repressed reappears, in this case, in the form of a negation: Kristeva's theory inverts the sublime, switching the places of the law and the sensory side of the psyche. Both theories involve a crossing the limit from one field, or province, to another. One field is on the surface (Kant's sensory, Kristeva's symbolic), while the other one (Kant's suprasensible, Kristeva's unnamable) is hidden and obscure, but causally constitutive of the surface. The instance in charge of this hidden field (Reason, the incorporated mother) is at once an

[13] See also, for instance, 151: "And then the vision of murder turns sublime, the murderous apocalypse shows its lyrical side before everything founders into vomit."

alter ego and a "true" self, but is inaccessible to signification. Both Kristeva and Kant—the latter with regard to "untutored man"—compare it to an abyss. The encounter between the two fields takes place via an outside, mediating object (Kristeva's phobic object, Kant's landscape) which the surface instance seeks due to an inexplicable demand (the behest of the hidden instance). This encounter is experienced as affectively ambivalent: there is repulsion and horror (for the surface instance), and there is satisfaction (for the depth instance). Kristeva explicitly sees the solution of this situation in an act of identification away from the hidden instance: the phobic (or obsessive, or pervert) must identify with the imaginary father. Kant's solution is also, in fact, an act of transference: the Imagination must find its true self in Reason. Hence his is an inverse movement to Kristeva's in terms of systematics, but similar in its contents (identification with morality and common humanity).

The temptation to add Kristeva to our little *histoire* of the sublime leads us to the following question: Is the abject, then, an example of the sublime?[14] Or, is the sublime sublimated abjection?[15] In short, which is the (hidden) cause? We are moved, yes, but not to the tear: we cannot decide, we cannot tear this couple apart. The ecostate structure of their embrace indicates a supplementary logic (cause and effect being undecidable) whereby the complacent continuities of any historical narrative, including the aforementioned one, can be fundamentally challenged. Instead of shaking up the narrative of the sublime, though, let us instead utilize

[14] An unearthing of the abject's Kantian roots could take three paths. (1) It could point to Lacan's radicalization, inherited by Kristeva, of Freud's theory of the unconscious, which explicitly draws upon Kant's theory of the *Noumenon.* See Lacan 1977, 21. (2) It could demonstrate the similarities between Freud's topographies and Kant's theory of the faculties. For instance, Freud's Letter 52 to Fliess compares his agencies to rulers in charge of separate provinces–precisely the metaphor Kant uses for his faculties. See Freud 1966, 235. (3) It could trace Freud's theory of the unconscious back to the 19th century philosopher J. F. Herbart, a Kantian in part, who had a theory of repression and the unconscious. Herbart described the unconscious through a coinage that still resonates in many languages–as *subliminal.*

[15] Thomas Weiskel's book *The Romantic Sublime* contains a fine psychoanalytical reading of Kant's theory.

the very special effects of both discourses—both Kant's and Kristeva's—in our reading of Beckett. Let the interrogation begin.

Presenting, in effect, The Unnamable

Samuel Beckett's novel *The Unnamable* was first published in 1952 by Editions de Minuit.[16] A common interpretation of this, and other works by Beckett, is largely Cartesian—the narrators are seeking a true self, a true "I" inside the mind, oblivious to the cares of the outside world.[17] This is not a completely incorrect interpretation. However, the question remains: Who am "I"? If "I" is indeed an other, as Rimbaud claimed, then a purely Cartesian reading of *The Unnamable* is insufficient. The previously explicated theories of Kant and Kristeva will help us focus on the heterogeneous and non-representational aspects of Beckett's text. By replacing Kant's dichotomy of the sensible and the suprasensible with the sayable and the unsayable, we will bring Kant closer to Beckett's text. For the narrator in *The Unnamable* is also pitted between two poles. He is caught between the realm of language where his interrogators, his stories, and his puppet-like representatives (primarily Mahood and Worm) ceaselessly chew the cud of vain locutions, and the other domain where the unspeakable "I" may be found. Both of these poles are, however, internalised: "it's I who do this thing and I who suffer it" (370).[18] Language is both the field of *Darstellung* where this struggle comes to light *and* an interior realm belonging to something like Kant's Imagination.

[16] The original French title was *L'Innomable*. Beckett himself wrote the English translation. This novel was later assimilated into a trilogy, together with its two predecessors: *Molloy* (1950) and *Malone meurt* (1951). In fact, all three texts contain allusions to characters from even earlier works by Beckett. Our main focus, throughout, will be on *The Unnamable*; references to other works will only be made in order to cast light–or shadow–on it.

[17] For instance, Hugh Kenner claims, in the article "The Cartesian Centaur," that "*The Unnamable* is the final phase of a trilogy which carries the Cartesian process backwards, beginning with a bodily *je suis* and ending with a bare *cogito*" (Kenner 1965, 59).

[18] All page references given directly in the text from now on (apart from those explicitly referring to Kant or Kristeva) refer to Beckett 1976.

"Imagination dead imagine": this title of one of Beckett's late short prose pieces gives us a provisional translation of *The Unnamable*'s torments into Kantian terms.[19] The Imagination, or the creative ability of the subject, is so impotent before the impossible demands of the unnamable that it feels itself virtually killed by their pressure. This unnamable is unknowable and plays, therefore, a role analogous to that of Reason in Kant's system. As in Kant, we must go beyond "terms, if not notions, accessible to the understanding" (342). The representations, or stories, we are offered are representations of the non-representation of the unnamable. The unnamable is referred to as "unimaginable" (380), and the narrator dismisses his own repeated inventions as "more mere imagination" (331). It is as if after failing once (presuming, of course, that there was a first time), the Imagination knows it can never succeed: "seek, find, lose, find again, lose again, seek in vain, seek no more" (358). But it has no other ability than to heap on more stories—it cannot go silent. Instead of presenting the absolutely great, these stories try to reach an absolute destitution, a "living degree zero." These spurious inventions—each gradually erasing the memory of those prior to it—reach a certain peak (the point of incomprehension) before they have to start all over again: "it's unending, it will be unending" (377). For Beckett's narrator is definitely "untutored" according to the Kantian model: he never reaches self-recognition, and instead sees only "a vault, perhaps it's the abyss" (377).

If the narrator could give an adequate representation, this would be a true sentence, in the sense provided by traditional theories of truth.[20] But truth has become an impossibility: "it's not the moment to tell a lie, but how can you not tell a lie" (378). Every stasis or thesis achievable in language, with "blank words" (375), is already on an exorbitant course away from the unnamable: "that's all hypotheses, lies" (378). Can the narrator then be introduced, indirectly, to the unnamable by way a failed representation of it? Is

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[19] See Beckett 1984, 145-147. The same phrase recurs in the earlier "All Strange Away" (ibid., 117-128).

[20] This is the "traditionelle Wahrheitsbegriff" discussed in paragraph 44a of Heidegger 1986.

this the same succeeding through failure, granted as one of two possibilities for Kant's Imagination? Such a solution is encumbered by the fact that the narrator has no concrete "demand," no known way of access:

> I see me, I see my place, there is nothing to show it, nothing to distinguish it, from all the other places, they are mine, all mine, if I wish, I wish none but mine, there is nothing to mark it [...]. (334)

There is no demand, no mark, no spoor that bears incontrovertible witness to that one is on the right path—*unterwegs*—to the unnamable. Therefore the narrator grasps at anything that might facilitate the impossible mediation: "Perhaps I've missed the key-word to the whole business. I wouldn't have understood it, but I would have said it, that's all that is required" (339). Even silence, a route favoured throughout by the narrator, is not a sure spoor: "what can be said of the real silence, [...] that there is no such thing, that perhaps there is such a thing" (376). Thus the narrator doesn't have unqualified access to an effect of the unnamable (à la Kant's "respect"), nor even to a determinate demand. Yet the fact that he is trying to reach the unnamable, that it concerns him, might lead one to speak of an effect of an effect, an echo of an echo of the "unthinkable unspeakable" (307). Thus the unnamable is like a thing in itself, like a *Noumenon*, yet even more elusive. The accentuated inaccessibility of the unnamable explains why the stories of Beckett's narrator degenerate into parody: unlike aficionados of the sublime, he has not much hope of illumination. Or perhaps he's merely skirting the unnamable, too frightened to really confront it? Kristeva's theory would suggest so, if we let her abject mother flesh out this unknowable abyss.

The Big 'M'

Is there a mother in this text? The first novel of the trilogy to which *The Unnamable* was assimilated, *Molloy*, is—on the surface—much more concerned with the female parent than our text. The title character, and narrator of the first half, may in fact have killed his mother. Throughout his analeptically narrated account, Molloy returns to some undefined business that he has to settle with her. The act of narration begins at a later point, and by then his mother is dead and he is using her old room. Whether he has actually killed her or not, a sudden burst interrupting an enumeration of his former female loves certainly spells out a compelling incestuous temptation:

> And there are days, like this evening, when my memory confuses them [i.e. his old loves] and I am tempted to think of them as one and the same old hag, flattened and crazed by love. And God forgive me to tell you the horrible truth, my mother's image sometimes mingles with theirs, which is literally unendurable, like being crucified, I don't know why and I don't want to.[21]

There are few references to the mother in *The Unnamable*, but most are aggressive and in the nature of "I'm looking for my mother to kill her" (360). The scarcity of such references, though, indicates that *The Unnamable*, in the main, no longer has any truck with the concrete mother of Oedipal struggles—this mother (an object relation) having being done away with in *Molloy*—but is instead concerned in following the trail of the death drive all the way to the pre-objective, abject mother. The narrator is, after all, in the outer limits of a process which was so prominent in *Malone Dies* (the second novel of the trilogy), namely of withdrawing his libidinal cathexes[22] from all object relations: "I never desired, never sought, never suffered, never partook in any of that" (299).

The relationship to the unnamable and abject mother are now indicated by the narrator's relations to silence, that "little hole" (363), instead of any given references to a mother-signified. On one occasion, the narrator refers to "my horror of silence," imputed to him by his interrogators (320). This indication of a retreat from the unnamable, is soon after strengthened by his granting that only "terror" and "a longing to be in safety" can induce him to claim that he is in a head (322): silence and nothingness are terrifying in their

[21] Cited from *Molloy*, in Beckett 1976, 55.

[22] The speaker of the text uses the word "adhesion" (see pages 290, 296, and 303).

consequences. The other side of this ambivalent relationship, one of attraction, reveals itself in the many returns to "the true silence, the one I'll never have to break any more" (362) as his only true aim. Thus one could postulate that this silence is indeed the mother's body, that simultaneously desirable and repulsive locus which Kristeva's abjects weave their discourses around. The narrator would be half inside it (his "true" self), and half outside it (in the outside world of his interrogators and masks), straddling this border uneasily. So wrenching is the tension between these two sides, that at one point the narrator even tries to identify himself with the border itself: "an outside and an inside and me in the middle, perhaps that's what I am, the thing that divides the world in two" (352). But there is no rest in this limit-realm of stirrings still. The mother's body remains a restless and unspeakable locus for the death drive's trajectory into nothingness—the beyond of both life and death, the "wombtomb."[23] Mahood's fate illustrates the inability to fully give in to that drive to die (to follow the death drive to oceanic unity), while Worm's vicissitudes exemplify the opposite inability to be born (to achieve subject status, apart from the mother): "Mahood I couldn't die. Worm will I ever get born?" (323)

The meaninglessness of language, so often mentioned or implied by the narrator, can also be accounted for by Kristeva's model. Since the mother's body is literally the beyond of speech, all affective charge is removed from the spurious signifieds of an empty language (cf. Kristeva 1982, 50). The fear of this body can therefore be bracketed out (cf. ibid., 6), hence hiding the narrator's previously cited "horror of silence"—a horror which almost never explicitly surfaces in Beckett's text, since the narrator is both possessed by and safe from the abject as long as he is within the protective castle of language. The speech of *The Unnamable*, seen in the light of Kristeva's theory, is that of a walled-in and obsessive narcissism that wants to disavow the symbolic (language, the interrogators) yet is too wary of the unnamable to face it—to turn and face the music of the "'primal' pulsation" of the chora (Kristeva

[23] This coinage of Beckett's is often used in other of his fictions. See for instance p. 121 of Beckett 1993.

1982, 14). Only seldom does the narrator find that privileged instant, which Kristeva calls "the moment when revelation bursts forth" (ibid., 9). Such examples of the *nunc stans* common to both the sublime and mysticism—moments when "ceasing to be, I ceased to see. Delicious instant truly..." (312)—can only happen outside the present of speech. For the present of speech is never immediate it is inexorably mediate to the differentiated codes and conventions of the symbolic. The unspeakable mother inhabits even speech, though. She is subliminally present in the names of the narrator's many predecessors and "spurious egos" (Kristeva 1982, 47). Murphy, Mercier, Molloy, Moran, Malone: The capital "M," the big "M," is repeated in the names of Beckett's protagonists, almost all of which are enumerated in *The Unnamable*. Mother ("M") is the start, the never to be repeated beginning, which they all set off from, aim to return to, and are necessarily in excess of. A hood covering the body of "Ma": one of the last of Ma's alliterative litter is the aptly named "Mahood."

The Depositions of Poetic Language

The pre-Oedipal and pre-linguistic experience of the mother's body, then, is the unnamable. Indeed, it strikes one as surprising that Kristeva omits mention of Beckett among her examples of "Great modern literature" (Kristeva 1982, 18), since the word "unnamable" recurs so often in *Powers of Horror*. This omission is, however, not simply a forgetful lapse. An earlier essay of Kristeva's on Beckett, "The Father, Love, and Banishment,"[24] purports to grasp and circumscribe all of the "writer's known novels and plays"[25] through an analysis of two short texts ("Not I" and "First Love"). Beckett's writings, she claims, are centred on the "unnamable domain of the father" and *not* that of the mother.[26] Kristeva's conclusion is largely based on two premises: Firstly, a thematic analysis of the two texts in

[24] The English translation is included in Kristeva 1980, 148-158.

[25] Ibid., 148.

[26] Ibid., 153.

question, and secondly, the claim that Beckett's writing (unlike Joyce's) is not a "'poetic' endeavour."[27]

The Unnamable, despite such a surprising claim, is also a text marked by what Kristeva calls "Poetic language" (Kristeva 1982, 61). The thesis, or thetic authority, of the symbolic, speaking subject is undermined by Beckett's text. The hypo-thesis (cf. discussions of it on pages 372 and 378 of the novel) is a privileged category of statement throughout. It often surfaces in the guise of tentative answers to unanswerable questions, such as those that open the text: "Where now? Who now? When now?" (267) This is, however, neither a juridical type of questioning,[28] nor a scientific hypothetical-deductive method, nor a version of philosophy's inaugural "*Ti esti?*" For the answer to the aforementioned string of questions is, typically, less than an answer: "Unquestioning. I, say I. Unbelieving. Questions, hypotheses, call them that" (267). The question, and the entire authority it seeks to establish in the name of knowledge, is undermined. This is a process of hypo-theses: we are beyond—*hypsous* in Longinus' terminology—any stable positioning of the subject. The subject is *en process*: in process, or on trial.[29] The law itself is on trial. The law's demand for a subject who belongs to community based on knowledge and on judgement, is challenged by the unnamable which is ignorant—"in the silence you don't know" (382)—and "ephectic" (267).[30] Furthermore, *The Unnamable* demonstrates this subversive non-dialogue with the law by giving the

[27] Ibid., 152.

[28] I beg to differ with Kristeva's claim, in "The Father, Love, and Banishment" (ibid., 152-153), that "Questioning is the supreme juridical act, for the I who asks the questions, through the very act of asking these questions (apart from the meaning of the request) postulates the existence of the other. Here, since it is 'not I', not you either, there must be a He beyond communication." In *The Unnamable* we often find the third person pronoun "he" adopted, yet it is always dropped again–just like "I" (see Beckett 1976, 326). The text explicitly denies any privilege to any of the positions of enunciation represented by pronouns: "Bah, any old pronoun will do, provided one sees through it" (ibid., 315).

[29] For more on the "subject in process/on trial," see Kristeva 1984.

[30] "'Law,' which derives etymologically from lex, necessarily implies the act of judgment whose role in safeguarding society was first developed by the Roman law courts" (ibid., note 15, page 240).

interrogated victim the ability to whisk away his interrogators. This is not through an act of will, it is not *his* doing—nothing proper to the subject is at work here—hence the bemused exclamation: "I notice one thing, the others have vanished, completely, I don't like it" (368).

But "the others"—all those representatives for the Other that is the symbolic law—never completely go away. To speak, to write is to be within the symbolic order. But this speech has cracks, crevices, through which that hidden core—the "chora"—fleetingly indicates the fluid unworkings of the unnamable. Despite being renounced on one important occasion (cf. 281) the voice, or voices, remains throughout a privileged "metaphor" (298). On the one hand what is wanted is a pure signifier: "If I could speak and yet say nothing, really nothing? Then I might escape [...]" (277). This would be a pure performative, completely devoid of constative force, an act which Kristeva compares to the "material, active, translinguistic, magical impact" (Kristeva 1982, 74) of religious rituals. But more insistently in *The Unnamable* there is a tendency to equate the unnamable with the silence in between sentences. The long, chopped-up sentences, encountered increasingly often towards the end of the text, try to let silence be heard in between enunciations. This would be death itself: "the comma will come where I drown for good, then the silence" (376). A returning prothesis, both funeral and dangerous supplement of the thesis, silence thus intimates the unnamable throughout speech, by virtue of every comma, every withdrawing of breath. It sentences the sentences to alterity, to an unlawfulness akin to the line break of poetry in the way it detours the tail end needed for the standard tales of prose:

> Enormous prison, like a hundred thousand cathedrals, never anything else any more, from this time forth, and in it, somewhere, perhaps, riveted, tiny, the prisoner, how can he be found, how false this space is, what falseness instantly, to want to draw that round you, to want to put a being there, a cell would be plenty, if I gave up, if only I could give up, before beginning,

> before beginning again, what breathlessness, that's right, ejaculations, that helps you on, that puts off the fatal hour, no, the reverse, I don't know, start again[...]. (377)

The story is not told, a narrative is never fully pieced together—not simply because of a denial of the narrative stance, but also because the narrative voice is traversed and sabotaged, throughout, by "gaps" (339). These gaps poetically indicate a "*heterogeneity of signifiance*" (Kristeva 1982, 51)—echoing, from afar, the irrepressible semiotic motility of the mother's body.

Yet another manner in which the de-positioning of the enunciating position is accomplished is, quite simply, by equating speaking with defecation: "I'll let down my trousers and shit stories on them" (350). Words are here not seen as the symbolic carriers of meaning, but rather as the unsettling deposits—material, repulsive—of the body, the improper body. Elsewhere they are compared to "ants" (326), and the narrator himself temporarily takes the name "Worm." Thought itself is also transformed into that very despicable matter it attempts to repress: "the blessed pus of reason" (325). Are these eruptions impossible to assimilate? Or is writing here functioning as a "second level rite" (Kristeva 1982, 75), a purification of waste? *Powers of Horror* grants a lot of space to theories of sublimation. The ambivalence of the abject depositions by *The Unnamable* cannot easily be enclosed by such theories, though. The word, the "repulsive gift" (ibid., 9) proffered by Beckett's narrator remains a *pharmakon* resistant to any decision which would make it choose between "sublimation and perversion" (ibid., 89). Although Kristeva repeatedly poses the choice between such alternatives, Beckett's text resists being equated with an analysand. The text's ability to "go on," as stated in its last words, bears witness to aterminability—i.e. it is neither terminable nor interminable, as a psychoanalytical case is. The text is not a patient, not even a human being—there's no "cure" for *The Unnamable*.

Rereading the Unreadable

We have interrogated Beckett's text long enough, now it is time to absolve it from our reading. A unifying reading, such as the one we've been tending towards, cannot quite rid itself of the suspicion that the supreme pointlessness of the text evinces something that is not amenable to any analysis whatsoever. For *The Unnamable* is without a central point, without a *point de capiton* which could structure the text. We have used the term "the narrator," as if we were sure that it was the same "I" that was pitted between the interrogators and silence, throughout the text. The radical transitions of narrative voice do, however, imperil this thesis.[31] For instance, on page 321, after a long section of an "I" narrating, there is the startling interruption: "Where am I? That's my first question, after an age of listening." Is this one narrative level relieving another one, and if so: which level is relieving which? A few pages on, we witness the following juggling of I's: "I am far, do you hear him, he says I'm far, [...] I am far, do you hear him, he seeks me I don't know why" (371). Our centring the text in a body (the mother's) as opposed to the suprasensible, can also easily be contradicted by the text's repeated claim that "I don't feel a body on me" (379). Hence critical idealism and psychoanalysis both find their explanatory power foiled by this text that insists "I deny nothing, I admit nothing" (380).

The text pivots around countless other such undecidable interruptions, and even undermines the fundamental value we have been granting to silence, finding it "full of murmurs" (381). These murmurs on occasion reveal that they really belong to his interrogators. Silence, then, would be the truth to be revealed by the law. The mother, on the other hand, is precisely the opposite of that silence, precisely what he is denying: "what can be worse than this, a

[31] Blanchot's "Where Now? Who Now?" (see Blanchot 1982) points to this anomaly of Beckett's text. We might add that not only is the thesis of there being one speaker disturbed by the text, but the supremacy of speech altogether is placed into question. Not only does the speaker on one occasion claim that "I have no voice" (Beckett 1976, 281), but there is also an earlier reference to "the manual aspect" of writing (ibid., 276).

woman's voice perhaps" (335). The ambivalence of this text thus reveals why Kristeva could find the locus of Beckett's work in the dead father instead of in the abject mother. The text uses these dichotomies, but overturns and plays with them: the mother is the father, and vice versa. What is at play here is a process of infection, whereby identities become their other through displacement: "some tiny subsidence or upheaval, that would start things off, the whole fabric would be infected, the ball would start a-rolling, the disturbance would spread to every part" (353).

Hence we are returned to something like a mathematical sublime of reading. If reading must be a *Sammlung*,[32] or a comprehension of disparate elements into a unity, what can one do with a text that seems to necessarily resist that process? The reading "recoils upon itself" (Kant 1952, 100), and must question its own questioning. But *The Unnamable* is not so much quantitatively overpowering—as is the case of the mathematical sublime—as fundamentally undecidable. The text indicates this, by giving us an allegory of reading where every reader is an interrogator who really want to know who or what the unnamable is. If, in the words of Beckett's novel, "a decision must be reached" (329), then this decision does not belong to the text but to the powers of the reader: "I'm ready to be whatever they want" (319). It is not the sheer mass of information that is unsettling, but rather the text's wisp-like elusions—"bringing nothing, taking nothing, too light to leave a mark" (326). Thus the text is not a power—it is *in between* the power invested by the reader in the warring dyads (father and mother, the sensory and the suprasensible, psychoanalysis and idealism, etc.). It is not a hidden cause, with determinate effects, as is Kant's *Noumenon.* Neither "bringing" nor "taking," the gift of the text cannot be completely couched in the terms belonging to the limited economy of psychoanalysis, either: it does not obey the law of the home (the *oikonomia*). It is heterogeneous, and hence other to this economy which always returns to the same, through regressions to the truly homogeneous—to the same genesis (Oedipal or, for Kristeva, pre-Oedipal). Both the abject and the sublime are fundamentally narratives:

[32] See "Was heißt Lesen?" in Heidegger 1981.

a triangular story of mother, father, and child, on the one hand, and a (pre-Hegelian) slave and master struggle, on the other. They want to tell the truth, but stumble over the scandal of Beckett's text: "To tell the truth—no, first the story" (300). Hence their stories cannot tell the truth of the fiction (there is none), but the fiction can reveal the fiction of their truth.[33] The text gives nothing to narrative, and therefore gives almost anything. A founding fiction, *The Unnamable* is the helpless echolalia of the lessons prescribed to it by the reveries of the solitary reader—the echo fading even as we speak, unreadable, unnamable.

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[33] For more on this fictionality, see for instance Derrida 1992, 190-191. Kristeva is adamantly committed to some kind of truth. She refers to "truth-effects" (Kristeva 1982, 88) stemming from the unnamable. She is even more explicit elsewhere: "what is truth, if not the unspoken of the spoken?" (Kristeva 1986, 153). For Kant, as we have shown, the unveiling of the suprasensible reveals the truth of the sublime.

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