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Apologies and Apologetic Attitude in Early Modern English

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1. Introduction

One of the speech acts in human language which has attracted the attention of scholars dealing with social and cultural patterns in language is apologies. In this paper I will discuss apologizing in the Early Modern English period. The present study is based on a preliminary version of the Corpus of English Dialogues 1560-1760 (CED). The corpus (see Culpeper and Kytö 1997) is divided into five subperiods: 1560-1599, 1600-1639, 1640-1679, 1680-1719, 1720-1760. The corpus is also divided into five different subcategories of text-types: trials, witness depositions (written records of spoken interaction), drama, fiction, and didactic works (constructed spoken interaction), the latter including language-learning texts. In May 2001 the corpus totalled 1,305,703 words.

Although I will investigate different forms of apologies, boosting, text-type distribution, and politeness, the focus will be on the strategies and functions of the apology expressions *sorry* and *pardon*. Comparisons with studies of apologizing in Present-day English are made (especially Aijmer 1996), partly in order to obtain a diachronic view, and partly because the topic has not yet been given much attention in historical studies.

Classical speech act theory defines and classifies apologizing according to felicity conditions for its seemingly most prototypical realizations, ie an apologetic performative verb and/or an expression of regret. Furthermore, apologies are commonly seen as a ritual, allowing an offender to act as if a ritual equilibrium is being restored (see eg Goffman 1976: 68). However, the main contributions in the 1980's and 1990's to the pragmatics of apologizing are not based on introspection, but on natural data. Olshtain and Cohen (1983) define apologizing as a culture-sensitive speech act set of semantic formulae or strategies. This sociolinguistic model was also

successfully applied by Blum-Kulka et al. (1989) in the Cross-Cultural Study of Speech-Act Realization Patterns (CCSARP) project. A very recent study on apologies in the British National Corpus shows that there is social variation in apologizing in Present-day English; for instance, those of the middle class apologize more often than the working class do, and younger people apologize more often than older people (Deutschmann 2003: 205).

When discussing apologies, the concept of politeness, which in recent decades has become central in the discussion of human interaction, must be considered. Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of avoidance-based negative politeness and solidarity-based positive politeness is very important, but it is problematic in some ways. An apology expression is an IFID (Illocutionary Force Indicating Device) used as a strategy to express regret, to offer an apology or to request forgiveness. It may seem obvious that it is polite to use these strategies but in fact, there seems to be very little agreement among researchers about what exactly politeness is (Fraser 1990), nor does the concept of face seem to be universally applicable (Matsumoto 1988). Brown and Levinson (1987: 187) treat apologies as an intrinsically negative politeness strategy and consequently, from the speaker's perspective, the apology is an FTA (face threatening act) which damages his positive face (Brown and Levinson 1987: 68, 76). In other words, an apology is face-saving for the hearer and face-threatening for the speaker in Brown and Levinson's terms. Still, it is not evident what face-threatening and face-saving mean for different language groups, as Suszczyńska (1999: 1055) points out. Likewise we may assume that the modern concept of face is not directly applicable in different historical periods.

2. Forms of apologies

Apologies are sets of relatively fixed expressions, consisting of verbs (eg *apologize, excuse, pardon*), adjectives, (eg *sorry, afraid*) and nouns (eg *pardon*). All of these, with modifications and expansions, are found both in the CED and by Aijmer in Present day English (Aijmer 1996: 84). Nevertheless, there are differences in the frequencies of the apology-expressions between Modern and Early Modern English. In Aijmer's (1996) study of the London-Lund Corpus (LLC) a vast majority of the apology-expressions, 83.7 % were made up of *sorry* or *I'm sorry*. It should be noted that any comparison between data from the LLC and the CED must take the differences of content, and methods of compiling the corpora into consideration. The spoken interaction in the CED has all

been filtered by writers and printers, whereas the LLC contains non-filtered (authentic) speech. In the CED, the apology-expressions occur as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. CED apology-expressions.

Expression	raw frequency	percentage
I apologize	1	
excuse me	56	16.5%
forgive me	44	12.9%
(I beg (your)) pardon (me)	156	45.9%
(I am) sorry	42	12.3%
(I am) afraid	39	11.9%
Total	338	

Interestingly, the most frequent expression in the CED is *pardon*, making up 45.9% of the apology-expressions. The expressions *excuse me* (16.5%), *forgive me* (12.9%) and *sorry* (12.3%) have similar frequencies. Notably, *sorry* is slightly less frequent than *forgive me* and *excuse me*.

In Present-day English represented by the London-Lund Corpus, the expression *pardon* only occurs in situations where a person has not heard what was said (Aijmer 1996: 84), but it seems that the Early Modern *pardon* was the general purpose apology-expression of that period. The high frequency of *pardon* will be discussed further below. Other patterns found in the CED are the hedging devices *I'm afraid* and *(I) regret(s)*. These occur sparingly in the Present-day English data (Aijmer 1996: 849) but are possibly more frequent in the CED (Aijmer gives no frequencies for these expressions). *I'm afraid* occurs as an apology, or at least with an apologetic attitude, 39 times (11.9 %) which may be presumed to be more than in Aijmer's LLC material. However, *I'm afraid* is not a direct apology since the expression only serves to announce the speaker's apologetic attitude towards a proposition or the state of affairs; for instance it is used to announce, or to apologize for unwelcome information (Owen 1983: 90). In (1) Tukely gives unwelcome information to Sophia:

(1) (^Sophia.^) Pooh, pooh! that's the old Story - You are so prejudic'd. - (^Tukely.^) *I am afraid* 'tis you who are prejudic'd, Madam; for if you will believe your own Eyes and Ears - (*The Male Coquette*, 1757)

The expression with *regret* is also used in the CED in order to express an apologetic attitude towards the speaker's own actions, as in (2), where a gentleman challenges his best friend to a duel over a woman. Expressions with *regret* as a noun were found only twice.

> (2) You must therefore force your happiness through me; as I will attempt mine from you. Tho' Heaven knows *with what regret*! To morrow, Sir, [$ (^ (continu'd he) ^) $] I shall expect you on the backside of (^Southampton^) House. (*The Female Gallant*, 1692)

2.1. Boosting

The Present-day English intensifiers, or boosters, found in the LLC with *sorry* were: *so, very, terribly, awfully* (Aijmer 1996: 92). These boosted apologies constituted 8.9% of the LLC examples. Moreover, Present-day English *sorry* was often reinforced by emotional exclamations *ah, oh (dear)* and/or by address forms and terms of endearment.

In the CED apology expressions are boosted in 9.7% of the examples. *Sorry* occurred with *very* seven times, example (3), and *heartily* three times, example (4). The boosters found in the CED are shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Apology expressions and boosters in the CED.

Expression	boost
I apologize	--
excuse me	Oh, O
forgive me	Dear, sweet, good, Oh
(I beg (your)) pardon (me)	Dear, thousand, I humbly, Oh, sweet, *address forms*: sir, Lord etc
(I am) sorry	very, extremely, heartily

> (3) And now, my Dear, [$ (^says I to him,^) $] I am <u>very</u> *sorry* to tell you that there is all, and that I have given you my whole Fortune (*Moll Flanders*, 1722)

> (4) (^Nur.^) Kinde young Master, now I am <u>heartily</u> *sorry* that I mov'd you. (*A Mad Couple Well Match'd*, 1653)

Notably, the adverbials *awfully, terribly* etc are absent in the CED but address forms and terms of endearment are found with the expression *pardon*, see (5), (6) and (7).

> (5) (^Que.^) It doth, it doth: O *pardon* me <u>my lord</u>, that I mistake thy royall meaning so. (*A Humerous Dayes Mirth*, 1599)

> (6) (^Camp.^) *Pardon* <u>my Lord</u>, I loue (^Apelles^) . (*Alexander and Campaspe*, 1584)

> (7) *Pardon* me, <u>my dear</u> charming (^Bracilla^) [$ ((^replyed^) Montano) $] and forgive the first transgression I have done, (*The Adventures of Covent Garden*, 1699)

In (5), the apology concerns a misunderstanding. There is no social distance between speaker and (absent) hearer (the queen addressing her husband, the king), but there may still be a social difference, or at least a difference in official status between the sexes. It is also tempting to interpret the boosted apology as ironic. In (6) the social distance is great, a slave woman speaking to Alexander the Great, and it seems as if the apology only concerns that very social distance, ie the speaker apologizes for speaking. Both the social distance and the context as a whole probably call for the use of a boosted apology. Montano in (7) has shown too much emotion, thus transgressing one or more social conventions for which he is apologizing, and the boosting can be seen as triggered by the speaker's feelings for the hearer.

3. Text-type and period distribution

Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate how the various apology-expressions are distributed over different text-types and periods in the CED.(Next page)

Table 3. Apology expressions in different text-types and subperiods in the CED.

Period Trials	1	2	3	4	5	total
afraid			1	2		3
apologize			2			0
excuse					3	5
forgive					3	3
pardon	4	1	4	4	1	13
sorry	2		3	3	1	8

Witness depositions	1	2	3	4	5	total
afraid						
apologize						
excuse			1	1		2
forgive	3	9	1		2	15
pardon	1	5	1	1		8
sorry			1		1	2

Comedies	1	2	3	4	5	total
afraid	1		1	5	8	15
apologize			1			1
excuse	1		1	7	7	16
forgive	1	1	1	3	5	11
pardon	15	7	15	16	11	64
sorry	2		2	3	1	8

Didactic works	1	2	3	4	5	total
afraid		1	3	5	1	10
apologize						0
excuse				3		3
forgive		2		2		4
pardon			1	5		6
sorry	1	1	3	2		7

Language teaching texts	1	2	3	4	5	total
afraid	1					1
apologize						0
excuse		5	15			20
forgive		1				1
pardon	2	4	3		3	12
sorry	2					2

Fiction	1	2	3	4	5	total
afraid			1	5	4	10
apologize						0
excuse		1	5	2	2	10
forgive	1	1		7	1	10
pardon	6	6	9	23	9	53
sorry	2		5	1	6	14

Table 4. Apology expressions in subperiods. Figures are normalized to 100,000 words. Raw figures are given within brackets.

Period Expression	1	2	3	4	5
Afraid	0.8 (2)	0.4 (1)	2.1 (6)	5.4 (17)	5.3 (13)
Apologize			0.3 (1)		
Excuse	0.4 (1)	2.7 (6)	8.3 (24)	4.1 (13)	4.9 (12)
Forgive	2.1 (5)	6.3 (14)	0.7 (2)	3.8 (12)	4.5 (11)
Pardon	11.9 (28)	10.4 (23)	11.0 (32)	15.5 (49)	9.8 (24)
Sorry	3.8 (9)	0.4 (1)	4.5 (13)	2.8 (9)	4.1 (10)

The preferred general purpose apology expression in the CED dialogues is, as already mentioned, *pardon*, with the highest frequencies in period 4. It is possible to argue that this indicates an increase in negative politeness in that period. Negative politeness is associated with a higher degree of social distance in society in general, which of course is reflected in language. The expression *pardon*, which is intrinsically a request, may be associated with

negative politeness (see below). The text-type with the highest number of apologies is comedy, which suggests that this is the most "conversational" text-type of those represented, based on the fact that comedies contain more politeness-related and/or ritual speech acts such as apologies and thanking than other text-types (Jacobsson 2002: 72).

4. *Sorry or pardon and politeness*

It is fairly clear from the evidence presented above that *sorry* had not developed into the standard apology IFID in Early Modern English that it is in the present day according to the LLC. Instead, the expression *pardon*, used in nearly half of the apologies in the CED, is a better candidate for the Early Modern English standard apology IFID. But why *pardon* instead of *sorry* in Early Modern English? In terms of strategy, *sorry* is an expression of regret (Suszczyńska 1999: 1056) whereas *pardon* is a request for forgiveness along with *excuse me* and *forgive me*. The latter two IFIDs, especially *forgive me/forgiveness*, are more common in the CED than in Present-day English. The relevance of the distinction between expressions of regret and requests for forgiveness has been supported by the findings of Vollmer and Olshtain (1989). The explanation at hand is not entirely conclusive, but as I have suggested previously (Jacobsson 2002: 71, 72), there may have been a tendency towards a more positive politeness culture, in Brown and Levinson's terms, in the first century or so of the Early Modern period. From the mid-1600s onwards, the trend was towards negative politeness (for discussions of positive and negative politeness in Early Modern English see Kopytko 1993 and 1995, and Nevalainen and Raumolin-Brunberg 1995). *Pardon* peaks during period 4 in the CED, which possibly also marks the peak of social distance in English society. This should increase the use of negative politeness strategies according to Brown and Levinson and, if this is the case, it is possible to argue that a request is more in line with social distance, and thus negative politeness, than is an expression of regret. There are sociohistorical explanations which support this: England in the late 1600s was a country with an increasing population; London especially, but also smaller towns, were crowding with migrants from the countryside. In turn this may have created anxieties about social roles (Wood 1999: 15). The growth of a modern urbanized, and later industrialized, society might well create unstable relations between people (Lévi-Strauss 1958) which may cause the development of a negative politeness culture.

5. Strategies

The model of apology strategies most frequently used in pragmatic research is based on Olshtain and Cohen (1983). This model suggests six superstrategies with some division into substrategies:

(1) Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs):

a) Expression of regret, eg *I'm sorry*.

b) Offer of apology, eg *I apologize*.

c) Request for forgiveness, eg *excuse me/pardon me/forgive me*.

(2) Explanation or account. Any external mitigating circumstances, "objective reasons" for the violation, eg *The traffic was terrible*.

(3) Taking on responsibility:

a) Explicit self-blame, eg *It's my fault*.

b) Lack of intent, eg *I didn't mean it*.

c) Expression of self-deficiency, eg *I was confused/ I didn't see you*.

d) Expression of embarrassment, eg. *I feel awful about it*.

e) Self-dispraise, eg *I'm such a dimwit*.

f) Justifing the hearer, eg *You've right to be angry*.

g) Refusal to acknowledge guilt or denial, eg *It wasn't my fault*. Blame the hearer, eg *it's your own fault*.

(4) Concern for the hearer, eg *I hope I didn't upset you*.

(5) Offer of repair, eg *I'll pay for the damage*.

(6) Promise of forbearance, eg *It won't happen again*.

Other models, largely based on the above have been constructed by Fraser (1981: 263) with nine strategies, and Aijmer (1996: 83) with thirteen strategies. Olshtain and Cohen's model, however, has been successfully tested (Ohlstain 1989, Suszczyńska 1999), and according to the results obtained, speakers of various languages resort to a limited number of strategies when apologizing, all of which can be categorized into the above six superstrategies.

Moreover, apologies can be made up of combinations of strategies by means of adding an extra conversational move. In Present-day English (LLC), Aijmer (1996: 94-5) found five strategies where *sorry* was used (Aijmer's strategies do not correspond exactly to Olshtain and Cohen's and her fifth strategy is what she calls 'reinforcing' or 'gushing,' eg *Oh God*).

The recurrent combinations of strategies in the LLC were, in Olshtain and Cohen's terminology, strategies 1+2, 1+3b, and 1+3a. The expression *sorry* in the CED is used in the combinations presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Strategies with sorry *in the CED according to Olshtain and Cohen's model.*

Strategy	
1	27
1+3a	2
1+2	4
1+5	3
1+3e	5
1+6+5	1

As for compound strategies, Table 5 shows how often the necessary core or component, eg *sorry* (strategy 1) is modified (strategies 2-6). *Sorry* in the CED is used in compound strategies 15 times or in 36% of the instances. Aijmer (1996: 96) has 13% in the LLC and Holmes (1990: 170) had about 50% for Present-day New Zealand English.

Table 6. Strategies with pardon *in the CED according to Olshtain and Cohen's model. E is Aijmer's 'gushing,' eg* oh!

Strategy	
1	126
1+2	15
1+6	6
1+3e	5
1+E	1
1+3b	3

For *pardon* (Table 6), 19% of the CED examples are used in compound strategies, the most common being IFID + explanation or account, as in (8).

> (8) (^Ala.^) I ask *Ten Thousand Pardons*. <u>I was thinking, and did not see you</u>. (*Chit-Chat*, 1719)

Aijmer (1996) also found the combination of strategies in (8) together with acts of self-reproach modifying the apology. This is explained by a

politeness maxim, according to which the speaker should be modest by conveying a bad impression of himself (Leech 1983: ·132). This is also found the CED:

> (9) [$to which (^Schiarra^) seeing she would not rise, kneeling likewise down; replied,$] Goddess, for your celestial beauty, and Angelical voice confirm, yea, *pardon* my inconsiderate   rudeness (*The English Lovers: or, a Girle Worth Gold,* 1662)

6. Function

In the following I will look at three issues at the core of the function of apologizing; firstly, I will deal with the ritual aspects of apologies and, secondly the time factor, ie anticipatory and retrospective apologies, will be discussed. Thirdly, the functions of apologies also concern the offences themselves – what is apologized for?

6.1 Apologizing as a ritual

There are of course situations where an apology is emotionally serious, and meant as a remedy for one or several offences made by the speaker. In most cases, however, a Present-day English apology is a mere ritual, occurring in stereotypical situations, and the offence is rather trivial (Aijmer 1996: 97). The ritual apology also serves as a softener and disarmer, and may, as Norrick (1978: 280) points out, simply be a way of showing good manners. Indeed, Deutschmann (2003: 204) says that 50% of his examples from the British National Corpus (BNC) were formulaic or 'discourse managing devices'.

In the CED there are some indications that *sorry* and *pardon* were used more to satisfy social expectations than to express genuine emotion, see (10) and (11). However, these examples are very difficult to find and a thorough understanding of the context is necessary.

> (10) Ah! how far you exceed all that ever I saw in the Art of Powdering. (^Belira^),don't you think Sir (^Amorous^) Dresses extreamly well?   [$ (^Bel.^) $] Undoubtedly, Sir (^Amorous^) , I beg your *Pardon* I did not see you sooner - (*The lost Lover; or, the Jealous Husband,* 1696)

(11) masters, you bee all welcome: *I am sorie* that I make you tarie so longe. (*The French Schoole-Maister*, 1573)

Belira's *pardon* in (10) is clearly used only to apologize for a minor offence, and to show good manners, and the *sorry* in (11), spoken by an innkeeper to his guests has a similar function.

Aside from the difficulties concerning the seriousness of apologies, another aspect of function has to do with time. That is, the apology may either refer to an act in the past, or to upcoming discourse or actions.

6.2 Retrospective and anticipatory apologies

The classification into retrospective and anticipatory apologies (Aijmer 1996: 98 ff) may be helpful in defining the discourse-function of apologies. The retrospective apology is a response to an offence, whereas the anticipatory apology, of course, anticipates an offence. In effect, retrospective apologies are remedial, supportive (face-saving) and self-demeaning. Anticipatory apologies are disarming or softening. That speakers apologize not only for a fact but also for an intention was suggested by Edmondson (1981: 282). Aijmer (1996: 99) estimates that her sample has roughly 50% anticipatory apologies, and we may assume that the two time-distinguishing factors are of equal importance in Early Modern English.

In the CED both types are found:

(12) Then (^Dick Low^) reply'd, but still holding him, (^I beg your *Pardon* Sir, for my Mistake, for you are as like my Friend Doctor^) Cross, (^as ever I saw two Men in my Life like one another.^) (*History of... most noted Highwaymen*, 1714)

In (12) the speaker apologizes retrospectively for mistaking the identity of the hearer.

(13) [$ (^Mrs. T.^) $] Sir, I beg you'd *pardon* me the Impertinence of # some Questions. (*Modern Dialogues between a Vintner and his Wife*, 1703)

In (13) Mrs T is about to ask questions and makes an anticipatory apology.

Indeed, a little more than half of the CED apologies are anticipatory and there does not seem to be any difference here from Present day use. Nevertheless, there is a slight difference when comparing the expressions

pardon and *sorry*. For *pardon* there is a slight inclination to anticipatory apologies and for *sorry* the preference is for retrospective apologies (exactly two thirds of the examples). It is likely that this is because the intrinsic meaning of *sorry* is that of regret, which naturally is a retrospective sentiment.

6.3 The offences

The types of offences associated with an apology are important because they help determine the variation between different forms. In the LLC *sorry* is used mainly for communicative problems. *Pardon* is used for similar 'talk offences', but much less frequently. The offences apologized for with *sorry* in the LLC have been classified by Aijmer (1996: 115), who in turn has followed Holmes (1990: 178). I have followed the same categorization for the CED and the results are shown in table 7.

Table 7. Offences with sorry *in the LLC and the CED.*

Offence	LLC	CED
talk – interrupt	98 (45.6%)	0
time – being late	21 (9.7%)	3 (7.1%)
space, bothering	5 (2.3%)	2 (4.8%)
social gaffe	2 (0.9%)	0
inconvenience, mistaking identity	90 (41.6%)	32 (76.2%)
possession, physical damage	0	5 (11.9%)

Since it is evident that the expression *pardon* was used more frequently than *sorry* in the CED, the same data for *pardon* is given in table 8.

Table 8. Offences with pardon *in the CED.*

Offence	CED
talk – interrupt	26 (16.7%)
time – being late	2 (1.3%)
space, bothering	1 (0.07%)
social gaffe	1 (0.07%)
inconvenience, mistaking identity	124 (79.5%)
possession, physical damage	2 (1.3%)

Both *pardon* and *sorry* are mainly used to apologize for inconveniences of some sort in the CED. In the LLC the majority of *sorry* examples are used for the 'talk – interrupt offence', and it is possible that Aijmer here has used telephone conversation, where this type of offence is likely to be more frequent. The (obvious) absence of telephone conversation in the CED would explain the apparent lack of such 'talk apologies'. Nevertheless, we must also consider the possibility that the written language of the Early Modern period may be lacking in accuracy in this respect – naturally there are huge differences between the recording of the LLC telephone conversations and the MSS and imprints of the CED.

The group where the CED shows more apologies than the LLC is, as already noted, the somewhat diffuse 'inconvenience offences.' Aijmer (1996: 116) defines this as apologies caused by offences that the speaker thinks will annoy or inconvenience the hearer, for example, errors committed, mistaken assumptions, when the speaker cannot answer a question or comply with a request, or has forgotten to do something which he or she has promised to do. In (14) the speaker apologizes for not being able to (or wanting to) go outdoors; in (15) the speaker does not want to give the name of the person discussed.

> (14) You must *pardon* me sir [$ (quod she,) $] I am sickely disposed, and would be loth to take the ayre, (*A Hundreth Sundrie Flowers*. 1573)

> (15) [$ (^Di.^) $] I am *sorry* I cannot oblige you with his name, without asking him leave, I am afraid he meets with many discouragements already but if he were named, (*Dialogue between a Member of Parliament ...* 1702)

Concerning offences, two other apology expressions, *excuse* and *forgive(ness)* show some features not evident with *sorry* and *pardon*. The expression *excuse* (*me*) (56 examples) is mostly used to apologize for a variety of offences which fall under the inconvenience category (47 examples are used in this way). Three examples are of 'talk offences' , but not of the type where the speaker has not heard what was said and is asking for repetition, which is mostly the case with *pardon*, but rather the 'talk offences' where the speaker interrupts and/or contradicts something, as in (16), which is spoken in the context of an important trial.

> (16) [$ (^Lord President^) $] And this that you have said is a further declining of the (^the Iurisdiction of this Court^) , which

was the thing wherein you were limited before [$ (^King^)$] Pray *excuse me* Sir, for my interruption because you mistake me, It is not a declining of it, you do judge me before you hear me speak (*King Charls his Tryal*, 1649)

Excuse me is also used twice for social gaffes, such as bursting into laughter at the wrong time, as in (17).

(17) [$ (^Gib.^) $] My Company's but thin, ha, ha, ha, we are but three, ha, ha, ha. [$ (^Aim.^) $] You're merry, Sir. [$ (^Gib.^) $] Ay, Sir, you must *excuse me*, Sir, I understand the World, especially the Art of Travelling; (*The Beaux Stratagem*, 1707)

The apology expression *forgive (me)/forgiveness* (44 examples) is used either for an inconvenience offence or to apologize for crimes committed, which would fall under the possession/damage category. There are 15 examples of *forgive(ness)* where the speaker apologizes for his or her crimes, all of which are from trials or witness depositions, as in (18).

(18) And therevpon she the said (^Alizon^) fell downe on her knees, & asked the said (^Bullocke^) *forgiuenes*, and confessed to him, that she had bewitched the said child, (*Discoverie ... of Witches in Lancaster*, 1612)

In conclusion, it is obvious that some types of offences in Present-day English are directly tied to this period, eg 'talk offences' in telephone conversations. Other factors influencing apology-worthy offences in the CED may be social structure and perhaps, literary conventions.

7. Conclusions

According to the data from the CED and LLC the apologies of the Early Modern English period were the same in form as today, ie the same lexical items are used in apologies in both corpora (*sorry, pardon, excuse me* etc). The only notable difference is found in the frequency of the expression *pardon*, which seems to have been the general apology expression of the period 1560-1760, whereas the Present-day English general purpose expression is *sorry*. The reason for this change of expression may be due to the intrinsic request-meaning of *pardon*, making it more fitting in a negative politeness culture. The Early Modern boosters (or intensifiers), have been replaced to some extent, but the degree to which apology expressions are boosted has not.

An apparently growing negative politeness culture of the late 17th century is suggested by the apology expressions. The use of the request *pardon* is probably a marker which together with other linguistic and sociohistorical evidence reveals a changing society influencing politeness.

When discussing strategies of using apologies, or any other speech act, statistics may not give all the answers. Present-day English material shows great variation in frequencies while at the same time the strategies themselves appear universal, both in space and time.

There is clear evidence of the ritual function of apologies in Early Modern English, as well as the division into retrospective and anticipatory apologies. The difference in function from Present-day English lies in the offences apologized for. In Present-day English we tend to apologize for 'talk-offences,' ie we do not hear what is said or we interrupt the speaker. However, it must be remembered that much of the material in the LLC is telephone conversation, which may account for the 'talk-offences'. Instead of 'talk offences', the CED is filled with inconvenience-offences which may reflect social distance and a highly negative politeness culture.

Much more can be done, not only with regard to apologies but concerning all types of speech-acts in Early Modern English such as thanking, requests and greetings. Future study of these will hopefully bring us closer to an understanding of Early Modern English spoken interaction as a whole. The problems are, as always with speech-related historical data, the reliability of the written material and thus the validity of the results. However, there are many opportunities for further research offered by such corpora as the CED.

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Modal Verbs in New Zealand English Directives[1]

BERNADETTE VINE

1. Introduction

The distribution and semantics of the different modal verbs in English have been explored using a number of corpora (e.g., Palmer 1979, Coates 1983, Quirk et al 1985, Biber et al 1999, Kennedy 2002). *Will* has been found to be the most frequent of the central modal verbs, while *will*, *would, can* and *could* occur a lot more often than the other central modals (Coates 1983: 23, Biber et al 1999: 486, Kennedy 2002).

To date, research on the modal verbs in New Zealand English has not been conducted, although there has been a widening of our knowledge of this variety of English in recent times (Bauer 1994). An initial search of the one million word Wellington Corpus of Spoken New Zealand English (WSC), shows that *would* is the most frequent of the central modals. This is followed by *will, can* and then *could*.

The prevalence of *would* in the WSC may be accounted for by the large proportion of informal data in this corpus. The distribution of the different modals has been found to differ between written and spoken texts and according to the exact context. Kennedy (2002), for example, shows how the distribution of the modal verbs varies in the different genres within the written texts in the British National Corpus (BNC). Because there are different types of meanings associated with different modal verbs, the frequency of the modals would also be expected to differ from one type of spoken data to another. Focussing on the transactions and meetings

section of the WSC, *will* rather than *would* is found to be the most frequent of the central modals.

In this paper, I examine the use and meaning of modal verbs in a small corpus of workplace data collected in New Zealand and, more particularly, in situations where women are asking each other to do things, i.e., in directives[2]. I also investigate the use of marginal auxiliaries associated with the different modal meanings. Over the whole of the 52 extract sample analysed, *will* is the most frequent of the central modal verbs and, as in studies of other varieties of English, *will, would, can* and *could* occur a lot more often than the other central modals. This pattern is not repeated, however, when the directive utterances are pulled out and examined.

Coates' (1983) and Kennedy's (2002) results were observed in large corpora. My corpus of 52 extracts only amounts to 85,268 words and the 439 directive utterances that I have identified in these transcripts total 6,190 words. There are 209 occurrences of central modal verbs in the directive data, i.e., 3.4% or 34 tokens per 1000 words, while in the overall data there are 28 tokens per 1000 words. Kennedy (2002: 77) found 21.5 modals per 1000 words in the spoken texts from the BNC. As well as considering the distribution of the central modals, Kennedy (2002) also explored the distribution of *need to, ought to, dare* and *used to*. The total of 21.5 modal verbs therefore includes figures for these verbs. Combining my results for *need to* with the results for the central modals means that I have 252 occurrences across all directive utterances. This raises the number of modals per 1000 words to 41, while the overall figure rises to 30 tokens per 1000 words. Directives[3], therefore, are one type of speech act which makes a great deal of use of modal verbs, although the workplace context also appears to be one where speakers make frequent use of modals.

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[2] In Vine (2001) and Vine (2004) I use the term *control act* to refer to directives, requests and advice. In this paper, the term *directive* covers all of these. The broad definition of *directive* adopted here is "an attempt to get someone to do something". Simple questions for information and clarification are not included.

[3] In particular my data involves mainly what I call LATER directives rather than NOW directives, i.e., they are predominantly directives which relate to actions which will be carried out in another place and time. This has implications in terms of the basic form used. I would predict that a corpus of predominantly NOW directives would have a lower usage of modal verbs as there would be a lot more imperatives.

2. The Data

The results presented in this paper come from a larger study exploring the expression of power in interactions between a group of women in a New Zealand government department. Modal verbs were not a major focus of the research but results found in a brief look at modal use as a modifying device in the expression of directives, showed some interesting patterns which did not follow the overall pattern present in the WSC nor that found in other varieties of English as noted by researchers such as Coates (1983) and Kennedy (2002). More significantly, it did not reflect the overall distribution present in the 52 interactions.

The focus of the larger study on workplace language came from an interest in the language that people use at work. Workplace communication has only recently become a focus for linguistic research. Many people spend a large proportion of their lives at work, making this a very important context in which language and communication should be studied. The Wellington Language in the Workplace Project aims to examine real workplace interactions and my dataset was drawn from recordings made in the first workplace where data was collected. Women's language was analysed because although there were some men in the workplace investigated, it was predominantly a female workplace. The few men there were only recorded on a few occasions. My main focus was on two women managers and the ways their status was or was not evident in their one-to-one interactions with their staff (Vine 2001, 2004).

As noted above, the data examined comprises 52 interactions and 85,268 words. I identified 439 directive utterances in this data[4]. One hundred and five of these were imperatives and 163 were implicit, i.e., the speaker did not explicitly state what they wanted the addressee to do and/or that the addressee was to do it. The results in each section below refer mainly to the use of modals and marginal auxiliaries when these modify the action specifying verb, i.e., in the 171 verb phrases where a speaker explicitly states what they want the addressee to do, although overall results are also given.

I use the terms implicit and explicit in a specific way here. The following utterances are all coded as explicit. There is imbedding at times, but I would argue that the action required and the agent of the intended action are still retrievable from each utterance.

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[4] For issues relating to the identification of utterances as directive, see Vine (2004).

Example 1:

a. can you just write that up a bit neater?

b. and if you can just later today have a check through that that would be good

c. you need to just check the travel booking

d. and then um we could contribute to the discussion that way

e. tell her we might be a few seconds

Example 1(a) is a conventionally indirect utterance. Although the literal meaning in this type of utterance is about ability, the conventional meaning is directive. In order for the literal meaning to be understood there needs to be something in the context that indicates that this meaning is intended.

The use of the pronoun *we* in Example 1(d) is interesting because it could be argued that the agent of the action is ambiguous and the directive is therefore implicit rather than explicit. *We* can mean *you*, *we* (the two of us or the two of us and everyone else as well) or *I*. Because of the workplace context in which my data was collected *we* often means the organisation - or more specifically in the cases I am talking about *we* or *you* as member(s) of that organisation. The job roles and obligations of the individuals involved often mean that the meaning can be more clearly defined. Generally the actions being referred to are the addressee's responsibility and they know this, so the speaker does not need to be more explicit. They do not have to use *you* as *we* is explicit enough. In the interaction from which 1(d) was taken the speaker was giving the hearer advice about an upcoming meeting that the hearer would be attending as a representative of the organisation they both work for. The speaker was not going.

In Example 1(e) the directive takes the form of an imperative 'tell her'. The thing that the speaker wants the hearer to tell a third person is 'we might be a few seconds'. The central modal *might* is used here, but does not modify the action specifying verb. Modals used in this way are not counted for the explicit directives results below, but are included in the overall figures.

The utterances in Example 2 are all implicit. The focus in this type of utterance is frequently on the speaker, an object or a third person's need or action. In order for these things to be fulfilled however another action is required on the part of the addressee.

Example 2:

a. so I can look at it then okay *meaning* have it ready for me then

b. now I need to get that up to them today *meaning* get back to me quickly on this so I can send it off

c. that needs to be couriered up to [name] today *meaning* get that couriered to [name] today

d. if you've got views on how you think it should be structured um that those ideas would be really helpful *meaning* give me feedback on this

e. he could be a useful ally *meaning* get in touch with him

The meaning in implicit directives may be similar to the meaning in explicit directives, but these were separated out because of my interest in the relationship between the speaker and the hearer. Reference to oneself, a third person or a thing distances the directive from the hearer and therefore modifies the force of the directive. Some implicit directives can be more forceful than explicit directives, e.g., 2(c) above in comparison to 1(a), but the reference to the object is another strategy which softens the directive in a different way.

The central modal verbs and the marginal auxiliaries in the directive utterances in Example 2 are not modifying a verb specifying the action which the speaker requires of the hearer. The difference between explicit and implicit directives is particularly pertinent when looking at utterances such as Example 2(d). Here there is both a reasonably strong modal, *should*, as well as a more hedged modal *would*. It is the softer of the two which is most relevant to the action required, but even then the action is distanced from the hearer.

3. Results and Discussion

I will now explore the distribution of the modal verbs according to their meanings. The semantic classification used is a fairly simple and traditional one, but is useful in examining the meaning of the modals in the specific directive context involved. Unfortunately there have been no investigations of the meaning of the modal verbs in New Zealand English, although linguists in New Zealand are aware that there may be some interesting differences (e.g. Bauer 1987).

3.1 Modal Verbs and Marginal Auxiliaries of Volition and Prediction

The most frequent modal found in the WSC is *would*, while the most frequent modal in the 52 workplace interactions I examined is *will*. *Would* and *will*, along with *shall* are modals of volition and prediction (Biber et al 1999: 485). Coates (1983: 167) also lists *will* and *shall* as modals of volition and prediction, but differentiates between these and *would*, which is a 'hypothetical' modal (Coates 1983: 205). Biber et al (1999: 485) also list BE *going to* along with the central modals of volition/prediction.

Quirk et al (1985: 229) note that *will* meaning 'willingness' is a meaning which 'is common in requests and offers'. In requests, this involves the use of an interrogative form. Example 3(a) and (b) are the only two directives in my data which are modal interrogatives containing *will*.[5]

Example 3:

    a. as soon as you've contacted Yvette will you let me know what the story is?

    b. will you have time to do that today if I fire the stuff across to you?

    c. we'll put it with the you know the three separate papers that we've made up

    d. we'll just say it straight out that most of credits have been in this [topic] sector that you might want to look at in priority so other areas where you would increase or make the access for [social group]

Example 3(c) and (d) are declaratives. In these cases the meaning of *will* is more one of intention or prediction. The proposed action will take place in another place and time. The speaker's use of *will* strongly asserts what will happen.

Table 1 gives the number of occurrences of the modal verbs and marginal auxiliaries of volition/prediction.

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[5] Syntactic construction is not often highlighted in this discussion as my corpus is small.

Table 1: Occurrences of modals of volition/prediction

Modal	Number in explicit	Number overall
will	11	24
would	2	44
shall	1	1
BE going to	5	16
Total	19	85

There were only 14 occurrences of *will, would* and *shall* modifying the verbs in the explicit directives. Contrary to expectations therefore, *would* and *will* were not common, although *will* was more common than *would* or *shall.*

Occurrences of *will* more than doubled however when looking at the overall results. This is not surprising given *will's* overall prevalence in spoken data. At times it is used in the implicit directives in a similar way to that found in Examples 3(c) and (d), for instance when the intended state of an object is asserted, this state only being attained after the hearer completes the required action.

Would is an interesting modal because of its use in modifying phrases. Overall there were 44 instances of *would* in the directive utterances in my data. When the analysis focuses on the occurrences of modals modifying the verb specifying the action in the explicit directives, this figure drops to two. This is because *would* frequently occurs in the phrase '(that) would be good' as in the examples in Example 4.

Example 4:
    a. it would be good if you could think about that
    b. make it sort of later next week would be good

The use of *would* in these phrases reflects the fact that *would* is perceived as being very polite. James (1978) and Fraser & Nolen (1981) each asked 40 subjects to rank a group of sentences which varied on a number of factors, including the use of different modal verbs. Eight of James' 14 sentences contained either *may, would* or *can.* Sentences with *may* were rated as the most polite, followed by *would* and then *can* (James 1978: 180). Fraser &

Nolen (1981) explored a wider range of modals and syntactic structures. Once again, *would* was rated as being weaker than *can*. It was also rated as more deferent than *could* (Fraser & Nolen 1981: 101).

Another interesting result in relation to this phrase is that often an *if* clause was present, of the type found in Example 4(a) above, but the 'that would be good' part was omitted. This was actually more common than utterances where it was included, 15 out of 22 didn't contain the matrix clause. *If* could be regarded as a directive marker, or even as a politeness marker in the way that *please* is often interpreted[6].

4. Modals of Permission, Possibility and Ability

Can and *could* are also frequent in spoken English. *Can, could, may, might* and *be able to* can all be used to convey the meanings of permission, possibility and ability (Coates 1983: 85-130; Biber et al 1999: 485). In relation to directives, Coates (1983: 98-99) notes that the use of 'CAN='Root possibility' to imply willingness ... is taken one step further in its use as a covert imperative'.

Coates (1983) is referring to the use of *can* in interrogatives here, but the same point applies to declaratives. In these cases, *can* questions the preconditions of a directive that specify 'that the addressee should be able (i.e. nothing prevents him carrying out the action) and willing' (Coates 1983: 98).

Table 2: Occurrences of modals of permission, possibility and ability

Modal	Number in explicit	Number overall
can	42	64
could	18	27
may	0	1
might	16	30
BE able to	2	8
Total	78	130

[6] Chris Lane (personal communication) notes that identifying *if* as a directive marker would parallel a number of languages (e.g. Samoan) in which the item usually glossed *if* can appear in a main clause and marks the clause as interrogative.

Overall, *can* and *could* account for 60 of the 98 occurrences of the central modal verbs that modify the action specifying verb (61%). Coates (1983: 98) notes that in these directive situations, *will* (and *would*) 'occur more frequently than' *can* (and *could*). In my explicit directive data, *can* (and *could*) occur much more frequently. This pattern is evident in both interrogatives and declaratives. Some examples are provided in Example 5.

Example 5:
    a. can you please make sure that the room is booked for the whole day?
    b. could you have a quick word with her?
    c. you can say that I'm going to send them an example

Over all the directive utterances *can* is also most frequent, although this is then followed by *would. Could* and *will* show a similar distribution, although *could* is slightly more frequent.

Some researchers on directives and requests note that the difference between *can* and *could* is one of tense (see for example Trosborg 1994: 210). As Biber et al (1999: 485) note, however, the main function of pairs of modals such as *can* and *could* relates to 'speaker stance rather than the marking of time distinctions. For example, modals associated with past time are also associated with hypothetical situations, conveying overtones of tentativeness and politeness'. Coates (1983: 121) also refers to the use of 'hypothetical COULD ... as a polite form of CAN.' This is especially true of a directive context. In every case where *could* is used a future act is required.

Like *could, might* has a hypothetical meaning when used in directives. Coates (1983: 161) notes that the use of hypothetical Root *might* 'is often used to indicate a course of action politely, without giving overt advice'.

Example 6:
    a. so you might get them to score their own work as to the extent to which it satisfies the criteria
    b. you might like to just reassure them
    c. you might wanna rewrite it

Might and *could* had a similar distribution in my data, as seen in Table 2. Corpus studies have shown that *might* tends to occur a lot less frequently than *could, can, would* and *will*. This suggests that the directive context is one which favours the use of this modal. This is further supported by looking at the overall distribution of these five modals in the 52 workplace interactions. Overall there are 203 occurrences of *might*, while the closest of the other four central modals, *could, can, would* and *will*, in terms of frequency is *can*, with 333 tokens.

5. Modal Verbs and Marginal Auxiliaries Expressing Obligation and Necessity

The last group of modals and marginal auxiliaries are those which express obligation and necessity. These are much less frequent in spoken English than modals of volition/prediction and of permission/possibility/ability (Coates 1983, Biber et al 1999: 493). Of the two central modals which express obligation and necessity, *must* and *should*, only *should* occurs in my data and its use is infrequent (see Table 3).

Example 7:

    a. you should ask

    b. we should probably put in there that um the ministry has what we
        did actually intend

It is interesting that the only central modal of necessity and obligation used is one of 'weak obligation' (Coates 1983: 58). Coates (1983: 58-59) notes that

> 'where the speaker, in subjective examples of Root MUST, demanded action, with subjective SHOULD, he only suggests it. In the case of MUST the speaker expects to be obeyed, but in the case of SHOULD there is no such expectation'.

The utterances in Example 7, were both said by managers. I would argue therefore that the speaker expects to be obeyed. The strategy used, however, is more polite and less forceful because it suggests that the addressee does have a choice.

Biber et al (1999: 495) also found that *must* 'marking personal obligation' was rare in conversation. They concluded that this 'is probably due to the strong directive force this modal has when used in face-to-face interaction. The modal *should* provides a hedged expression of obligation that is typically regarded as more polite'. Other researchers mention the association of *should* with suggestion and advice. Altman (1990), for example, explores the interpretation of two forms which he associates with the expression of advice – *should* and *had better*.

The infrequent occurrence of *should* and the non-occurrence of *must* is interesting given that they are modals of obligation and necessity. It could be expected that in a workplace context where the tasks required in the directives relate to the job obligations of the addressees, that this may be a factor that is referred to through the use of this type of modal. A number of other marginal auxiliaries have also been associated with the conveyance of this type of meaning. Biber et al (1999: 489-490) note that the low occurrence of *should* and *must* in their data could be partly explained by the fact that 'semi-modals have become better established in this semantic domain, apparently replacing the modal verbs to a greater extent'.

Table 3: Modals and marginal auxiliaries of obligation/necessity

Modal	Number in explicit	Number overall
must	0	0
should	8	18
(had) better	1	1
have to	10	14
have got to	2	2
need to	33	43
ought to	0	0
BE supposed to	1	1
Total	55	78

Need to only accounted for 0.2% of the modal verbs in the BNC (Kennedy 2002). As seen in Table 3, *need to* is reasonably frequent in my explicit directives. If the results for *need to* are combined with the results for the central modals, *need to* accounts for 17% of these modal verbs. This is one form, therefore which the women in my dataset use a great deal when issuing directives. It would appear that when the focus is on directives this marginal auxiliary is common. I do not know if this pattern is peculiar to New Zealand English, or whether it would also be found in other varieties of English. I have yet to explore the distribution of *need to* in the WSC.

Kennedy is one of the few researchers who has explored the distribution of *need to*. This reflects the fact that *need to* has not always been accepted as a modal. Coates (1983: 49) and Palmer (1990: 127) are both careful to distinguish between *need* the modal and *need to* the non-modal. Biber et al (1999: 484), however, call *need to* a 'marginal auxiliary' and count the marginal auxiliaries (including *need to*) as 'semi-modals'.

The status of *need to* as a marginal auxiliary can be justified by looking at the way that it functions. Coates (1983: 31-84) explores the modals of 'obligation and necessity'. She includes the 'quasi-modals' *have got to* and *have to* because 'no discussion of MUST or of the modals of Obligation and Necessity would be complete without reference to them' (Coates 1983: 52). Coates (1983: 52-58) shows how these quasi-modals can function in a similar way to *must*. A similar argument could be applied to *need to*. The examples in my data with *need to* also have the 'meaning of MUST' (like *have got to* and *have to*), i.e., 'they can be paraphrased 'it is essential that" (Coates 1983: 53).

Example 8:
    a. we need to add in a column or something
    b. and once you've faxed it through we need to send them th- the original
    c. you need to just check the travel booking

Need to is softer than *must*, but the meaning is similar. *Need to* allows the speaker to avoid direct reference to their own authority. *Need to* implies external forces require the task to be done, and therefore distances the directive from the speaker.

Along with *must*, *should* and *need to*, Biber et al (1999: 485) list a number of other marginal auxiliaries which convey the meaning of obligation/necessity: (had) better, have (got) to, ought to, be supposed to. Although not frequent in my data (see Table 3), there were 14 examples found in the explicit directives. Some examples are provided in Example 9.

Example 9:

  a. you're supposed to be making an appointment

  b. we have to fax this off

  c. and we have to arrange fifty percent payment

  d. but we better take that one with us

The low frequency of *have to* is unexpected given the findings of corpus studies. Biber et al (1999), for example, found that *have to* was used more than any of the other modals or marginal auxiliaries which express obligation and necessity. It may be that in New Zealand English this role has been taken by *need to*, a marginal auxiliary which is stronger than *should*, but is weaker than *must* or *have to*.

6. Summary and Conclusion

Directives, in the context in which I have examined them here, are a type of speech act where modal verbs are used a great deal. In the action specifying verb phrases in the explicit directives, the most common modal verbs and marginal auxiliaries used in the directives are modals of possibility. *Can, could, might* and *be able to* account for 51% of the modal verbs and marginal auxiliaries. These modals are associated with a low level of force and convey high levels of tentativeness and politeness.

Modal verbs and marginal auxiliaries associated with obligation and necessity account for a further 36% of the modals in the explicit directives. This type of modal can strengthen the force of an utterance, although the strongest modal in this group, *must*, does not occur at all. *Need to* was the most frequent of the modals in this group. It is at least twice as frequent as any of the central modals except *can*. There were ten occurrences of *have to*. The other marginal auxiliaries do not occur frequently, even though the workplace context is one where reference to job obligations might be expected.

Looking at the overall results, *can* is still the most frequent of the modals and marginal auxiliaries, with 64 occurrences. *Would* and *need to* have similar frequencies, 44 and 43 respectively. *Might* ranks fourth with 30 occurrences.

These results differ from the overall patterns found in studies of spoken English in a number of ways. In particular, there is a relatively low use of *will*, while *need to* has a high frequency in the directive data. The modals that occur frequently generally serve as softening devices, with modals associated with a strong level of force, such as *must* and *should* occurring relatively infrequently. The two women managers who uttered the majority of the directives were found to have a supportive style of interaction with their staff. They showed concern for others' face needs and this was evident in the ways they expressed their directives. They were not authoritarian, rather they worked to maintain good relationships through their patterns of interaction. Only 7% of their directive utterances did not have internal softening devices of some type, modals being one such device which was used frequently.

The different patterns of modal verb frequency observed may be a reflection of the variety of English examined. A quick look at the WSC disputes this, however, since the central modals in this corpus do not show the same pattern. The overall data from which the directives have been taken also provide further support to refute this, as the distribution of the modals here also differs.

The focus on women's speech could explain the differences. This may be the case, but without examination of workplace data collected from men it is not possible to confirm nor completely dismiss this proposition. I have not yet examined the directives of any of the male managers that have subsequently recorded interactions for the Language in the Workplace Project. Comparing the overall pattern found in the 52 extract workplace sample I used to another sample of data from the Language in the Workplace which involves men in one-to-one meetings, however, provides evidence which suggests that gender is not an overriding factor. The most frequent central modal in a 181,142 word sample of male interactions was also the most frequent in the overall women's data, i.e., *will*. The least frequent central modals also rank in the same order as in the women's data - *may, must* and *shall* being least common. There is some interesting variation in terms of the ranking of the other modals. Whether this is due

to gender differences or other factors, such as the exact type of interactions involved, needs further exploration[7].

One conclusion that I have reached after the brief investigation presented here is how interesting modal verbs are and how much more research could be done to explore their use in New Zealand English - both in terms of frequency and use - and within a range of types of data. Modality is a challenging area of the English language, which is certainly worthy of further attention

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[7] Different types of speech act can be found in different types of interactions. For example, an interaction whose main purpose is task allocation will have a high occurrence of directives, while a report back/information update meeting is likely to have a much lower incidence. *Can* and *need to*, for example, may then have a high corresponding frequency in the task allocation interaction, while other modals may occur more in the report back meeting.

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How Revolutionary Was *Lyrical Ballads* (1798-1800)?

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In the traditional account of literary Romanticism in Britain, *Lyrical Ballads* is considered the seminal, inspirational work. The first edition of October 1798, published anonymously in Bristol by the young Wordsworth and Coleridge, has been said to be 'the only literary publication (as opposed to political event or turn of a century) that has been used to mark the beginning of a period in either English or American literature' (Stillinger 2000: 70). The 'Advertisement' which headed the book stressed the experimental nature of the poems, which were claimed to have been

> written chiefly with a view to ascertain how far the language of
> conversation in the middle and lower classes of society is adapted to
> the purposes of poetic pleasure. (ll. 7-10)[1]

The book was not immediately perceived as a radical experiment. Though not a bestseller, it sold tolerably well, and went into four editions between 1798 and 1805. The reviews were mostly favorable, and the poems were much reprinted in magazines and miscellanies (Mayo 1972). But the work, as if to demonstrate its 'organic' character, did not remain unchanged. The second edition, which appeared in 1800, was augmented by the addition of a second volume, another 227 pages of newly composed verse—all of it by Wordsworth—and a strident, polemical Preface by Wordsworth, which he later expanded, and which arguably proved as influential as the verse. When we speak about *Lyrical Ballads* we commonly mean the work as it evolved from 1798 to 1805, and essentially as it appeared in 1800. I would add, 'Preface and all', as the Preface seems to me an integral part of the *Lyrical Ballads*, or at least such an important influence on its reception that it cannot be ignored. Such was the impact of the work in hindsight, then,

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[1] References throughout are to *Lyrical Ballads*, ed. Michael Mason (London and New York: Longman, 1992).

that 1798 has commonly been taken to mark the beginning of the Romantic period, despite the fact that Wordsworth's Preface and the second volume were not yet written.

A 'revolutionary' work? The question need only imply that the book was 'revolutionary' in the long-established sense that it is 'an instance of great change or alteration in affairs or in some particular thing' (*OED*, 'revolution', III.6.b.). This is the sense in which Wordsworth uses the term in the Preface, when he speaks of 'retracing the revolutions not of literature alone but likewise of society itself' (ll. 52-3). Yet there is also the very palpable analogy with *political* revolutions, a pregnant analogy in the case of *Lyrical Ballads* because early Romanticism is so strongly associated with the ideals of the French Revolution, which Wordsworth and Coleridge had enthusiastically embraced as younger men. Although both poets had suffered disenchantment over political developments in France since the mid-1790s, their criticism of social conditions could still be considered seditious by critics who, like the *Edinburgh Review*'s Francis Jeffrey, feared that social unrest, fuelled by a series of bad harvests, would lead to large-scale upheaval on the French model (Perkins 1993: 88-91). By 1798, however, the anticipations of a new world order that had so agitated the early years of the decade had largely lost their charge, though conservative fears still ran high. There is wide agreement that Wordsworth and Coleridge finally shut the door on their 'radical years' in the summer of 1798 (Roe 1988: 262-75). A traditional view, both vehemently affirmed and strongly contested in recent criticism, sees *Lyrical Ballads* 'as the product of quietistic retreat' (Sheats 1991: 99).[2] More than one critic has recently called attention to the ambivalence that lies behind the composition date announced in the full title of 'Lines written a few miles above Tintern Abbey, on revisiting the banks of the Wye during a tour, *July* 13, 1798', a poem actually written over several days. The thirteenth of July was a date of rich personal significance for Wordsworth. It was the day Wordsworth and his sister completed their tour in 1798. It also commemorates the eve of the storming of the Bastille. Wordsworth landed in France on 13 July 1790, and moved into the house at Alfoxden in Somerset with his sister on 13 July 1797 (Benis 2000: 134; Johnston 1998: 232, 522). 'Five years have passed', the first line of 'Tintern Abbey'

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[2] See also McGann 1983: 84-90, and Levinson 1986: 18-23. For the counter-argument that *Lyrical Ballads* represented 'the culmination of Wordsworth's development of a particular kind of English radicalism, one which used a view of rural landscape and society to makes arguments about the government of the nation', see Fulford 1996: 161ff.

tells us, 'five summers, with the length | Of five long winters' since Wordsworth visited the Wye as a young radical; if we measure the time exactly, as the date in the title invites us to do, it was five years to the day since the assassination of Marat on 13 July 1793, which marked the beginning of the Terror (Johnston 1998: 373). As James Heffernan observes, Wordsworth seems to be acknowledging his radical past even as he is saying, in effect, goodbye to all that (Heffernan 1998: 238). Critics have long acknowledged the strong elements of political as well as social protest in poems like 'The Female Vagrant' and 'The Last of the Flock', which deplore the effects of enclosure, rural poverty, and the repressive policies of the Tory government in the wake of Britain's wars against the American colonies and France. But humanitarian protest does not entail political radicalism, and even radicalism does not entail the support of revolution as a means of political action.[3] The farmer-poet Thomas Batchelor protests even more explicitly than Wordsworth against the war and the distress of the rural population in his nearly contemporary georgic *The Progress of Agriculture* (1801, published 1804), in which the authorities come in for scathing rebuke. Yet though Batchelor is outspoken, his commitment to the practical business of rural life keeps him, like Wordsworth, from advocating any radical or revolutionary course of action.[4]

The fact that Wordsworth portrays his characters so vividly and sympathetically does lend his humanitarianism an emotional impetus which intensifies the political thrust of the poems. But his sharp focus on particularized individuals and their specific local contexts resists doctrinaire solutions, and thus most politically radical solutions, to social ills. The accusation that Wordsworth condones the poverty of the Old Cumberland Beggar is unjust, but he does suggest that mere legislation of any political stripe would be the wrong way to deal with him, as this would deny his actual moral function in the rural world. In sum, it seems hard to disagree with those critics to whom *Lyrical Ballads* represents a deliberate turning away from revolutionary politics and the city, and a commitment to

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[3] Even Godwin questioned the expediency of revolution as a political instrument; cf. *Lyrical Ballads*, ed. R. H. Brett and A. R. Jones, 2nd edn (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), xxxiv; Prickett 1989: 111-15; Roe 1988: 11.

[4] Thomas Batchelor, *Village Scenes, The Progress of Agriculture, and other poems* (London: Parnassian Press for Vernor and Hood, 1804). According to the preface, 'The Progress of Agriculture' was 'first written in 1801, but has since received many alterations'. See especially the peasant's complaint on the war against France, ll. 504-15 (p. 95).

engage with an emphatically English and provincial world in a manner which, as the Preface makes clear, is explicitly and self-consciously aesthetic (Heffernan 1998: 236). This is not to say that *Lyrical Ballads* is apolitical: Wordsworth's letter recommending the second edition to the radical Whig Charles James Fox of 14 January 1801 demonstrates just how politically he conceived some of his poems (Sambrook 1983: 127-8). But not all of them, and not in equal measure: the distressed woman of 'The Thorn', a poem I'll be returning to, has recently been discussed as a representative of the vagrant community—a sister of 'The Female Vagrant'—whereas it seems to me that she is not an itinerant person at all, and that her significance, as I shall argue later, has more to do with the sexual politics of sentimental literature than with social issues to be dealt with by political reform (Benis 2000: 96-113). The letter to Fox also shows that Wordsworth's political aims were not revolutionary, as indeed the reviewer in the Tory journal *The British Critic* admitted when he concluded that, despite traces of political disaffection in 'The Female Vagrant', *Lyrical Ballads* as a whole did not offer 'any offensive mixture of enmity to present institutions, except in one or two instances, which are so unobtrusive as hardly to deserve notice' (*British Critic* XIII, 1799, p. 369, cited in Stabler 1998: 217).

But if *Lyrical Ballads* cannot be said to be revolutionary in political terms, as tending towards the overthrow of existing institutions, another understanding of 'revolution' allows a different claim, namely that Romanticism as a movement represents a literary revolution, and that Wordsworth and Coleridge represent its English avant-garde. Viewing 1798 as a transposition of 1789, the publication of *Lyrical Ballads* would seem the literary equivalent of the storming of the Bastille, and Wordsworth's Preface of 1800 a manifesto heralding the overthrow of the *ancien régime* and the proclamation of a republic of letters along enlightened and egalitarian lines. In all events, the question before us implies that *Literary Ballads* was the agent of radical literary change.

My title contains one further word that ought to be interrogated, the apparently innocent verb *was*. When 'was' *Lyrical Ballads* revolutionary? Robert Hume has commented incisively on this question in his recent book on historical methodology:

> What is the right context? If you are coming to Wordsworth from Gray, Collins, Smart, Churchill, Cowper, Ossian, Chatterton, and Crabbe, then the 1798 *Lyrical Ballads* seems as revolutionary as textbooks still make it sound. If, however, you do what Robert

> Mayo did, and read extensively in magazines that published verse in
> the 1790s, then all of a sudden Wordsworth seems a great deal less
> of an innovator. In retrospect, one might have guessed this: context
> that does not come from within the decade at issue is unlikely to be
> anything but misleading. (Hume 1999: 139-40)

Hume's point strikes me as essential. Should we judge whether *Lyrical
Ballads* was revolutionary from the viewpoint (which, as Hume
emphasizes, we must as always contruct for ourselves) of the decade before
it was published and the first few years of its reception? Or looking back
on the whole gamut of subsequent Romanticism, which, as Marilyn Butler
reminds us, 'is a posthumous development'? (Butler 1981: 2). Jerome
McGann embraces the anachronistic historical perspective we inevitably
bring to older texts, saying that 'The significance of a book like *Lyrical
Ballads* lies in its ability to look before and after' (McGann 1983: 107).
This means *our* ability to look before and after, not that of Wordsworth or
Coleridge or their contemporaries. We look in vain for a strictly
contemporary 'revolution' caused by *Lyrical Ballads*. This does not mean
that great changes are not discoverable in its wake. But reception history will
tend to complicate rather than merely confirm the notion of *Lyrical Ballads*'s
revolutionary trajectory. In either 1799 or 1801 (probably the latter) the
teenage radical Thomas De Quincey read *Lyrical Ballads*, and wrote later
that it was 'the greatest event in the unfolding of my own mind':

> I found in these poems 'the ray of a new morning', and an absolute
> revelation of untrodden worlds teeming with power and beauty as
> yet unsuspected amongst men. (De Quincey 1973: 57)

But it is unwise to generalize too freely from such instances. If we didn't
know otherwise, we might well imagine that John Clare, that great admirer
of Wordsworth, might have similarly caught his first glimpse of 'the ray of
a new morning' in *Lyrical Ballads*, or may have felt emboldened by the
proposal in the 1802 Preface to speak 'the very language of men' (ll. 267-
8). Certainly Wordsworth's Preface lastingly influenced Clare's reception
(Storey 1994: 36-8, and Vardy 2000: *passim*). But as a teenager (*c.* 1806)
Clare himself was initiated into poetry by the momentous experience of
reading a work that had little to do with the avant-garde: Thomson's *The
Seasons*. Three-quarters of a century after its first appearance, *The
Seasons*—a work which strongly influenced Wordsworth,[5] but which was

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[5] See Jacobus 1976: 39-44, 105-9, and Johnston 1998: 81-3, 85-6.

open to criticism for its obsolescent brand of 'poetic diction'—made a dramatic, I am almost tempted to say a revolutionary, impact on a major poet of the 'second' Romantic generation (Goodridge and Thornton 1994). The chance survival of such evidence as this reminds us that reception is only partly and uncertainly recoverable. And there is no way to accurately determine whether longer-term changes in literary history were actually caused by any work, whether by Thomson or Wordsworth or any other writer. Hume takes this to undermine the viability of any literary history that attempts to span more than a decade or so. I am in general sympathy with his argument, though the limits it insists on are considerable.

Hume's reference to Robert Mayo is actually more polemical than accurate. Mayo does in fact emphasize, in his famous article on 'The Contemporaneity of the *Lyrical Ballads*' (1954), that the work

> was 'original' in various respects (as reviewers said it was), and that it was to be a leavening force of extraordinary power in the years to come. (Mayo 1972: 106)

Mayo even concedes that

> From one point of view the *Lyrical Ballads* stand at the beginning of a new orientation of literary, social, ethical, and religious values; and they are unquestionably a pivotal work in the transition from one century to the next. (Mayo 1972: 106-7)

Yet from a strictly *contemporary* point of view, Mayo argues, the poems were not exceptional in anything but their excellence (110-11). Humanitarian verse was a staple of the magazines of the time. Nor was experimentation with the ballad form an innovation in itself (97-104). Most of the verse forms and the general topics of *Lyrical Ballads*, Mayo concludes, would have been familiar to contemporary readers. And yet he immediately adds the statement I have just quoted: that the work *was 'original'* in *various respects* and that *it was to be a leavening force of extraordinary power in the years to come.* In other words, the verse was superficially unexceptional, yet *Lyrical Ballads* was nonetheless original in its literary achievement and revolutionary in its long-term impact.

'Original' in what particular respects? The term was hazy then as now. Reviewers seem to have selected the compliment from the common

store, usually without meaning anything very specific,[6] though Dr Burney offers a more precise application when he notes that Coleridge's 'The Nightingale' is 'Miltonic, yet original' (Burney 1972: 55). In his notorious hostile review, Southey predictably avoids the term (Southey 1972: 53-4). But he immediately draws attention to the striking fact that the 'Advertisement' to *Lyrical Ballads* presents the poems, or 'the majority' of them, as *experiments*. This was later developed as the cardinal point in Wordsworth's Preface, which insists that the poems are '*materially different* from those upon which general approbation is at present bestowed' (ll. 57-9, my emphasis). If the poems were so consonant with popular taste, and Mayo shows that on the whole they were, why does Wordsworth present them as so 'materially different' that they need a new theory to be understood?

This question is addressed most persuasively, in my opinion, in Brian Wilkie's article 'Wordsworth and the Tradition of Avant-Garde' (1973), which looks back at Wordsworth from the vantage-point of the wave of experimentalism in the arts of the 1950s and '60s. Wilkie takes Coleridge's view that the question of *Lyrical Ballads's* radical originality was raised by the Preface rather than the poems.[7] Wilkie argues that the volume is set apart by the implications of explicitly proclaiming itself a vehicle for poetic experiment, and by Wordsworth's insistence in the Preface that readers must re-educate themselves in order to appreciate his achievement. This position, Wilkie argues, is familiar as the characteristic stance of the artistic avant-garde of every modern generation, and places Wordsworth very near the beginning of this emphatically modern tradition.

As critics have pointed out, most of Wordsworth's ideas in the Preface are not themselves original. The idea that the representation of rural life allows the poet to give the purest expression to universal passions (ll. 106-19)[8] is a basic idea of pastoral, and the idea that poetry is concerned with permanent things, and that 'truth' is 'not individual and local, but general', was a commonplace of eighteenth-century criticism. Wordsworth was not the first to criticize empty diction; Pope and the Scriblerians did so too. Wordsworth's insistence that the poet should

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[6] See Jordan 1976: 56, 59. In the *Monthly Review* (1799) Dr Burney concludes that a great deal of 'genius and originality are discovered in this publication' (Burney 1972: 57).

[7] See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria, or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Opinions*, ed. George Watson (London: Dent, 1965, repr. 1971), 42.

[8] Wordsworth's observation that the language of ordinary men must be 'purified' of its 'defects' (l. 120) implies that representation must be stylized to a certain degree.

'choose incidents and situations from common life' (ll. 96-7) would surely have pleased Cowper, the poet of domestic life.[9] Wordsworth's intention to use 'the language really used by men' (ll. 98-9) seems to owe something to Burns's example (*for a' that* Wordsworth is not a dialect poet), and his aim 'to illustrate the manner in which our feelings and ideas are associated in a state of excitement' (ll. 177-9) draws on the same Lockean tradition as Sterne, who would surely have agreed that it is feeling that gives meaning to action, not vice versa (ll. 210-12). (As Samuel Johnson famously said about reading Richardson, one must 'consider the story as only giving occasion to the sentiment'.)[10] Nor was Wordsworth's hostility to didactic verse on scientific topics in any way exceptional (ll. 587-613). What does seem new is his emphasis on a radical kind of *pleasure*. As early as the Advertisement of 1798 (quoted at beginning of this paper), Wordsworth says he aims 'to ascertain how far the language of conversation in the middle and lower classes of society is adapted to the purposes of poetic pleasure'. Lionel Trilling has drawn attention to Wordsworth's repeated emphasis in the Preface on 'giving pleasure' (l. 467), especially in the expanded 1802 version, in which he stresses the poet's 'necessity of giving immediate pleasure to a Human Being' (ll. 505-10). This necessity

> is an acknowledgment of the beauty of the universe, an acknowledgment the more sincere, because it is not formal, but indirect; it is a task light and easy to him who looks at the world in the spirit of love; further, it is a homage paid to the native and naked dignity of man, to the grand elementary principle of pleasure, by which he knows, and feels, and lives, and moves. (ll. 516-22).

Trilling points out that this statement is 'bold to the point of being shocking, for it echoes and controverts St. Paul's sentence which tells us that "we live, and move, and have our being" in God (Acts 17:28)' (Trilling 1966: 58). Wordsworth's description of giving poetic pleasure as 'a task light and easy' refers even more audaciously to Christ's words, 'For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light' (Matthew 11:30). The implied idea of poetry as a secular religion *is* distinctly modern, and does *not* seem to be a great deal older than Wordsworth, and the changes attendant on

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[9] And the reviewer in the *British Critic* observed that Coleridge emulated *The Task* in his 'conversational' poem, 'The Nightingale'; *Lyrical Ballads*, ed. Brett and Jones, 2nd edn, 329.

[10] Boswell 1887: II, 175. In McGann's opinion, 'Wordsworth's "Preface" [...] is a sentimental manifesto in the strictest sense'; 1996: 121.

this conception of literature *do* seem to merit the word 'revolutionary'. Wordsworth repeatedly emphasizes the novelty of what he is saying. 'A practical faith in the opinions which I am wishing to establish', he declares,

> is almost unknown. If my conclusions are admitted, and carried out as far as they must be carried if admitted at all, our judgments concerning the works of the greatest Poets both ancient and modern will be far different from what they are at present [...] (ll. 412-14)

And the way in which he proceeds to discuss this new poetry of pleasure is itself very revealing. Wordsworth does not ask 'What is Poetry?', but 'What is a Poet?' (l. 422). The shift in focus from the poem to the poet, and from the poetic result to the creative process which brings if forth (ll. 422ff., 797ff.), is new. And as Wilkie points out, Wordsworth's tone itself—'militantly astringent' (Danby 1960: 16) as well as anxious and enthusiastic—suggests a new relationship between the poet and his audience, in which the poet demands that the audience submit to a process of aesthetic self-discipline to make themselves ready to receive his Word. Jack Stillinger has recently claimed that *Lyrical Ballads*, with its deliberately 'mysterious and puzzling' poems, marks

> the beginning of a kind of interpretative democracy in which it is the individual reader, rather than the author, who determines the meanings in a literary work. (Stillinger 2000: 71)

But the Preface seems equally novel in its insistence on the poet's authority to tell the reader how to read. In this blend of authorial assertiveness and passionate egalitarianism, *Lyrical Ballads* looks forward to the long prose preface of Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* (1855). As Wilkie suggests, the manifesto is no longer presented as detachable from the work of art, but as a path to its origins, and thus to its meaning. Wordsworth's Preface has shown a remarkable power to influence responses to *Lyrical Ballads*, as indeed to other works. When John Stuart Mill describes in his autobiography the importance of reading Wordsworth during the crisis in his youth, his prose is saturated with the language of the Preface:

> What made Wordsworth's poems a medicine for my state of mind, was that they expressed, not merely outward beauty, but states of feeling, and of thought coloured by feeling, under the excitement of beauty. (quoted in Danby 1960: 2)

This strikes Danby (1960: 2) as 'an odd way of describing Wordsworth's best achievements as a poet'. But it seems to me that Mill is subconsciously remembering Wordsworth's dictum that the purpose of his poetry is to show how our ideas and feelings are associated in a state of excitement (ll. 175-9). Mill has internalized the language of the Preface; it has colored his experience of the verse, and thus become integral to his view of Wordsworth's poetry.

One of Wordsworth's greatest claims to originality, in poetic theory as well as in practice, lies in fusing two traditions: on the one hand, the pastoral practice of using representations of rural simplicity to express universal passions in the purest form, and on the other, the austere realism of Crabbe's 'anti-pastoral' mode, with its firm commitment to what Crabbe considered lived experience (Barrell and Bull 1974: 427). 'Michael' is the great example of this synthetic achievement (Sambrook 1983: 126-7). But Wordsworth's experiments with the ballad form represent his most daring attempts to infuse the pastoral tradition with an unprecedentedly intimate, even humorous, sympathy with rural life and popular culture. It seems significant that the poems featuring Wordsworth's so-called 'simple' style, for instance 'Goody Blake', 'The Idiot Boy', and 'Simon Lee', are those which most sharply divided nineteenth-century taste, puzzling many readers and eliciting a great number of parodies. Even today these poems are sometimes read as experiments in cultivating real simplicity, either for its own sake or for realistic or humanitarian purposes, rather than as formally sophisticated experiments with traditional materials. Wilkie, for instance, speaks of Wordsworth's 'attempt to present rustics and their language and other even less arty subjects *virtually raw*' (Wilkie 1973: 207, my emphasis). The saving word here is 'virtually'. J. R. Watson's Longman survey of *English Poetry of the Romantic Period* tells us that, in order to convey the humanitarian concerns of the poems with the greatest possible immediacy, verbal and narrative art has been sacrificed in a 'radically new' way:

> The language [of *Lyrical Ballads*...] intentionally undercuts the felicities of art. There is no elegance in 'The Thorn', because elegance is not required; there is no tale in 'Simon Lee', because a tale would allow the reader to enjoy something other than the dreadful contemplation of old age. (Watson 1989: 126)

This puritanical severity compares oddly with Wordsworth's remark that he 'never wrote anything with so much glee' as 'The Idiot Boy' (Jacobus 1976: 250), and with the explicit hedonism of the Preface. But though I

wonder whether 'elegance' can be said to have been sacrificed in 'The Thorn', which strikes me as an extremely elegant poem (not least in formal terms), I will offer a reading of some of its lines which suggests a conclusion similar to Watson's. Wordsworth's ballad imitations *do* use exceptionally simple language, and this *was* 'radically new', though simple language was hardly novel in itself, especially in popular verse. Wordsworth's use of simple language was new in part *because* it was elegant: it was designed to give sophisticated pleasure. That partly explains why it also caused, and continues to cause, acute embarrassment. 'The Thorn' presents the clearest instance of this readerly discomfort. As Stephen Gill observes, 'readers have generally found [the poem] one of the most uncomfortable of all the lyrical ballads' (1989: 187), and the rhyming couplet which ends the third stanza is the locus classicus of Wordsworthian embarrassment. Wordsworth himself finally succumbed to this pudor and altered the lines in 1820. The offending couplet describes a muddy pond:

> I've measured it from side to side:
> 'Tis three feet long, and two feet wide. (32-3)

Wordsworth's disciple Henry Crabb Robinson told the poet that 'he dared not read those lines aloud for fear of ridicule' (Darbishire 1950: 48-9). Many twentieth-century critics have cringed at their 'unendurable banality' (Gill 1989: 187). But Wordsworth's terse reply to Robinson was adamant: *They ought to be liked* (Darbishire 1950: 49).

Nevertheless, he had anticipated criticism. In the 1798 Advertisement he warned readers that the narrator of 'The Thorn' was not to be associated with the author himself, and in 1800 he added a fulsome note explaining that the poem was (in effect) a dramatic monologue. The question of whether this is really so is too complex to discuss here;[11] I

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[11] I share Jacobus's view that 'The Thorn' is not, or not merely, a dramatic monologue: that the interest is primarily geared towards the tale and not the teller; see Jacobus 1976: 248, but see also Parrish's influential discussion, 1973: 97-112. The issue is crucial, and one is easily confused by the many versions of the text: in Duncan Wu's recent student anthology, which would appear to follow the 1798 edition, we find the whole poem bracketed by inverted commas, as it did not appear until 1815; see *Romanticism: An Anthology*, 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 234-40. The *Norton Anthology of English Literature*, gen. eds M. H. Abrams and Stephen Greenblatt, 7th edn (2000), vol. II, also dates its text 1798 while silently adopting the inverted commas.

mention Wordsworth's note to draw attention to his anxiousness about 'The Thorn''s reception.

Criticism duly came from many quarters, not least from Francis Jeffrey, famous to posterity as the scourge of what he called the 'Lake School'. Paradoxically, perhaps, Jeffrey's dismissive criticism of 'The Thorn' (in 1808) seems to me a very accurate reflection of Wordsworth's brilliant achievement in that poem:

> A frail damsel is a character common enough in most poems; and one upon which many fine and pathetic lines have been expended. Mr. Wordsworth has written more than three hundred lines on that subject: but, instead of new images of tenderness, or delicate representation of intelligible feelings, he has contrived to tell us nothing whatever of the unfortunate fair one, but that her name is Martha Ray; and that she goes up to the top of a hill, in a red cloak, and cries 'Oh misery!' All the rest of the poem is filled with a description of an old thorn and a pond, and of the silly stories which the neighbouring old women told about them.[12]

There we have the poem in a nutshell. As later critics have also observed, it is an 'anti-ballad' (Gravil 1982).[13] More specifically, it seems, Jeffrey was outraged that Wordsworth had not written a 'sentimental' poem in the tradition of the literature of 'sensibility'. *New images of tenderness*, the *delicate representation of intelligible feelings*: these are the stock-in-trade of sentimental literature. The assumption in this kind of literature is that there is a language of the feelings, that this language is 'intelligible', and that it can be mastered by interpreting its physical manifestations (Fairer 1999: 132-6). It is by means of this attention to the body in sentimental literature that moral feeling (such as virtuous outrage) is commonly eroticized (McGann 1996: 7; Goring 2001: xi-xxxvi), as in the seduction scene of Wordsworth's German source. This popular literary ballad by Gottfried Bürger, translated into English as 'The Lass of Fair Wone' in 1796, tells the story of a minister's daughter who is seduced, gives birth to a child, kills it, repents, buries the infant, is hanged in view of its grave, and haunts the spot as a ghost. In the seduction scene the physical signs of the maiden's distress—her heart beating, her breast heaving—powerfully

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[12] *Edinburgh Review* XII (April 1808), 135, in Arthur Pollard, ed., *Crabbe: The Critical Heritage* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 57.

[13] According to Parrish, 'The difference between Bürger's "Lass of Fair Wone" and "The Thorn" is plainly the difference between a ballad and a lyrical ballad'; Parrish 1973: 109.

charge the description of her rape; her innocence is 'blasted' not merely by male lust but by 'the glowing *breath* of lust'.[14] As critics have noted, Wordsworth 'deplored the sensationalism of Bürger's poems' (Gravil 1982: 49). He may well have been thinking of 'The Lass of Fair Wone' when he denounced, as a specifically urban phenomenon, the 'degrading thirst for outrageous stimulation' (ll. 230-58) which, according to the Preface, characterized popular taste.[15] Wordsworth explicitly identifies the poems of *Lyrical Ballads* as the tangible efforts of his endeavour 'to counteract' this taste (ll. 247-8).[16] And nowhere, I think, does he succeed as spectacularly as in 'The Thorn'.

The main contrast between 'The Lass of Fair Wone' and 'The Thorn' is well understood (Averill 1980: 199). The contrast between the dewy sensationalism of the German ballad and Wordsworth's dry restraint is immediately evident. In Bürger's ballad every detail of the woman's physical suffering and mental anguish is described in disagreeably sensuous detail. We are made to observe the robes growing tight around her pregnant belly, the 'bloody wales' her father raises on 'her lily skin' when he discovers the pregnancy, and the 'rending pains and darting throes' which 'assail her shuddering frame' as she gives birth. We hear the newborn baby's cry, and witness the mother's piercing the infant's 'tender heart' with her hairpin, then her digging of a shallow grave 'with bloody nails'. To top it off we are given her cries of repentance and her admission that she deserves to be picked clean by ravens on the gibbet, from which her skull, afterwards, 'seems to eye the barren grave'. Bürger not only eroticizes the suffering woman, but, as Mary Jacobus has pointed out, 'his interest in the mother's sin leaves no room for her suffering'. In contrast, what do we find in Wordsworth?

> High on a mountain's highest ridge,
> Where oft the stormy winter gale
> Cuts like a scythe, while through the clouds
> It sweeps from vale to vale,

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[14] 'The Lass of Fair Wone' appeared in *Monthly Magazine* I (April 1796), 223-4, and is printed in Jacobus 1976: 284-88. The emphasis on 'breath' is mine.

[15] Averill 1980: 183. Jacobus 1976: 224 suggests that Wordsworth had Bürger's 'Lenore' in mind.

[16] For an argument that 'the pursuit of poetic pleasure rather than the arousal of excitement [...] links Wordsworth to sensationalist literature', see Izenberg 1998: 120.

> Not five yards from the mountain path,
> This Thorn you on your left espy;
> And to the left, three yards beyond,
> You see a little muddy Pond
> Of water never dry;
> I've measured it from side to side:
> 'Tis three feet long, and two feet wide. ('The Thorn', stanza III: lines 23-33)

Critics have observed the way in which the first four lines, describing the mountain's height and the limitless space of the skies and the storms which sweep the valleys, contrast with the description of the small spot in the remaining seven lines, with those famously minute directions and measurements which admit of such mortifying accuracy. Five yards off the path, three yards to the left, three feet long, two feet wide.[17] 'Of water never dry' tells us that the little muddy pond is deep; it may be puddle-sized in surface area, but not in depth. Even if contemporary readers hadn't already guessed the poem's theme—and the may tree, as Jacobus points out, was commonly associated in literature with illegitimate birth and infanticide (Jacobus 1976: 241)—they would know, as I think all readers do instinctively, that the gratuitous placing of details like the height of the thorn ('Not higher than a two years' child'), the comparison of the mound of moss to an infant's grave in size, and (especially) the exact measurements of the pool—this placing of details promises that the scene of a crime will duly be revealed. The spot on which the German ballad turns measures 'three spans in length', under which the baby is buried and on which no grass ever grows. It is *because* Wordsworth counts on his readers' expectations of a story about a child murder that he waits until the end of the poem to have the narrator confess that nobody knows what actually happened, and the local people only agree, but cannot prove, that a child is buried under the mound of moss. In 'The Thorn' we do not even know whether 'a child was born or no' (l. 159). But the little muddy pond is never dry. 'Tis three feet long and two feet wide. We are made to *imagine*, not merely witness, a mother's murder of her child, simply because we are given precise measurements and nothing else.

The measurements make us think logistically about the murder, and in doing so it seems to me we inevitably imagine ourselves performing the

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[17] I am paraphrasing Bateson 1965: 6.

action. Is it possible to drown a baby in a pool of such-and-such dimensions (helpfully specified)? We imagine ourselves doing it. Wordsworth thus diverts attention from the mother just as the crime is placed before the reader's imagination: we imagine the sin, as it were, without the sinner, or rather *in the sinner's place*. This, as much as the deliberate shock of bathetic indecorum, is probably what has made so many readers feel uneasy: empathy is enforced while access to the object of empathy is denied. As Jeffrey says, Wordsworth

> has contrived to tell us nothing whatever of the unfortunate fair
> one, but that her name is Martha Ray; and that she goes up to the
> top of a hill, in a red cloak, and cries 'Oh misery!'

The effect of this, as Paul Sheats has noticed, confers 'power', not 'pity', on the awesome figure of Martha Ray (Sheats 1991: 99). Jeffrey's reference to 'the fair one' interestingly betrays his own assumption that she is indeed 'fair', as convention demands. In fact Wordsworth does not give a single hint about her physical appearance. The narrator says that when he saw her face, 'that was enough for me', and he turned around (ll. 200-1). All we know is that the woman's presence makes a powerful impression on the narrator. What Wordsworth does tell us is that she once was happy, and that she now is 'wretched'. Her wretchedness is the poem's mystery, and it is essential to the poem that her wretchedness resist the demands of sentimental analysis, and remain impenetrable. As Jeffrey points out, her words are opaque: they consist of the single refrain, 'Oh woe is me! Oh misery!' Beyond this cliché, Jeffrey complains, her feelings remain 'unintelligible'. But they are intelligible to the *imagination*, as Wordsworth surely wished. In 'Hart's Leap Well'—another poem modelled on yet departing from a Bürger ballad—the narrator declares that

> The moving accident is not my trade:
> To freeze the blood I have no ready arts:
> 'Tis my delight, alone in summer shade,
> To pipe a simple song to thinking hearts (ll. 97-100)[18]

Thinking hearts: this paradoxical phrase says much about the Romantic ideal of the imagination. What Wordsworth achieves in 'The Thorn' is to

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[18] See discussion in Izenberg 1998: 119.

render the woman's feelings not unintelligible to emotive thought but *impregnable*: resistant to the discourse of sentimental analysis. The salient features of the German ballad all conspire to gratify readerly desires to finger the woman's guilty secret, desires which Wordsworth clearly thinks ought *not* to be gratified. That is why I too feel his chillingly bathetic line—"'Tis three feet long, and two feet wide'—*should be liked.*

I hope to have suggested, then, with my remarks on these famous lines, that Wordsworth accomplishes at least four things in 'The Thorn'. In the first place he de-eroticizes the figure of the woman. Secondly, he renders her anguish and her person inscrutable, while giving her figure a powerful presence through narrative. In the third place he ensures that the reader's sympathetic response must be projected by his or her own imagination, virtually unmediated by direct description. And finally he achieves this in a relentlessly minimalist fashion, which is not primitive but very consciously designed and artfully achieved.

My reading of 'The Thorn' runs parallel to Sheats's much fuller reading (1991). He argues that the bathos of the famous lines has a *political* dimension which suggests that Wordsworth's 'commitment to the humanitarian ends of the French Revolution had not diminished in 1798' (100). This sounds fair enough to me, though I am less confident that 'the form and rhetoric' of Wordsworth's ballads actually 'reincarnates the heuristic violence of 1792', or that Wordsworth's use of aesthetic shock tactics risked 'once again the hopes of 1789' (100). I, too, read 'The Thorn' as an 'attempt to purify Martha Ray's suffering', though in a way that relates specifically to *sexual* politics. By concentrating on the demonstrable changes Wordsworth made to his source, we are able to trace his deliberate and radical intervention in sexual politics, or the sexual politics of sentimental literature.

I am by no means about to suggest that Wordsworth was a revolutionary proto-feminist. But in its artful resistance to sentimentalism and to the male forms of power on which the literature of sensibility depends, 'The Thorn' does represent a radical experiment. In this connection 'revolutionary' might be hyperbolic, but not quite unjustified.

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
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"This Wide Whisper Round My Head"
In Memoriam and the Complexity of Memory

CHARLES I. ARMSTRONG

Lord Alfred Tennyson's *In Memoriam A. H. H.* is, one feels safe to say, a poem of memory. For rarely has the memory of a friend been given such an illustrious, elevated poetical treatment. Yet the question remains: how is the poem "of" or "in" memory? And is the poem really *about* its propounded subject, Arthur Hallam, at all? Although the initial premise of *In Memoriam* seems simple enough, a closer reading of how recollection works in the text reveals considerable complexity in its dealings with memory.

To a large extent, Tennyson himself neglected such questions. Although a poet prodigiously interested in memory, he seems resistant to pursue its ravel beyond a certain point. Melancholy recollections hold many of his speakers in a spell – a spell which it often seems the poems themselves are unable to sufficiently contextualise or dispel. Although overly irreverent, perhaps Auden's mocking evaluation of his Victorian predecessor can be of help here. Tennyson, he famously wrote, "had the finest ear, perhaps, of any English poet; he was also undoubtedly the stupidest; there was little about melancholia that he didn't know; there was little else that he did" (Auden 1946: x). Although stupidity surely does not come into it – that epithet being more revealing of Auden's characteristically supercilious wit than of his extremely knowledgeable subject – there is some point to this estimate. Making extensive use of the various intertexts (both biographical and poetical) of *In Memoriam*, this paper will try to hone in on how the anti-intellectual view of Tennyson and his poem – propounded not only by Auden, but also many other scholars – is simultaneously belied and confirmed by the poet's dealings with the activity of memory. Tennyson may not be the most explicitly philosophical of poets, but he is rarely *simple*, and it is the problem of recollection itself that can most decisively help us to revise our common memories of the bard.

It might be granted that there is a resistance to thought, of sorts, in Tennyson's obsession with all things gone by. Of course this is implicit

already in 1831 when Arthur Hallam, writing to Tennyson, says he is "not without knowledge and experience of your passion for the past" (Tennyson, Hallam T. 1897: I, 81). Now a passion is something more than a mere interest, but also something rather different to a reflection. Tennyson's poetry seems to frequently be beset by memories, implicitly recalling the Latin root of the word passion: *patior*, meaning "to suffer." His protagonists suffer their memories, having no other choice than to be inundated by the compelling evidence of the past. Part of the reason for this passivity lies in the fact that memory is here understood to be the very element of thought and action, rather than a limited faculty one can make use of at will. At one point Tennyson writes of how the dead will have access to the "eternal landscape of the past" (xlvi, 8)[1]: all their past experiences will be laid out before them, presumably as well-organised and accessible as all the varied features of nature's scenery in a picturesque painting by Claude or Poussin. Even if the temporal experience of the living is different, for them too the past does not simply pass away. Tennyson is close to Antonio Negri's claim that the past is "eternal," since it is "indeed the power of accumulated life, of an irreversible and indestructible temporality" (Negri 2003: 165). The poet's general unwillingness to *forget* Hallam, even if he is removed from him by the inevitable distancing of mourning, is a form of non-transcendental evidence of the indestructibility of the past.

Nevertheless, even if the past does not vanish, it is not easy to grasp. Whatever may be said of the dead, the living cannot easily obtain an overview over times past. The speaker of *In Memoriam* may want his reminiscences of the dead to haunt the "memory like a cloudless air" (xciv, 11), but this is easier said than done. In section lxx of the poem, for instance, the speaker struggles at length with the "shadowy thoroughfares of thought" (lxx, 8) before finally managing to conjure up the features of Hallam's face. And even the pivotal experience of section xcv, where the reading of the friend's letters facilitates a mystical sense of communion, soon loses its immediacy: before long, we discover the speaker lamenting how hard it is "for intellect to reach / Through memory that which I became" (xcv, 48). Yet this does not mean that one is doomed to be a

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[1] All quotations from *In Memoriam* will be supplied with references to the relevant section and line numbers of the poem. For all references to Tennyson's poetry, I have used the following edition of Tennyson's poems: *Tennyson: A Selected Edition*, edited by Christopher Ricks. Harlow: Longman, 1969.

creature of the present. The past is continuously there, surrounding the present like a luminous halo, or like – to use Tennyson's own favourite image, rather than one of Woolf's – the sound of the sea. In one of the discarded fragments of the poem he uses another image: in the lines beginning "Are these the far-famed Victor Hours" he evokes as a piece of counter-evidence to the meaninglessness of the present what he calls "this wide whisper round my head" (line 11). At least part of this wide whisper is the mutterings of past: as in modern hermeneutics, the past of Tennyson's poetry is always impinging upon the present, always providing the *milieu* from which every act or reflection takes its bearings.

The differing titles

If the pervasiveness and ineluctability of the past is one of its more arresting features, one should not underestimate its complex richness, either. If *In Memoriam* deals with memory, it does so in an elusive and often seemingly self-contradictory way. The story of the poem's title makes this evident. As is well known, the published title was not the obvious choice it might seem to some of its readers in retrospect. During the poem's long, seventeen-year gestation, the author tried out various different titles, but not *In Memoriam* before the very end. "Elegies" was one of the alternatives used for the work in process, and according to the testimony of Aubrey de Vere, Tennyson also "once thought of entitling [the poem] 'Fragments of an Elegy'" (Tennyson, Hallam T. 1897: I, 293). In the title "Fragments of an Elegy," two of the main themes of twentieth century criticism of the poem are faced head-on: the poem's close relation with the elegiac genre, and its somewhat piecemeal, certainly less than systematic, structure. Although the final version of *In Memoriam* indicates that its disjointed appearance is necessary – Sorrow dares not "trust a larger lay, / But rather loosens from the lip / Short swallow-flights of song" (xlviii, 13-15) – there has been much debate about exactly how independent the prologue, epilogue and 131 sections are of one other (see for instance Bishop 1970).

Another title used by the poet on more than one occasion was "The Way of the Soul."[2] The final title which the poem is known by today was in the final draft still merely the dedication, and was only later promoted

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[2] *Memoirs*, I, note 2 on p. 393.

to its more elevated, final status. In the field of tension opened up by these three titles, we can glimpse three rather different ways of reading the poem. "Fragments of an Elegy" is rather defensive, both calling upon a venerable past and forestalling any criticism on the basis of the structural incoherence. The Latinate quality of the final choice still resonates with the classical past of Roman precursors such as Catullus, Ovid, and Propertius,[3] yet removes any complete identification of genre and also shifts the emphasis away from the question of structural cohesion and over to the deceased "subject" of the poem. The structural strand reappears in "The Way of the Soul," where the "way" in question is surely that of the process of mourning. The poem itself arguably borrows structural unity from the ideal teleology of the soul, in an inversion of its famous pronouncement on how art itself grants the model of ordered progression: "I see in part / That all, as in some piece of art, / Is toil coöperant to an end" (cxxviii, 22-24).

Yet letting the rather abstract term "Soul" stand at the head of the poem radically shifts the attention away from Hallam, and nudges us far closer to Wordsworth's description of *The Prelude* as a poem on "the growth of my own mind" (Wordsworth 1979: 533), as well as Keats' description of earthly life as a "vale of Soul-making" (Keats 1958: 102). Tennyson often claimed that the speaker of the poem was a general subject, representing all of mankind rather than himself, and here it would seem that the development of that subject *per se* – rather than the individual Arthur Hallam – is the exclusive theme of the poem. "What know we greater than the soul" it is asked in the "Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington" (line 265), and here the greatness of this theme is in danger of overshadowing the promising but all-too-brief life of Tennyson's friend.

Of course, neither "The Way of the Soul" nor "Fragments of an Elegy" ever did make the printed page: both were banished to the critical paraphernalia of footnotes and biographies, rather than the finished version of the poem. Yet this does not mean that they do not make their weight felt, if only obliquely, within the text. Tennyson's poem is one that frequently asserts that it has hidden, unsaid depths, and any reading that is willing to take such pronouncements at face value must do more than resort to paraphrase or summaries of its surface themes. *In Memoriam* is a subtle web of textual and contextual memories, twisting in and out of sight

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[3] On the relationship between *In Memoriam* and Roman elegy, see Shatto and Shaw 1982: 26-32.

a variegated assembly of linked references and allusions. In what follows, the three strands suggested by the differing titles – strands which can be summarised as conflicts involving structure vs. fragmentation, generality vs. personality, and memory vs. forgetting – will give us our lead for the untangling of this web.

Day-dreaming, reading, dedicating

David Bromwich has noted how the "larger possibilities of invention" which concerned Kipling "emerge only if one reflects on more than a poem or a story at a time" (Bromwich 1989: 195). The same is arguably also true with regard to Tennyson. Productive intertextual dialogues can be made between *In Memoriam* and other texts of the poet, most obviously ones which were written at the same time as its first drafts (and which exist side by side with it in an early notebook) such as "Morte d'Arthur" and "Love thou thy Land, with Love Far-Brought."[4] But the kind of genealogical myopia that sometimes takes over the bibliographical study of sources and influences should not deter one from looking further afield. A text is not, after all, a simple memory of one event or one occasion, but partakes in a veritable force field of recollective allusions – and this is true *in extremis* when the text in question has such a long and convoluted gestation as *In Memoriam*.

One of the less obvious, but perhaps most fruitful of intertexts for this poem is "The Day-Dream," published in 1842. *In Memoriam*'s openness to differing interpretations, as well as Tennyson's ultimate deference to the wishes of his wife on the question of the title, resonates with the express comments on the practice of interpretation proffered in this unusually self-conscious text. A rather whimsical rendering of the legend of the Sleeping Beauty, "The Day-Dream" both offers, retracts, and problematises various possible interpretations of itself. As in the poem on Hallam, the latter is a somewhat disjointed, almost fragmentary affair. Early on, the speaker admonishes his listener, Lady Flora, to not "look what too-earnest eye – / The rhymes are dazzled from their place, / And ordered words asunder fly" ("Prologue," lines 18-20). Of "The Day-Dream"'s nine subsections, the last three – "Moral," "L'Envoi," and

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[4] See the notebook in the property of Trinity College, Cambridge, the Trinity MS 0.15.17. I am grateful to Trinity College for allowing me to inspect both this text and the Trinity MS 0.15.13.

"Epilogue" – all address the vexed question of the poem's message. The first of these disclaims fixing the poem within any one semantic pigeonhole: "'twere to cramp its use, if I should hook it to some useful end" ("Moral," 15-16). The poem goes on to register some outward pressure in this matter, however, as the speaker notes Lady Flora's unwillingness to make do with a poem devoid of a moral: "You shake your head. A random string / Your finer female sense offends" ("L'Envoi," 1-2). After this, a determinate meaning is both propounded and retracted. In "L'Envoi," the speaker rather half-heartedly locates a meaning in the beauty of Lady Flora and in hopes for a transformation "to some brighter world" ("L'Envoi," 40). In the epilogue, though, the poem returns to indeterminacy, and again identifies the mere possibility of meaning as resting upon its listener:

> So, Lady Flora, take my lay,
>   And, if you find a meaning there,
> O whisper to your glass, and say,
>   'What wonder, if he thinks me fair?' ("Epilogue," 1-4)

The indeterminacy of the beautiful, a mainstay of post-Kantian aesthetics, here seems to undermine the very possibility of extracting a significant meaning from the work of art. Even if the reader, embodied in Lady Flora, may feel impelled to act like a phenomenological subject à la Wolfgang Iser (cf. Iser 1978) – one which is compelled to make a unified reading of the poem – "A Day-Dream" will not let him or her do so without being aware of the arbitrariness such a procedure.

Although *In Memoriam* is a considerably less light-hearted affair than "A Day-Dream," it is inhabited by a similarly fragmented quarry of meaning. These poems also share a directedness towards the reader, who has to make the final word on interpretive questions. Tennyson's wife, Emily, famously had some influence on the choice of *In Memoriam* as the title of the poem, acting almost like a discrete Lady Flora behind the scenes (cf. Thwaite 1996: 191). In section lxv, this bestowal of interpretative responsibility is anticipated by the manner in which the speaker places himself in the hands of Hallam: "Sweet soul do with me as thou wilt" (lxv, 1). The kind of mutual influencing described by the poem with regard to the relations with Hallam, also figures the give and take of the creative

process, where both writer and reader contribute to the making of the artistic experience.

The opening up of *In Memoriam* to the force of the reader is partially evident in the final title of the poem. By making the title identical to the dedication of the poem, the textual corpus is folded towards its own outside. Tennyson skews the normal communicative situation, transforming it into a more unconventional and unpredictable operation. While a dedication can name the ideal addressee of a poem, or some important cause or catalyst in its production, a title does so less frequently. By invoking Hallam in the title of the poem, theme, cause and addressee are all equated. While this partially entails a sublimating homogenisation, where the complexity of the work is reined in by one, unified focus, it also simultaneously warps *In Memoriam* from within. For the name Arthur Hallam does not refer to a simple presence or plenitude of being – it is also, of course, a sign evoking death and ephemerality. "Hallam" marks a place of passing away. The relevance of this sign of absence to the intended audience of the poem is made evident in section lxxvii, where the speaker laments the finitude of verse:

> What hope is here for modern rhyme
>> To him, who turns a musing eye
>> On songs, and deeds, and lives, that lie
> Foreshorten'd in the tract of time? (lxxvii, 1-4)

Tennyson's endeavour is "darken'd" (lxxvii, 13) with the feeling that one day his poem will be without any readership. Hence the traditional humanistic afterlife, so important to Shakespeare's sonnets (a strong influence on *In Memoriam*), where survival is bestowed through literary fame, seems foreclosed. Although the poem is open to a reader, the place of that reader is at least partially absent. Certainly if Hallam is not only the theme and cause of the poem, but also its ideal reader, then this is a poem which really only can be read by the dead. Yet there is consolation to be found, even given such dispiriting circumstances: "To breathe my loss is more than fame, / To utter love more sweet than praise" (lxxvii, 15-16). Without any real reader, Tennyson can least aim to please himself. In time, though, he will also come to please others, for behind the scenes gradually repeated acts of memory are propelling the speaker out of his melancholy haven of solitude.

Textual dismemberment

In a recent reading of *In Memoriam*, Robert Douglas-Fairhurst has detected a narrative of development through retrospection, whereby the self-remembering of the poem can be interpreted benignly as a process of maturation "creating the sound of a mind raising its past, and itself on that past" (Douglas-Fairhurst 2002: 252). Certainly such a reading would tie in nicely with *In Memoriam*'s own organic paradigm, where the speaker's resurfacing from his grief is a natural process which reaps "what fruit may be / Of sorrow under human skies" (cviii, 13-14). Yet a somewhat different, perhaps less credulous, interpretation is also available, if one takes into account the sacrifices and deprivations inherent in all progression.

In the nine fragments excluded from the poem, all written according to the same verse form as the rest of *In Memoriam*, one can trace something of this ambivalence. These fragments are the dross of Tennyson's work of mourning, utterances of an abstract negativity which could not be completely assimilated by the published version. In them, the body of *In Memoriam* is stretched to a breaking point, to a prosthetic site where it is hard to separate an *oeuvre*'s amputations and abortions – the "indigestions of the brain"[5] – from its vital, living limbs. They might even be said to represent the corpse of the poem: for a poem about death and mourning, *In Memoriam* is strikingly silent about the materiality of the corpse. It is as if the traditional taboo against touching the corpse is here transformed into a verbal interdiction: the poet shall not dwell upon the singular impersonality and haunting liminality of the corpse; he shall not even deign to mention it. Angela Leighton has made us aware of how ambiguous and virtual the poem's repeated references to the hand of Hallam are (cf. Leighton 2001), yet the fact remains that those references remain obfuscations before the cadavre and the way in which "the corpse appears in the strangeness of its solitude as that which has disdainfully withdrawn from us" (Blanchot 1982: 257). The poem has replaced the strange leadenness of dead limbs with virtualised familiarity.

The following discarded fragment can bring this process of denial into clearer focus:

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[5] Excluded fragment no. viii ("He was too good and kind and sweet"), line 8.

Let Death and Memory keep the face
  Of three and twenty summers, fair.
  I see it and no grief is there,
Nor time can wrong the youthful grace.

I see it and I scarce repine.
  I hear the voice that held me fast.
  The voice is pleasant in the past,
It speaks to me of me and mine.

The face is bright, the lips are bland,
  He smiles upon me eye to eye,
  And in my thoughts with scarce a sigh
I take the pressure of his hand.

Here the look "eye to eye" in the final stanza may lead one to think of Walter Benjamin's concept of the aura, which strongly privileges a community of glances, a form of ocular sociality. But for Tennyson it is the following reference to "the pressure of his hand" that bears the brunt of the verse's emotional investment, giving tactility a characteristic pride of place. As Christopher Ricks' notes point out, this fragment was plundered for two different sections of the final version of *In Memoriam*. Lines 7-8 were transformed into the following: "And that dear voice, I once have known, / Still speak to me of me and mine" (cxvi, 11-12). The final four lines crop up elsewhere, as "And bless thee, for thy lips are bland, / And bright the friendship of thine eye; / And in my thoughts with scarce a sigh / I take the pressure of thine hand" (cxix, 9-12). The references to the bright face, the smile, as well as the intensity of the mirroring "eye to eye" are thus gone. More generally, the published fragments fail to recover the way in which this fragment travels across the length and breadth of Hallam's body, creating a veritable catalogue of sensuous immediacy. Yet it *is* a fragmentary catalogue; more a fetishistic roll call of bodily impressions than an evocation of a unified totality. Severing the links of this body, the writing of *In Memoriam* can be said to register a veritable recoil from the incompleteness of the disorganised body. Arguably, it is precisely the very disjointedness of this fragment that causes it to splinter the organic unity

of the work of art where "all [...] / Is toil cöoperant to an end" (cxxviii, 23-24). Where some parts are splintered or discarded, the sense that all contributes to the whole is at best an inexplicable faith, at worst misguided and misguiding illusion.

The question of *In Memoriam*'s structure, or the lack thereof, has a far from negligible bearing on the question of memory's role in the poem. For in many ways this is a poem fragmented by memory: its disjointedness stems from the very diversity of its embodied memories. This is a feature which it shares with Tennyson's preceding long poem, *The Princess*, published in 1847. *The Princess* is a poem notoriously diverse, spanning many different moods and registers. Not only does it consist of different narrations, thus constituting – as its subtitle also insists – a medley. In addition, there is the heterogeneity of the framing narrative, set in the gardens of Sir Walter Vivian, and the interspersed songs. The songs were a late addition, and were meant to solder the poem into a more unified whole. Arguably, they have had quite the opposite effect, as later anthologies are often wont to feature songs such as "Tears, idle tears" and "Come down, O maid, from yonder mountain height" completely severed from the surrounding poem: these verses thus seem to function as detachable units, originally welded to a larger whole but now primarily remembered as independent lyrical utterances.

Their status is additionally complicated by the fact that they are themselves carriers of memories. "The splendour falls on castle walls," or (as it also is known) the bugle song, is famously linked with Tennyson's sightseeing experience of Killarney, a fact that was so well known that it considerably boosted the tourist industry at this Irish lake. The landscape painted in "Come down, O maid," for its part, was said by Hallam Tennyson to be "written in Switzerland (chiefly at Lauterbrunnen and Grindelwald), and descriptive of the waste Alpine heights and gorges, and of the sweet, valleys below" (Tennyson, Hallam T. 1897: I, 252). A more complex process of remembering is linked with "Tears, idle tears," which Tennyson admitted writing close to Tintern Abbey – a place which not only resonates of Wordsworth's own act of poetical remembering, but also of Hallam, who was buried in nearby Clevedon.

In all such cases, the songs function not only as elements of a larger whole, but also as both memorable in their own right *and* significantly linked to one or more personal memories heterogeneous to the plot of *The Princess*. Not only is "Tears, idle tears" a poem in its own right, but due to its allusion to Hallam it also forges a subterranean mnemonic link between

the larger bodies of *The Princess* and *In Memoriam.* In *The Princess*, Tennyson elegantly compares living poetry, the kind of verse which survives in the memory of its audience, with "jewels five-words-long / That on the stretch'd forefinger of all Time / Sparkle forever" (*The Princess*, ii, 355-357). Exemplifying what it pronounces, this fragment implicitly figures memory as a something of a dissevering force, or even as something of an elusive jewellery thief: memory does not reconfigure a whole – it does not construct a palace – but rather a small, detachable gem. It wheels and deals with the surface ornaments of the edifice, neglecting both the heart and the deep-seated skeleton of the matter as it sees fit.

It would, however, be overstating matters to claim that memory's "jewels five-words-long" completely disfigure the poetical work. However available or memorable biographical anecdote may be, it does not necessarily constitute the pure essence of any literary work. Tennyson's own vexed relationship to biography exemplifies this truism. Hallam's memoirs of his father are replete with irritated jibes aimed at those who would reduce poetry to a mere imitation of given facts. "Why," Tennyson is cited as asking at one point, "do they give a poet no credit for imagination? The power of poetical creation seems to be utterly ignored now. This modern realism is hateful, and destroys all poetry. No man with an imagination can be tied down for his ideal" (Tennyson, Hallam T. 1897: II, 423).

At the same time, Hallam's memoirs are the richest source of all for those who want to give links between poetry and biography some form of credence. The imagination's credit is not without limits, it evidently does have its debts to the real. Thus we are told that a simile about a hearth, in the "Balin and Balan" section of *Idylls of the King*, "was suggested by what he often saw from his own study at Aldworth" (Tennyson, Hallam T. 1897: II, 319). Numerous similar references are given to the passing sights and sounds Tennyson experienced at different locations, and particularly on the beaches of the Isle of Wight. Hallam's biographical project is itself an attempt to control and direct the biographical seepage of the poems, neglecting for instance worrying details about Tennyson's childhood and family, circumscribing the life narrative within the boundaries of what he understands to be his father's relevant legacy. While *In Memoriam* covertly suggests that Hallam might have been the critical complement to Tennyson's poetical genius, a kind of Coleridge to his Wordsworth, the whole project of the *Memoirs* is an act that not so much sets the house of Tennyson's poetry in order, as it tidies up and fences in its surrounding biographical landscape.

This is surely not exclusively a case of damage limitation, though. The inclusion, by Tennyson's son, of a number of personal anecdotes and data opens up a rich contextual field for the poems. Tennyson's poems can from then on be said to *allude* to biographical fact, heavy from their pregnant load of memories, just as much as they resonate with echoes of literary forebears such as Shakespeare, Wordsworth, and Milton.

The space of mourning

The use of Arthur Hallam in *In Memoriam* is too explicit to function as mere allusion, but nevertheless the references to his identity have a peculiar logic of their own. We have already touched upon the way in which the contrast between the titles *In Memoriam A. H. H.* and *The Way of the Soul* shows different interpretive possibilities which coexist at the heart of the poem. Thus when the poem hardly mentions Hallam's name, and in the end subsumes him as both part of a spiritual universe and as a quasi-Christ figure, these are gestures which resonate with the erased title: soul is, as it were, getting the upper hand. This particular forgetting of Hallam is thematised, and thus remembered, within the text itself. The speaker remembers that he is forgetting his friend, which of course is something quite other than letting him slip his mind completely.

The paradox of a kind of forgetful memory relates to the entirety of *In Memoriam.* This is not to say that the poem involves a light-hearted dealing with its weighty subject. Quite to the contrary, it does not neglect the "sense of duty" Tennyson believed to be inherent in literature, a duty "not only to the living and the unborn, but also, in a very marked degree, to the dead" (Tennyson, Hallam T. 1897: II, 203). Yet this duty involves one in a complex double bind: the best way to remember Hallam, one might say, is to forget him. Indeed the speaker does try to imagine how Hallam would react to grief, and finds a precedent – and some solace – in his belief that he would not overdo it. A temperate form of forgetting thus shows that one's mourning is not self-indulgent, that one is getting to grips with the matters at hand. As Princess Ida says, after having "Tears, Idle Tears" sung to her, there are times one must let "the past be the past" and "let old bygones be," since all hinges on the fulfilment of Millennial harmony: "all things serve their time / Toward that great year of equal mights and rights."[6] Seizing not only the moment but also the past entails

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[6] *The Princess*, section IV, lines 58, 51, and 55-56.

an act of organisation, of structuring experience, and even here Tennyson has Hallam as his own exemplar: he admires his old friend for how he "large elements in order brought" (cxii, 13). This is the kind of control that Tennyson must find within himself in the writing of *In Memoriam*, for how else can he avoid becoming

> that delirious man
> Whose fancy fuses old and new,
> And flashes into false and true,
> And mingles all without a plan? (xvi, 17-20)

Thus when Tennyson tries to organise his long, elegiac poem into more than stray fragments, he is allowing his own "imitative will" (cx, 20) be spurred by his old friend. There is, however, the danger the resulting edifice will hardly bear any legible inscription in memory of Hallam. If one wanders further down the well-travelled highways of biography, there is also the obvious fact that the poem seems in some respects to be a monument which *replaces* that of Hallam's own gravestone.

As is well known, Tennyson neither attended his friend's funeral nor managed to respond to Hallam's father's request for a biographical contribution to the publishing of his son's literary remains.[7] The eighteen years passed in between Hallam's death and the publishing of *In Memoriam* makes the poem twice as belated as Spenser's mourning of Sidney in "Astrophel," another famously delayed act of poetical mourning. In light of his extreme hesitation with publishing it, one might see the text as constituting a kind of substitute fetish, or relic, creating a sense of presence of one particular past person. As Edward S. Casey has pointed out, it is a common activity to "commemorate [...] by *remembering through* specific commemorative vehicles such as rituals or texts – or any other available *commemorabilia*" (Casey 2000: 218). Certainly *In Memoriam* contains within itself several references to various objects functioning as such vehicles. Timothy Peltason has justly remarked upon how the memory of Hallam does not "do its work unaided in the poem," but is triggered by relevant objects such as "landscapes, houses, and significant

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[7] Michael Thorn speculates that "Tennyson refused to attend the funeral because he wanted to preserve his private reaction to Hallam's death, already knowing perhaps that it would bear creative fruit" (Thorn 1992: 128).

places, [as well as] his letters" (Peltason 1985: 15). Yet one should not forget the poem itself: Tennyson's manuscripts are material objects, comparable, say, to the drawing of Hallam by one of the Sellwood sisters which he always kept by his side. By holding on to them for so long, he was not merely evincing shyness, or how a combination of critical denigration and oversensitivity contributed to a withdrawal from the literary scene, but also holding on to and prolonging the ritualised presence of Hallam.

In a way, the poem can be read as functioning like Tennyson's own personal gravestone to his friend. For not only is *In Memoriam* intricately bound with the process of mourning, but it is also – at least in part – a spatial object, and one which Tennyson kept returning to in an extended process of working through his grief. But perhaps even a gravestone is a too modest image of the text's affective power: perhaps another aspect of the famously intense and thorough Victorian practices of mourning offers a better comparison. For the regimentation of space in Tennyson's sprawling poem makes its phenomenology of mourning more similar, in some ways, to that of an entire graveyard than just a single gravestone. The way in which the Victorians tried to give grief its pride of place in their elaborate graveyards (of which Highgate and Kensal Green are perhaps two of the most illustrious examples), yet still displace death's more unhealthy side-effects from the centres of their cities (by opting for more marginal and rural sites), loosely parallels the way in which Tennyson's poem both confronts and sublimates the speaker's sorrow. A more rigorous similarity can be gleaned from the fact that the initial drafts of *In Memoriam* reveal that the text was initially meant to be written in sections of a regular length. It is as if the poet was planning to map his grief in tidy, symmetrical plots of ground.

Thus the Trinity Notebook, containing some of the earliest drafts of the poem, starts off with what would become section 30 in the published version, which is then followed by numbers 9, 17, 18, and 31. All of the latter contain precisely *five stanzas* of the poem's characteristic quatrains, and numbers 17 and 18 are headed "II" and "III" respectively. Hence there is evidence that the earliest formal conception of the poem seems to have been of a section of short poems of the same length. This conception was quickly shattered by the subsequent poem, which is a version of section 85, which despite seeming to build on the same scheme, soon grows to become far longer than the preceding poems. Yet even this section may have been of five stanzas originally, with the remainder added

on later; a thesis which is supported by the fact that the subsequent section (number 28) is again five stanzas long.

If the poem was originally understood as a tidy, almost mathematical burying of the poet's friend, its geometry soon became more similar to that of an old, time-worn cemetery – the kind which the more rationally structured Victorian graveyards were meant to leave behind – overflowing with keepsakes of the dead and with the odd administrative building dotted around its landscape. The growth of *In Memoriam* is a mirror image of the kind of congestion that overtook the cemeteries of the day, as even the new and spacious private-enterprise cemeteries began to be filled up. James Stevens Curl claims that by the 1870s,

> it had become apparent to many observers that the new hygienic cemeteries were bound to create difficulties as they, too, filled with bodies. There were growing murmurs about pollution of rivers, and the masses of human remains packed into London clay caused great concern. [...] Furthermore, the early [and characteristically Victorian] idea of cemeteries as landscaped parks with mausolea and monuments tastefully placed within them had failed as they had more and more memorials crammed into a limited space (Curl 2000: 176-177).

Similarly, Tennyson may have started out wanting to swiftly order his experience of death in a spatial schematics, but he soon found himself obeying death's own drawn-out and labyrinthine logic. While he once was Hallam's "partner in the flowery walk / Of letters" (lxxxiv, 22-23), the process of writing *In Memoriam* involved him in meandering peregrinations on obscure paths, amid tangled growths, outlined by the virtual body of his deceased friend.

Traces of Hallam

Tennyson's poem can be read as an act of compensation, the formation of a sprawling graveyard-like space of language where the poet could confront and explicate his own grief without letting go of his past. Yet it also tends towards being an act of substitution, replacing both Hallam and Somersby with an alternative, virtual site: this is illustrated by the fact that for many the name Arthur Hallam barely conjures up more than the words of Tennyson's poem. If we are tempted to act out the ritual of mourning

traced by *In Memoriam*, the speaker of the poem subtly desists from making the object of that mourning a specific, living human being:

> I leave thy praises unexpress'd
>   In verse that brings myself relief,
> And by the measure of my grief
> I leave thy greatness to be guess'd;
>
> What practice howsoe'er expert
>   In fitting aptest words to things,
>   Or voice the richest-toned that sings,
> Hath power to give thee as thou wert?
>
> I care not in these fading days
>   To raise a cry that lasts not long,
>   And round thee with the breeze of song
> To stir a little dust of praise. (lxxv, 1-12)

This poem goes on to add that "here shall silence guard thy fame" (line 17), but unfortunately silence is a poor and innocuous guardian. These lines also risk implying that the speaker's own emotional "relief" is more important than even trying to express the "greatness" of the deceased. As Tennyson repeatedly alludes to Shakespeare's sonnets in *In Memoriam*, he well knows that occasionally a well-formulated "cry" does last long indeed, so long as to either fully or partially blot out the identity of the A. H. H.'s or W. H.'s of the world.

   Perhaps this is the reason why silence is not left the sole guardian of Hallam's fame. In a remarkable *volte-face*, the speaker actually does get down to supplying something more than a mere shadow of Hallam's virtues (from section cix to cxiii). The young man's wisdom (as opposed to mere knowledge) is lauded, his conversational brilliance and intellectual promise are noted, other virtues are sketched out, and particular attention is given to his ability to correct and inspire others by his example. Even here, though, the personal touch seems strangely to be missing. Allusion is made to Hallam's particular fortes only to issue in a general (and rather

crusty) defence for the old values of the gentleman (in cxi), and a prophecy of apocalyptic change in the political realm (in cxiii). All such observations are relatively commonplace, though; they seem to be saying too much, and thereby far too little, about the singular life of the deceased. It is as if the "novel power [that] / Sprang up for ever at a touch" (cxii, 10-11) was *too* novel for words to fully measure up to it. Unlike Hopkins' belief in inscape and the way in which humanity and nature "Deals out that being indoors each one dwells; / Selves – goes itself; *myself* it speaks and spells" ("As kingfishers draw fire," lines 7-8), Tennyson's poem seems to be more sceptical about any profound expression of interiority. The section detailing Hallam's potential to inspire self-improvement in his contemporaries significantly ends with his influence on the speaker:

> While I, thy nearest, sat apart,
> And felt thy triumph was as mine;
>> And loved them more, that they were thine,
> The graceful tact, the Christian art;
>
> Nor mine the sweetness or the skill,
>> But mine the love that will not tire,
>> And born of love, the vague desire
> That spurs an imitative will. (cx, 13-20)

Here again one may detect a tendency towards appropriation. With some qualification – even if he "felt thy triumph was as mine," he stills returns to what virtues "were thine" in the next line – Tennyson is assimilating Hallam's power, making it into his own even as he obliquely lets the reader get into its force field. Tennyson's early sonnet "As when with downcast eyes we muse and brood" addressed a similar process. It argued that the extreme closeness of friendship, where the thoughts of the friends became like "Opposed mirrors each reflecting each" (line 11), creates a similar kind of identity to that which is created between the present and the past in experiences of *déjà vu*. *In Memoriam* frequently seems to tend toward a similar conclusion, as it elides both the past and its other (i.e., Hallam) into the present and future of the living poet.

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This process of elision can be read as a sublimated version of a hidden *agon* in the text. Although *In Memoriam* surely is not an insincere poem, it does perhaps have an air of exaggerated ingenuousness in this respect. Despite the fact that Tennyson does write in an autobiographical, introspective vein of sensibility inherited from forerunners such as St. Augustine and Rousseau, he does not to do so with anything approaching their level of frankness and explicitness. *In Memoriam* is closer to the smokescreen of Wordsworth's "Julia and Vaudracour," a fictional story covering for the poet's own ill-starred relationship with Annette Vallon in book ix of *The Prelude*, than to their confessions. If there is some underlying wish to appropriate Hallam's energies at work in *In Memoriam*, it does not surface fully. Yet Tennyson is more a poet of sublimation than of downright repression, and if one looks elsewhere the underlying tensions of friendship are in evidence. This is particularly true of *The Princess*, published only two and a half years before *In Memoriam*. Whereas Blanche's resentment and jealousy sours her friendship with Princess Ida, there is no comparable intersubjective tension at the heart of Tennyson's poem: only death can come between the speaker and his beloved friend.

Section cii is an important one, in this respect, as it brings out a ripple of tension on the text's otherwise rather placid surface: it certainly shows that the speaker is aware that mourning Hallam is not his sole concern. Here the poet's reminiscences of his native Lincolnshire landscape, soon to be left behind as the family are forced to leave Somersby, takes on a valedictory tone. But why is he loath to leave this landscape behind? As for Wordsworth, a tension between memory as primarily interested in personal memories of nature, on the one hand, and interpersonal acts of remembrance, on the other, becomes evident: thus "Two spirits of a diverse love / Contend for loving masterdom" (cii, 7-8). For a moment, the struggle between memories of his own "boyhood" (cii, 9) and those of his "lost friend" (cii, 15) threaten to have a disastrous outcome:

> These two have striven half the day,
>   And each prefers his separate claim,
>   Poor rivals in a losing game,
> That will not yield each other way (cii, 17-20).

The "losing game" is one in which the mind that does not manage to compensate and re-invest its own losses, but rather has to face a pure deficit of affects. Such a catastrophe is avoided, however, as the two spirits "mix in one another's arms / To one pure image of regret" (cii, 23-24). As one of the two spirits is a representative of the speaker himself (i.e. his younger self), it would seem hard to envisage such an assimilation as being weighted otherwise than towards the mind of the poet.

The same form of assimilative presentation is also arguably at work when Tennyson alludes to his friend's own literary work. Several recent critics have pointed out how *In Memoriam* contains verbal echoes of Hallam's own poems and criticism.[8] Such instances embody extremely complex affective and literary transactions, where the involved economy of give and take is hard to calculate. No doubt part of the intention is to attain a reciprocal exchange which "turns [Arthur's] burthen into gain" even as his "credit thus shall set me free" (lxxx, 12,13): homage is being given to the dead man, even as his words assist the living poet to make his statement. Both are being recompensed, both are finding "in loss a gain to match" (I, 6). If one is to believe the poem's own rhetoric, its subtle allusions to Hallam's own words really are meant to be understood by Tennyson's friend now or in the future. It is as if the speaker were envisaging something like the reunion of Florian and his sister Psyche, after a long separation, in *The Princess*: "betwixt them blossomed up / From out a common vein of memory / Sweet household talk, and phrases of the hearth, / And far allusion" (ii, 292-5). *In Memoriam* is a text replete with the kind of "far allusion" which none of Tennyson's contemporaries, bar a miraculously returning Hallam, could fully understand.

This poetical process of mutual enrichment changes its appearance somewhat, however, if one takes into account how often *In Memoriam* simply rephrases themes and interests from Tennyson's earlier poetry, dating long before Hallam's death. The struggle between religious faith and doubt is for instance to be found in "Two Voices" and "Supposed Confessions of a Second-Rate Sensitive Mind." Tennyson's "old affection of the tomb" (lxxxv, 77) was similarly older than his friendship with Hallam, and can be traced in several early poems. The same is true of

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[8] According to Garrett Jones, T. H. Motter was the first to detected the allusions to Hallam's writings, in 1943 (Jones 2001: 153). Recent examples of readings pursuing these allusions in detail include Christopher Ricks' *Allusion to the Poets*, and Robert Douglas-Fairhurst's *Victorian Afterlives*.

many other aspects, too numerous to mention here. Even the disillusionment with Christmas celebrations, marked in section cv where it is asked "who would keep an ancient form / Through which the spirit breathes no more?" (19-20), is anticipated. For prior to this, in "The Epic," there is the lamentation: "all the old honour had from Christmas gone / Or gone or dwindled down to some odd games / In some old nooks like this" (lines 7-9). Then there is also the fact, long overlooked, that "Ulysses" – rather than responding to Hallam's death, and being one of a kind with *In Memoriam* – actually pre-dated the composition of the latter poem (see Christopher Ricks' note in Tennyson, Lord Alfred 1969: 82).

Such echoes must be understood as a form of auto-allusion, where the poet recirculates and rephrases the concerns of his past. Tennyson may seem to be remembering Hallam, but he is just as much concerned with remembering his own verse. There is an obvious autobiographical parallel: as Tennyson subsumes Hallam to his own creative powers in the poem, he would later – by calling his son Hallam – even give birth to a kind of replacement figure for his dead friend. Although one should doubtless not overemphasise the emotional investment evident in this naming process, there certainly is an interesting way in which Hallam Tennyson's memoirs of his father are the recommencement of the (hastily interrupted) form of critical consecration represented by Arthur Hallam's early criticism.

To argue that Tennyson is almost more concerned with remembering himself than recalling Hallam is to improvise upon a recurrent theme in the criticism of *In Memoriam*: Tennyson's narcissism. Peter M. Sacks has written deprecatingly about how Tennyson and his peers were belaboured with "the retarding Victorian obsession with personal survival" (Sacks 1985: 217). For Timothy Peltason, that obsession lies at the heart of the poem dedicated to Arthur Hallam, although the poet's single-minded concern with his own mortality is obscured by the fact that it is "mediated by community, translated into the fear of lost companionship or, later, of the death of the species" (Peltason 1985: 76). Peltason admits that he "cannot be certain, of course, that the fear of his own death was the original language of Tennyson's life-long insistence on personal immortality" (ibid.), but he does stick to such a thesis.

The idea that there should be an "original language" for a belief or emotion is attractive, but surely beguiling. Certainly Peltason's thesis connects with the avoidance of the corpse that I have previously traced in Tennyson's poem, but this view is perhaps not quite attuned to how complexly both language and memory function in Tennyson's writings.

For *In Memoriam* is ultimately not in memory of any specific thing or person, but rather a testimony to the dislocating powers of memory itself. The passing of time, mediated through acts of memory, is always already eroding presumed "original" languages. As in the case of the reception of Wordsworth's poetry, there is a tendency to all too easily simplify and unify what in reality is a very complex and multifarious movement. If *In Memoriam* has a grammar underlying its acts of remembering, it is a highly complex one, signifying much more than "I, Alfred Tennyson, remember Arthur Hallam in order to sustain my faith in immortality and not to confront death." The subject of the poem's acts of remembering is not only the empirical identity of the poem, but also blurs into a more generalised subject. The object of *In Memoriam*'s memories is, as we have seen, even more complex: frequently memory itself is what is at stake. Auden's "stupidity" is not so much an apt description of Tennyson, as of the critic who does not see what strange shapes Tennyson's "passion" of the past drags this poem into, what odd and forbidding paths his devotion to his friend leads him to. To remember *In Memoriam*, one might say, is surely also to never forget how hard it is to remember anything at all.

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Language Fixation in Dryden's *All for Love*

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In his preface to *All for Love* (1677), John Dryden made the following remark on the relationship between his new play and its Shakespearean source: "In my Stile I have profess'd to imitate the Divine *Shakespeare* . . . . I hope I need not explain my self, that I have not Copy'd my Author servilely: Words and Phrases must of necessity receive a change in succeeding Ages: but 'tis almost a Miracle that much of his Language remains so pure..." (18). What is particularly interesting about this passage is how a standard invocation of the Renaissance ideal of *imitatio*— that is, a balance between respectful imitation and individual innovation— immediately turns into a divided remark on language change. While Dryden seems to accept that language change is inevitable, his characterisation of Shakespeare's language as remarkably 'pure' also suggests that mutability is ultimately synonymous with corruption.

This negative perception of linguistic change and the resulting desire for purity and stability is entirely in keeping with Dryden's well-known commitment to language reform: the idea that it might be possible to "fix" the English tongue and thus render it more stable and dependable.[1] The question I want to raise here is whether the slippage from dramatic imitation to language change in the passage above is an isolated event, or whether similar concerns also rubbed off on the very play to which he affixed this preface. Perhaps *All for Love* itself contains traces of this self-conscious attitude to language, and particularly the dream of a more stable correspondence between words and things?

Before I define my argument more closely I want to examine and integrate two important critical insights about *All for Love,* the first of which concerns its overriding theme. In 1970, Derek Hughes argued that the play "portrays man in an environment of inner and outer instability....the ideals which he formulates and the roles which he tries to

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[1] For a broad and accessible account of English language reform from 1580 to the eighteenth century, see Part Two of Howatt (1984): 75-110.

assume are constantly divorced from the realities of human and external nature" (Hughes 563). Writing five years later, Douglas Canfield objected that Hughes had exaggerated the element of mutability at the expense of its dichotomous counterpart, the absolute ideal of constancy. He also pointed out that "the motif of mutability versus constancy remains ever-present in dramatic treatments of Antony and Cleopatra up to the time of Dryden . . . . No Renaissance play on the subject that I have examined – and that includes every one known to be extant – treats it in any other terms" (Canfield 44, 47). While all readings are necessarily provisional and rarely exhaust all dimensions of any given work, I will assume that Canfield was right about the centrality of mutability and constancy to Dryden's play (for further perspectives, see Fisher 1977 and Vance 1986). More recently, Steven Zwicker has also identified Lucretius as a longstanding philosophical influence "that allowed Dryden to acknowledge – and then to embrace – in the very structures and gestures of his writing, the casual and inevitable drift of all things towards dissolution" (Zwicker 309).

The second critical contribution I will draw upon concerns Dryden's attitude towards language. In 1987, Robert King published an article that drew important connections between Dryden's activities as dramatist and language reformer:

> John Dryden's name appears frequently in scholarly accounts of language reform in the seventeenth century in England for several good reasons: he belonged to the Royal Society committee on language; his essays frequently deal with language as such; and he has long been regarded as an early master of a mature prose style. In 1930, R. F. Jones implied that a causal chain connects Dryden's prose to the influence of the Royal Society and to John Wilkin's [sic] attempt to forge a language of signs with universal, common significance; thirty-eight years later, Philip Harth saw Wilkins's influence reaching Dryden though Cambridge. Two recent critical comments indicate that scholarship has generally accepted Dryden's association with the Royal Society as evidence of abiding convictions that disposed him toward a plain, unornamented style.
>
> (King 45)

The dream nourished by several illustrious members of the Royal Society was a direct correspondence between *res et verba,* words and things. The

most extravagant example, touched upon by King above, was Bishop George Wilkins's awe-inspiringly ambitious *Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language* (1668): a massive tome where he proposed an intricate artificial language that would provide a dependable taxonomy of all conceivable things and notions. Other society members such as Thomas Sprat were more concerned with the eradication of figurative language and other equivocal embellishments from the existing English tongue in order to increase its economy and precision.

These somewhat Quixotic attempts at language reform were soon to be immortalised satirically in Jonathan Swift's *Gulliver's Travels,* in spite of the author's own manifest desire to fix the English language once and for all.[2] In the academy of Lagado, the venerable language professors are engaged in two ambitious projects: one is to remove all polysyllabic words, verbs, and participles from language, "because in reality all things imaginable are but Nouns." The other is "a Scheme for entirely abolishing all Words whatsoever....since Words are only Names for *Things,* it would be more convenient for all Men to carry about them, such Things as were necessary to express the particular Business they are to discourse on" (Swift 2002: 157-58). What Robert King finds in Dryden's play, by contrast, is a "more complex response to the *res et verba* question than the satiric ones of Marvell and Swift." While the language reformers were suspicious of all forms of abstraction and figurative expressions, *All for Love* employs "highly wrought sound patterns and bodies forth a qualified endorsement of terms rooted in things" (King 49, 46).

If we accept these two claims—that Dryden's *All for Love* is steeped in mutability, and that it also involves a response to seventeenth-century language reform—then it also seems reasonable to perceive a logical connection between them. For as Robert Stillman points out with specific reference to George Wilkins, the attempt to reform language was ultimately a war against time: "Linguistic change is corruption; corruption is the work of time; and time's most nefarious manifestation . . . is 'general custom,' the mutability of history itself" (Stillman 241). In the preface to *Troilus and Cressida* Dryden expresses some nostalgia about the age of Aeschylus, when the Greek language supposedly reached its perfection, and

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[2] Unlike Dryden, Swift did not regard language change as inevitable. He saw no "absolute Necessity why any Language should be perpetually changing" and therefore recommended "that some Method should be thought on for *Ascertaining* and *Fixing* our Language for ever, after such Alterations are made in it as shall be thought requisite" (Swift 1712/1957: 9, 14).

remarks dejectedly that "The English language is not capable of such a certainty..." (225). In the dedicatory letter to the Earl of Sunderland, he also describes his native tongue as a "composition of the dead and living tongues" that makes people speak "barbarously." As a result, he is often forced to translate his thoughts into Latin, "thereby trying what sence the words will bear in a more stable language" (222). This is, of course, the motif of constancy and mutability in a nutshell, translated into the realm of language.

But for anyone who dreams of a better world, language, or literature, time cannot only be a source of corruption or post-lapsarian nostalgia: it will also be a great redeemer. "Only through time time is conquered," as Eliot puts it so memorably in *The Four Quartets,* and Dryden's *Essay of Dramatick Poesy* (1668) takes as its principal subject the question of literary progress versus decay. Indeed, his recognition of linguistic corruption in the preface to *Troilus* soon gives way to a more optimistic view of language change: "Yet it must be allow'd to the present Age, that the tongue in general is so much more refin'd since Shakespeare's time, that many of his words, and more of his Phrases, are scarce intelligible..." (225). What distinguishes linguistic 'corruption' from 'progress' or 'refinement' is the presence of deliberate human agency: the systematic attempt to tame the gargantuan beast called "language change" and strap it to the plough. At the heart of language reform in the late seventeenth century lies the dream of restoring language to its former Edenic state, so that words and things might once again become true to one another. In such a world, language would become a tremendously efficient and powerful tool since the acts of naming, defining, and determining would really amount to the same thing.

In one respect, the language reformers were responding to a timeless exigency for those who seek knowledge and understanding. Whenever modern academics or pre-Socratic philosophers seek to define their terms they pay similar homage to the inescapable link between meaning and conceptual-linguistic precision. But as Swift's hilarious parody suggests, one need not be a deconstructionist[3] to be struck by the vanity of the

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[3] In fact, Derrida's attitude towards language—which is still surprisingly influential among literary scholars—is best described as an equally misguided reversal of the seventeenth-century position. In both cases language is conceived reductively as a *system of signs,* quite apart from its rather obvious roots in the governing intentions of its users and their real-world contexts. The chief difference between the language philosophy of the language reformers and Derrida lies in the response generated by the initial perception of an inevitable slippage between words and things: while the language reformers respond

proposed seventeenth-century match between the individual *res et verbum*. This is what the language historian Charles Barber has to say on Wilkins's *Essay towards a Real Character:*

> To the modern reader, perhaps the most staggering thing is the assumption that the number of possible 'notions' in the universe is finite. To do Wilkins justice, he does say that there are some things that his philosophical tables cannot cover. They include things peculiar to one place or nation, such as titles of honour or of office, and legal terms, and also things which are continually changing, like fashions in clothes, games, foods, the tools of trades, and political and religious sects. But in spite of this qualification, he seems to think in terms of a universe in which there are certain fixed categories of objects and of notions, which are independent of the classificatory process carried out by language itself.
>
> (Barber 101-102)

Once again the chief and fatal wedge between words and things turns out to be Father Time, and the problem is exacerbated by the rootedness of language in particular places and contexts. But there is also a third common denominator between the things that Wilkins has no dependable signs for, and that will be particularly important in the pages that follow: most of them are concerned with *conventions that human beings establish between themselves, and by which they define their identities as well as their relationships to one another.*

In a pre-Darwinian and post-Aristotelian universe, composed of a limited number of divinely ordained essences, it is one thing for Wilkins to establish a taxonomic list of all the kinds of *frogs* or *quadrupeds* or *minerals* there are in the world. But it is quite another to establish taxonomic ground rules for the manifold, shifting roles and identities that human beings attribute to themselves and to others, and that often come into conflict with one another. If the chief problem for any essentialist conception of language (like that of Wilkins) is to "accommodate the everyday observation that an individual object can be classified and

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constructively by defining their terms and seeking a closer correspondence between words and essential things, the *deconstructive* response is to increase the gap between words from things and to deny the very possibility of words ever having a determinate, dependable meaning. For lucid critiques of Derrida and his literary-critical disciples, see Ellis 1980, Tallis 1988, Vickers 1993, and Carroll 1995.

reclassified under a multitude of different names" (Tallis 103), then this problem is obviously exacerbated when we consider the exceedingly complex realm of human relationships. Things become even more complicated when we consider those ambiguous socio-political compounds of things and people we call 'nations' or 'countries'— composed, as they are, of carefully demarcated territories, measurable material goods, but also of the abstract values, ideals, beliefs, and identities of their inhabitants.

After these preliminaries I would now like to piece together my exact thesis concerning Dryden's *All for Love*. My overriding claim will be that this play gives voice to a historically specific disquiet about the capacity of words such as proper names, titles, and epithets to correspond to their human referents. This gap between words and people, between linguistic conventions and a lived reality, has two distinct symptoms in Dryden's play. On the one hand, the play seems complicitous with the seventeenth-century awareness of language fixation as a means of control—not only of nature, but also of other people. Dryden's characters repeatedly attempt to define and thereby determine each other as human beings, and they are also conscious about the way that other people define them. But these attempts to determine reality by means of language are rarely successful, and the play reminds us of the inescapable tension between the mutability of individual selves and the relative constancy of the words used to describe them. Throughout my discussion of these phenomena I will assume that Dryden's description of the English tongue as a vehicle for 'dead and living languages' is equally applicable to the relationship between his own play and the literary tradition it draws upon. To understand more fully what is special and what is merely mundane about Dryden's treatment of language and identity, we must explore it in relation to the Shakespearean source it imitates.

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In the opening line of *All for Love*, the prophet Serapion informs us of a cosmic slippage between words and things: "Portents, and Prodigies, are grown so frequent, / That they have lost their Name" (1. 1-2). The idea is, of course, that extravagant events are only deemed so on account of their relative scarcity; what counts as a 'prodigy' cannot be understood in terms of a fixed, vertical relation between individual words and things since the aptness of the term is always established horizontally by means of

comparison. Compared with the line that may have inspired it, Dryden's formulation also has a specifically linguistic dimension that seems absent in his source. In his legendary soliloquy, Hamlet observes that "enterprises of great pitch and moment…lose the name of action" whenever those who originally planned to perform them think too much (3. 1. 86-88). By contrast, Dryden's Serapion is not dissecting the relationship between action and reflection: he is commenting on the discrepancy between language and the mutable reality it presumes to represent.

If the entire first act of Dryden's play describes a world that is at variance with its former self, then this development is particularly noticeable in the male protagonist. When Ventidius arrives in Egypt he finds an Antony who is "alter'd from the Lord of half Mankind" and now finds himself "crampt within a corner of the World" (1. 176, 179). When they meet, Ventidius immediately reminds Antony of the current discrepancy between his proper name and its human referent:

> *Ant. starting up. Art thou Ventidius?*
> *Ven. Are you Antony?*
> *I'm liker what I was, than you to him*
> *I left you last.* (1. 245-47)

While Antony is merely seeking to identify Ventidius as an individual person, the latter throws back his question in a format that is at once existential and linguistic. A little later in the same act we find Antony accepting his general's diagnosis of a rift between personal identity and language: "I have lost my Reason, have disgrac'd / The name of Soldier, with inglorious ease" (293-94).

In large part, Dryden's concern with Antony's name and identity is attributable to the literary tradition he drew upon, especially the Shakespearean source he set out to imitate. In Shakespeare's version of the play the protagonist's name is described as a magical "word of war" (2. 2. 49), and we are frequently reminded of the contrast between past and present selves. Shakespeare's Antony complains that Octavius Caesar is constantly "harping on what I am, not what he knew I was" (3. 13. 147-48), and his Cleopatra patches up an argument by observing that "since my lord / Is Antony again, I will be Cleopatra" (3. 13. 191-92). In the play's most touching meditation on personal transience, Antony likens himself to a figure in a cloud that is destined to lose its temporary form:

"Here I am Antony, / Yet cannot hold this visible shape" (4. 14. 13). The Shakespearean self, like that in Montaigne, is constantly in flux and therefore stands in constant tension with description. But Shakespeare's characters never seem overly worried by this inescapable gap between the sign and its concrete referent: "What's in a name? That which we call a rose / By any other word would smell as sweet" (*Romeo and Juliet* 2. 2. 43-44). This relatively untroubled attitude towards the arbitrariness of individual words is also reflected in Shakespeare's linguistic practice whenever he felt constrained by the existing English vocabulary: *Can't think of the right word? Well, make up a new one!* Such a penchant for individual neologisms is enough to give any language reformer grey hairs, and it would simply have been unthinkable for Dryden some seventy years later.

Indeed, a principal difference between Shakespeare and Dryden's versions of the Antony and Cleopatra story is that the latter consistently turns the problem of identity into a problem of language. In *All for Love,* much is at stake when a particular word is applied to a particular person. When Alexas suggests that Cleopatra's heart is not "wholly alter'd," Antony responds vehemently—not to the idea itself, but to its potential formulation: "No, dare not for thy life, I charge thee dare not, / Pronounce that fatal word" (4. 372-74). Once more the overriding theme of constancy and mutability takes on a distinctly linguistic dimension as Antony acknowledges the power of language to define and thereby determine its human referent. Ventidius voices an even stronger recognition of the same phenomenon when Antony rashly accuses him of treason: "You may kill me; / You have done more already, call'd me Traitor" (1. 383-84). Again and again, Dryden's play returns us to these contrary attitudes towards language, where a belief in the capacity of words to determine their human referents coexists uneasily with a recognition that words simply cannot keep up with people.

In the passages from Shakespeare and Dryden I have cited so far, the problem of language and identity is still fairly straightforward. Antony is no longer the Antony that everyone knew, and this failure to live up to a previously well-defined self engenders existential and linguistic confusion. But in *All for Love* the relationship between naming and being is more complicated than this. As we saw above, an important obstacle to any faithful wedding between words and people is that people have different roles and functions in different contexts. The first complication in Dryden's play is that Antony is torn between two versions of himself—the Roman emperor and the Egyptian lover—and that attempts are made to

establish the correct one. The moment when Ventidius thinks that Antony has been restored to his real self—that is, when he resumes his role as emperor and soldier—must be interpreted in opposite terms by Cleopatra: "I know him well. / Ah, no, I know him not; I knew him once, / But now 'tis past" (2. 26-28).

When Charmian brings word from Antony that "He knew himself so well, / He could deny you nothing, if he saw you" (72-73), Cleopatra's version of Antony appears to be vindicated. But the Egyptian queen actually draws a rigorous distinction between different versions of herself and her lover, suggesting that their words will have very different meanings depending on the roles they assume: "If as a friend you ask my Judgement, go; / If as a Lover, stay" (382-83). When Antony finally decides to leave, Cleopatra sees this choice as an act of self-determination where he assumes a specific identity and discards another: "Go; leave me, Soldier; / (For you're no more a Lover:) leave me dying" (410-11). This exchange also illustrates the irony that surrounds Canfield's view of constancy as an "absolute value" in Dryden's play (Canfield 49); it is not that the characters do not seek to be constant, but that it is difficult to be constant when you are several conflicting things at once. Cleopatra's response to this problem is a primarily linguistic one, since she defines herself and Antony in mutually exclusive terms (friend/lover, soldier/lover) and thus imposes a measure of order upon her experience.

It is useful to bear in mind here that the ideal of constancy is not an idle creation; it is both socially and existentially motivated. First of all, there is considerable personal satisfaction to be derived from the *integer vitae* celebrated by Renaissance poets like Robert Campion. No matter what theories are advanced in favour of the intrinsically fractured self— from neural networks theory to various postmodern vilifications of individual unity or coherence—it still cannot be denied that some sense of personal wholeness and coherence is indispensable for human happiness. What is more, since human beings are social animals who are mutually dependent upon one another, it is also natural for us to appreciate a measure of constancy in people around us, and especially in those that matter most. A truly 'decentred' self of the kind celebrated by postmodernists, with no sense of a stable core, will usually inspire either repulsion or pity in other people (and for good reason). It is in this light that Antony's reunion with his family in Act Three is best understood—as an unusually graphic expression of the dream that all our potentially

conflicting roles and expectations might one day coalesce into a single and exhaustive definition:

> *Ven.* Was ever sight so moving! Emperor!
> *Dolla.* Friend!
> *Octav.* Husband!
> *Both Childr.* Father!
> *Ant.* I am vanquish'd: take me,
> *Octavia;* take me, Children; share me all.*(Embracing them.)*
> (3. 361-63)

The idea is not merely that there will be enough of Antony to go around, but also that there will be no leftovers. Of course, the audience knows that this dream is impossible since Antony has not been defined completely or exhaustively here: he is not just emperor, friend, husband, and father, but also Cleopatra's lover. It is interesting to note in this context that George Wilkins made a valiant attempt in his *Essay towards a Real Character* to cover various universal, "oeconomical" relationships such as consanguinity, master-servant relations, parenthood, and so forth (249-53), but that he never included *lovers* or *mistresses* in his well-ordered system of signs.

Antony's reunion scene is perhaps the most lucid example in Dryden's play of the contrary impulses that arise from a perception of mutability and the desire to control it by means of language. As Cleopatra has predicted, there can be no commerce between the friend, the soldier, and the lover, and hence no unambiguous Antony. That the Egyptian queen should structure her world by means of such rigid linguistic categories is especially noteworthy in comparison with Shakespeare's protagonist. It is, of course, a critical commonplace that much of Dryden's revisionary energy was devoted to cleaning up her act and rendering her morally acceptable to his Restoration audience. But it is still remarkable that the voracious and loquacious fountain of sensuousness described by Shakespeare came to be painted in such different colours on the Restoration stage. While Shakespeare's Cleopatra simply cannot stop talking and so constantly prevents her messengers from delivering their urgent messages, Dryden's Cleopatra sounds more like a sombre member of the Royal Society committee on language when she admonishes Serapion to "be more plain" (5. 75).

If the relationship between "Antony" and its human referent is called into question repeatedly in *All for Love*, the same is also true of "Cleopatra." Other characters seek to define the meaning of her name in the hope of either controlling its connotations or disconnecting it from them. In Act Four, the strategically talented Ventidius even manages to perform both actions in the course of a single statement:

> *Ant.* My Cleopatra?
> *Ven.* Your *Cleopatra,*
> *Dollabella's Cleopatra:*
> Every Man's *Cleopatra.*
> (4. 295-98)

This is not bad, as mixed messages go. One the one hand, Ventidius wants to convince Antony that it was indeed Cleopatra who was seen flirting with Dollabella, and so he narrows down the semantic contents of "Cleopatra" to a sign with an unambiguous referent. The word becomes nothing more than the formal designation of a particular human being, quite apart from the desires or perceptions of other people (or her relationship to them). On the other hand, the notion of a Cleopatra who is the same for all men clearly constitutes a sexual innuendo, an indictment of the Egyptian queen as a common strumpet who is universally available. In this way, Ventidius both restricts the associations surrounding her name—excluding, for example, the amorous bond that Antony invokes with his possessive pronoun—and then channels them in a very specific direction. In his view, there can be little doubt about what sort of person the name "Cleopatra" refers to.

At this point it can be useful to take a step back and consider the deeper linguistic mechanisms that are at work in Dryden's play. As John Searle points out, it has often been assumed by philosophers that proper names are special cases because they do not have *senses* in the Fregean sense of the word: that is, they are empty marks that only refer to individual objects without telling us anything about them or presenting them in a particular way. The most obvious problem with this common-sense dissociation of reference and description is that it leads to a metaphysical distinction between objects and their properties (as if we could somehow separate an empty, ethereal husk called "John Dryden" from all the characteristics and properties we associate with this person: that he was a

man, that he had arms and legs, that he lived in the seventeenth century, and so forth). On the other hand, Searle also notes that the inverse attempt to turn proper names into a kind of condensed, shorthand descriptions fares equally badly since any change in the object that is described would have strange consequences. As he puts it, "the meaning of the name (and perhaps the identity of the object) would change every time there was any change at all in the object, the name would have different meanings for different people, etc." (Searle 166).

According to Searle, the solution to this crux lies in a somewhat messy compromise where proper names, in order to be used successfully, must satisfy a sufficient but unspecified number of descriptions of their objects. But this imprecision is very far from a weakness or flaw:

> ...the uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lies precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to an agreement as to which descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object. They function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descriptions. Thus the looseness of the criteria for proper names is a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the describing function of language.
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> (Searle 172)

What Dryden's play demonstrates is that such a functional imprecision works both ways, since the freedom from the need to define can just as well be the freedom to define reductively. In their use of proper names, the characters in Dryden's play seek to *fuse* the 'describing function' and the 'referring function' of language and so establish an unambiguous and exhaustive relationship between the proper name and the properties of its referent. In this way, proper names are used not only to refer to other people but also to define them aggressively and reductively by *calling names*. Once this has been achieved, the next strategic step is to sever the reference to a particular person and allow the proper name to take on a generic function. It now refers to all persons with similar properties in a perfectly reductive wedding between proper names and people.

Further on in Act Four, Antony's wife Octavia employs a similar tactic when she confronts her husband:

> Wherein have I offended you, my Lord,
> That I am bid to leave you? Am I false,
> Or infamous? Am I a *Cleopatra?*
> (4. 394-96)

Once more we witness how a character moves with lightning speed from a reductive definition of the particular to a generalised assertion. The conceptual leap that underlies Octavia's sarcasm can be fleshed out as follows: she first defines the nature of the referent sharply so that "Cleopatra" comes to stand for nothing else than a false and infamous woman. Once the exact relationship between the sign and its human referent has been stabilised in this way, the sign can be broadened into a generic term for all false women. It is interesting to note that Antony immediately picks up on this strategy and uses it to question the integrity of his own general: "Are you my Friend, *Ventidius?* / Or are you turned a *Dollabella* too, / And let this fury loose?" (410-12).

A final and slightly different example of identity fixation by means of reductive exclusion occurs when Antony greets his wife upon her arrival in Egypt:

> *Octav.* Thus long have I attended for my welcome;
> Which, as a stranger, sure I might expect.
> Who am I?
>   *Ant.* Caesar's sister.
>   *Octav.*   That's unkind!
> (3. 253-55)

In the other examples above, the referent of a proper name is first nailed down with clinical (and somewhat callous) precision, at which point the name is free to take on an almost emblematic capacity to account for similar objects. In this specific case, Antony attempts to dissociate himself from his marital union with Octavia by generating a false dichotomy on the basis of a partial truth: if she is Caesar's sister, then she is not Antony's wife. Once more the manifold roles and functions people play—as lovers, friends, husbands and wives, soldiers, and so forth—are opposed to each other in the attempt to define and determine another person.

So far, we have considered the relationship between language fixation and identity on two levels of complexity. The first was fairly straightforward and concerned the incapacity of language to keep up with the mutable self it claims to represent: when Antony no longer has the characteristics traditionally associated with him, the question arises whether he is still "Antony" in any meaningful sense. The response to this problem is equally simple, since one can either realign the present self with its former nature or redefine the name in accordance with the changing referent. The second and more complex phenomenon occurs when an opposition arises in the present tense between different social roles and conceptions of personal identity. Cleopatra cannot be Antony's friend and lover at the same time, and Antony finds it impossible to reconcile his different roles as emperor, father, husband, and lover. The solution to this problem lies in acts of linguistic exclusion by which the characters define themselves and other people in a manifestly reductive ways. In this way, they seek not only to order their own experience but also to define and thereby control other people. I want to end my discussion of Dryden's play by considering a phenomenon that is even more complex: the perception that even a single term like "friend" or "lover" proves too imprecise and undependable to generate stability by means of language.

There is no room here for a more extended discussion of the subtle and complex ways in which specific words like *Roman, lover, mistress, Emperor,* and *Queen* are employed by Dryden's characters as means of "fixing" other people. But one word that becomes sufficiently important towards the end of the play to warrant special attention is "friend." When Cleopatra regards the roles of lover and friend as incommensurable in Act Two—"If as a friend you ask my Judgement, go; If as a Lover, stay"—we can surmise that her sharp distinction is predicated on something like the following assumption: the foremost quality of a *friend* is concern for the other person's well-being, while a passionate *lover* tends to be more egotistic because he or she cannot stand back from the personal desire for closeness and proximity. Unlike the friend, the lover simply cannot *let go*.

The whole point of Cleopatra's opposition is, of course, that these identities or relationships are relatively well defined so that they can be contrasted clearly with one another. That this is not always the case in Dryden's play is evidenced by Antony's reaction to Dollabella's arrival, which draws heavily on Plato's discourse of love in the *Symposium:*

Ant. 'Tis he himself, by holy Friendship!
[*Runs to embrace him.*
Art thou return'd at last, my better half?
Come, give me all my self.
(3. 118-20)

Some seventy years earlier, when Shakespeare was still active as a dramatist, the lexical distinction between lover and friend also appears to have been more fluid than it is in Dryden's play. In *Julius Caesar*, Brutus argues that he has killed his "best lover for the good of Rome" (3. 2. 45), and Ulysses departs from Achilles in *Troilus and Cressida* with the following words: "Farewell, my lord: I as your lover speak" (3. 3. 213). In yet another Shakespearean play, Menenius describes his own quasi-paternal friendship with the young Coriolanus in the following terms: "I tell you, fellow, / Thy general is my lover" (5. 2. 13-14). In *All for Love*, by contrast, the words "lover" and "friend" are not easily confused, lexically speaking, even though their referents share important characteristics. Antony appears to love his friend Dollabella with the same fervour that is typically associated with romantic attachments, but they are definitely 'friends' and not 'lovers.'

Though the question is an interesting one, this is not the place to investigate how representative Dryden's and Shakespeare's word usage may be of larger historical developments in seventeenth-century English. It does, however, seems clear that the definition of 'friend' and 'lover' developed over time in a direction that Dryden would have appreciated; that is, towards increasing precision and stability. As we all know, the modern English word "lover" has been purged of its early modern vagueness and is now usually reserved for sexual relationships: 'if we can't be lovers, then we can at least be friends.' The problem with the word "friend" in Dryden's play is rather its problematic relationship to the reality it purports to describe. Indeed, the fate of this word in *All for Love* reads like a miniature portrait of the mechanisms of language change, by which the meanings of words are twisted, redefined, and—in Dryden's view—*corrupted* through eclectic and improper usage.

We have seen that at the beginning of *All for Love*, friendship is a fairly unambiguous affair that involves affection and a desire to promote the happiness of another person. But when Antony grows convinced Dollabella has double-crossed him, Dryden once more lets his hero conflate uncertainties about identity with qualms about language: "See,

where he comes ... / Who has prophan'd the Sacred Name of Friend, / And worn it into vileness!" (4. 440-42). Dollabella's supposed betrayal has generated a crisis of language where a word that was once pregnant with meaning has now been worn down and emptied of its content. The problem is not simply that Dolabella has ceased to be a "friend," but that the word itself has become contaminated. This idea is similar to the opening line of the play, where we saw that "portents" and "prodigies" lost their name because they became too frequent. In the dedicatory letter to the Earl of Sunderland, cited earlier in this text, Dryden also shows acute awareness of how the repetition of words can produce an inflation that renders professions of friendship or fondness suspect. After praising the Earl for his no-nonsense attitude, Dryden suddenly interrupts himself:

> But the eminence of your condition...is my unhappiness: for it renders whatever I would say suspected. Professions of Service, submissions, and attendance, are the practise of all men to the great: and commonly they who have the least sincerity, perform them best...

> (220)

As a result, Dryden's manifest attempt to be "plain" in his praise of the Earl proves impossible. Since other tongues have 'worn' the name of friend or admirer 'into vileness,' he can only profess sincerity but never hope for a direct correspondence between the tongue and the heart. This recognition has nothing to do with the determinacy or indeterminacy of language: on the contrary, it once more demonstrates the fundamental weakness of all language philosophies that treat language only as a system of signs, forgetting that it is also an intentional phenomenon involving rule-governed speech acts.

Since the names of 'friend' and 'mistress' have now been debased through improper usage, Antony is suddenly at a loss for words. He turns to Dolabella and Cleopatra and stutters,

> Two, two such,
> Oh there's no farther name, two such---------to me,
> To me, who lock'd my Soul within your breasts...
> (4. 480-82)

This is obviously an impossible situation, and when Antony resorts once again to the familiar words—"a Friend and Mistress was what the World could give" (496-97)—it seems clear that they no longer have the same meaning for him. This impression is given further reinforcement when Dollabella—who enters with the singularly ironic and unfortunate greeting "O, my friend!" (447)—seeks to acquit himself of the unfair accusation by distinguishing clearly between the roles of 'friend' and 'lover.' His profession to love Cleopatra "[n]o more than Friendship will allow" is immediately cut down to size by Antony: "No more? / Friendship allows thee nothing: thou art perjured" (496-97). Not surprisingly, Dolabella and Cleopatra find it difficult to vindicate the words that have been called into question— "Forgive your mistress...Forgive your friend" (523-24)—since Antony thinks he "can forgive / A Foe; but not a Mistress, and a Friend" (543-44).

In this way, Dryden once more turns a disillusionment with *people* into a disillusionment with *language*. This is a fitting response from a dramatist who was keenly aware that language must change because reality changes, but who nevertheless shared the contemporary dream of counteracting this process of corruption by means of deliberate human effort. As a result, the characters in *All for Love* give voice to two contrary but intimately connected attitudes to words and people. Since they employ language deliberately as a means of determinining and thereby defining other people, the failure to control their surroundings in this way quite naturally generates a disenchantment with language as much as with its human referent.

But is there no way out of this linguistic quandary? In fact, the ending of *All for Love* does open an escape hatch from the conflicting self-definitions and distorting linguistic attributions that flesh is heir to, but it is patently *not* the kind of solution that one could turn into a programme for language reform. When Ventidius—who spent the entire first act seeking to convince Antony that he was still Emperor—is about to take his own life, he suddenly addresses his superior in unfamiliar ways:

> Now, Farewel, Emperor. *(Embrace.)*
> Methinks that word's too cold to be my last;
> Since Death sweeps all distinctions, Farewel, Friend.
> That's all...
> (5. 321-23)

Significantly, Cleopatra makes a very similar volte-face as she prepares to die. In her bitter and scornful exchange with Octavia earlier in the play, she accused the latter of bearing "the specious Title of a Wife, / To guild your Cause" while she herself was doomed to "bear the branded Name of Mistress" (3. 399-400, 404). But now that her life is drawing to an end, Cleopatra is finally prepared to define herself in a manner that corresponds more fully with her experience:

> I have not lov'd a *Roman* not to know
> What should become his Wife; his Wife, my *Charmion;*
> For 'tis to that high Title I aspire,
> And now I'll not die less. Let dull *Octavia*
> Survive, to mourn him dead; my Nobler Fate
> Shall knit our Spousals with a tie too strong
> For *Roman* laws to break.
> (5. 412-18)

This is the specifically linguistic nature of Dryden's *Liebestod:* since death 'sweeps all distinctions' it also promises to end all ambiguities and conflicting definitions of who we really are. Death carries with it the right to self-determination, conceived more specifically as a capacity for self-definition where words can finally do justice to one's own reality and experience. Those who are left alive must live out their days in the shadow of the Tower of Babel, constantly struggling to overcome the painful breach between words and things, words and people.

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Freudian Economies and Constructions of Love in Poe's Tales

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Introduction

A clean, Freudian-inspired reading of Poe's texts is hard to come by. A major reason for writing this paper is the very basic claim that Poe's literary constructs are perfectly intelligible to the modern reader without needing what most critics regardless of theoretical persuasion have offered for decades: a psycho-biographical apparatus as introduction. In fact, this paper argues that donning allegorical glasses in order to find correspondences between Poe's life and Poe's work is at best a futile exercise and at worst a blinding of the reader/analyst to the signification of Poe's tales. Paradoxically, the exercise is not futile because correspondences cannot be found, but on the contrary because so many and so comprehensive correspondences can be construed that one should immediately suspect that this is not entirely without auctorial design in itself.

The point is then briefly that there is an allegory embodied in Poe's oeuvre, but it is not an allegory we can decode just by attempting to psychoanalyse the remains of Poe and apply the findings to his literary work (this being for instance the project of Marie Bonaparte (1949)), nor indeed the other way around: psychoanalyse his characters and think they can tell us the truth about Poe. The allegory is accessible, as any signification, through a structural analysis, and explicable through our knowledge of the human psyche.

A further comment to the immediately preceding is of course that by presupposing the presence of an allegory in the author's work, it is by implication also presupposed that this allegory is largely under auctorial control and hence largely intentional. However, the decoding of it is, unlike what Poe dreamt of, largely outside the author's control, and falls within the domain of reader or critic's control. It is, however, possible that

this allegory has the potential to become semi-autonomous and so to speak obsessive in its expression. It seems perfectly normal and artistically interesting for a modern audience that an artist in the field of representational pictorial art (say Monet) should produce a series of art products over the same motif with just the slightest of variations according to the season or changes in the light. May we not also read Poe's oeuvre as a series of variations over a theme (here borrowing from the terminology of music), and just enjoy the subtlety of his craftsmanship in producing the variety of expression of his motifs without ascribing the sinister symptoms of obsession to the author (which is what Hoffman (1972) tends to do when he insists on finding what he calls a donné in Poe)?

The analyses in the following indicate that Poe's allegory is habitually under his control, but that it is never as rigidly expressed in his fiction and poetry as it is in his poetics and other criticism. In *Eureka* Poe gave an explicit admission of his unitary philosophy (in contrast to his critical credo of facultative divisions of motive), and one could argue that the unitary philosophy of *Eureka* is a form of blueprint for the whole of the rest of his fictional oeuvre. So there is an overall coherence in Poe's work and one must accept his own formulation of it as a deep undercurrent of allegorical nature (Galloway 1967/86:442). What must be rejected is that this allegory is an unconscious 'allegory of author', and this rejection seems to be supported by the fact that when we decode the allegory of unity through close readings of the work and the work alone, we come up with a perfectly intelligible and psychologically stable, even sound, desire for imposing order on a cruel and chaotic universe, which does not differ in substance from that of other Romantic authors or even many a modern human being.

The compass-points of structural analysis and a psycho-economic understanding of human motivation and mythopoeic activity are used throughout the paper to anchor the argument in the realm of – if not truth – then at least likelihood. This type of analysis runs counter to the current fashion for thick description and historicisation of Poe's oeuvre, yet work such as this is still relevant because it yields comparative insights into figures and forms across the author's output, and because of its general contribution to the field of studies in Romantic poetics.

Towards a Freudian Economy of (Narrative) Urges

> It can easily be shown that the psychical value of erotic needs is reduced as soon as their satisfaction becomes easy. An obstacle is required in order to heighten libido; and where natural resistances to satisfaction have not been sufficient men have at all times erected conventional ones so as to be able to enjoy love. (Freud 1977:256-7)

Freud's well-known remark from "On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love (Contributions to the Psychology of Love II)" addresses the libidinous economies of love in several senses of the word: both as what is involved in enjoying (physical) love (i.e. pure sexual pleasure), and as what we now call relationships. The latter could be defined as arrangements between lovers involving living together, having a long term sexual relationship, and sharing various other social obligations – conventionally such an arrangement is of course known as 'marriage'. This remark naturalises the male point of view on these matters and assumes that agency in the matter of love is by default with the masculine part. Later we shall see how Poe's story world destabilises this gendering of love's economy.

It is tempting to use Freud's remark also as a starting point for analyses of literary representations of love, i.e. love stories. One would however necessarily have to first think about the relationship between actual libidinous activity and the telling of such activities, or how "love" (in the broadest sense of the word, as suggested by Freud towards the end of the quote) is emplotted in narratives. Such a theory of emplotment would have to explain both the relation between love as a psychological/physical phenomenon and a literary phenomenon and be able to address the structural characteristics of (narratives of) love.

We may begin by attempting to adapt the elements of Freud's remark and their implications to literary representations of love. Let us postulate that an element of love is the expression of it (feelings and acts) in the form of a story, and that such a story is in essence what we call a love story. If love becomes more interesting with the raising of obstacles to its fulfilment, then the same must be true of love stories (In 'translation' of Freud's opening: The narrative value of erotic needs is reduced as soon as their satisfaction becomes easy). It thus follows that love stories concern that which prevents or threatens love, and inversely that happy love has no (interesting) story.

Observations of archetypal narratives of love, such as the story of Tristan and Iseult, which can be read as a sequence of barriers or obstacles to love's fulfilment, followed by a series of threats to the happiness attained after love is accomplished, can supply enough examples of how actual love stories work to validate this initial point. Thus a mapping of the paradigmatic structure of love stories onto Freud's observation of the libidinal economy of the satisfaction of erotic needs seems viable. We can again 'transcribe' Freud: A narrative obstacle is required in order to heighten the reader's interest.

In his remark Freud adds the interesting twist that the barriers to love are largely self-imposed by the would-be lovers. This is not necessarily expressed on the surface of the narrative of love, where the barriers are often explained as the doings of others, but if we accept Freud's observation, it would seem to open up an avenue to a deeper interpretation of such narrative structures. Characters as well as narrators, which all of course are mediated auctorial constructs, would then be seen to have agency in connection with plot complications in love stories.

One step further along the line of logical implications of this collation of libidinous energies with narrative energies would lead us to postulate that love is necessarily a story. Love is not love unless it is told and hence becomes a narrative with a plot, protagonists, barriers, denouement etc. Unstated love must therefore be something else, or perhaps the premise here should rather be that love is always stated, if only inwardly as a story told by the lover to himself. If love is necessarily a story, it is also necessarily tellable, hence automatically told at least once in its very formulation by the lover – internally or externally. This line of reasoning does not substantiate itself directly on Freud's remark, but follows from his opening of the economies of love and its workings. Scholars such as Brooks (1984) and Roemer (1995) have developed readings of literature that trace the economies of plot and narration in Freudian inspired terms.

Zooming in on the function of the barriers to love in narratives we must conclude that the presence of a barrier to the fulfilment of a need or desire is identical to the presence of a narrative or narratable element. This point of view rests on the assumption that we experience the world through narration, if only internally to ourselves, non-vocalized. Certainly, if this is the philosophical basis we choose, every act we perform in the world is in some sense a statement in the narration of our lives. This is an inversion of the idea that every statement we make is also the performance of an act (a theoretical foundation for this idea might be found in speech-act theory).

There is a basic need for mythopoeic activity in human life, and it runs parallel to one of Freud's postulated drives: the pleasure principle. The lover wants to live, so that he/she can love. It is however interesting to speculate on the presence of other drives that by their very nature transcend the libidinous desire for fulfilment in the form of attainment of pleasure. Freud hints at such instincts beyond the pleasure principle (first in a work of just that title) (Freud, 1955), later summarised by him as an opposition between Eros and these death instincts, Thanatos. Here the discussion of thanatic energies will be confined to a postulation of a death wish which is connected to the wish for fulfilment of erotic needs, in fact is a displacement of this wish, itself a displacement of the wish to return to the symbiotic relation with the mother. These symbiotic desires by definition involve a form of suspension of one's individual being (in erotic fulfilment a temporary suspension), and why not seek the ultimate dissolution of individual being: death?

This radical formulation of the tension between two drives within the psychological economy throws interesting light on the economy of love stories as well. In a love story the desire for love is also (in some sense) the desire for death. The key to the understanding of this radical claim lies in seeing death and other apparent threats to love as examples of barriers erected and overcome by the lovers. Certainly the libido-heightening involved in dying or risking death for love must be deemed considerable, hence the erection of death-like or at least life-threatening barriers to love becomes economically interesting for the libido.

We have thus a Freudian insight promising to yield results when applied to literary representations. We should now be more specific with regards to the textual loci of these economies. Obviously we might wish to say that death is a feature of the plot of many stories, including love stories. However we cannot have a love story without protagonists and other characters, and thanatic energies may spill over from the event or plot level to the character level as well. Love may seek an object or fasten itself on an ideal, but best of all might be to dissolve that dichotomy and have love fasten itself on a dead protagonist. This would further allow for an operation on the level of characterisation where the lover would be emotionally enriched by this love of an idealised, deceased partner: For the lover, happiness thus easily becomes sadness.

On the level of ideas this construct of love and death would also reveal fundamental truths about the desire of both pleasure and death in the economy of love: Love in its most fundamental and characteristic

form, is the love of love, which is to say that it follows a Platonic ideal and can subsist without a physical object. Secondly, love transgresses all social norms and conventions, many of which we will remember Freud already defined as convenient constructs.

The erotic fulfilment is thus highly suitable as a locus for the death wish, where one's personality can undergo a process of dissolution (also glossable as a reversal of individualization), quite mechanically through merging with the other – so to speak by entering/taking in the other. This can easily be taken one step further and be seen as a quest for that original other who participated in the first mother/child symbiosis, and who has in fact ever since been the missing half of one's self, the identical half or double needed to complete one's personality.

If love is closely akin to telling, we should not neglect the obvious reversal of this claim and state that love is closely related to the act of reading. Love stories are a mediated response to the economies of love, understood as the totality of the drives and instincts, labelable as Eros and Thanatos. A dialectic exists, wherewith we often learn about our psychological motivations through (archetypal) love stories, just as reading also provides us with models for our own formulation of stories. Love lends itself readily to telling and reading, because the psychological mechanisms of love are structured as a process with a beginning, a development and (often) an end – in fact love has a plot much like a story. Furthermore love involves a set of protagonists and antagonists and is episodic in nature. All of these inherent factors in love's psychology make love immediately tellable and readable, much like other archetypal plots: the quest, war-time adventures, the *Bildung* of an artist etc. – all of which may embody love stories in their plots as well.

Love stories are produced/consumed as a surrogate for or at least a symbolic representation of our desire for producing/consuming love itself. Thus we may well fall in love with love stories, use love stories to seduce others into falling in love, take our ideals of love from archetypal love stories etc.

The Freudian economies traced out in the above can serve as a set of theses concerning narrative structures and their correspondences with libidinal structures. Of course a constructivist viewpoint would emphasise that both sets of structures are not in possession of any canonical infallibility, but that is hardly a reason to abstain from a comparison and the ensuing analysis of the extent to which the two structural sets match and mutually elucidate one another.

Love's Construction in Four Poe-tales

For a long time Poe was regarded as an odd, if not perverse figure in American literature. Someone who had an unhealthy preoccupation with horror, madness and death, and someone only suited for raw material for B-movies and really only fit for immature readers. Still, Poe was regarded as a necessary feature of the American canon, but usually seen as essentially a very un-American author, drawing on German traditions, and mainly appreciated by French poets. Most often Poe's biography was seen as a key to understanding Poe's stories, and because Poe's stories were bizarre, Poe, the actual person, was considered psychologically deviant too.

This paper proposes that Poe was not a pervert, that Poe is relevant for all of us, and, perhaps most surprisingly, that Poe mainly wrote love stories, albeit of a slightly unusual nature. Of course, Poe's stories also have horrific (surface) elements, but really Poe uses the vehicle of the love story to say something profound about human nature, and the limits of rationality a human being can be driven to by the most basic conditions of life and love.

Poe's explicit poetic dictum, stated in the essay "The Philosophy of Composition" (Galloway (ed.), 1967/1986:486), was that the most poetic of all subjects was the death of a beautiful lady – a subject he used in both his poems and tales throughout his life, but never more clearly expressed than in a quartet of early, arabesque tales that bear the names of such beautiful dead, yet undying; buried, yet returning ladies: "Berenice", "Morella", "Ligeia", and "Eleonora". The tales of these women form a core set of love stories, the structures of which we shall examine in the following.

A very simple beginning to this structural investigation is to see what acts take place in these four tales; who are the actors involved in them; and what are the relations between them. From this simple programme it is already obvious that no clear distinction between plot and characters is possible – the two concepts are mutually interdependent. Acts cannot be recounted without explaining who commits them, actors cannot be understood or characterised without recounting their actions. It is also clear that it is not merely a temporal sequence of events/acts which must necessarily be laid out in an investigation of plot, but rather that both a temporal and causal linkage of events is necessary in order to understand events and their motivation (the bridge to closer decoding of characterisation).

It is therefore the merest of beginnings to state that in this quartet we have a pattern of actions which looks as follows in a temporal outline: A marriage takes place or is planned; a death occurs, ending or preventing

the marriage; a man takes action to rectify the situation and overcome the barrier of death as hindrance to love/marriage; this man loses his reason in the process; a new marriage-like consummation of love takes place, but does not bring about a lasting resolution to the problem of love.

Let us introduce some causal links between these temporal events: The marriage is somehow not a fulfilling consummation of love; therefore death must occur to heighten the libidinous/thanatic energies involved in this love. Because death is such an interesting barrier the man now becomes more active in seeking consummation and begins to bring it about. The economy of love and passion, however, is such that these displays of passion cause him to lose his rationality. The various ways in which he re-consumes his love are all of temporally limited duration and most often do not outlast the telling of the tale. This would indicate that there is something inherently wrong with these re-consummations, that they are doomed to fail – the original symbiosis is the one that counts, not subsequent surrogate relations.

Let us then introduce a set of characters acting in this skeletal plot: There is a male lover and a female love-object, although often she is quite as active a lover as he is. There are no other characters involved in these plots. On occasion the first female lover is replaced by another female character (in fact this is virtually the rule), but this female lover/2 is invariably a form of double of female lover/1, and in the process of the tale she is collapsed into female lover/1 and their identity (as identical-ness) is revealed.

The absence of external antagonists in these plots is striking and leads to the obvious conclusion that since everything goes wrong for these lovers all the same, the protagonists in these tales have to function simultaneously as their own antagonists. This is programmatically realised by having dualities built into their characters. Where the females are formal externalised doubles, the male protagonists are doubles in a psychological sense – they embody split personalities, which they invariably discuss in terms of reason vs. madness/ disease.

We will now proceed to see how this is fleshed out in this set of tales. First: the marriage.

In "Berenice" the marriage never actually takes place, but is fixed and ready to proceed just as Berenice 'dies'. This however is not really a significant variation on the marriage theme, since the other marriages/1 in the tales are stated as virtual *faits accomplis*.

In "Ligeia" we learn about the marriage in the following fashion: Ligeia was "her who was my friend and my betrothed, and who became the partner of my studies, and finally the wife of my bosom" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:311). Not only is the marriage proper · told to us in a subordinate clause among other subordinate clauses, it is also presented merely as the last in a series of processes happening between the lovers – first they become friends and betrothed, then partners in study and only then "finally", or even more tellingly in 3 published variants of the text, "eventually", wife and husband. This reduces the status of the marriage to a background event; it is almost part of the setting of the tale.

In "Morella" the situation is even more explicit: "Yet we met, and fate bound us together at the altar" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:229). Here the marriage (never labelled with that word) is a peculiarly passive thing – not even desired by the lovers, rather something fated. We are hardly surprised when we read on and learn of the male lover's feelings: "I never spoke of passion, nor thought of love" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:229). This is quite parallel to the planned marriage in "Berenice" which comes about despite the male lover's disgust/fear of Berenice, and is undertaken out of pity for her – though deeply rued by the male lover afterwards: "in an evil moment, I spoke to her of marriage" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:214).

In "Eleonora" no formal marriage/1 takes place, but Eros sneaks up on the two hitherto innocent lovers and traps them, which leads to a marriage-like vow undertaken by the male lover, promising to stretch his fidelity quite a bit beyond 'till death do us part'. That is to say, the sequence of events is slightly altered in "Eleonora". Passion precedes the 'marriage', whereas in "Berenice", "Morella" and "Ligeia" the marriage is in itself quite passion- and loveless. In each case, however, the marriage which should be the end/consummation of love is merely the beginning of a process of love, but simultaneously of something else, namely a fall from reason.

It may seem paradoxical that this fall from reason is in fact also an embarking on a quest for knowledge. This, however, is the case. The male lovers engage in studies of what is typically (in "Morella" and "Ligeia") labelled "forbidden" knowledge (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:230 & 316), and it is undertaken under the tutelage of their wives whose intellects are so developed as to reduce their husbands to childlike status. Egæus, the male lover in "Berenice", is also a diligent student (his favourite books all deal with the theme of resurrection) and observes that the nature of his studies helps his peculiar disease to develop (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:212-3). It must be said that Egæus' disease is already in full progress before his marriage

plans are made, and that since he was born in a library, he has always lived in a world of books. Indeed his disease is one where reality and irreality become indistinguishable for him.

"Eleonora" of course is set in a bookless world, but this does not prevent the lovers from starting a course of "examination" of and "discourse" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:641) on their feelings and the changes in their physical surroundings apparently brought about by their love. In fact this discourse on biology turns out to be fatal, because it inevitably ends in a discussion of death, which as soon as it is raised as a topic, becomes a physical reality for Eleonora.

In summary it will be seen to be a recurrent phenomenon that an attempt at gaining 'forbidden' knowledge is going on in these marriages or proto-marriages.

It is always so that the female part is in possession of the knowledge desired (or stumbles upon it as in "Eleonora"). In "Berenice" the possession of knowledge on Berenice's part is slightly peculiar, since it is located in her teeth, but this idea fixates itself in Egæus' mind one day, and is seen by him as the key to getting his reason back: "I more seriously believed *que tous ses dents etaient des idées*" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:216).

In "Morella" and "Ligeia" the knowledge is explicitly ascribed to the wives, but the husbands realise that it is futile for them to grasp at this knowledge – it may seem within their reach when their wives are there to help them, but after they die it slips away. This is hardly surprising, because it is becoming obvious that the 'forbidden' knowledge is tied up with death and dying. As mentioned Egæus' studies deal with resurrection, Eleonora's knowledge is that of her own mortality (and impending transition to angel-hood), and in "Morella" the field of study is "theological morality" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:230) or more specifically "the notion of that identity which at death is or is not lost forever" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:237). Ligeia's great project is crystallised in her preoccupation with immortality, which she reduces to a question of will – indeed there is a fourfold reiteration of this tenet which also serves as motto for the tale: "Man doth not yield himself to the angels, nor unto death utterly, save only through the weakness of his feeble will" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:310, 314, 319 & 319-20). Thus it is plain that the forbidden knowledge is that of how to transcend death and live on (in some form) forever.

In all four tales it becomes necessary to make attempts at applying this knowledge of transcendence of death, and in the process of doing so

the lovers in all four tales transgress against aspects of morality. In all four tales the female lover/1 dies, and these deaths are tied in with the occurrence of passion in some form. In "Berenice" the death of the title character is preceded by a ghostly visit she pays to Egæus' library. She is in fact already "vacillating" and "indistinct" in outline (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:214) when she comes. She is silent and her eyes are "lifeless" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:215). But her teeth are quite vivid and spark off an attack of Egæus' disease, which he in fact describes in these terms: "For these [the teeth] I longed with a frenzied desire" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:215). This is quite as passionate as Egæus ever gets, and he remains in this monomaniac state till after Berenice's death is announced.

In "Morella" the narrator has specifically denied his erotic interest in his wife and sought satisfaction merely through her tutelage, but after a while her physical presence becomes "oppressive" to him, and he can "no longer bear the touch of her" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:231). This loathing on the narrator's part takes on the nature of a desire for her to die: "I longed with an earnest and consuming desire for [...] Morella's decease" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:232). In fact the narrator's loathing for Morella is what kills her, since this is the only cause for her lingering disease, which is explained to us rather quaintly and laconically in one sentence: "Yet was she woman, and pined away daily" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:231). Now, this passionate desire for Morella's death must have also had other physical consequences for the relationship between the two, for after she has been dying "for many weeks and irksome months" (nine perhaps), she – to our absolute astonishment – gives birth to a daughter "which breathed not until the mother breathed no more" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:233). A more direct linkage between passion, death and birth would be hard to find.

In "Ligeia" a twist occurs, in that the passion is located first in the wife of the love relationship. This is rather queerly described as a general trait in her personality in the following way: "Of all the women whom I have ever known she [...] was the most violently a prey to the tumultuous vultures of stern passion" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:315). This passion is later invested in Ligeia's struggle with death – her spirit writhes convulsively in this fight, we learn – much as her body may have writhed when visited by the "tumultuous vultures" of physical passion/orgasm. But she still has passionate devotion left for her husband, whom she identifies with the principle of life itself (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:317, l. 25-7).

In "Eleonora" the passion (Eros) precedes the death of Eleonora by a very short time-span, in fact she is compared with "the ephemeron [...]

made perfect in loveliness only to die" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:642). Erotic love which alters the nature of the valley is originally causal in bringing about her death, since it is "change" as a concept that leads her to think of death in the first place, and the thought of death promptly brings it about in her. A fate she quite happily accepts, by the way – quite unlike Ligeia. It turns out that Eleonora has access to inside information about life after death, which eases the passage for her. After all she is able to return at will and visit her still living lover, a feat Ligeia is only capable of <u>by</u> will (and once only).

Now that these deaths have been "accomplished" (a tell-tale phrase from "The Black Cat", Mabbott (ed.), 1978:856) to the accompaniment of passion displayed to hitherto unseen degrees, the lovers need to take action to remedy the situation which would seem to signal the end of love. In doing so the lovers quite matter-of-factly transgress in various ways.

In "Berenice" Egæus leaves his beloved library for the first time and violates Berenice's burial vault with the object of course of getting hold of her "*dents*" or "*idées*" (inevitably glossable as '*identité*') and thereby his reason, which then can cure him of his passion and his disease. This act is not intended by him to bring Berenice back, but as it unfortunately does so, his project fails and his newfound reason is then scattered all over the library floor in the shape of neat little ideas/teeth.

Grave-robbery and hinted-at necrophilia are Egæus' transgressions, but it is simply his passion that he is punished for by his renewed loss of reason. In "Morella" the narrator's transgression is that he raises his daughter to take her mother's place in his life, with all the hints of incest this involves. He denies the identity between Morella/1 and her daughter far beyond the point where the identity is painfully obvious for the observer, but in the story-world there are no outside observers since he raises her in "rigid seclusion" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:235). Only when he names her Morella at her baptism is he forced to face the fact that the hated Morella/1 has come again as Morella/2 whom he has loved "with a love more fervent than I had believed it possible to feel on earth" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:233, variant o).

This obtuse narrator has not learned his lesson. Just as his passionate hatred for Morella/1 led to her death, his passionate love for Morella/2 causes her to die. Indeed the very instant he names her, thus unveiling her identity, she falls "prostrate on the black slabs of our ancestral vault" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:235). And although all the four elements seem to the narrator to call out Morella's name, Morella/2 dies, and the physical

identity between her and Morella/1 is hammered home, as there is no body in the charnel where Morella/2 is placed and Morella/1 should have been. Again passion has been the double downfall of a male lover.

In "Ligeia" where passion is the domain of the female lover, the narrator is "crushed into the very dust with sorrow" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:320) over her death. He therefore decides to re-marry. "After a few months" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:320) he has bought and redecorated an English abbey – most particularly furnishing a pentagonal bridal chamber in a turret – and married a woman as physically and mentally different from Ligeia as possible. This marriage takes place under the influence of opium and "in a moment of mental alienation" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:320-1) according to the narrator. He has however prepared quite elaborately for the event by designing the bridal chamber as nothing so much as a tomb *cum* torture chamber for his new bride.

His transgression is, of course, that he intends to drive Rowena mad and kill her. Rowena never becomes a character in her own right, since she never does anything, never leaves the chamber and never fights her husband's attempts on her life. She is in fact merely a body, necessary for the narrator and the disembodied will of Ligeia in their little experiment in re-animation of the dead.

After quite a protracted agony of recurring diseases Rowena eventually dies, though not until she is helped along by "three or four large drops of a brilliant and ruby colored fluid" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:325) which mysteriously find their way into her wine one night. The narrator suggests that Ligeia placed them there, but is uncertain – after all he is high on opium which is becoming his favourite alibi for not being accountable for what he sees and does.

The stage is now set for a re-consummation of the narrator's lost love, and this takes place as Rowena in a night-long set of orgasmic re-vivifications and new little deaths becomes transformed into lover/1, Ligeia. This process excites the narrator who is becoming "a helpless prey to a whirl of violent emotions of which extreme awe was perhaps the least terrible, the least consuming" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:329). What these other, unnameable emotions that consume him are, we can only guess – but happiness at regaining his lover certainly does not seem to be one of them. In fact madness is what the narrator himself repeatedly (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:330) refers to his state as, and the telling ends when he has "shrieked aloud" Ligeia's name. Again a tale which ends in passion and unreason – again it would seem because of a causal link between the two states.

The ending of "Eleonora" is somewhat different from the pattern we have seen hitherto where the only variation has been that in "Berenice" there was no doubling of the female lover, though there certainly was a return of Berenice from the 'dead' in an altered state. But here in "Eleonora" the bereaved lover (in some variants named Pyrros, and what an ardent lover he is with already one passionate death behind him) neither does peculiar things to his dead lover's body, nor has a weird relationship with his daughter, nor procures a convenient blonde to perform experiments on – no, he remains true to his vow for "years" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:643). But eventually the eroticism of the valley itself subsides and he no longer likes it there, in fact he is "*pained*" by the valley (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:643) and longs for love.

So, in fact, he does transgress in a fashion – he breaks his vow and invokes a dreadful curse for doing so. But as all other transgressions in these tales it is done without a second thought. He "yielded" and "bowed down without a struggle" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:644) – this fool without hesitation lets passion sweep him away again: "What indeed was my passion for the young girl of the valley in comparison with the fervor, and the delirium, and the spirit-lifting ecstasy of adoration [...] at the feet of the ethereal Ermengarde?" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:644)

The object of this extreme passion is Ermengarde, who is in every aspect a carbon copy of Eleonora, although the narrator seems to think her a vast improvement over "the young girl of the valley". Nonetheless we learn nothing of Ermengarde to distinguish her from Eleonora, whom we already know had become an angel or spirit – and Ermengarde is described as nothing less: She is "ethereal", a "seraph" and an "angel" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:644). And when narrator Pyrros looks "down into the depths of her memorial eyes I thought only of them and of *her*" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:644). It is forgivable if the reader feels confusion here. Just who is the 'her', he is thinking of? Might we not be tempted to believe that he at least partially was thinking and talking of Eleonora too? Certainly it never becomes clear wherein the difference between lover/1 and lover/2 consists in this case, and we are left with the impression that they are both extremely un-corporeal entities. Indeed the description of the female lovers in "Eleonora" is the strongest example of Platonic love-ideals in these Poe-tales.

We would now expect disaster to strike the passionate fool as we have seen the pattern unfold in the other tales, but this does not happen. In the tale the narrator is absolved of his vow "for reasons which shall be made known to thee in Heaven" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:645). Apart from

registering acute disappointment over this outcome, what shall we make of this? Two points may be brought forward. First, since the love affair with lover/2 is so bodiless, the passion may not have to trigger off another death – in a sense Ermengarde is already a spirit rather than flesh and blood. Secondly, and more sinisterly, there is a very strong hint in the story that this happy ending is a figment of the narrator's imagination, since he, like all the other male lovers, has a duality in his "mental existence" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:638). He certainly insists that his whole existence in the valley (with lover/1) is a period of "lucid reason", whereas the second part of his life (where he meets lover/2) is under a "condition of shadow and doubt" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:638). Poe has thus crafted yet another narrator who dreams of happiness and reason – and this time he has even let him stay within the dream to the end of the tale.

Of these four tales two are told linearly ("Eleonora" and "Morella") and two involve a circularity in the telling ("Ligeia" and "Berenice"). The circular tales begin after the action they involve has taken place, and feature the narrators musing over what went wrong with their great projects. In "Ligeia" the narrator even refers to his own writing process, the telling of the tale (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:311, l. 2). From this retrospective vantage point where "Ligeia" is narrated, it is clear that "Ligeia" did not end well for the narrator – Ligeia once re-animated did not stay with him.

Likewise is Egæus left with only misery to contemplate at the end of the events/beginning of the tale. He remains in "the anguish of to-day", dreaming of "the ecstasies which might have been" (Mabbott (ed.), 1978:209). This circularity highlights how temporary the re-consummations of love have been for these narrators.

In "Morella" the bitter laugh of the narrator at the end leaves no doubt (nor indeed do the events) that love/2 was as temporary as love/1 was for him. But "Eleonora" seems to break the mould – even if love/2 is only imagined by Pyrros, is it not eternal (or at least life-long) for him? Indeed it would seem to be so, and therefore it is apt that "Eleonora" is the last such tale in Poe's oeuvre. After long experimentations with solving the problem of how you can remain faithful to the original (innocent, childlike) love, even after the loved one is dead, and still marry again, he found the formula in "Eleonora" – let the loved-one/2 be as disembodied and angelic as love/1, and things will be fine. But the loss of reason still remains a price to be paid, the second love is still a double of love/1 and her incorporeal state leaves her as veiled as any corpse from the grave.

Conclusion

The structural analyses of the quartet of love stories illustrate Poe's one overriding purpose of writing – namely an ongoing experiment in coming to terms with a divided world and a divided mind, desperately seeking for unity, hardly ever admitting this, but in the process trying every available model of fiction and every obstacle/aid to the project psychologically conceivable. That the obstacle/aid he most often placed at the crux of his tales was death in every form you would care to dream up, is surely not accidental. Still we need not search exclusively or at all in Poe's sad psychosexual life story for explanations for this omni-presence of death (partly as ideal condition, partly as arch-foe). After all it is a theme on which every Romantic writer, every transcendentalist had to formulate a stand: the ultimate barrier to human existence, the end of philosophy and rational planning and the transition into faith and intuitive speculation. Here Poe differs not greatly from his contemporaries or those who have come after him as mere mortals all. This is also why it is too easy to see Poe as just the odd one out in American or any other letters in ideational content or even in psychology. The close match between the postulated Freudian economies of love and love stories, and Poe's tales of love show little about Poe's own psycho-sexual predilections. Rather, they show us that Poe is not just for perverts, but for us and in us all.

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Orders of Power: The Authority of Babo in Herman Melville's "Benito Cereno"[1]

ALAN SHIMA

At the conclusion of Herman Melville's novella "Benito Cereno," Babo, the principal leader of a slave revolt, suffers an appalling fate: "dragged to the gibbet at the tail of a mule, the black met his voiceless end. The body was burned to ashes, but for many days, the head, that hive of subtlety, fixed on a pole in the Plaza, met, unabashed, the gaze of the whites; . . ." (Melville 2002 [1856]: 102).[2] The slave rebellion took place aboard the Spanish *San Dominick* and the scene just described is set in Lima, the administrative center of Spain's colonial holdings in the region. Babo's punishment and public humiliation is meant to demonstrate the irrefutable authority of Spanish colonial rule. However, this display of terror, masked as compensatory justice, is re-articulated by Babo's obstinate stare of defiance. Despite his mutilation and dismemberment, the figure of Babo remains resolute and undefeated in Melville's text. More than an indelible nineteenth-century symbol of political insurrection, Babo's mortal expression forever condemns those who perpetuate racial violence. Summarizing the attributes of Babo's extraordinary character, C.L.R. James contends: "He is a man of unbending will, a natural leader, an organizer of large schemes but a master of detail, ruthless against his enemies but without personal weakness, as was proved by his behaviour after he was captured. Melville purposely makes him physically small, a man of internal power with a brain that is a 'hive of subtlety'" (James 2001: 112).

In this paper, I wish to enlarge upon the opinion expressed above and further explore the particularity of Babo's genius. Contrary to the view

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[1] A version of this paper was presented at the "Close Encounters of an Other Kind" American studies conference in Joensuu, Finland, 2003.

[2] All subsequent references made to "Benito Cereno" appear parenthetically hereinafter and refer to the Norton Critical Edition of *Melville's Short Novels: Authoritative Texts, Contexts, Criticism.*

that deems Babo a dark intelligence made cruel by slavery, I will argue that Babo is a resourceful and inventive character, one that is critically aware and socially responsible. In his short-lived career as a free man, he demonstrated the power to unite and uplift the lives of those who were judged less than human. It is for this reason that the presence of Babo hauntingly lingers in the mind of Benito Cereno as well as incessantly returns to the thoughts of Melville's reader.

Taking Command

Published in 1855, Melville's antebellum tale is clearly filled with political resonance. A number of commentators view "Benito Cereno" as a critique of the anti-slavery debate that was feverishly discussed when it first appeared in print.[3] Although the narrative is set in 1799 and the action takes place on a Spanish colonial vessel, it has been argued that Melville's story is an allegory of the contemporary controversy over the slave issue in the United States. For instance, "Benito Cereno" has been read against the background of Melville's disapproval of Northern liberals who maintained a limited view of slavery's institutional complexity and who were willing to resolve black oppression with a "back-to-Africa" unification policy.

On one level, Babo represents the revolutionary ideal Thomas Paine advocated in his essay "The American Crisis." In his appeal, Paine uses the bondage of slavery as a trope to describe the political and economic tyranny exercised by England against its American colonies. Implicit in Paine's argument is the belief that human freedom, as a natural law, supersedes state power or legislative acts. While this principle became a cornerstone in the rhetoric that supported the struggle for independence, we know that liberty, before and after the formation of the United States, was not extended to all. With its focus on the subject of slavery, "Benito Cereno" re-contextualizes the denial of personal liberty and political independence in terms of race relations. Babo understands the deeper structures of racism and cunningly re-figures them for his own purposes.

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[3] For insightful commentary regarding the historical and political context of "Benito Cereno" see in particular Eric Sundquist's *To Wake the Nations: Race in the Making of American Literature*, pp. 135-182; Michael Rogin's "Mutiny and Revolt"; Maurice S. Lee's "Melville's Subversive Political Philosophy: 'Benito Cereno' and the Fate of Speech"; and James H. Kavanagh's "That Hive of Subtlety: 'Benito Cereno' and the Liberal Hero".

On the other hand, because Melville's text contains clear references to geographical and political zones beyond the immediate borders of the United States, I feel that the narrative is most richly read from an international perspective. Laurie Robertson-Lorant, among other scholars, reminds us that "Benito Cereno" is based on an actual slave revolt that occurred on the Spanish *Tryal* in 1805[4] but Melville changed the date of the mutiny to 1799 "to evoke memories of the revolution in Santo Domingo and altered the description of Babo so that the Senegalese mastermind resembled Haitian patriot Toussaint-Loverture, president of the first black republic in the New World" (Robertson-Lorant 1996: 293). This international reference in Melville's text should not be undervalued in spite of what might be considered allegorical allusions to the controversies over slavery in the United States. Consequently, I believe that the South America setting is crucial to the inner logic of the story and certainly significant if we are to more fully understand the tactful turns of Babo's intelligence as he reshapes order on the *San Dominick*.

The historical and geographical cross-referencing embedded in Melville's story directly alludes to shifts in the political and economic perception of the Americas at the time. Columbus's project of New World exploration, settlement, and exploitation becomes a deeply-rooted transnational enterprise by the nineteenth century. Nation-state interests and commercial trade expansion overtakes the more narrowly defined endeavor of conquest and resource appropriation in the New World. Paul Gilroy, in *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, perceptively analyzes the global dimension of nineteenth-century political and economic structures that supersede national boundaries. According to Gilroy, ethnic and national distinctions become unsettled because transnational cultural experiences, in the form of colonialization and commercial transactions (slavery being the most sinister) dislocate previously stable notions of ethnic and national identity.

Correspondingly, it is their shared profession as sea-faring entrepreneurs rather than as representatives of separate nations that initiates an empathetic bond between the Yankee Captain Delano and the

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[4] Melville's "Benito Cereno" builds upon Captain Amasa Delano's autobiographical account of this event. Although Melville is faithful to the story outlined in Delano's non-fictional text, including word for word duplication of passages, he adds fictional details that provide deeper hues of meaning to the principal characters of the action. See *Delano's Voyages of Commerce and Discovery*, edited by Eleanor Roosevelt Seagraves.

Spanish Captain Cereno. Delano's ship is returning from Canton bound for Boston with tea and silk and Cereno is transporting slaves and local produce from Valparaiso, the port of Santiago, to Callao, the port of Lima. Delano and Cereno both understand the commercial value of transported merchandise, whether it is silk, tea, sealskins, or the human cargo of slaves. Their shared experience and professional interests make them particularly sensitive to the risk and responsibility of transporting valuable cargo across large bodies of water. Babo too knows the value of shipped cargo, which is why he and his comrades are willing to purchase their freedom with the lives of whites and if necessary with their own. Rising to reclaim their freedom, the slaves violently seize the *San Dominick*, forcefully resisting the commerce that turns human beings into commodities of profit.

The slave revolt requires a commander and Babo provides the necessary leadership. Because of several years of servitude in the Spanish colonies he has learned to speak Spanish. Babo's linguistic skill and his rhetorical versatility are instrumental assets as he negotiates the terms of the Spanish crew's safety after the take-over. Moreover, Babo strategically organizes the diverse slave population. Far from an indistinguishable lot of submissive bodies, Benito Cereno makes clear how diversified the slaves were when it comes to their place of birth, experience, and temperament In his legal deposition, which functions as a kind of narrative appendix, Cereno states that there were "one hundred and sixty blacks, of both sexes, . . ." (90) and goes on to give brief descriptions of certain individuals. A young man named José assisted Aranda and spoke Spanish well. There was a man named Dago, a grave digger, who too had lived among the Spaniards many years. Fernando, a Buenos Aires mulatto who sang in Valparaiso churches, was a cabin steward. There were four blacks between 60 and 70 years of age who were experienced caulkers. The fiercest rebels were identified as Ashantees, among them a man named Atufal who was "supposed to have been a chief" (90).

Finally, there was the Senegalese Babo. Little in stature but large in ability, Babo gives shape and direction to the repressed rage and deferred hopes of his companion slaves. Against this background of ethnic diversity, Babo achieves a common standard of restraint and discipline among the slaves. In spite of the massive discontent and a volatile desire for reprisal among many of the slaves, Babo effectively manages their simmering rage. Though members of the Spanish crew are murdered both deliberately and indiscriminately, Babo insures the survival of Cereno and a handful of seamen and makes certain that the *San Dominick* remains navigable. In

this context, Babo persistently comes up with improvised solutions when dealing with the fluctuating temperaments of his fellow rebels as well as inventively responding to the unexpected arrival of the American Captain Delano. Taken together, these acts denote a character that far surpasses the reductive image that surfaces in Delano's thoughts. For Delano, Babo is mostly remembered as the shadow that left a traumatized mark on Benito Cereno's spirit. But Babo, as I have been suggesting, is much more than a slaveholder's worst nightmare.

The Mime of Power

Originally from Senegal, Babo claims that he has suffered two cultural domains of oppression. In contrast to one of Babo's co-conspirators, the majestic Atufal whose ears were once adorned with "wedges of gold" (50), Babo confides that he was a black man's slave only to become the slave of a white. Whether Babo's statement is true or whether it is part of his carefully designed charade, this comment cunningly addresses the transatlantic colonial connections that placed Africa, Europe and the Americas in a geometry of dehumanizing commercial exchanges. Babo's mention of his double enslavement is at once both a political remark that enlarges considerations regarding human bondage and one of the many self-effacing comments he makes that directs suspicion away from him. The twofold reference to oppression artfully conceals Babo's actual authority by compounding his servitude.

Throughout the different phases of the revolt, Babo maintains a delicate peace between the vengeful slaves and the severely reduced Spanish crew. His effectiveness as a leader and his social competence are specifically put to the test when the Yankee skipper, Captain Delano, unaware of the upheaval, boards the slave vessel. Babo directs a masquerade of deception and assumes command over what some early reviews of "Benito Cereno" narrowly appreciated as a gothic tale of misrecognition and violence. But beyond the eerie aspects of the story's action, what is truly uncanny is Babo's performance and how he subverts the logic of racial politics by miming the forms and images that construct blacks as obedient yet unintelligent attendants. He pretends to be Cereno's body servant and is successful in orchestrating a false explanation regarding the *San Dominick*'s battered appearance. In Delano's eyes, Babo comes across as a humble and congenial assistant, more companion than servant: "By his [Cereno's] side stood a black of small stature, in whose rude face, as occasionally, like a

shepherd's dog, he [Babo] mutely turned it up into the Spaniard's, sorrow and affection were equally blended" (39). This condescending attitude is later concentrated in one of Delano's private thoughts. Considering his first impression of Babo, Delano assumes: ". . . harmonious in every glance and gesture; as though God had set the whole negro to some pleasant tune" (70-71). Impressed with the devoted loyalty of Babo, Delano makes an attempt to purchase Babo from Cereno: "I should like to have your man here, myself—what will you take for him? Would fifty doubloons be any object?" (58). Before Cereno can come up with a reply, Babo ingeniously deals with Delano's self-indulgent proposal: "Master wouldn't part with Babo for a thousand doubloons" (58). Babo's remark is followed by an authorial narrative comment: "the strange vanity of a faithful slave, appreciated by his master, scorning to hear so paltry a valuation put upon him by a stranger" (58). The critique is obviously ironic. Conversely, it is Delano who is vain in his offer to purchase Babo and vain when he believes that he understands the significance of Babo's response. Babo is no longer a commodity to be traded or purchased. Instead, it is Cereno's life, and for that matter Delano's too, that has been deposited in an economy of debt and payment.

Babo's mime of what Delano appreciates as dog-like loyalty is masterful because it is plainly performed and effortlessly executed. But adjacent to Babo's simple behavior is the cunning eradication of racial discourse. Relevant to this point, Homi Bhabha, in an abstract and more theoretical manner, reflects on the radical nature of mimicry and proposes:

> [T]he discourse of mimicry is constructed around an ambivalence; in order to be effective, mimicry must continually produce its slippage, its excess, its difference. The authority of that mode of colonial discourse that I have called mimicry is therefore stricken by an indeterminacy: mimicry emerges as the representation of a difference that is itself a process of disavowal. Mimicry is, thus the sign of a double articulation; a complex strategy of reform, regulation and discipline, which 'appropriates' the Other as it visualizes power. (Bhabha 1994: 86)

Viewing Babo's masquerade of servitude through Bhabha's notion of mimicry, one could argue that Babo's deception excessively represents the imaginary difference between whites and blacks. His imitation of a loyal and decorous servant convinces Delano because it amplifies the formulaic traits that construct and maintain racial differences. Concurrently, Babo's deception subversively transgresses the outer limits of a subjugated person.

Babo is quick to take liberties in a surreptitious fashion, maintaining control even as he conforms to a racialized stereotype.

At the same time, Babo's impersonation of a faithful servant is disciplinary in the way Bhabha suggests because it requires Cereno to mime the appearance of authority. Broken in rank and mind, Benito Cereno is forced to imitate the attitude and actions commensurate with a sea captain's status. Cereno does this under great duress and his performance is awkward and intermittently raises misgivings in Delano. Such incongruities are, however, inadequately explored in Delano's mind. And because Babo understands the protocol of master-slave relations thoroughly, he is able to author and perform persuasively the necessary parts of his grand charade.

The Signature of Authority

Within this script of evolving deception, Melville plants a number of portentous signs that provide narrative and interpretative complexity. In my opinion, the most resonate example of this is found in the following excerpt:

> Whether the ship had a figure-head, **or** only a plain beak, was not quite certain, owing to canvas wrapped about that part, either to protect it while undergoing a re-furbishing, **or** else decently to hide its decay. Rudely painted **or** chalked, as in a sailor freak, along the forward side of a sort of pedestal below the canvas, was the sentence, '*Seguid vuestro jefe,*' (follow your leader); while upon the tarnished headboards, near by, appeared, in stately capitals, once gilt, the ship's name, 'SAN DOMINICK, ' each letter streakingly corroded with tricklings of copper-spike rust; while, like mourning weeds, dark festoons of sea-grass slimily swept to and fro over the name, with every hearse-like roll of the hull (emphasis mine, 37).

This scene appears early in the story and describes the first sighting of the Spanish ship. Notes of uncertainty and indecision are clearly marked and establish the major chord in which the narrative's action is set. The repetition of the conjunction "or" syntactically reinforces the pervasive sense of ambiguity within the text and, from the beginning, places Captain Delano between feelings of trust and doubt.

The above quote is also noteworthy for its embellished literary figures. The tropes "mourning weeds" and the "hearse-like roll of the hull" are unmistakable references to death, which in turn literally refer to the

casualties onboard. Captain Delano, at this point, has yet to discover the true extent to which the slave ship is a vehicle of death. From his white merchant marine perspective, he sees narrowly, making him vulnerable to the lie about the storms and calms that have caused the calamity now witnessed aboard the *San Dominick.* On the other hand, from a slave's perspective, a slave ship is always a vehicle of death regardless what the weather conditions are. In all instances, the life of a chattel slave, subjugated against his or her will, can be regarded as a life prematurely concluded.

In addition to the syntactic and figurative significance of this passage, the imperative *"Seguid vuestro jefe"* ("Follow your leader") is of primal importance. *Sequid vuestro jefe* rhetorically functions as a command and a threat, a point that I will discuss in greater detail below. Melville's use of Spanish here strategically reminds the reader that the action is set in the realm of Spain's colonial possessions and that the conversations between Delano, Cereno, and Babo are held in Spanish, despite the story's English narration of events. We are directly told that Delano knows Spanish because, over the years, he has frequently navigated along Spanish sea-trade routes. Delano's understanding of Spanish facilitates his communication with Cereno, Babo, and the others aboard the ship. Yet his ability to read the multiple signs of meaning encountered on the *San Dominick* is seriously restricted.

Initially, the American captain attaches an ornamental, albeit disfigured, function to the inscription *Sequid vuestro jefe.* The phrase's deeper meaning evades him and it is only near the conclusion of the narrated action that Delano, as well as the reader, confronts the sinister dimension of this phrase. The three-word imperative, at the outset, is thus an enigma, similar to the concealed revolt, which goes unobserved. To my mind, *Sequid vuestro jefe* can be read as a shrewd yet ambiguous redefinition of power relations. Consequently, interpreting the registers of this scrawl is not only problematic for Delano but for all who are brought before it.

The ship's draped prow is suddenly revealed during the climax of the narrative's action. Benito Cereno desperately leaps into Delano's departing boat and the American captain imperfectly grasps the duplicitous nature of the *San Dominick*'s predicament. Cereno's dash towards freedom has an explosive effect aboard the slave ship. Hatchets and handspikes flash in animated fury. The cable that connects Delano's boat and the *San Dominick* is slashed "and the fag-end, in lashing out, whipped away the canvas shroud about the beak, suddenly revealing as the bleached hull swung round towards the open ocean, death for the figure-

head, in a human skeleton; chalky comment on the chalked words below, *Follow your leader"* (86). This imperative, as mentioned earlier, is both a command and a threat. Delano's chief mate, who was selected to command the recapture of the *San Dominick*, shouts "Follow your leader" (88) as he heads the assault.[5] Delano's men hurtle over the ship's bulwarks with cutlasses and sealing spears eager to wreck havoc on the black rebels. The fighting is fierce, in part fuelled by the prospects of financial reward: "The more to encourage the sailors, they were told, that the Spanish captain considered his ship good as lost; that she and her cargo, including some gold and silver, were worth more than a thousand doubloons. Take her, and no small part should be theirs. The sailors replied with a shout" (87).

If the call to conquer and profit seemed powerful in the American crew's eyes, there was a potent deterrent in the original Spanish formulation *Seguid vuestro jefe.* It is only in Cereno's deposition that we learn additional details about the skeleton and the chalked words that were placed on the *San Dominick's* prow. As a sign of extraordinary symbolic power, slave owner Don Alexandro Aranda's blanched bones were "substituted for the ship's proper figure-head, the image of Christopher Colon, the discoverer of the New World; . . ." (93). Aranda and Cereno were dear friends and the first sight of Aranda's desiccated remains sickens Cereno. He shuts his eyes in revulsion and during this backwash of emotional shock, Babo, according to the deposition, serenely approaches Cereno and murmurs: "Keep faith with the blacks from here to Senegal, or you shall in spirit, as now in body, follow your leader" (93). Stripped of flesh, Aranda's remains are invested with another tissue of meaning. Babo ingeniously creates a palimpsest of colonial history when he orders the image of Christopher Columbus to be written over by the bones of Aranda. Babo superimposes a revolting text upon the mythologized explorer of the New World. To complete the revisionist and prophetic aspects of this palimpsest, Babo scribbles the portentous *Seguid vuestro jefe*

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[5] Delano is eager to lead the attack himself. Cereno is unsettled by the circumstances and cautions Delano: "What! Have you saved my life, senõr, and are you now going to throw away your own?" (87). It is, however, financial considerations that determine Delano's decision: "The officers also, for reasons connected with their interests and those of the voyage, and a duty owing to the owners, strongly objected against their commander's going. Weighing their remonstrances a moment, Captain Delano felt bound to remain; appointing his chief mate—an athletic and resolute man, who had been a privateer's man—to head the party" (87). It is noteworthy that the narrative shows how commercial interests are decisive at a moment when emotions are at their peak.

below it. The threat, to "keep faith with the blacks," is repeated to each and every one of the remaining Spaniards on a daily basis and effectively compels the aggrieved and terror-stricken crew to cooperate with Babo.

New Orders

The symbol of Aranda's bones and the repeated pledge of collaboration from the Spanish crew underscore a new order and direction aboard the *San Dominick*. Although the cooperation of the Spaniards is important, I believe that the allegiance among the slaves is even more essential to what the rebellion hopes to ultimately achieve. In this context Babo proves to be an indispensable leader. Originally, the slaves were judged to be "tractable" by their owner Alexandro Aranda, which is why they were not chained or kept under lock in the ship's hold. Aranda presumably saw his slaves as a conquered collective, unvarying in their subjugation and obedience. This misjudgment proved fatal for Aranda and Babo cunningly uses Aranda's skeleton as a spectacular display of authority and power.

If the unsightly remains of Aranda are effectively used to crush the last vestiges of resistance among the Spaniards, Aranda's bones instrumentally serve as a banner of victory and as a kind of talisman for the blacks. The multiple symbolic dimensions of Aranda's skeleton can be noted when seen in metonymic proximity of the "unseaworthy" long-boat "warped as a camel's skeleton in the desert, and almost as bleached, [which] lay pot-wise inverted amidships, one side a little tipped, furnishing a subterraneous sort of den for family groups of the blacks, mostly women and small children . . ." (68). The skeleton-like form of the long-boat, bleached as it was, is a variant of Aranda's skeleton. In its inverted form, the boat provides a sheltered space of privacy and comfort. Similarly, in a stripped and overturned form of authority, Aranda's skeleton harbors an irrefutable fact: the slaves are no longer exposed to the will of their master.

The successful coercion of the Spanish seamen and the disciplined teamwork of the mutineers are essential to Babo's plan for freedom. Without a place of refuge or free black state in the surrounding sea, Babo envisions a return to Senegal. This may seem ironic given the fact that Babo claims that he was once a black man's slave in his home country. Nevertheless, it is the destination chosen by Babo, a choice that perhaps reflects the nostalgia for origins among those who experience diasporas. There is a political idealism embedded in Babo's strategy of homeland reunification. And this idealism runs counter to the reality of the

rebellion's New World location and to the ethnic diversity of the slave population. The journey to Senegal is thus an unrealistic, if not impossible, goal. But failing to reach this desired destination does not diminish the triumph of Babo.

Babo's accomplishment is better measured within the unreal yet visionary space of the *San Dominick*. The vessel is an imaginary fabrication of intersecting references, fragments of the past reassembling into a not yet available future. Initially, death is undoubtedly the most prominent image projected by the *San Dominick*. But in addition to the melancholic mood attached to the vessel when it is first sighted, the *San Dominick* is compared to a variety of figures, ranging from "a Lima intriguante's one sinister eye peering across the Plaza from the Indian loop-hole of her dusk *saya-y-manta*" (35-36) to "a whitewashed monastery after a thunderstorm, seen perched upon some dun cliff among the Pyrenees" (36). The former grandeur and now decaying surfaces of what Delano describes as "a Spanish merchantman of the first class" (36) is also compared to an Italian palace with the ship's "two high-raised quarter galleries" suspended over a "grand Venetian canal" (37). The mix of New World and Old World imagery produces a critical space of possibility. The *San Dominick*, not unlike the Mississippi river raft used by Huck Finn and Jim, is adrift between the past and the future, between the predictable consequence of capture and the unlimited opportunities of freedom. No longer one man's property or free people in a free state, the rebels, under the leadership of Babo, constituted a new class of beings. With the inversion of authority and the surreptitious establishment of a new social contract, Babo manages another structure of relationships.[6] Those onboard the *San Dominick* are no longer rigidly defined by their national affiliations, social standing, or professional rank. Blacks and whites must control their animosity and pool their labor to sustain the new order. The

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[6] In Cereno's deposition, it is mentioned that there was a formal written agreement between Cereno and Babo (who represented his rebel comrades) and co-signed by "the sailors who could write" (94). The agreement stipulated that Cereno "obliged himself to carry them to Senegal, and they not to kill any more, and he formally to make over to them the ship, with the cargo, . . ." (94). Such a contract would not hold up in a court of law because slaves were not in a legal position to sign such an agreement. However, the gesture has symbolic value, as does the ship's new figurehead of bones and the inscription *Sequid vuestro jefe*. In signing over the ship and cargo to Babo, the *San Dominick* becomes a newly formed state and its enslaved cargo a liberated citizenry.

large-scale fraud hence becomes a hybrid effort, where the drive to survive supersedes the severing emotions of hate and anger.

This point is illustrated when Delano's men appear with much needed provisions. The crew and slaves are desperate for want of food and water and Babo has organized a chain of command amongst the rebels to better secure control and stability aboard the ship. But some of the blacks "hung over the bulwarks in disorderly raptures" (66) when Delano's men arrive with the first wave of provisions. There is a moment of confusion as casks of water are lowered onto the deck and Delano is pushed. He orders the slaves to stand back. A number of the blacks freeze poised to attack. The black oakum pickers, however, re-establish control and "as if nothing had happened, the work of hoisting in the casks was resumed, whites and blacks singing at the tackle" (67). Rations of "soft bread, sugar, and bottled cider" circulate among whites and blacks against the opinion of Delano, who felt that such provisions should have been reserved only for the whites (67). But with Babo secretly in command, Cereno expedites the new order of things and the supplies are equally distributed regardless of a person's color.

Masked Meanings

Delano initially reads *Seguid vuestro jefe* as "a sailor freak," a mischievously streaked gesture, to which he attached curiosity but little importance. However, this "imperfectly" lettered phrase personifies a transculturated vision of what is to come in a post-colonial era. Babo's enigmatic formulation, together with the palimpsest of Columbus's image and Aranda's skeleton, dramatically expresses what could not previously be imagined about a black man. What Babo authors on the prow of the *San Dominick* can therefore be read as a New World icon and as a compositional act of authority. In both instances, Delano reads them incorrectly.

What also runs the risk of being read imperfectly is the detailed description of a woodcarving mounted on the rear of the ship: ". . . the principal relic of faded grandeur was the ample oval of the shield-like stern-piece, intricately carved with the arms of Castile and Leon, medallioned about by groups of mythological symbolical devices; uppermost and central of which was a dark satyr in a mask, holding his

foot on the prostrate neck of a writing figure, likewise masked" (37).[7]
The visual drama depicted in this emblem of victory is frequently
interpreted as a prefiguration of the scene where Cereno suddenly darted
to the safety of Delano's departing boat. Cereno's action confuses the
American captain. Delano first believes that Cereno is staging his kidnap.
When Babo too lands in the boat bearing a knife, Delano assumes that
Babo is trying to stab him in order to rescue Cereno. Babo is disarmed
and Delano pins him to the bottom of the boat with his foot. This
stillness, however, is only momentary: "Glancing down at his feet,
Captain Delano saw the freed hand of the servant aiming with a second
dagger—a small one, before concealed in his wool—with this he was
snakishly writhing up from the boat's bottom, at the heart of his master, . .
." (85). The similarity between the stern-piece figures and the action just
described seems obvious. The writhing masked figure in the woodcarving
logically corresponds to Babo "snakishly writhing up from the boat's
bottom." Yet there is reason to pause and reconsider this apparent parallel.

To compare Delano with the masked satyr crushing the writhing
masked figure in the stern piece is tempting. The assumed similarity
reinforces the defeat of an evil Babo, coiled at the bottom of Delano's
boat. However, one of the story's primary concerns is the treatment of
Delano's constant misreading of events and relationships. In the narrative
it is suggested that Delano is naive and good-hearted, making him
vulnerable to the deceptions and dangers aboard the *San Dominick*.
Delano's vision is also diminished by his racial prejudices; his perceptions
are dimmed by categorical assessments regarding the supremacy of whites
and the inferiority of blacks. Delano, for instance, wonders: "could then
Don Benito be any way in complicity with the blacks? But they were too
stupid. Besides, who ever heard of a white so far a renegade as to apostatize
from his very species almost, leaguing in against it with negroes?" (63).

In addition to Delano's racial prejudices, his status as a sea captain and
as an agent of international trade preconditions him to interpret and react to
the plight of the *San Dominick* in a particular manner. Delano is primarily

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[7] In Greek mythology satyrs represent the spirits of forests and mountains. Their
unexpected appearance would frighten unsuspecting travellers. According to the *New
Larousse Encyclopedia of Mythology*, satyrs, "with their low forehead, their snub nose, their
pointed ears, their hairy body ending in a goat's tail, their cloven hooves" (160), possessed
the features of a monkey and a male goat. Only pointed ears and horns survived this earliest
image of a satyr. What is most prominently associated with this woodland spirit in modern
times is the satyr's lecherous and malicious nature.

preoccupied with supplying the ship's crew and slaves with water, food, and provisions in the form of a "new suit of sails" (77) so Cereno can continue and complete his journey of commerce and profit. This aspect of Delano's reasoning adds yet another veil of dullness to his consciousness.

If the shrouded nature of intentions and the failure of interpreting properly are a problem for Delano, these difficulties seem to occur for the reader of the text as well. Untangling the knot of appearances is, as the old sailor in the narrative hints when he throws a giant knot of hemp at Delano, crucial yet filled with difficulty and danger. First impressions, including seemingly logical connections, can certainly be misleading. Are the mythological carvings illustrated in the stern piece a reliable foreshadowing of the physical struggle that occurs between Delano and Babo? Or do they represent an Old World myth waiting to be "overwritten" by a New World reading? Is the writhing figure a representation of Babo or is the figure an indeterminate and shadowy other?

Perhaps an answer depends on where we place our attention. If we concentrate on the posture and physical positions of the mythological figures and the scene where Delano places his foot upon the prostrate Babo, the masked satyr predicts Delano's triumph in the boat. If we focus, however, on the mythological history of satyrs and their practice of terrifying travellers and their malevolent deeds, Babo better fits this description. What further supports the latter interpretation is the fact that, after the court investigation in Lima, Cereno is left prostrate and spiritually crushed by the weight of Babo's memory. Reading the narrative parallels in this manner would be a symptomatic kind of reading that surreptitiously approaches the masked figures of the stern piece from a different angle. But having offered this counter-intuitive reading, there is still another way to understand the significance of the combating masked characters.

The stern-piece carving could also be an allegorical portrayal of the clash between bigotry and empathy that occurs in Captain Delano's inner consciousness. This alternate reading is indirectly suggested by Delano's reaction upon discovering Babo's deception: "He [Delano] smote Babo's hand down, but his own heart smote him harder" (85). This passage indicates a two-directional anger. Delano realizes that he has been duped; his physical anger is aimed at Babo but he directs moral wrath towards himself for falsely believing Cereno a criminal. But, as I see it, Delano's self-condemnation misses its mark. For it is Delano's racist attitude that led him astray and not misguided suspicions about an innocent man. It is thus Delano's bigotry, posing as a benevolent observer, that keeps his

empathy pinned to the ground. This being the case, Delano remains ignorant of both Cereno's dilemma and of Babo's political strategies. An outward admission of this fact is inconceivable for Delano and his guilt can be transformed into a high-minded condemnation Babo. The two-faced nature of Delano's rage, similar to the mythological battle depicted on the stern piece and the iconography of the imperative "*Seguid vuestro jefe,*" is again an example of how difficult it is to read with certainty.

Finally it is Babo's terminal stare, head perversely severed and undyingly defiant, that resists conventional reading. As mentioned at the beginning of this essay, Melville's story concludes with a horrific image made all the more disturbing by what can be described as a slow-motion visual widening of the scene. Babo's detached head sits speared upon a pole in the town plaza of Lima. This grim exhibition is intended to convey the futility of revolt and to demonstrate the power of colonial authority. Ostensibly, decapitation mutilates the integrity and disfigures the memory of Babo by making him a grotesque symbol of defeat and humiliation. On the other hand, Babo's authority is maintained through his head's defiant stare, which "met, unabashed, the gaze of the whites" (102) and looked outward to the church whose vault contained the bones of Babo's master and Cereno's beloved friend Alexandro Aranda. This visual back reference to the stripped flesh and mutilation of Aranda's body is a key narrative element. It should not simply be considered a formal means by which to bring the story full-circle or to give it an ironic kind of symmetry. Although the horror evoked by Babo's head seems as frightening as was the skeletal remains of Aranda, these two signs of human ruin connote different registers of meaning. Aranda, the owner of the slaves who were transported on the *San Dominick*, was killed to insure the freedom of the slaves. From a slave's perspective, it was a vengeful and necessary political act. In what might be termed the "semiotics of slavery," Aranda's bleached bones serve as the actual and symbolic demise of the master. On the other hand, I would argue that Babo's authority remains intact in spite of his defilement. His relentless stare is an undiminished revolt against those who would enslave others.

In the end, the reader is told that Babo's gaze reaches out to the site of Aranda's remains. And beyond that, Babo's gaze "looked towards the monastery, on Mount Agonia without; where, three months after being dismissed by the court, Benito Cereno, borne on the bier, did, indeed, follow his leader" (102). The syntax of this final statement seems to stutter towards a reluctant conclusion. Stylistically, it perhaps connotes the

shallow and irregular breaths of a terminally ill Cereno. But what is significant in the final declaration "Benito Cereno, . . . did, indeed, follow his leader" is how it subversively defines the relationship between Cereno and Babo, captive and captor. Beyond what could be voiced or reasonably recorded, it is Babo who inevitably holds power and control to the very end. And if this is the case, Benito Cereno does, in fact, follow Babo, not to a grave but to a traumatized understanding of what it is like to be a slave. The singularity of this awareness withers Cereno from within and he soon dies. In contrast to Cereno's demise, Babo endures. With panoptic force, his look opens outward to a world still waiting to be unmasked.

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Dual Voice and Dual Style:
Translating Free Indirect Discourse in *Ulysses*

IDA KLITGÅRD

Free indirect discourse and "the Uncle Charles Principle"

Parallel with Homer's *Odyssey*, the 18 chapters of James Joyce's *Ulysses* are divided into what is known as the "Telemachiad" (chapters 1-3), the 'Odyssey' (chapters 4-15) and "Nostos" (chapters 16-18). In the novel, Joyce's poetics of cultural foreignisation and aesthetic defamiliarisation is slowly and carefully developed from the so-called initial style of the "Telemachiad" and roughly the first half of the book through increasingly experimental styles in the second half. In a letter of 6 August 1919 to Harriet Shaw Weaver, who had just commented on the musical style of the "Sirens" episode, Joyce himself speaks of an "initial style": "I understand that you may begin to regard the various styles of the episodes with dismay and prefer the initial style much as the wanderer did who longed for the rock of Ithaca" (Gilbert 1957: 129). It can be argued that this initial style is the narrative foundation from which all Joyce's experimental departures spring. Without it, *Ulysses* as we know it could not have been written.

The initial style is also known as free indirect discourse (either speech or thought), narrated monologue, represented speech (*erlebte Rede*), psycho-narration, hybridisation or in Hugh Kenner's words, "the Uncle Charles Principle", but more on that later. Free indirect discourse originates from the French stylistician C. Bally's term *le style indirect libre* in 1912, referring to a type of narration in which a character's focalisation and a narrator's voice are blended with no reporting clause (Wales 2001: 164). The following three examples will elucidate this:

1. He said, "It is our job to make solid research" (direct speech)

2. He said that their job was to make solid research (indirect speech)
3. It was their job to make solid research (free indirect speech).

The past tense of the free indirect discourse fuses the event narrated with the "now" of the moment of utterance. Such combined discourse is what R. Pascal calls "dual voice" (1977) and Ann Banfield "the unspeakable" (1982) as there is no "real" speaker (Wales 2001: 165). Free indirect speech is used to explore viewpoints, expose certain character traits or achieve varying effects of irony, parody or sympathy.

These examples may, however, not be striking examples of how a character's perspective and a narrative voice may blend to achieve a certain effect. The words of the speaker in question are not especially distinct for his personality, but rather neutral. In Joyce's works the characters almost always speak in individualised or even idiosyncratic ways, and the typically Joycean technique of the "initial style" is to have a third-person narrator borrow such a character's marked idiom. The traditional objectivity of the narrative voice of a prose novel is here suddenly blended with the subjectivity of fictional characters to such a degree that the reader is confused as to which viewpoint and which attitude belong to the narrator, the character and the author. There is no longer a stable authority to take the reader by the hand. Every utterance has become a (self-)deluding defamiliarisation of someone else's thoughts or speech.

This narrative style is best illustrated with examples from Joyce's *Dubliners* (1914). It is here that the narrative "rock of Ithaca"is founded. In the story "Clay"for instance, this is how the narrator freely represents the thoughts of the lonely, repressed spinster Maria:

> The kitchen was spick and span: the cook said you could see yourself in the big copper boilers. The fire was nice and bright and on one of the side-tables were four very big barmbracks. These barmbracks seemed uncut; but if you went closer you would see they had been cut (Joyce 1914/2000: 95).

The narrative voice borrows Maria's collocations and clichés "spick and span", "nice and bright", together with her assumptions "you could see yourself...", you would see..." Her little, isolated world consists of "nice"people and borrowed assumptions from *petit bourgeoisie* Dublin. And that the focalisation is from a Dubliner is also evident in the choice of "barmbracks" which is Anglo-Irish for a currant bun. In *The Odyssey of Style in* Ulysses, Karen Lawrence explains that

through the use of free indirect discourse, the narrator [...] borrows their [the characters'] self-images, their fictions, their clichés. He masquerades as a participant in the world of his characters and appears "unreliable" because he seems to accept his characters' limitations. Free indirect discourse allows him to *seem* to accept the self-image a character has created for himself, while pointing to the insufficiency of that image. The characteristic irony of the stories originates in this masquerade (Lawrence 1981: 23).

This explanation is further elucidated with reference to Hugh Kenner's concept of the "Uncle Charles principle". In *Joyce's Voices* (1978), Kenner lists more examples of such fluctuating narrative points of view and deducts a rule of thumb in Joyce's narratives. Kenner's first example is the opening of "The Dead" in *Dubliners*: "Lily, the caretaker's daughter, was literally run off her feet" (Joyce 1914/2000: 175). "Translate that into any language you like", Kenner says, because what does "literally" mean? "To wonder what 'literally' may mean is the fear of the Word and the beginning of reading", he says, rather majestically. Lily cannot possibly be run off her feet literally, but figuratively. "Literally" is a solecism the uneducated Lily would mistakenly use for "absolutely". To emphasize, the third sentence of the story, "It was well for her she had not to attend to the ladies also", similarly adopts the manner of speech a Dubliner of Lily's social status would use: "well for her". Another example is from *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916) where it says: "Every morning, therefore, Uncle Charles repaired to his outhouse but not before he had greased and brushed scrupulously his back hair and brushed and put on his tall hat" (quoted in Kenner 1978: 16-17). The archaic, formal expression "repaired" is one Uncle Charles would use. The dignified brushing of his hair and hat is parodically contrasted with the more mundane act of going to the outhouse. "So let us designate the Uncle Charles Principle: *the narrative idiom need not be the narrator's*", Kenner concludes (Kenner 1978: 18). Following in Kenner's footsteps, Karen Lawrence argues that it is exactly this development of the free indirect discourse into a general loss of a single authorial voice in *Dubliners* and *A Portrait* that is the underlying narrative norm of the odyssey of styles in *Ulysses*:

... it is the obliqueness of the technique that makes free indirect discourse a more important antecedent of the radical stylistic developments in *Ulysses* than the stream-of-consciousness technique which purports to give a more direct transcription of the mental process without narrative intrusion. The mimicking in the narrative

of the second half of *Ulysses* in part grows out of the mimicking
begun in *Dubliners* (Lawrence 1981: 24).

With Joyce, the conventional narrator of for instance nineteenth-century
fiction loses his/her objective and often one-sided stance and becomes
multifaceted and multilingual for aesthetic as well as cultural and social
reasons.[1]

Problems in the translation of free indirect discourse

The translator must of course be aware of such stylistic hybridity and for
instance not correct Lily's or Uncle Charles' idiom to more standard
expressions. This problem has been discussed in various ways in translation
studies resulting in a general discussion as to whether narrative is
independent of the language in which it is written, or whether underlying
narratological structures do change in the transformation from one
language into another. The following examples of criticism are a few
Nordic cases in point.

In her article "Narratological and Pragmatic Aspects of the
Translation into Finnish of Doris Lessing's *Four-Gated City*" (1993), Ellen
Valle, for instance, challenges structuralist narratology's firm belief in the
universality of narrative as expressed in David Lodge's *After Bakhtin: Essays
on Fiction and Criticism* from 1990. Valle opposes his claim that narrative
point of view is also part of an untouchable deep structure by stating that
all meanings are dependent upon language, and that point of view, which
obviously also carries meaning, will ultimately have to change in a
translation (Valle 1993: 247-48).

This argument is supported in Tarja Rouhiainen's article "Free
Indirect Discourse in the Translation into Finnish: The Case of D. H.
Lawrence's *Women in Love*" (2000). Here it is demonstrated how the
Finnish translation of the third-person singular pronouns he/she into the
Finnish third-person singular pronoun *hän*, which is unmarked for gender,
may change the viewpoint from the character's discourse to that of the
narrator's. For example, problems arise in the representation of a
character's consciousness in which third-person singular pronouns occur,

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[1] For further theories on free indirect discourse, see Dorrit Cohn (1978), Brian McHale
(1978), Gérard Genette (1980), Geoffrey N. Leech and Michael H. Short (1981) and Ann
Banfield (1982).

referring to the very character him- or herself. In the translation, the ambiguity of gender is for instance avoided by replacing the third-person singular pronouns by proper names which the characters in question would never use in self-reference. Such results raise the question as to which stylistic norms the translator has chosen, consciously or unconsciously, for the task.

E. A. Levenston and G. Sonnenschein's article "The Translation of Point-of-View in Fictional Narrative" (1986) is more relevant in my study of Joyce and therefore deserves more attention here. Levenston and Sonneschein consider the French translations of the opening of the story "The Dead" in *Dubliners* and conclude that the first translation from 1926 for instance misses out on the solecism of "literally" and shifts the register from informal to neutral (Levenston and Sonnenschein 1986: 51-52). The second translation from 1974 is more successful in handling such aspects, they conclude. Based on a number of relevant theories, Levenston and Sonnenschein then list a number of linguistic and textual features which indicate focalisation. They will be used as directional points in my analysis:

1. Register-restricted vocabulary items (such as Maria's 'nice')
2. Collocations and clichés
3. Word order
4. Free indirect speech
5. Deixis
6. Modality
7. Thematization
8. The choice between active and passive
9. Sociolectal variation
10. Geographical dialect
11. Spelling and other graphic devices
12. Source-language words with strong connotations (such as resolute – stubborn – pigheaded) (Levenston and Sonnenschein 1986: 53-57).

The features listed here can be classified as strong markers of both personal and cultural language. "Translation which fails to preserve these nuances", argue Levenston and Sonnenschein, "commits a double sin. Not only does it fail to render the point of view of the character; it also fails to preserve the *switches* in focalization, between character and narrator, so

characteristic of Joyce's sophisticated narrative technique" (Levenston and Sonneschein 1986: 55).

Based on the above findings, it can be argued that narrative structures and narrative points of view may change in the translation of one language into another. They are not universal deep structures, but are prone to strategical manipulation in which the features listed above may be ignored or completely lost.

Methodological parametres

In the section following this, I will give a contrastive analysis of a number of samples of the translation from English to Danish of the varieties and hybrids of personal and cultural language in Joyce's free indirect discourse. Such an analysis is bidirectional as both source text and target text must be scrutinised in order to reach a sound *tertium comparationis*. But before describing, analysing and evaluating the translation qualitatively, methodological parametres of the function of Joyce's language, appropriate translation strategies and attitudes towards equivalence must be given.

Without elaborating on the extensive theoretical debate on equivalence in translation, I want, however, to express the standpoint that no full equivalence can be obtained between words as far as their denotative meanings are concerned. Equivalence can be obtained in the way words function in a text. Therefore, it is paramount to estimate the function of the text and the language of both source text and target text. In *A Textbook of Translation* (1988), Peter Newmark applies K. Bühler's functional theory of language as adapted by Roman Jakobson to translation. According to this theory, the three main functions of language are the informative, the vocative and the expressive functions. The core of the informative function is to reveal the "truth" or the facts of the matter, and the status of the author or speaker is anonymous. Text examples may be scientific textbooks, technological documents and economic reports. The core of the vocative function is the readership, the addressee, and the status of the author or speaker is anonymous here, too. Text examples may be instructions and propaganda. The core of the expressive function is the mind of the author or speaker making the authority of him/her "sacred". Text-types may be serious imaginative literature, authoritative statements, autobiography and personal correspondence (Newmark 1988: 39-42).

Joyce's *Ulysses* obviously belongs to the category of the expressive function. The core of the novel is the expression of thoughts and feelings of the originator of the text. It is essential, says Newmark, that the translator is able to distinguish the personal components of these texts, such as unusual collocations, original metaphors, "untranslatable" words, unconventional syntax, neologisms and archaisms. These features are often characterised as "idiolect" or "personal dialect" as opposed to "ordinary" language. To this must be added culture-specific features, such as geographical dialect, regional slang and sociolect. A translator should not normalise these features according to Peter Newmark (Newmark 1988: 40).

As such personal, expressive markers cannot be translated into direct equivalents in another language, the function of their expressiveness must be rendered in alternative ways. The global translation strategies available are either to emphasise the source text by way of word-for-word translation, literal translation, faithful translation, semantic translation, or to emphasise the target text by way of adaptation, free translation, idiomatic translation and communicative translation (Newmark 1988: 45). Newmark finds that only the semantic and communicative strategies fulfil the two main aims of translation, which are accuracy and economy.

The semantic translation strategy is close to the faithful one in the attempt to reproduce the precise contextual meaning of the source within the constraints of the grammatical structures of the target language. But semantic translation pays greater attention to the aesthetic value of the source text than the faithful one, "compromising on the 'meaning' where appropriate" in order to also transfer the creativity of the source text (Newmark 1988: 47). The distinction between them is that the faithful strategy is uncompromising and dogmatic, whereas the semantic one is more flexible (Newmark 1988: 46).[2]

The communicative strategy, on the other hand, emphasises fluency by making the contents and the language comprehensible to the reader. "Semantic translation is used for 'expressive' texts, communicative for 'informative' texts", says Newmark (Newmark 1988: 47). In other words, semantic translation attempts to render the original in its originality,

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[2] The term "semantic" used here gives rise to terminological confusion as "semantic" is usually used of meaning only and not style. To call the strategy "stylistic translation" would have been appropriate as it would have referred to an adherence to both meaning and form of the language in question.

whereas communicative translation attempts to convert the translation into a product the target readers can easily understand.

In the translation of free indirect discourse and the creative Uncle Charles Principle in *Ulysses*, the translator may want to be more faithful to the style than to the contents. The personal, cultural and aesthetic markers of the dual voice technique presented in the preceding section must not be "communicated" by way of fluent normalisation, but rendered approximate in the target language. This means that stylistic equivalence is more desirable than semantic equivalence proper in cases where a choice has to be made between the two types of equivalence. The expressiveness of the author's language is in the forefront rather than the informative facts of the textual contents.

The method used in the following analysis of Mogens Boisen's strategies is a critical comparison of semantic and stylistic elements, such as ambiguity of single words, phrases, sentences, symbols, sounds, etc., expressing cultural foreignisation and aesthetic defamiliarisation amidst a hybrid focalisation. My focus of attention is on the function of the translational choices to obtain con- and intertextual coherence in the work, warranting my choice of samples to be larger textual units from the novel rather than severed sentences or clauses.

The Danish translations

The late Danish translator of hundreds of classics, Lieutenant Colonel Mogens Boisen (1910-87), published three translations in 1949, 1970 and 1980, including continuous insertions of hundreds of revisions in reprints during those thirty years. In the second translation from 1970, he made more than 10,000 revisions and retranslated episodes 1-5 and 9 from scratch. In the last translation from 1980, he made thousands of revisions, in part due to the large number of misprints in the second translation. In 2002 a new paperback edition was published including Bent Wiberg's careful corrections. In my study I predominantly make use of the 1949 and 1970 editions, as the big shift in translation strategies and quality takes place between these two editions. All corrections and revisions in the 1980 edition will be included in square brackets in the quotations from 1970. I will refrain from using the 2002 edition as I am only interested in the Danish translator's choices and not those of a Danish external editor's.

To all this must be added that the authorized Hans Walter Gabler edition of *Ulysses* used here for convenience in referencing was not the one Boisen used. For his first translation, he made use of the 1934 Random House edition which is notorious for its many errors. Whenever there is a discrepancy between the two editions, I will either insert the discrepancy by means of square brackets in the quotations from the Gabler edition or make a note of it. References to the Gabler and Random House editions will be *U* 1922/1986 and *U* 1934 respectively. The Danish translations are referred to as either *U* 1949, *U* 1970 and *U* 1980. Lastly, in accordance with standard references to the Gabler edition in Joyce criticism references will be to chapter and line numbers, not page numbers.

The Danish readership of the 1949 translation was limited to a small group of artists and intellectuals, bearing in mind that the international high modernism hardly made any influence on Danish art and literature until the 1950s where an actual Danish literary modernism began to flourish. Also, Ireland and Irish culture were foreign to a Danish audience at that time as German, and not English, had been the first foreign language to be learned in Denmark. The readership of the later translations in the 70s and 80s has grown considerably, and perhaps also broadened to include more common readers than intellectuals, as Joyce has become more famous internationally as well as nationally in Denmark. After WWII, English gained a footing as first foreign language in Denmark enabling wider knowledge of English-speaking cultures.

Dual voice: Stephen Dedalus and the narrator

In "Telemachus" it is approximately 8 a.m. The setting is the Martello Tower in Sandymount Cove in the periphery of Dublin city centre. The young poet Stephen Dedalus lives there together with medical student Malachi "Buck" Mulligan and Haines, an Englishman who has travelled to study the Irish. It is a year after Stephen's mother died. Her death brought him home from Paris only to refuse to kneel at her death bed. This refusal haunts him. Stephen also feels estranged from his "usurping" room mates as well as from his country, Irish religion and Irish society. The episode launches themes of conflicting senses of home and exile, cultural and aesthetic colonisation and independence. The themes are reflected in the free indirect discourse as Stephen's and the narrator's voices are often interdependent. This may be a reflection of the fact that the Irish in general are tied to foreign forces, such as England and the Roman Catholic

Church. This feature of cultural hybridity must be maintained in a translation.

Here is the famous opening page of "Telemachus":

> Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather on which a mirror and a razor lay crossed. A yellow dressinggown, ungirdled, was sustained gently behind him on [by] the mild morning air. He held the bowl aloft and intoned:
>
> *Introibo ad altare Dei.*
>
> Halted, he peered down the dark winding stairs and called out [up] coarsely:
>
> Come up, Kinch! Come up, you fearful jesuit!
>
> Solemnly he came forward and mounted the round gunrest. He faced about and blessed gravely thrice the tower, the surrounding land [country] and the awaking mountains. Then, catching sight of Stephen Dedalus, he bent towards him and made rapid crosses in the air, gurgling in his throat and shaking his head. Stephen Dedalus, displeased and sleepy, leaned his arms on the top of the staircase and looked coldly at the shaking gurgling face that blessed him, equine in its length, and at the light untonsured [untonsored] hair, grained and hued like pale oak.
>
> Buck Mulligan peeped an instant under the mirror and then covered the bowl smartly (*U* 1922/1986: 1.1-18; *U* 1934: 5).

Before analysing the hybrid style of the passage, it is important to say a few words about Stephen's language in general. He is a young intellectual, aspiring poet with a growing sense of the power of words. His style is generally formal, serious, lyrical, learned and well-turned. It is often also very ironic, sarcastic, piercing and bitter. In the above passage such language can be glimpsed through the idiom of the third-person narrator. "Stately, plump Buck Mulligan" toys with alliteration and assonance which are Stephen's favourite preoccupations, for instance in the later "Proteus" episode. The paradox between "stately" and "plump" is also Stephen's creation as his feelings towards Mulligan are mixed. As religion, or rather the revolt against religion, plays a great part in Stephen's life, it would have been typical of *him*, and not the narrator, to notice how the mirror and the razor lay symbolically crossed. The narrative voice has adopted Stephen's language as well as his perception.

In the second sentence the word "sustained" is rather special and archaic as a description of how a dressing gown hangs behind a person. It

is an example of what Levenston and Sonnenschein call "source-language words with strong connotations" on their list of features indicating focalisation. In *The Language of James Joyce*, Katie Wales notes that "The elevated tone of the word combined with the passive and deleted agent (who or what is actually holding up Mulligan's gown?) reinforces the mock-ceremony of the passage" (Wales 1992: 120).

The word "ungirdled" is also rather unconventional – another word with strong connotations. According to Gifford and Seidman, "ungirdled" suggests the long narrow band worn by a priest celebrating Mass. The fact that Mulligan does not wear a girdle denotes a "violation of the priestly vow of chastity" (Gifford and Seidman 1988: 13). In fact, the whole passage is loaded with associations to the rituals of the Catholic Mass so horrid to Stephen's rebellious mind.

Also, to say "on the mild morning air" is to combine an unusual choice of preposition, in this case "on the […] air" rather than "in the […] air", as well as providing a pleasing alliteration with m's in "mild morning. It is "geographical dialect", according to Levenston and Sonnenschein's list of features indictating focalisation. Katie Wales notes how the Hiberno-English idiomatic use of prepositions "in part influenced by Gaelic, is one of the most pervasive features of Joyce's dialectal representation in this novel, but likely to pass unnoticed by the casual reader" (Wales 1992: 15). Examples from the novel are "What's *on* you, Garry?", "because I saw *on* the moment she was…" and "Is there Gaelic *on* you?" [my emphasis] (Wales 1992: 15). This case in 'Telemachus' may be a similar mark of the Hiberno-English dialect, but what is a translator to do about that? Mogens Boisen's two Danish translations are the following:

Værdigt traadte den trivelige Buck Mulligan frem fra den øverste trappeafsats; han bar en sæbeskaal, paa hvilken et spejl og en barberkniv laa over kors. En gul, snorløs slaabrok bølgede let efter ham i den milde morgenbrise. Han løftede skaalen og intonerede:

    - Introibo ad altare Dei.

Han var standset og kiggede ned ad den skumle vindeltrappe og raabte med grov stemme:

    - Kom op, Kinch. Kom op, du skrækkelige jesuit!

Højtideligt skred han videre og steg op paa den runde kanonplatform. Han vendte sig om og velsignede alvorligt tre gange taarnet, det omliggende land og de vaagnende bjerge. Nu fik han øje paa Stephen Dedalus, bøjede sig for ham og gjorde hastige korstegn i luften, mens han udstødte gurglende

lyde og rystede paa hovedet. Stephen Dedalus, som var irriteret herover og søvnig, hvilede armene paa vindeltrappens øverste afsats og saa koldt paa det rystende og hesteagtigt gurglende, aflange ansigt, som velsignede ham, og paa det lyse, uregelmæssige egetræsgule haar uden tonsur.

Buck Mulligan kiggede et øjeblik under spejlet og lagde det herpaa hurtigt tilbage paa skaalen (*U* 1949: 7)[3]

Statelige, trinde Buck Mulligan trådte op fra det øverste af trappen; han bar en skål med sæbeskum, på hvilken et spejl og en barberkniv lå over kors. Uomgjordet bares en gul slåbrok blidt bag ham af den milde morgenluft. Han holdt skålen i vejret og intonerede:

- *Introibo ad altare Dei.*

Han var standset, kiggede ned ad den mørke vindeltrappe og kaldte barsk frem:

- Kom op, Kinch. Kom op, du frygtelige [frygtsomme] jesuit.[!]

Højtideligt gik han frem og besteg den runde kanonplatform. Han gjorde omkring og velsignede alvorligt tre gange tårnet, det omliggende land og de vågnende bjerge. Idet han nu fik øje på Stephen Dedalus, bøjede han sig hen imod ham og slog hastigt kors i luften, alt mens han gurglede langt nede i halsen og virrede med hovedet. Med mishag, søvnig, lænede Stephen Dedalus armene på vindeltrappens åbning og så koldt på det virrende, gurglende ansigt, der velsignede ham, hesteagtigt i sin længde var det, og det lyse ukronragede hår, året og af farve som blegt egeved.

Buck Mulligan kiggede et øjeblik under spejlet og dækkede derefter behændigt skålen (*U* 1970: 19; *U* 1980/1990: 17).

In the first translation, Boisen has been forced to abandon the p-, m- and b-alliterations which give a ring of heaviness to the plump Mulligan in favour of a repetition of "tr" in "traadte" and "trivelige" which is even pursued in the translation of "stairhead" into "trappeafsats". Boisen translates "stately" as an adverb rather than an adjective as his "værdigt" means "in a dignfied manner". In *OED*, however, "stately" is only explained as an adjective such as in the collocation "stately homes", and as such it creates a humorous paradox between the adjectives of "stately" and

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[3] Before 1948 the last letter of the Danish alphabet 'å' was ortographically rendered with an 'aa'. The change in 1948 was not manifested in Danish dictionaries until 1953 which explains why Boisen does not adhere to it in his 1949 edition. Whenever there is a slash between aa and å in a quotation from the 1970 edition, it merely indicates that this is the only type of alteration which has been made in the relevant passage between 1949 and 1970.

"plump" which means pleasantly fat or nicely rounded such as chubby babies or nice, fat chickens. Usually, plumpness and grandeur are contradictions in terms. As supporting evidence that "stately" is an adjective, the adverb form can be found in the much later "Aeolus" episode: "It passed statelily up the staircase, steered by an umbrella, a solemn beardframed face" (U 1922/1986: 7.45). As the opening of a novel, and indeed an episode, is usually very important in terms of setting the tone and themes of the work, in this case that of an ironic paradox, a mistake such as this one may have serious consequences. Boisen has fortunately changed this in the second translation as it now says: "Statelige, trinde Buck Mulligan". The two adjectives as well as the "tr" alliterations have been preserved. In both translations the Danish synonyms "trivelige" and "trinde" express precisely the connotations of being nicely fat.

When it comes to the "ungirdled" dressing gown, Boisen writes in his first translation "En gul, snorløs slaabrok bølgede let efter ham i den milde morgenbrise", and in his second translation "Uomgjordet bares en gul slåbrok blidt bag ham af den milde morgenluft". The first translation has normalised "ungirdled" into "gul, snorløs" [literally: yellow, stringless] whereas the second translation has foreignised the expression in accordance with Joyce's lines as "uomgjordet bares en gul slåbrok" [literally: untied was a yellow dressinggown carried]. The word "uomgjordet" is highly archaic in Danish and so is the unusual past passive form of the verb "bære" (carry) in "bares" meaning "was carried". The Danish translation draws a lot of attention to itself emphasising Stephen's idiosyncratic observations implanted in the narrative discourse.

The strange use of the dressing gown in "sustained behind him" is in Boisen's first translation rendered as "bølgede let efter ham i den milde morgenbrise" [literally: waved softly behind him in the mild morning air] and in the second "bares [...] blidt bag ham af den milde morgenluft" [literally: was softly [...] carried behind him by the mild morning air]. In the first translation the dressinggown flows in the wind, not "on" as was the case in Hiberno-English. In the second translation the wind holds it up behind Mulligan as if holding a train on a dress. This renders more mocking majesty to the characterisation of Mulligan, but omits the Hiberno-English influence on the discourse. Boisen has adapted the foreign use of prepositions to the linguistic norms of the target language culture.

Another case of marked free indirect discourse is the narrator's description of the way Stephen watches Mulligan. Stephen "looked coldly at the shaking gurgling face that blessed him, equine in its length, and at

the light untonsured [untonsored] hair, grained and hued like pale oak". In his first try, Boisen does not seem to be able to fit in the parenthetical insertion of "equine in its length" and just adds "equine" ['hesteagtigt': horselike] to the other adjectives, such as "shaking" ("rystende") and "gurgling" ("gurglende"). The translation reads: "saa koldt paa det rystende og hesteagtigt gurglende, aflange ansigt, som velsignede ham, og paa det lyse, uregelmæssige egetræsgule haar uden tonsur". In his second translation, Boisen becomes more daring and places the description "hesteagtigt i sin længde var det" [literally: equine in its length it was] in an appropriate parenthetical insertion. In Danish this is, however, a rather unusual constellation, but again it emphasises the pensiveness so typical of Stephen. The whole translation reads: "så koldt på det virrende, gurglende ansigt, der velsignede ham, hesteagtigt i sin længde var det, og det lyse ukronragede hår, året og af farve som blegt egeved".

Mulligan's "light untonsured [untonsored] hair, grained and hued like pale oak" is in 1949 translated as "det lyse, uregelmæssige egetræsgule haar uden tonsur" and in 1970 "det lyse ukronragede hår, året og af farve som blegt egeved". The first translation struggles to make sense of both the syntax and meaning of words such as "grained" and "untonsured" which is "untonsored" in the 1934 Random House edition that Boisen used. The first translation is very compact. It can be back-translated into "the blond, uneven oak-yellow hair without a tonsure". The paleness is left out and so is the image of "grained" oak, that is the pattern of fibres in wood. The image of Mulligan as a pale, wooden man has thus been erased. However, as in the two previous cases, Boisen uses a strategy of foreignisation in his second translation. Here the image of paleness is maintained ("blegt"), and so is the wood by means of the word "året" ("grained"). It would have been more idiomatically correct to say "med årer" in Danish [literally: with grains], but this unfortunately also means "with oars" which would of course have been inappropriate in this context.

Two final interesting points in this passage are, one, the archaic "hued like" which is rendered into the anglicized "af farve som" [literally: of a colour like] in Boisen's second translation. Here it would have been more idiomatically correct to say "af en farve som". And two, the translation of the creative neologism "untonsured" has also become an equally creative neologism in Danish, "ukronragede", rather than the more naturalised "uden tonsur" [literally: without a tonsure].

Dual style: Lyrical language

In "Telemachus" we get glimpses of even more poeticised free indirect discourse of the kind so dominant in the later "Proteus" episode. Here a narrator reports Stephen's impressions and thoughts coupled with sentences which cannot be exactly categorised as either the narrator's or Stephen's. The shift between voices is invisible:

> Woodshadows floated silently by through the morning peace from the stairhead seaward where he gazed. Inshore and farther out the mirror of water whitened, spurned by lightshod hurrying feet. White breast of the dim sea. The twining stresses, two by two. A hand plucking the harpstrings, merging their twining chords. Wavewhite wedded words shimmering on the dim tide (*U* 1922/1986: 1.242-47).[4]

The Danish translations are:

> Skovskygger svævede lydløst forbi gennem morgenfreden fra trappens udgang og mod havet, mod hvilket han saa. Tæt ved land og længere ude hvidtedes vandets spejl, sporet af letskoede, rappe fødder. Det uklare havs hvide bryst. Sammenslyngede klange, to og to. En haand, som griber i harpestrenge og forener de slyngede klange. Vovehvide viede ord, som glimter paa den dunkle flade (*U* 1949: 13).

> Skovskygger svævede lydløst forbi gennem morgenfreden fra trappens øverste ende og mod havet, hvorhen han så. Tæt ved land og længere ude hvidtedes vandets spejl, sporet af letskoede, rappe fødder. Det uklare havs hvide bryst. De sammenslyngede spændinger, to og to. En hånd, som griber i harpestrengene og forener deres sammenslyngede klange. Vovehvide viede ord, som funkler på den utydelige [uklare] flod (*U* 1970: 24-25; *U* 1980/1990: 24).

The first sentence is rather clumsy in Boisen's first translation. The elegant combination of the two-syllable words "stairhead seaward" in "from the stairhead seaward where he gazed", indicating Stephen's "head" facing the sea, has not been transferred into Danish. Instead it reads "fra trappens

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[4] According to Weldon Thornton's *Allusions in* Ulysses: *An Annotated List* (1968) the word "woodshadows" is prompted by "the shadows of the wood" in Yeats' poem "Who Goes with Fergus?" which is quoted just before this passage, such as "And no more turn aside and brood". The line "the shadows of the wood" is, however, not mentioned in the text (Thornton 1968: 16).

udgang og mod havet, mod hvilket han så" [literally: from the exit of the staircase and towards the sea towards which he gazed]. This recurrent heaviness has been softened in the second translation which reads "fra trappens øverste ende og mod havet, hvorhen han så" [literally: from the upper end of the staircase and towards the sea on which he gazed]. Now we know he is positioned high above the sea.

In the translation of the second sentence, meaning, rhythm and the peculiarity of words have been maintained. Also, the alliteration in "water whitened" has been transferred into "hvidtedes vandet". However, normally we would say "turned white" as "hvidtedes" signals "whitewashing".

In the sentence with "The twining stresses, two by two" Boisen first translates "stresses" into "klange" [literally: rings, clangs] and secondly into "spændinger" [literally: tensions]. Stephen is experimenting with the musicality of words, and thus "stresses" must be taken to mean either stresses in language in a linguistic sense, stresses in lyrical metre or indeed clangs as the next sentence speaks of an aeolian harp. Had Boisen chosen the Danish word "betoninger" he would have covered all three aspects.

Mogens Boisen's translations of the last highly alliterative sentence are interesting as they would have reached a near perfect level between semantic and stylistic translation had they been merged. Boisen manages to transfer the sound of the w-alliteration in "Vovehvide viede", but not in the subsequent "ord" [literally: words]. The second half, "shimmering on the dim tide", is in the first translation "som glimter paa den dunkle flade" and in the second translation "som funkler på den utydelige flod". The original's alliteration and assonance in "shimmering" and "dim" have not been transferred into either translation. And in 1980 Boisen recycles "uklare" from the earlier "Det uklare havs hvide bryst". However, had Boisen picked "dunkle" [literally: dim] from the first translation and "funkler" [literally: shimmer] in the second translation and put them together in "som funkler på den dunkle flod" he would have gained f- and nkl-alliterations and and u-assonance to make up for the loss.

In another passage the reader's expectations of straightforward third-person narration is once again disrupted:

> He skipped off the gunrest and looked gravely at his watcher, gathering about his legs the loose folds of his gown. The plump shadowed face and sullen oval jowl recalled a prelate, patron of arts in the middle ages. A pleasant smile broke quietly over his lips (*U* 1922/1986: 1.30-33).

A few stylistic peculiarites can be extracted here. In this passage attention is drawn to Mulligan's legs as they are mentioned first rather than last as in the common sentence structure of verb (gathering), object (the loose folds of his gown) and adverbial clause (about his legs). Thus this is the feature of "word order" on Levenston and Sonnenschein's list of focalisation signs. Furthermore, the triads in "plump shadowed face" and "sullen oval jowl" carry a distinct repetitious rhythm as well as alliteration and assonance. The last sentence with the "pleasant smile" comes as a shock as we would not expect Stephen to think of Mulligan in favourable terms. We are suddenly insecure as to exactly whose focalisation this is, Stephen's or the narrator's. Still, we are reassured of Stephen's point of view again by way of the slightly naive lyrical description of "broke quietly over his lips" rather than a more down-to-earth "he smiled pleasantly".

The likeness between Mulligan's face and a "prelate, patron of arts in the middle ages" suggests the face of the Spanish-Italian pope, Alexander VI (Roderigo Lanzol Borgia, c. 1431-1503). He and his family are notorious for extensive corruption as well as a thorough dedication to the arts in order to outshine his predecessors (Gifford and Seidman 1988: 14). This likeness suggests that Mulligan's dedication to his artist friend Stephen may be a similar fraud.

Mogens Boisen's 1949 translation reads:

> Han sprang ned fra kanonplatformen og saa alvorligt paa iagttageren, mens han samlede sin slaabroks løse folder om benene. Det fyldige ansigt med de mørke skygger og det ovale, mutte kæbeparti mindede én om en prælat, en kunstens velynder i middelalderen. Et venligt smil brød umærkeligt frem på hans læber (*U* 1949: 8).

And in 1970:

> Han sprang ned fra platformen og så alvorligt på sin iagttager, mens han samlede slåbrokkens løse folder om benene. Det fyldige ansigt med de mørke skygger og det ovale, mutte kæbeparti mindede om en prælat, en kunstens velynder i Middelalderen. Roligt brød et venligt smil frem på hans læber (*U* 1970: 19).

Not many changes have been made in the second translation. In both cases Boisen smoothes out the reverse word order in the second half of the first sentence. The Danish suggestions can be back-translated into "while

gathering the loose folds of his gown about his legs". Initial focus on the legs in the sentence draws attention to Mulligan's attempt to look dignified, to cover his legs, whereas end focus draws attention to the messiness of the loose folds. In this way, Boisen's translation loses finer details of text analysis.

In addition, the masterfully crafted rhythm in the triads of adjectives and nouns has been dissolved into somthing like: The plump face with the dark shadows and the oval, sullen jaw. The lyrical quality is obviously lost. And the translation of "plump" in this case is not the same as in the opening line of "Telemachus". Here Boisen has "fyldige" [literally: full] rather than "trivelig" (1949) or "trind" (1970) used in the opening line. The choice of "fyldig" is more idiomatically correct in a Danish description of a face than the two other suggestions, but then the emblematic quality typical of Mulligan as "plump" recedes into the background.[5]

The last sentence "A pleasant smile broke quietly on his lips" becomes in 1949 "Et venligt smil brød umærkeligt frem på hans læber" and in 1970 "Roligt brød et venligt smil frem på hans læber". The first translation is loyal to the word order and meaning of every word in the source text, whereas the second translation suddenly has the adverb "roligt" [literally: quietly] in the beginning of the sentence taking away the shock-effect of the pleasantness in Mulligan's countenance. In the first translation the focus is on the manner in which Mulligan began to smile, namely quietly, rather than the fact that his smile is perceived as surprisingly "pleasant".

Dual style: Literary naivety

The distortion and the naivety documented in this last expression are not exceptional. Karen Lawrence argues that

> while the decorum of the novel is established, the presence of
> another narrative strand in the first chapter slyly questions the
> assumptions about language upon which the normative style is
> based. The effect of this narrative strand is subtle, nothing like the
> radical disruption of narrative stability in the later chapters. And yet
> this narrative fluctuation in the first chapter of the book serves as a

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[5] More instances of Mulligan's plumpness in the chapter are "Stephen turned his gaze from the sea and to the plump face with its smokeblue mobile eyes" (*U* 1922/1986: 1.125-26) and "His plump body plunged" (*U* 1922/1986: 1.739).

warning to the reader of the strange narrative distortions to come (Lawrence 1981: 44).

Not only is the free indirect discourse a blend of the narrator's and Stephen's perspectives, but it also occasionally embarks on two obliquely suggested separate or perhaps even interdependent strands of unexpected distortions, or "dislocations", and a "naive narrative quality" (Lawrence 1981: 44-45). In other words, the already tricky free indirect discourse is increasingly infected with linguistic and stylistic disruptions as well as cliché-ridden plainness. Two contradictions in terms that give shape to the development of stylistic experimentations throughout *Ulysses*. The following quotations from "Telemachus" are Karen Lawrence's prime cases with two examples of dislocation and one example of youthful naivety:

> He shaved evenly and with care, in silence, seriously.
> Stephen, an elbow rested on the jagged granite, leaned his palm against his brow and gazed at the fraying edge of his shiny black coatsleeve. Pain, that was not yet the pain of love, fretted his heart (*U* 1922/1986: 1.99-102).

Lawrence expounds the puzzling quality of the first sentence as the number of adverbs and adverbial phrases surprises us. In the second sentence the past participle "rested" surprises the reader expecting the present participle "resting". The last sentence may be an example of "the repeated formulaic narrative constructions of which no student of creative writing, however inexperienced, would be proud" (Lawrence 1981: 45). The unsophisticated strand parodies Stephen's shortcomings as a writer. "There is a naive quality to this writing that separates parts of speech as if they were about to be diagrammed", concludes Lawrence about the stylistic shifts (Lawrence 1981: 44). To return to Levenston and Sonnenschein's characteristics, the examples are combined cases of "register-restricted vocabulary" of a young writer including "collocations and clichés".

Boisen has translated the passage as follows:

> Alvorlig og tavs barberede han videre, omhyggeligt og regelmæssigt.
> Stephen støttede en albue paa den ru granit, lagde haandfladen mod panden og stirrede på sit blankslidte frakkeærmes flossede kant. En smerte, der endnu ikke var kærlighedssmerte, gnavede i hans hjerte (*U* 1949: 9-10).

And:

> Regelmæssigt og med omhu barberede han sig, tavs, alvorlig.
> Med den ene albue støttet på den ru granit lagde Stephen håndfladen mod sin pande og stirrede på sit blankslidte sorte jakkeærmes flossede kant. Smerte, der endnu ikke var kærlighedens, gnavede i hans hjerte [gnavede hans hjerte] (*U* 1970: 21; *U* 1980/1990: 20).

As in the previous cases, in his first translation Mogens Boisen renders the contents of the text extremely carefully, disregarding stylistic oddities. The first sentence is transformed into a syntactically correct Danish sentence in which the adverbial phrases "evenly and with care" ("omhyggeligt og regelmæssigt") and "in silence, seriously" ("Alvorlig og tavs") have been reversed. In the 1949 example he inserts an "and" instead of a comma between the adverbs in the end of the sentence, perhaps disliking the strangeness of the clotting effect of so many adverbs and adverbial phrases.

In the first translation of the second sentence, the insertion "an elbow rested on the jagged granite" has become part of an enumeration of what Stephen does: first he rests his elbow, then he leans his palm against his brow and then he gazes at his coatsleeve. In the second translation the insertion has been naturally incorporated in the main sentence and thus loses its startling quality. Neither translation seems to allow for the dislocation of somthing like an unexpected verb tense as of the original.

As mentioned before, the third sentence is an example of a candid and self-opinionated youthful writer's attempt at describing passion. In this case the first translation functions better as an expression of this. The coinage "kærlighedssmerte" [literally: love-pain] has a ring of melodramatic silliness to it whereas "Smerte, der endnu ikke var kærlighedens" [literally: pain that was not yet that of love] is more unsentimental and literary as it makes way for an afterthought on love.

Several illustrations of such literary simplicity in "Telemachus" can be put forward:

> - I was, Stephen said *with energy and growing fear* [my emphasis] (*U* 1922/1986: 1.60)

> - Om jeg var, sagde Stephen *med eftertryk (U* 1949: 8)

> - Ja, sagde Stephen *med energi og voksende frygt (U* 1970: 20)

Here Mogens Boisen changes the melodramatic quality of the adverbial phrase into "med eftertryk" which is the equivalent of the English "with emphasis". The whole estrangement effect to Stephen of the narrated event, as well as the estranging style of unsophisticated language to the reader, have been discarded in the attempt to communicate a sensible interpretation of the strange combination of "energy" and "growing fear". In the second translation, Boisen may have realised that such fluent communication removes the subtle literary layers of the work and provides instead a direct translation of the elaborate adverbial phrase.

- Scutter! *he cried thickly* [my emphasis] (*U* 1922/1986: 1.66)

- Satans! *sagde han indædt* (*U* 1949: 9)

- Glid, *erklærede han med tykt mæle* (*U* 1970: 20)

- Fordømt! *erklærede han med tykt mæle* (*U* 1980/1990: 19)

"Scutter" is in Gifford and Seidman explained as "A scurrying and bustling about" (Gifford and Seidman 1988: 15). In the Hyperdictionary on the Internet, it says "To run quickly; to scurry; to scuttle".[6] But none of them notes that the word may also mean "diarrhoea" (according to Richard Wall's *An Anglo-Irish Dialect Glossary for Joyce's Works* 1986: 36). "Scutter" is slang for verbal diarrhoea, also known as "bullshit", thus an instance of 'sociolectal variation' on Levenston and Sonnenschein's list. However, in the reference work *Colloquial Language in* Ulysses, R. W. Dent needs better evidence for accepting this. He refers to Brendon O Hehir's doubtful suggestion of a derivation from Gaelic "scaid", meaning "refuse, waste" in his *A Gaelic Lexicon for* Finnegans Wake *and Glossary for Joyce's Other Works* (1967). Dent also refers to Helen H. Macaré's even more doubtful and undocumented explanation of the phrase as "Gael, O shit!" in *A Ulysses Phrasebook* (1981) (Dent 1994: 29).

In 1949 Boisen seems understandably ignorant of all this as he translates it into a swear word "Satans!" [literally: Damn!] This is justified from the context: "He [Mulligan] hopped down from his perch and began to search his trouser pockets hastily. – Scutter! he cried thickly. He came over to the gunrest and, thrusting a hand into Stephen's upper pocket said:

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[6] http://www.hyperdictionary.com/search.aspx?define=scutter.

- Lend us a loan of you noserag to wipe my razor" (*U* 1922/1986: 1.64-68). Mulligan could very well have damned the fact that he did not have any noserag, so in this sense "Satans!" is adequate. But the cultural importance of the occasional Anglo-Irish dialect has disappeared.

In 1970 Boisen mistakenly interprets the word as if Mulligan jokingly asks Stephen to get lost, as we would say today, as he chooses the very 1970s expression "glid" for "get lost". Today we would probably have said "smut!", "pil af!" or "skrid!" in Danish. Apparently he tries to accommodate the meanings of scurrying and scuttling into the translation. But the exclamation is not directed at Stephen personally, but addresses the fact that he has nowhere to wipe off his razorblade. In 1980 he realizes this mistake and returns to a mild profanation "Fordømt!" [literally: blast].

The naive narrative description "thickly" has in the first translation turned into "indædt" which can be back-translated into "savagely", "fiercely" or "with contempt". In his second translation Boisen may have consulted a dictionary as he uses the more idiomatically correct Danish expression "med tykt mæle" which is in fact the exact translation in most English-Danish dictionaries. He could, however, also have written "med grødet stemme".[7]

- The mockery of it, *he said gaily* [my emphasis] (*U* 1922/1986: 1.34)

- Hvor komisk, *sagde han gemytligt* (*U* 1949: 8)

- Komisk, *sagde han muntert* (*U* 1970: 19)

- The mockery of it, *he said contentedly* [my emphasis] (*U* 1922/1986: 1.116)

- Hvor komisk, *sagde han tilfreds* (*U* 1949: 10)

- Komisk, *sagde han veltilfreds* (*U* 1949: 21)

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[7] To stress the flatness of the adverb "thickly" it is also used in the parody of over-dramatic Gothic fiction in the "Oxen of the Sun" episode: "Yes, it is true. I am the murderer of Samuel Childs. And how I am punished! The inferno has no terrors for me. This is the appearance is on me. Tare and ages, what way would I be resting at all, he muttered *thickly*, and I tramping Dublin this while back with my share of songs and himself after me the like of a soulth or a bullawurrus?" [my emphasis] (*U* 1922/1986: 14.1016-21).

Twice Mulligan uses the formal expression "The mockery of it" rather than the more mundane "How funny".[8] In the first example he says it "gaily" and in the second "contentedly". In the first translation Boisen writes "Hvor komisk" [literally: how comical, funny] and in the second "Komisk" [literally: comical, funny]. Fortunately, this change is uniform in both examples with Mulligan. The adverb "gaily" is firstly translated into "gemytligt" [literally: jolly, jovial, convivial] and secondly into "muntert" [literally: cheerful, gay, merry]. The first choice gives us an image of Mulligan as warm and welcoming, whereas the second choice stresses his cheerfulness.

In the second example Mulligan says his line "contentedly" which becomes "tilfreds" [literally: with satisfaction, contentedly, happily] in 1949 and "veltilfreds" [literally: with pleasure, contentedly] in 1970. The Danish "veltilfreds" expresses more pleasure in the satisfaction than just "tilfreds". It gives us an image of Mulligan as very pleased with his own conclusions. This is on a par with his character traits in general.

Typically, certain phrases, clichés and words become emblematic and almost formulaic of certain characters. One striking example is the way the stock phrase "with delight" is used about Mulligan. And as with the previous "Scutter! he cried thickly" he cries here, too. Consequently, Mulligan's emblems are his plumpness, to say "the mockery of it", to express something "with delight" and to cry out:

> He laid the brush aside and, laughing *with delight, cried...* [my emphasis] (*U* 1922/1986: 1.44)

> Han lagde kosten til side, lo *henrykt og sagde...* (*U* 1949: 8)

> Han lagde kosten til side, lo *henrykt og spurgte oprømt...* (*U* 1970: 20)

> - Four shining sovereigns, Buck Mulligan *cried with delight* [my emphasis] (*U* 1922/1986: 1.296)

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[8] Mulligan also uses the word in his description of Stephen's refusal to kneel at his mother's deathbed: "To me it's all mockery and beastly" (*U* 1922/1986: 1.210). Later on in "Telemachus", the free indirect discourse acknowledges Mulligan's preference of this term: "Words Mulligan had spoken a moment since in mockery to the stranger. Idle mockery" (*U* 1922/1986: 1.660-61). In "Circe" Mulligan again makes use of the word in one of his lines: [Mulligan] "(*shakes his curling capbell*) The mockery of it! Kinch dogsbody killed her bitchbody" (*U* 1922/1986: 15.4178-79).

- Fire straalende sovereigns, *udbrød* Buck Mulligan *henrykt* (*U* 1970: 15)

- Fire blanke sovereigns, *udbrød Buck* Mulligan *henrykt* (*U* 1970: 26)

Buck Mulligan's face smiled *with delight* [my emphasis] (*U* 1922/1986: 1.377)

Buck Mulligans ansigt smilede *henrykt* (*U* 1949: 17; *U* 1970: 28)

Boisen may have been painstakingly aware of the need to homogenize repetitions which have such emblematic qualities, as he has translated "delight" into the Danish equivalent "henrykt" all the way through. This is a major plus in order to maintain the occasional formulaic naivety of the language. Unfortunately, the same consistency has not been possible with the translation of "cried" as Boisen uses various synonymous verbs for saying something with vehemence.

Conclusion

To sum up, the linguistic dislocations and stylistic naivety of the free indirect style of "Telemachus" are the touchstones of the overall parodic and metafictional quality of *Ulysses*. As Karen Lawrence says, "The sentences of this naive narrative point to the falsification and oversimplification that language wreaks on emotions by organizing them in discrete grammatical parts" (Lawrence 1981: 46). Not only is Stephen's intellectual seriousness mocked by Buck Mulligan, the very fabrication of fiction in the chapter is parodied as the narrative voice gets stuck in clichés: "In Chapter One, we get a brief glimpse of the kind of narrative mimicry of a type of text rather than a particular character" (Lawrence 1981: 47). Thus, the two strands of linguistic sophistication and stylistic crudeness do not only give the free indirect discourse an ironic twist in the psychological portrayal of characters as in *Dubliners*, but also a self-parodying concern with the act of story-telling itself.

As for the Danish translations, Mogens Boisen's 1970 translation of the opening of 'Telemachus' demonstrates generally a greater awareness of how the character's focalisation blends into the narrative voice than in 1949. Thus, the foundation of the initial style as the "Ithacan rock" of stylistic experiments is more solid in the second translation.

Specifically, in the samples of "source-language with strong connotations" Boisen turns from normalisation in his first translation to properly defamiliarised words in the subsequent translations. In the cases of register-restricted vocabulary, such as Stephen's naive writing, Boisen tries to make the writing idiomatically fluent in the first translation, but turns to a more Joycean naive style in the later translations. When it comes to collocations and clichées, Boisen creates a coherent pattern of emblematic phrases with great consistency on a par with the source text. As for word order, Boisen smoothes out inverted orders in both translations. The last items on Levenston and Sonneschein's list of focalisation features used here are sociolectal variation, as in "Scutter!" and geographical dialect as in the use of the preposition "on" in "on the mild morning air". In both cases Boisen demonstrates great insecurity as he makes mistakes in terms of "Scutter!" and ignores the odd use of "on". In both cases he makes no attempts to transfer the linguistic variations into Danish, but adapts them to the linguistic norms of Danish culture. I admit that translating Hiberno-English, or Gaelic even, into a dialect of the Danish countryside, for example, would have been inappropriate as the Irishness of the original would, then, completely disappear in a far too domesticated universe.

By way of conclusion, in this contrastive analysis it appears that Mogens Boisen's recent translations of *Ulysses* are strong on powerful connotations, register-restricted vocabulary, collocations and clichées, but not on sociolect and geographical dialect. Henceforth, it is suggested that the merging of dual voices and dual styles in the free indirect discourse of "Telemachus" is lacking in culture-bound elements which would have made the Danish translations more culturally foreignised and aesthetically defamiliarised. But while realising the impossibility of rendering all personal and geographical markers in the translation, cutting the dialectical variations by way of communicative translation, as it was defined by Peter Newmark, rather than cutting the personal, creative ones seems nevertheless to be a wise choice, however unintentional it may have been. In this way, at least the basic structure and format of Joycean aesthetic games with dual voices and a dual style, which he himself called "the initial style", have been kept intact.

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
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