Viewing Oneself through Others' Eyes: Shame between Biology and Culture in Biblical Texts

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A further problem presented by the affections of soul is this: are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence. If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible.... It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body-passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. (Aristotle, *De an.* 403a)[1]

Let shame (αἰσχύνη) then be defined as a kind of pain or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonor; and shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) as contempt and indifference in regard to these same things. If this definition of shame (αἰσχύνη) is correct, it follows that we are ashamed (αἰσχύνεσθαι) of all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful (αἰσχρά), either for ourselves or for those whom we care for. (Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1383b)[2]

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[1] Translation from John Alexander Smith, *The Works of Aristotle: De Anima* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1931).

[2] Translation from John Henry Freese, *Aristotle: The "Art" of Rhetoric* (London: William Heinemann, 1926).

There is little consensus on what emotions really are. Are they feelings, motivations, or evaluations? Not only do evolutionary biologists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers differ in perspective, but they also disagree within their own guilds, at times vehemently. As Andrea Scarantino points out, in *The Handbook of Emotions*, "we are apparently not much closer to reaching consensus on what emotions are than we were in Ancient Greece."[3] Nevertheless, Scarantino lists fifteen characteristics that are acknowledged by most emotion theorists. The list will not be rehearsed here, except for the third and the fourth point: there are evolutionary explanations for at least some emotions or their components and emotions are generally affected by sociocultural factors.[4]

This may seem commonplace enough, but for those of us who study emotional expressions in ancient cultures through ancient texts, a keen awareness of the interaction between biological underpinnings and cultural constructions is crucial to avoid at least the worst forms of anachronisms and generalisations.

In this article I will focus on the emotion of shame in the Bible, but I will largely leave the traditional discussion of a Mediterranean honour-shame culture aside. Instead I will discuss expressions of shame in biblical texts and I will relate my observations to the biological, evolutionary, and social functions of shame as an embodied emotion and to the ways in which emotional shame is culturally shaped, interpreted, and exploited. As will become clear, our concept of shame only partly overlaps with ancient constructs and terminologies, such as Hebrew בּוֹשׁ, בּוּשָׁה, or בֹּשֶׁת, together with word stems like חפר, כלם, and חרף, with which בּוֹשׁ is often juxtaposed and paralleled, and Greek αἰδῶς or αἰσχύνη together with their corresponding verbs and compounds. This fact requires attention and careful analysis, something that has been amply demonstrated by scholars like Douglas Cairns, David Konstan, and Yael

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[3] Andrea Scarantino, "The Philosophy of Emotions and Its Impact on Affective Science," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 3–48 (37).

[4] Scarantino, "Philosophy," 37.

Avrahami, to name a few, similarly to what for example David Konstan, Jan Joosten, and Françoise Mirguet have done with regard to pity.[5]

Aware of this, I will outline a variety of emotional patterns and relate them to the biological and psychological emotion complex of which shame is part, the shame family of emotions. I will pay special attention to ways in which shame is part of a social web of relationships, in particular to patterns of dominance and subordination. I will try to be aware of aspects of mutualism and hierarchy, power and deference. The first step, however, is to look at the development of shame as one of a cluster of self-conscious emotions.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHAME

The field of human emotions is sometimes divided into three types. Other-condemning emotions include contempt, anger, and disgust, and guard the moral order. Other-praising emotions include awe, elevation, and gratitude, and respond to good deeds. Self-conscious emotions include shame, embarrassment, guilt, and pride, and constrain individual behaviour in a social context.[6]

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[5] Douglas L. Cairns, *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); idem, "Honour and Shame: Modern Controversies and Ancient Values," *Critical Quarterly* 53 (2011): 23–41; David Konstan, *Pity Transformed* (London: Duckworth, 2001); idem, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Yael Avrahami, "בוש in the Psalms—Shame or Disappointment?," *JSOT* 34 (2010): 295–313; Jan Joosten, "חסד 'bienveillance' et ἔλεος 'pitié': Réflexions sur une equivalence lexicale dans la Septante," in *"Car c'est l'amour qui me plait, non le sacrifice…": Recherche sur Osée 6:6 et son interpretation juive et chrétienne,* ed. E. Bons, JSJ Sup 88 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 25–42; Françoise Mirguet, *An Early History of Compassion: Emotion and Imagination in Hellenistic Judaism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[6] Jonathan Haidt, "The Moral Emotions," in *Handbook of Affective Sciences,* ed. Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 852–70. One may rightly argue that all types of emotions influence moral behaviour. Other-condemning emotions, however, are understood to guard especially against moral transgressions of others.

Another way for theorists is to distinguish between basic or primary emotions and cognitive or secondary emotions. Basic emotions are generally understood to be innate, firmly anchored in human evolutionary biology, having evolved for adaptive functions, and expressed in involuntary reactions to stimuli, including universally recognisable facial expressions.[7] A classic example is Paul Ekman's use of cross-cultural recognition of facial expressions to identify six basic emotions: fear, anger, sadness, disgust, happiness, and surprise.[8] This focus on external responses may in fact have caused some emotions to be overlooked.[9] But even when priority is given to external signals for identifying emotions, the category of basic emotions is not so clear-cut, as we will soon see.

It is of course true that self-conscious emotions, as we normally understand them and carve them up, require a conscious self. But even the basic emotions do at least require "cognition necessary for perception," as Michael Lewis points out.[10] Lewis describes infant development: at the age of 15-18 months, self-awareness emerges in the child, but of a non-evaluative kind, which gives rise to "self-conscious exposed emotions," such as envy, empathy, and non-evaluative embarrassment. Embarrassment is caused by the self being observed. Around the age of three, cognition has evolved to a point where the child can conceptualize rules and goals, which goes together with the emergence of "self-con-

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[7] Sherri C. Widen, "The Development of Children's Concepts of Emotions," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 307–18 (310–11).

[8] Paul Ekman, "Facial Expression and Emotion," *American Psychologist* 48 (1993): 384–92.

[9] Naomi I. Eisenberger, "Social Pain and Social Pleasure: Two Overlooked but Fundamental Mammalian Emotions," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 440–52 (446).

[10] Michael Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotional Development," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 134–49 (134).

scious evaluative emotions," including evaluative embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt.[11]

Embarrassment, shame, and guilt are often distinguished from each other, with embarrassment requiring self-attention or self-conciousness, shame signalling a threat to the social self, and guilt responding to undesirable behaviour. Shame involves a loss of (self-) esteem and concern for loss of social status, while guilt can be thought of as more active and intent on reparation. Some see embarrassment as fairly distanced from both shame and guilt, while others regard it as a weak form of shame, in which the core self is not questioned.[12] The latter suggestion would fit with Lewis' evaluative embarrassment, but less with his non-evaluative embarrassment. Non-evaluative embarrassment, in fact, is more akin to shyness, which is less often discussed, and which Rowland Miller finds to be a "*future-oriented* mood state," rather than an emotion.[13] Be that as it may, shyness can be placed at one end of a spectrum in which guilt belongs to the other and embarrassment "is a cousin of both shyness and shame, but is clearly different from either one."[14]

The fact that self-conscious emotions require a conscious self does not mean that they are less biologically based than the so-called basic emotions. The argument for a secondary status from the lack of global facial expressions is not so strong as one would think. Embarrassment is often accompanied by blushing, although individual tendencies to blush vary and visibility depends on skin colour. The physical reaction is automatic and due to constrictions and expansions of blood vessels. Experi-

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[11] Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotional Development," 134–35.

[12] Tara L. Gruenewald, Sally S. Dickerson, and Margaret E. Kemeny, "A Social Function for Self-Conscious Emotions: The Social Self Preservation Theory," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 68–87 (68-71).

[13] Rowland S. Miller, "Is Embarrassment a Blessing or a Curse?," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 245–62 (246).

[14] Miller, "Embarrassment," 246.

ments show that people who blush at mishaps are regarded more sympa-thetically and judged more leniently than those who do not. The reaction cannot be faked and it signals sincerity.[15]

Blushing may also accompany shame, although not so frequently, and the role of blushing ascribed by Darwin is partly unwarranted. Moreover, the fluid border between embarrassment and shame compli-cates our assessment.[16] Shame, embarrassment, and guilt, however, do have certain body signals in common. These revolve around body pos-ture: people lower their face and sometimes tilt their head downward to the side, they avoid looks and slump their shoulders, in a shrivelled-up posture, which is virtually the opposite to displays of pride.[17] Interest-ingly, these are similar to defensive responses by infants to interpersonal disruptions.[18] There are several arguments for these signals being innate and the results of evolutionary adaptation. First, both pride and shame displays are equally exhibited in response to success and failure, and equally recognized as such in remotely diverse cultures like the industri-alised West and in small-scale societies in Burkina Faso and Fiji.[19] Sec-ondly, these behaviours were displayed similarly by sighted, blind, and congenitally blind athletes from more than thirty countries at victory

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[15] Miller, "Embarrassment," 251–52. However, the embarrassment displayed needs to correspond to the context; exaggerated reactions have an opposite effect.

[16] Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, The Works of Charles Darwin 23 (New York: New York University Press, 1989 [originally published 1872]), chapter 13; cf. Michael Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, Guilt, and Hubris," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 792–814 (793–795).

[17] Gruenewald, Dickerson, and Kemeny, "A Social Function," 73.

[18] Paul Gilbert, "The Evolution of Shame as a Marker for Relationship Security: A Biopsychosocial Approach," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 283–309 (291).

[19] Dacher Keltner et al., "Expression of Emotion," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 467–82 (470).

and defeat respectively, in the Paralympics. The only difference was that individuals from Western, highly individualistic cultures, moderated their shame responses, *except* for the congenitally blind, which further underscores that these behaviours tend to be innate.[20] Thirdly, these displays are similar to dominance and submission behaviours among other animals, studied by researchers.[21]

The last point of course raises the question of the evolutionary roots of the shame family of emotions. On the one hand, shame requires certain cognitive capacities necessary for self-consciousness and self-evaluation. These requirements basically correspond to what evolutionary theorists call Theory of Mind, the capacity to understand other individuals to the extent that one can see oneself through their eyes, that is, simulate how others evaluate and appraise one's own behaviour.[22] This makes for an *inner* inner world,[23] something human beings share to at least some extent with other intelligent social species, such as higher primates, elephants, and dolphins. On the other hand, shame (or embarrassment) displays apparently have an innate, biological substratum behind, or independent of, conscious behaviour. Although bodily reactions can be partially controlled, this is difficult, and public shame displays hardly enhance status, but openly declare failure. In spite of this, they are adaptive, if shame is understood within the framework of

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[20] Jessica L. Tracy and David Matsumoto, "The Spontaneous Expression of Pride and Shame: Evidence for Biologically Innate Nonverbal Displays," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 105 (2008): 11655–60.

[21] Gruenewald, Dickerson, and Kemeny, "A Social Function," 73.

[22] For a short overview with research history and a discussion of the evolutionary origins of Theory of Mind, see Ioannis Tsoukalas, "Theory of Mind: Towards an Evolutionary Theory," *Evolutionary Psychological Science* 4 (2018): 38–66. For now classical studies, see David Premack and Guy Woodruff, "Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?," *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 4 (1978): 515–26; Alan M. Leslie, "Pretense and Representation: The Origins of 'Theory of Mind'," *Psychological Review* 94 (1987): 412–26.

[23] For this expression, see Peter Gärdenfors, *How Homo Became Sapiens: On the Evolution of Thinking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 111–40.

a social hierarchy as a sign of submission to those in power and of loyalty to the group.[24]

We usually associate shame with the public failure to comply with some cultural or moral standards for behaviour, meaning that we know that others are aware of our failure. When shame is studied cross-culturally, however, it becomes evident that there need not be any failure to comply with social or moral rules, but the mere encounter with superiors or people of higher status is sufficient to trigger shame. Daniel Fessler talks of this as "subordinance shame."[25] Such shame, says Fessler

> is evolutionarily ancient [and] is bolstered by the fact that recognizing that one occupies an inferior position in a social hierarchy requires far less cognitive complexity than does recognizing that others know that one has failed.... It is ... likely that the common ancestor of humans and primates likewise lacked the cognitive capacity for a theory of mind, and hence that any emotions experienced by this species were not dependent on this capacity, making it all the more plausible that subordinance shame is the original or primordial aspect of this emotion.[26]

Fessler suggests that for nonhuman primates, lacking cultural criteria to measure success, social position was a function of dominance, but human societies developed prestige hierarchies in which dominant positions were given rather than taken.[27] The history of humankind suggests that both models coexist and that culture is perhaps a thin veneer. But the theory makes sense of shame behaviours as originally appeasement

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[24] Dacher Keltner and LeeAnne Harker, "The Forms and Functions of the Nonverbal Signals of Shame," in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, ed. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 78–98; Gruenewald, Dickerson, and Kemeny, "A Social Function"; Elizabeth Jacqueline Dansie, "An Empirical Investigation of the Adaptive Nature of Shame" (M.Sc. diss., Utah State University, 2009).

[25] Daniel M. T. Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity: Evolutionary and Cultural Perspectives on Shame, Competition, and Cooperation," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 174–93 (175–76).

[26] Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity," 176.

[27] Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity," 176.

displays, which signalled submission rather than fight, and helped losers avoid injury or death. On the other hand they lost in status. The reason for shame displays still being part of the human involuntary repertoire is probably that they communicate submission, cooperation, loyalty to superiors, and willingness to follow group norms. In the long run, there was more to gain by cooperation and coordination. By displaying submissive or subordinance shame, one could perhaps partner with the winners instead of being killed by them.[28] Self-conscious emotions facilitated and regulated both group cooperation and group organisation.[29]

SHAME IN CONTINUUM

In human groups, innate and biologically based capacities are largely formed by culture and cultural diversity leads to a variety of expressions. This becomes visible not least in language. Historical and contextual factors shape the ways in which emotions are expressed by actions as well as by words and harness emotions in the service of cultural ideals and practices. Embarrassment, guilt, and shame concepts are not identical between cultures, but overlap in various ways. The meaning of shame varies considerably depending on whether it expresses failure to uphold norms of reciprocity or norms of hierarchy.[30] Emotions are valued differently in different cultures. Western, individualistic cultures have little patience with shame and more or less ignore subordinance shame, even though they have the capacity to understand it. Many non-Western cultures, on the other hand, regard subordinance, shyness, and

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[28] Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity," 177–82.

[29] Jennifer L. Goetz and Dacher Keltner, "Shifting Meanings of Self-Conscious Emotions Across Cultures: A Social-Functional Approach," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 153–73 (154–56).

[30] Cf. Goetz and Keltner, "Shifting Meanings," 168.

respect as shame's core, while guilt is less prominent, or even lacking.[31] To note this is not the same as affirming the old dichotomy between shame cultures and guilt cultures, which is far too simplified.

Emotion words in one language lose nuances and take on partly new meanings when translated. In a cross-cultural study, Robin Edelstein and Phillip Shaver demonstrate that shame words in a specific language can be identified as part of particular emotion clusters, but these clusters vary. In English and Italian, shame and guilt are clustered together within the sadness cluster. In Indonesian and Dutch, however, shame and embarrassment fall into the fear cluster (but not guilt in Indonesian). In certain languages, shame is not even distinguished from fear. These examples may suffice to prove that differences depend on cultural contexts, as whether shame is associated primarily with anxiety or regret. Also, some languages use separate concepts for emotions which in other languages are identified by one word and only regarded as degrees of intensity.[32]

Based on all of the considerations discussed so far, I shall propose a scheme of emotions belonging to the shame family along a continuum, in order to differentiate as far as possible between various nuances and aspects. I should strongly emphasize that I do this entirely for heuristic purposes. The ways in which we carve up the field of self-conscious emotions is, although based on biopsychosocial considerations, still in many ways arbitrary, or at least highly culture-specific and contextual. I do this, however, to get a handle on shame and shame-related texts from the Bible.

The point of this scheme is *not* to nail characteristics or reactions to a particular "phase," but to illustrate the overlaps and fuzzy borders between various self-conscious emotional categories. Many details are in-

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[31] Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity," 184–85.

[32] Robin S. Edelstein and Phillip R. Shaver, "A Cross-Cultural Examination of Lexical Studies of Self-Conscious Emotions," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 194–208 (198–99).

	SHYNESS I	SHYNESS II / EMBARRASSMENT I	EMBARRASSMENT II / SHAME I	**SHAME II (FEAR?)**	SHAME III / GUILT I	GUILT II
Character	Future-oriented mood; Long-term Non-event	Non-evaluative social attention; *Event*	Negative social evaluation; *Subordinance shame*	**Negative social evaluation and self-evaluation,** *Subordinance shame*	Negative social evaluation and self-evaluation	Negative social evaluation and self-evaluation; Moral responsibility
Problem	Uncomfortable with self-awareness	Uncomfortable with others' observation	Judgment; Lack of status	**Undesirable self; Loss of status and control; Failure**	Undesirable action; Loss of integrity	Undesirable action; Loss of integrity Loss of self-respect
Body Reaction	Hide; Look away	Hide; Blush; Look away; Nervous touching	Sheepish smile; Blush; Look away; Lower face, tilt head, slump shoulders etc.	**Blush or pale?; Look away; Lower face, tilt head, slump shoulders etc.**	Blush or pale?; Look away; Lower face, tilt head, slump shoulders etc.	Look away; Lower face, tilt head, slump shoulders etc.
Signal	I don't want to be here	I am interested, but nervous	I want to be accepted; I adapt	**I accept my place; I submit; I appease; I am no threat; I am not faking**	I accept norms; I show respect; I am not faking	I make reparation; I reform; I subscribe to norms; I am not faking
Function	Avoidance	Divert attention	Receive empathy	**Survival; Avoid punishment**	Resume cooperation	Resume trustworthiness; Display loyalty

deed open to question and in several instances one could discuss whether items belong here or there or under several columns. The visual column structure itself in a way counteracts or contradicts the message about the shame family emotions along a continuum.

The two types of embarrassment, which were already previously mentioned, overlap with shyness as well as with shame, and shame and guilt are not clearly separable. Different cultures and languages construct different categories along this continuum and there are no hard and fast rules. In some cases, even certain types of shyness and shame may be subsumed under the same concept, as we will see with the Greek αἰδώς.

The most conspicuous observation is perhaps that SHAME II, which I have marked in bold above, has very little, if anything at all, to do with norm transgression or morality, but entirely with failure and loss of status. There is no wrongdoing behind such shame, but plain failure to stay in control and defend one's honour or privileged position visavi competitors or enemies. Loss of control in this sense might incur real danger, which makes concomitant body reactions related to fear just as predictable as those related to embarrassment. The fact that some languages relate shame vocabulary to the fear cluster gives support to such an explanation and to an explicit association of SHAME II with FEAR, as indicated in the scheme above. An example of this is the Hebrew בוש, which is occasionally associated with a pale face, as we will se examples of.

SHAME II corresponds largely to what Fessler calls subordinance shame, although some important characteristics of subordinance shame are also displayed in EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I. It is marked in italics in the scheme above. From an evolutionary point of view, subordinance shame, especially as represented in SHAME II, reflects a prototypical or ancient type of shame. Body reactions and signals have evolved to ensure survival within a hierarchical structure, in a way analogous to how many social animal species behave. The character of negative evaluation is in a way secondary to, or dependent on, the fact that one has been forced to hand over power and/or status to others, or somehow lost con-

trol regardless of any specific norm-breaking behaviour. One could discuss whether SHAME II or subordinance shame should be regarded as paradigmatic for the shame family, or rather as an archaic, underlying substratum, or perhaps as both. As we will see, it accounts for no small part of the textual examples we now turn to.

SHAME IN THE HEBREW BIBLE

The primary term for shame in the Hebrew Bible is the root בוש. The verb is found more than 130 times and there are a few instances of the two nouns, בּוּשָׁה and בֹּשֶׁת.[33] בוש is generally translated into Greek with αἰσχύνειν, occasionally with καταισχύνειν, in the LXX. It is often used in the Psalms and in the major prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah, with a few other references scattered in other books. It is fairly often paralleled with חפר, כְּלִמָּה/כלם, and חֶרְפָּה (the latter root is mostly represented by ὀνειδίζειν, while the two former are normally rendered by ἐντρέπειν in the LXX). The cluster of meanings focus on humiliation, insult, and infringement.[34]

    The three roots, בוש, כלם, and חפר, are carefully analysed in Martin Klopfenstein's classical "concept-historical" (*begriffsgeschichtliche*) study on shame in the Hebrew Bible from 1972.[35] Klopfenstein argues that shame and guilt are intrinsically (*von Haus aus*) associated, shame being

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[33] There is also the less common מְבוּשִׁים and בְּשְׁנָה. בֹּשֶׁת is conspicuously used as a dysphemism for various "foreign" gods, in particular Baal, by replacing the theophoric element in names such as Ish-Baal (>Ish-Boshet), and by its vowels replacing the original ones in divine names such as Ashtart (>Ashtoreth) and perhaps Molech. Marvin H. Pope, "Bible, Euphemism and Dysphemism in the," *ABD* 1:720–25.

[34] Alexandra Grund-Wittenberg, "Scham/Schande (AT)," 2015, in *Das wissenschaftliche Bibellexikon im Internet (WiBiLex)*, http://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/stichwort/26305/; Horst Seebass, "בוש *bôsh*; בּוּשָׁה *bûshāh*; בֹּשֶׁת *bōsheth*; מְבוּשִׁים *mᵉbûshîm*," *TDOT*, vol. 2, eds. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, rev. ed., 1977), 169–71 (169).

[35] Martin Klopfenstein, *Scham und Schande nach dem Alten Testament: Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu den hebräischen Wurzeln bôš, klm und ḥpr*, ATANT 62 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972).

the subjective expression of feeling guilt and shaming being the objective expression of exposed guilt.[36] The near equation of shame with guilt has been criticised among others by Lyn Bechtel Huber, who demonstrates how both formal (judicial and political) and informal (social) shaming function as sanctions of behaviour for a number of contexts in which sanctions involving guilt would not have been appropriate, and that shaming would often have been more powerful, due to the group-oriented character of society.[37]

Separating guilt from shame is admittedly more easily said than done, as already indicated in the preceding section, and Johanna Stiebert, who has written another monograph on shame in the Hebrew Bible, commends Klopfenstein for keeping shame and guilt together. She is, however, critical of his understanding of how בוש-language developed from its purported first use in the sexual domain in Hosea.[38] Stiebert's own monograph takes inspiration from psychological research and focuses on the three major prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. She attempts to prove the insufficiency of the honour-shame paradigm from Mediterranean studies for studying shame in the Hebrew Bible.[39]

In spite of Klopfenstein's detailed analyses, there are some major weaknesses. His view of בוש finding its origins in the sexual sphere (Gen 2:25; Hos 2:7) depends at least partly (for Genesis) on outdated or highly questionable source theories; his close association of בוש with cultic issues is arguably a result of over-interpretation; and his fundamental distinction between secular and theological usages of shame-terminology is strained and results from a certain theological bias.[40]

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[36] Klopfenstein, *Scham und Schande*, 33, 49.

[37] Lyn M. Bechtel, "Shame as Sanction of Social Control in Biblical Israel: Judicial, Political, and Social Shaming," *JSOT* 49: 47–76.

[38] Johanna Stiebert, *The Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible: The Prophetic Contribution*, JSOTSup 346 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 44–50.

[39] Stiebert, *Construction of Shame*, 165–73.

[40] Klopfenstein, *Scham und Schande*, 31–33, 58–60; for the secular-theological distinction, see the whole structure of Klopfenstein's work.

Many scholars point out that shame in the Hebrew Bible is mainly about loss of status, and has little to do with an inner experience or introvert feeling, but is associated with rather physical aspect.[41] Shame can result from one's own failure, or from being let down by significant others, as when Joab complains about David's behaviour against those who have saved him (2 Sam 19:6). Yael Avrahami suggests that the meaning of the root בוש is often "disappointment" or "failure," rather than shame in our sense. In her investigation of בוש-language in the Psalms, she demonstrates that such translations work well. The synonyms that בוש is juxtaposed to, belong to the semantic field of worthlessness and suggest that בוש is a negative experience. Only some of the synonyms are shame words. Moreover, none of the antonyms that appear is an honour word, but they all refer to positive experiences: to save, to be happy, to be satisfied.[42] Avrahami suggests that בוש "has to do with the experience of a disconnection between expectations and reality"[43] and she concludes with a few additional examples from the prophets. She suggests that the idea of two or three homonymic roots (בוש I, II, and III) is quite unnecessary and that texts in which a homonymic root has been supposed would also receive a simpler and more plausible interpretation, assuming a single root and taking her suggestions into account.[44] To spell this out: Moses *failed* to come down from the mountain (Exod 32:1), Sisera's mother asks "why does his chariot *fail* to return?" (Judg 5:24), Ezra says that he *failed* to ask for soldiers (Ezra 8:22), and the expression עד־בוש simply means "to the point of despair."

Avrahami's suggestion fits well with SHAME II in our scheme, which has a focus on failure and loss of control. For example, Psalm 35

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[41] Margaret S. Odell, "The Inversion of Shame and Forgiveness in Ezekiel 16.59–63," *JSOT* 56 (1992): 101–12 (103); Matthew J. Lynch, "Neglected Physical Dimensions of 'Shame'," *Bib* 91 (2010): 499–517, who suggests physical experiences of diminishment or harm.

[42] Avrahami, "בוש in the Psalms."

[43] Avrahami, "בוש in the Psalms," 308.

[44] Avrahami, "בוש in the Psalms," 310–13.

is framed by a prayer to YHWH for the failure of the author's opponents.

<div dir="rtl">

v. 4 יבשו ויכלמו מבקשי נפשי יסגו אחור ויחפרו חשבי רעתי
</div>

Let them be ashamed and humiliated who seek my life. May they be turned back and embarrassed who plan my evil.

<div dir="rtl">

v. 26 יבשו ויחפרו יחדו שמחי רעתי ילבשו־בשת וכלמה המגדילים עלי
</div>

Let them be ashamed and embarrassed together who rejoiced over my distress. May they be clothed with shame and reproach who magnify themselves over me.

The author hopes that those who seek his life, those who rejoice over his distress, will be shamed, covered with shame, meaning that he wishes them to be disappointed, unsuccessful, and fail in their intention. Here is a case of possible loss of status and control, perhaps a matter of survival. Shame can be similarly interpreted in Isa 54:5, where it is explicitly associated with widowhood, i.e., being let down without support, and in Jer 20:11, where בוש is juxtaposed to failure (stumbling; כשל *niphal*). And in Isa 24:23 the sun and the moon are shamed before YHWH, meaning that they submit to his authority: a clear example of subordinance shame.

In 2 Kings 19:26, Isaiah says about Sennacherib's destruction of cities: וישביהן קצרי־יד חתו ויבשו ("their inhabitants are powerless, terrified and shamed"). The "shame" is here juxtaposed to fear and concerns mere survival, it has little to do with norm infringement or loss of integrity. The association with fear makes sense of Isa 29:22, in which shame is paralleled to faces growing pale or white:

<div dir="rtl">

לא־עתה יבוש יעקב ולא עתה פניו יחורו
</div>

Jacob will no longer be shamed and his face will no longer grow pale.

The verb חור can hardly be translated as "blushing," as is occasionally done. This is not the reddening of embarrassment, but a sign of fear, a paling associated with subordinance shame.

This does not mean that בוש and other shame vocabulary are *only* used in contexts of what I call SHAME II, but meanings like failure, dis-

appointment, or being let down, go a long way, even taking figures like being "wrapped in shame" or "shame covers my head" into regard. There are instances, however, which go beyond a SHAME II framework, even though Isaiah's idol worshippers may probably pass for failures (e.g., Isa 42:17; 44:9, 11; 45:16, 17; cf. Ps 97:7) and Jeremiah's oracles against the nations being put to shame, too (e.g., Egypt, Jer 46:24; Moab, 48:39; Damascus, 49:23; Bel and his idols, 50:2; Babylon, 50:12; 51:47). In Ezekiel shame is clearly associated with sexual misconduct (Ezek 16:52, 63) and explicitly associated with sinful and abominable behaviour (36:31–32).[45] The framework for shame here is clearly SHAME III/GUILT I. Although the shame of nakedness (or rather, lack of shame) in the garden of Eden narrative (Gen 2:25) might possibly be understood as "they suffered no harm," this is contrived. It seems reasonable to read this text within the framework of EMBARRASSMENT II/ SHAME I: there is no negative social evaluation or lack of acceptance, in spite of the fact that the man and the woman are unclothed. The meaning of shame does move along a continuum, but subordinance shame and failure have the capacity to account for more than we might have thought and there is little need for overly theological explanations.

SHAME IN GREEK, IN THE LXX, AND IN BEN SIRA

The translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek introduces terminology with different connotations and overlaps. The main Greek terms revolve around two stems, αἰδ- and αἰσχ-. Douglas Cairns' major study on αἰδῶς in Homer and classical literature lays the groundwork for all subsequent discussion.[46] Cairns also discusses αἰσχύνη, αἰσχρός and other relevant terms. For our purpose, similarities and differences between αἰδ- and αἰσχ-terms are of most interest.

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[45] The attempt by Odell ("Inversion of Shame") to explain the mouth opening in Ezek 16:63 does not change this fact.

[46] Cairns, *Aidōs*.

From Homer and onwards, αἰδῶς and αἰδεῖσθαι describe a sense of propriety and respect, an emotion of bashfulness, embarrassment, or inhibition, especially before people of higher status or with more power. Basically, the vocabulary suggests "shame" of a sort that belongs within the frameworks of SHYNESS II/EMBARRASSMENT I and EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I. Cairns states that αἰδῶς cannot be equated with shame precisely because it covers both shame and embarrassment.[47] To feel and express αἰδῶς is then, in a slightly paradoxical way, equal to showing honour to those stronger or of more status than you. In that sense, it is typical of subordinance shame, although not *necessarily* associated with *loss* of status and control, but often just representing the appropriate behaviour towards someone with a higher position on the hierarchical ladder, for whatever reason.

The example of Nausikaa, from the Odyssey's sixth song, is a classical one, which also indicates the extent to which αἰδῶς was a particularly female virtue; at least it induced certain behaviours for women and partly others for men. In spite of her initiative and endeavour for liberty, Nausikaa displays deference and restraint, she is modest as befits women in Greek archaic and classical culture.

The gendered aspects of αἰδῶς/αἰδεῖσθαι are elaborated by the tragedist Euripides (fifth century BCE) in *Ifigenia in Aulis* 558–72, a passage in which the chorus clearly delineates the role of shame as modesty within the context of the current hierarchical social order:

> διάφοροι δὲ φύσεις βροτῶν, διάφοροι δὲ τρόποι· τὸ δ᾽ ὀρθῶς ἐσθλὸν σαφὲς αἰεί· τροφαί θ᾽ αἱ παιδευόμεναι μέγα φέρουσ᾽ ἐς τὰν ἀρετάν· τό τε γὰρ αἰδεῖσθαι σοφία, τάν τ᾽ ἐξαλλάσσουσαν ἔχει χάριν ὑπὸ γνώμας ἐσορᾶν τὸ δέον, ἔνθα δόξα φέρει κλέος ἀγήρατον βιοτᾷ. μέγα τι θηρεύειν ἀρετάν, γυναιξὶ μὲν κατὰ Κύπριν κρυπτάν, ἐν ἀνδράσι δ᾽ αὖ κόσμος ἐνὼν ὁ μυριοπληθὴς μείζω πόλιν αὔξει.

> The natures of mortals vary and their habits differ, but the truly good is always plain: educated upbringings greatly lead to virtue; for modesty is wisdom and has the extraordinary gift to judiciously discern what is fitting. Then reputation brings ageless renown to life. Great it is to hunt for virtue, for women according

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[47] Cairns, *Aidōs*, 7.

to the covert Kypris [i.e., a discrete gender role], while for men, the infinite and innate [sense of] order makes a city grow big.

In contrast to αἰδῶς, αἰσχρός basically means "ugly" in opposition to καλός and although αἰσχύνη is generally "shame," or "disgrace," the active αἰσχύνειν is to disfigure. To be ashamed (αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπαισχύνεσθαι), or to shame (καταισχύνειν), are basically aesthetic terms, applied also, but not exclusively within moral frameworks.

In his study on shame and necessity in ancient Greece, Bernard Williams explains that he does not separate uses of the two roots αἰδ- and αἰσχύν-, because he finds variations to be mainly diachronic, so that αἰσχύνη (shame) increasingly took the place of αἰδῶς (respect).[48] Rudolf Bultmann had already pointed out that although αἰδεῖσθαι was always in use, αἰδῶς "became rare in the time of Hellenism, but was brought back into use by the late Stoics."[49]

The fact that αἰσχύνεσθαι can be found as an equivalent to αἰδῶς already in Homer and that αἰδῶς/αἰδεῖσθαι continued in use with two senses as well gives David Konstan reason to protest against a simplified chronological argument.[50] In any case, Homer only has three occurrances of αἰσχύνεσθαι, all in the *Odyssey*, and Cairns concludes, after having discussed them one by one, that Homer's passages should not be use as "evidence for any fundamental difference in the function and significance of the two verbs."[51] Nevertheless, says Konstan, there is a slight difference in that αἰδῶς normally has a prospective or inhibitory sense, while αἰσχύνη also can reflect back on disapproved behaviour with regret—something that Konstan demonstrates from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.[52] To what extent such a differentiation is relevant to

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[48] Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 194, n. 9.

[49] Rudolf Bultmann, "αἰδῶς," in *TDNT*, vol. 1, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964), 169–71 (169).

[50] Konstan, *Emotions*, 93–94.

[51] Cairns, *Aidōs*, 138–39.

[52] Konstan, *Emotions*, 94–96; the example he quotes is from *Eth. nic.* 1128b.

more general usage is debatable; Bultmann suggests that this is a Stoic disctinction that does not really correspond to actual usage, and that both terms can be used in a prospective as well as a reflective sense.[53]

In relation to our heuristic scheme, we might suggest that αἰσχ- terminology perhaps fits best within the frameworks of SHAME III/GUILT I and GUILT II, but can also be used in the framework of EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I. This reminds us again, first that the scheme is heuristic and not meant to draw borders but to point to overlaps within a continuum, and secondly that an underlying stratum of subordinance shame often makes itself known all along the continuum.

When the Hebrew Bible is translated into Greek, בוש is usually translated with αἰσχύνη and αἰσχύνεσθαι. This introduces connotations of social and moral norms that were not unknown to בוש, but fairly marginal, at least not dominant. It is not difficult to imagine the effect when the struggle for status and control, reflected in Ps 35, is read through the lens of Greek expressions for shame and shaming. The fearful shame easily becomes moralised if fear is understood to mean fear of punishment for bad behaviour, and faces and heads covered with shame are possible to interpret as blushing and strong feelings of remorse, the effects of which we can see above all in modern translations.

Ben Sira provides a window into this cultural blending process, since his writing is packed with shame and some of his passages on shame are extant in both Hebrew and Greek. After having admonished his son not be ashamed of himself (ואל נפשך אל תבוש/περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς σου μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς), Ben Sira distinguishes between two types of shame, or embarrassment in 4:21:

<div dir="rtl">כי יש בֹשֶׁאת משאת עון ויש בשת כבוד וחן:[54]</div>

ἔστιν γὰρ αἰσχύνη ἐπάγουσα ἁμαρτίαν καὶ ἔστιν αἰσχύνη δόξα καὶ χάρις

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[53] Bultmann, "αἰδῶς," 170.

[54] Manuscript A1 Verso, Martin Abegg's transcription. Manuscript C1 Verso has וחן וכבוד, i.e., the opposite order.

The Hebrew text uses בוש here in a sense already influenced by Greek conceptualisation and the term is consequently translated with αἰσχύνη. If we were to claim a clear distinction between different terms in Greek shame vocabulary, the second instance of בוש would rather be represented by αἰδῶς, but this is not the case, as αἰσχύνη also takes on the meaning of "sense of shame." αἰσχύνη can obviously be used along the whole continuum, from embarrassment to guilt. The shame that leads to sin would most probably refer to disapproved behaviour,[55] but the shame that leads to honour and praise could refer not only to inhibitory shame, preventing misdeeds, but also to subordinance shame, resulting in appropriate behaviour towards superiors and seniors in a hierarchical society. This is at least what Ben Sira recommends in the beginning of chapter 4: μεγιστᾶνι ταπείνου τὴν κεφαλήν σου—"lower your head before the mighty" (4:7b).

In 41:14–42:8, Ben Sira provides lists of behaviours of which one should and should not be ashamed of. One *should* be ashamed (בוש/αἰσχύνεσθε) of adultery, lies, and a number of named crimes, but also of placing one's elbow in the food. Sex and money figure repeatedly, as we would expect. One should *not* be ashamed of the law, so as to be partial and aquit the ungodly, nor of keeping accounts, making a profit, disciplining one's children, or maltreating one's slave. Of the behaviours in the first list, Ben Sira says, "you may be legitimately ashamed (והיית בוש באמת/ἔσῃ αἰσχυντηρὸς ἀληθινῶς) and find grace in all people's eyes" (Sir 42:1; LXX 41:27). This is a shame which looks forward and makes

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[55] We would perhaps expect the reverse, that sin leads to shame, but the Greek meaning is probably that shame (αἰσχύνη) in the sense of shameful *behaviour* leads (ἐπάγουσα) to sin. On the other hand the Greek formulation may be the result of struggling with the Hebrew *Vorlage*: the translator seems to have taken משאת as a verbal noun derived from נשא and hence a raising or carrying, which has been interpreted in Greek as leading to, or bringing (out) sin. Based on the same root the Hebrew could also be taken to mean that shame is an offering to sin, a burden of sin, or even a signal or sign of sin (cf. the use of מַשְׂאֵ for beacon, fire-signal; Judg 20:38; Jer 6:1). There is an additional possibility: מִן + משֹׁאת (שׁוֹאָה cstr, as in Prov 3:25), which would render the meaning "there is a shame from the disaster of sin."

a person anticipate the detrimental results of acting against the norms so as to avoid such actions. One could possibly sense a difference in nuance here between the Hebrew and the Greek: the Hebrew may be interpreted as "you will be truly embarrassed for such behaviour (and thus avoid it)," while the Greek could perhaps be taken to mean "if you show the right shame and avoid such behaviour, you will become truly 'shameful,' in the sense of a 'modest person'."[56] In any case, the shame vocabulary employed here, in Hebrew as well as in Greek, stretches over the frameworks of at least SHAME I, II, and III. The fundamentally hierarchic character of the emotion of shame is not affected, but the process through which Israel is becoming embedded in Hellenistic culture seems to have shifted the emphasis of shame also in Hebrew, at least in Ben Sira, towards the moralistic side.[57]

SHAME IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

If we expect to see a continuation of such a "moral turn" in the New Testament writings, we may be disappointed. Space does not allow for

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[56] For somewhat related examples of possible differences in nuance between Ben Sira's Hebrew text in a Second Temple Jewish context and the Greek translation in a Hellenistic diaspora community, see Giuseppe Bellia, "An Historico-Anthropological Reading of the Work of Ben Sira," in *The Wisdom of Ben Sira: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology*, ed. Angelo Passaro and Giuseppe Bellia (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 49–74 (67–68).

[57] The extent of Hellenistic influences in Ben Sira has been subject to much discussion through the past decades. Ben Sira can be seen to display signs of resistance against the ongoing Hellenising process, but also to reflect Hellenistic ideology, philosophy, and education, at least to some extent. For overviews, also discussing previous research, see Oda Wischmeyer, "Die Konstruktion von Kultur im Sirachbuch," in *Texts and Contexts of the Book of Sirach/Texte und Kontexte des Sirachbuches*, ed. Gerhard Karner, Frank Ueberschaer, and Bukard M. Zapff; SCS 66 (Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2017), 71–98; John J. Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*; OTL (Louisville, KY: WJK, 1997), especially chapter 2: "Ben Sira in His Hellenistic Context," 23–41; Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. Di Lella, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira*; AB 39 (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 46–50.

more than a cursory overview of the most relevant material, but this is hopefully enough to discern a general picture.

Only once in the New Testament do we find αἰδῶς being used. The term is paired with σωφροσύνη in a highly patriarchal attempt to regulate women's dress (1 Tim 2:9–10), followed by detailed instructions about their submission (1 Tim 2:11–15): women should be shy, embarrassed, or have a sense of shame sufficient to avoid calling attention to themselves, and in particular to avoid speaking in public. This corresponds fairly well with the meaning of αἰδῶς in early Greek usage and is a clear example of subordinance shame. The corresponding verb, αἰδεῖσθαι, is not found in the New Testament at all.[58]

Elsewhere in the New Testament, shame terminology is dominated by the αἰσχ-family (αἰσχρός, αἰσχύνη, αἰσχύνειν, αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπαισχύνεσθαι, καταισχύνειν, and a few rare compounds). The scope of this terminology is fairly broad, but can be focused around a few nodes, one of which is gender roles. For example, Paul assumes that everyone finds it αἰσχρός for women to cut their hair (εἰ δὲ αἰσχρὸν γυναικὶ τὸ κείρασθαι ἢ ξυρᾶσθαι; 1 Cor 11:6). Does this mean that Paul found short-haired women ugly? Perhaps not, since the statement is part of an argument that a woman who prays without a head-covering shames her head (καταισχύνει τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτῆς; 1 Cor 11:5)—an argument to which we will soon return. On the other hand, we might suspect that these aspects were not necessarily or fully kept apart, if we suppose that an aesthetic notion adhered to the concepts of shame that Greek speakers used for thinking and feeling. Another example is the Pauline interpolator (as I take him to be)[59] of 1 Cor 14:35 who, similarly to the au-

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[58] The exception being the variant reading of Heb 12:28, found in the ninth century manuscripts K and L, also attested by a twelwth century corrector (א²) to Codex Sinaiticus.

[59] The literature on 1 Cor 14:34–35 is vast. Gordon Fee's arguments from mainly content and language are by now classic (Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*; NICNT [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987], 699–708), and the text-critical argument has been reinforced recently by Philip Payne's study of the distigme-obelos symbols in Codex Vaticanus (Philip B. Payne, "Vaticanus Distigme-obelos

thor of 1 Tim 2, finds it αἰσχρός for women to speak at public meetings
(αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστιν γυναικὶ λαλεῖν ἐν ἐκκλησία). These examples reflect
a subordinance shame perhaps as much of the EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME
I type as of the SHAME II type. It signals submission and acceptance,
even though the problem is lack rather than loss of status.

What about other norm infringements or "moral" issues? It may
come as a surprise that such matters are far from the main focus of
shame. In addition to texts dealing with gender roles, there are few
which explicitly associate shame with immoral behaviour. Paul does it,
in Rom 6:21, when he rhetorically asks his addressees what payback
("fruit") they received (τίνα οὖν καρπὸν εἴχετε) when they were slaves
under sin, and himself answers: such things you are now ashamed of
(ἐφ' οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε), which lead to death. Although the shameful
rewards are not explicitly spelled out, it is a fair guess, based on chapter
1, that Paul at least in part has sins of a sexual nature in mind. The au-
thor of Eph 5:12 finds it αἰσχρός to speak of what people do in secret
(τὰ γὰρ κρυφῇ γινόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν καὶ λέγειν).[60] We
could just imagine what the topic of such conversations might be – in
the *Dialogues of the Courtesans*, Lucian lets Leaina express herself simi-
larly, when Clonarion asks for details about how Megilla seduced her:
don't ask me for details, they are shameful (αἰσχρά).[61] Jude denounces
his opponents (Jude 1:13) by among other things accusing them for
"foaming their shames" (ἐπαφρίζοντα τὰς ἑαυτῶν αἰσχύνας), which in
the context likely refers to some kind of sexual licentiousness. In a few
instances, αἰσχύνη functions as a euphemism for genitals (Phil 3:19;
Rev 3:18).[62] Sexual norm infringments are clearly subject to feelings of

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Symbols Marking Added Text, Including 1 Corinthians 14.34–5," *New Testament
Studies* 63 [2017]: 604–25).

[60] An association between secrecy and shame is also found in 2 Cor 4:2 (ἀπειπάμεθα
τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς αἰσχύνης).

[61] Lucian, *Dial. meretr.* 5.3.

[62] Cf. the similarly euphemistic use in Rom 1:27 and Rev 16:15 of ἀσχημοσύνη,
which in the LXX is mainly found in Leviticus 18 and 20 and usually translates עֶרְוָה.

shame, although it is not evident where on a scale such shame should be placed. One could argue that somewhere within the GUILT spectrum makes sense, but neither loss of integrity, nor a negative self-evaluation is a completely necessary company to the shame involved. In addition to these examples there is surprisingly little evidence in the New Testament for shame language and moral discourse being associated or juxtaposed.[63]

The truth is that much of the shame language in the New Testament relates, just as בוש in the Hebrew Bible, to failure and success. Beginning with Paul, he employs a LXX expression from Isa 28:16 when he assures his addressees that a believer in Christ will not be let down (ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ οὐ καταισχυνθήσεται; Rom 9:33; 10:11). Similarly, in Rom 5:5, hope does not fail (ἡ δὲ ἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει), and in 2 Cor 10:8 he claims that his boasting is valid, he will not lose face (οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσομαι). In 2 Cor 9:4 shame is for him, as well as for his addressees, to fail in the Jerusalem collection. Even his imprisonment will not lead to shame (ἐν οὐδενὶ αἰσχυνθήσομαι), meaning failure (Phil 1:20).

Outside of Paul, 1 Peter displays a similar pattern, quoting the same passage from Isaiah (ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ, 1 Pet 2:6). Believers who suffer, not for wrongs, but for their faith, should not be ashamed (μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω), that is, they should not regard this as a failure (1 Pet 4:16), and those who slander Christians will be "put to shame" (καταισχυνθῶσιν), that is, they will be proven wrong (1 Pet 3:16).[64] Although the issue is Christian conduct (ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφή), the shame mentioned does not concern or threat that conduct but the opponents, whose vilifications will fail.[65]

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[63] Paul also reprimands the Corinthians (πρὸς ἐντροπὴν ὑμῖν λέγω), i.e., he shames them, for turning to outside judges (1 Cor 6:5) and for bad company leading to sin (1 Cor 15:33–34). However, in this context he does not employ αἰσχ-terminology,

[64] συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγαθήν, ἵνα ἐν ᾧ καταλαλεῖσθε καταισχυνθῶσιν οἱ ἐπηρεάζοντες ὑμῶν τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφήν.

[65] Several scholars have discussed the way in which 1 Peter turns shame into honour.

The examples I provide here are not comprehensive but representative enough. They demonstrate a primary focus for shame language in the New Testament: shame is a feeling of failure and defeat, the opposite of pride over success, and corresponds largely to the characteristics of SHAME II. We may register the cultural layers, but closely below them we detect an emotion inherited from our pre-human ancestors.

The other important focus for shame language in the New Testament is status and hierarchy. The unfaithful steward (οἰκονόμος) in Luke 16 is ashamed of the prospect of begging (ἐπαιτεῖν αἰσχύνομαι, 16:3); this would be below his status or dignity. Questions of status and hierarchy are also intrinsic to any discussions of gender roles, such as those already mentioned from 1 Timothy and 1 Corinthians. The context for Paul's discussion of hair length and head coverings in 1 Cor 11 has all to do with navigating earthly and heavenly hierarchies. A fixed hierarchy of "heads" is assumed, God – Christ – man – woman (παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἡ κεφαλὴ ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν, κεφαλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνήρ, κεφαλὴ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ θεός, 1 Cor 11:3), and the ways in which men and women cover their heads during prayer and prophecy are entirely related to this hierarchy (vv. 5–8).

Other hierarchies are overturned or inverted. Experiences that would normally be interpreted as failure, loss of control, and deprivation of status, are reinterpreted as signs of loyalty and success from a divine perspective of reversal. Paul claims that God elected the foolish and weak of the world in order to shame (καταισχύνη) the strong and wise, i.e., God reverses their status (1 Cor 1:27). Paul also warns believers against despising and "shaming" those of lower status, the have-nots (καταισχύνετε τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας, 1 Cor 11:22). Numerous texts argue against feeling shame for involvment with issues and people below one's own status level. Paul is not ashamed of the gospel (οὐ γὰρ

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See for example John H. Elliott, "Disgraced yet Graced: The Gospel according to 1 Peter in the Key of Honor and Shame," *BTB* 25 (1995): 166–78; David A. DeSilva, "Turning Shame into Honor: The Pastoral Strategy of 1 Peter, in *The Shame Factor: How Shame Shapes Society*, ed. Robert Jewett (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), 159–86.

ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, Rom 1:16). According to Hebrews, God is not ashamed to be called the God of the faithful (διὸ οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς θεὸς ἐπικαλεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, Heb 11:16), Jesus is not ashamed of calling believers brothers (οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται ἀδελφοὺς αὐτοὺς καλεῖν, Heb 2:11), and he was not even ashamed of the cross (ὑπέμεινεν σταυρὸν αἰσχύνης καταφρονήσας, Heb 12:2).[66]

Second Timothy talks repeatedly of the shame of imprisonment: the letter's "Paul" is not ashamed of his sufferings (δι᾽ ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ ταῦτα πάσχω· ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐπαισχύνομαι, 2 Tim 1:12), Onesiphorus was not ashamed of "Paul's" imprisonment (τὴν ἅλυσίν μου οὐκ ἐπαισχύνθη, 2 Tim 1:16), and the author asks Timothy to be ashamed neither of the witness/suffering of the Lord, nor of him as a prisoner (μὴ οὖν ἐπαισχυνθῇς τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν μηδὲ ἐμὲ τὸν δέσμιον αὐτοῦ, 2 Tim 1:8).

Even the synoptic Son of Man saying about reciprocal shame (Mark 8:38) fits into this pattern.

> ὃς γὰρ ἐὰν ἐπαισχυνθῇ με καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους ἐν τῇ γενεᾷ ταύτῃ τῇ μοιχαλίδι καὶ ἁμαρτωλῷ, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαισχυνθήσεται αὐτόν, ὅταν ἔλθῃ ἐν τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων τῶν ἁγίων.

> The person who is ashamed of me and my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him will the son of man be ashamed, when he comes in the glory of his father with the holy angels.

Without entering the discussion of how to relate "me" with the son of man,[67] we notice the plain message: recipients are encouraged not to feel shame for the lowly conditions of the earthly Jesus, but rather (as is

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[66] For a thorough socio-cultural analysis of shame language in the Epistle to the Hebrews, with an emphasis on reversal of values and a "corrective emphasis" on patronage, see David De Silva, *Despising Shame: Honor Discourse and Community Maintenance in the Epistle to the Hebrews*; Rev. ed.; SBLStBL 21 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008).

[67] Cf. Thomas Kazen, "Son of Man and Early Christian Identity Formation," in *Identity Formation in the New Testament*, ed. Bengt Holmberg and Mikael Winninge; WUNT 1/227 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 97–122.

clear from the preceding verses, Mark 8:34–37) to identify with them, because in the end the tables will be turned and conditions reversed. Loyalty will, in other words, be rewarded.

In 1 John 2:28 we find a similar passage and some degree of influence either from Mark or from some related Jesus tradition is likely.[68] The recipients are encouraged to remain loyal in order to have confidence and not be shamed by him (referent unclear) at his appearance (μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ, ἵνα ἐὰν φανερωθῇ σχῶμεν παρρησίαν καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ). It is a debated issue whether this verse closes the previous or introduces the subsequent section.[69] In the latter case, the references to righteousness in v. 29 may suggest a moral interpretation, so that the prospective shaming is associated with immoral behaviour, but there are strong reasons for v. 28 somehow pulling together the preceding christological section.[70] In that case, the text rather talks about loyalty to God/Christ ("remain in him") in contrast to those who listen to the antichrist. However, we must take a further aspect into account: the implications of the assurance or boldness (παρρησία) that is the opposite of being shamed. Although the term παρρησία often refers to frank (and critical) speech, and sometimes to rhetorical speech, or moral exhortation, this "freedom of speech" is rooted in the democratic right of citizens in classical Athens to express their views in the assembly. For many philosophers, such freedom was an inner virtue or capacity regardless of civic rights.[71] From this perspective, the contrast between παρρησία and shaming in 1 John 2:28 indi-

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[68] Judith M. Lieu, *I, II, & III John: A Commentary*; NTL (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 115.

[69] For a review of various options and attempts, concluding there is no consensus at all, see Matthew D. Jensen, "The Structure and Argument of 1 John: A Survey of Proposals," *CurBR* 12 (2014): 194–215.

[70] Lieu, *I, II, & III John*, 114.

[71] Cf. essays in John T. Fizgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn Stanfield Holland (ed.), *Philodemus and the New Testament World*; NovTSup 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2004); and essays in John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World* (Leiden: Brill, 1996).

cates two opposites with regard to status before the divine judge: subordinance shame versus integrity and positive self-evaluation, based on acceptance, even if not on equality. It could thus be argued that this passage reflects multi-faceted aspects of shame, but particularly attests to the predominance and paradigmatic nature of subordinance shame.

In sum, shame language in the New Testament is much less about social and moral norm infringement than many would expect. Expressions move along most of the shame continuum, but with dominance for frameworks represented especially by SHAME II and to some extent by EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I, in which issues of preventing or overcoming failure and defending or winning status are of crucial importance. Also in the New Testament, subordinance shame plays a major role.

CONCLUSIONS

Shame is a self-conscious emotion which contributes to the cooperation and survival of humanity, characterised as a highly advanced social species. Close to the biological roots we find a subordinance shame which navigates social hierarchies and mitigates failures. The texts and contexts we have visited indicate and support an understanding of this type of "primordial" shame cutting across layers of cultural development and construction, making itself visible along much of the continuum of shame-related emotions. The majority of cases seem to reflect shame of the EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I and the SHAME II types. More often than not, shame means failure. Most conspicuously, shame is only occasionally associated with moral norm infringements, and then almost exclusively with trespasses of a sexual character and with transgressions of gender norms, which often also have hierarchical aspects and are status-related.[72]

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[72] Cf. Thomas Kazen, *Smuts, skam, status: Perspektiv på samkönad sexualitet i Bibeln och antiken* (Göteborg: Makadam, 2018).

The texts and contexts we have discussed also suggest that social fear may play a more global role than we might think, as it has proved to be one of the underlying basic emotions associated with shame. Shame appears, in fact, as more visceral and closer to the basic emotions than we might have thought.

The cultural forms of shame, evidenced in the texts we have studied, accommodate to the highly hierarchical structures that dominated through the periods to which these texts belong. Some of these structures trace their roots far back into our primate past. Shame evolved for survival, but its social role is double-edged, or ambiguous. On the one hand, our capacity to feel shame facilitates cooperation and makes reciprocity and mutuality possible. This creates a problem for strongly individualistic cultures that often suppress shame. On the other hand, shame is easily and typically subsumed under hierarchical structures; shame is, in a sense, made for subordination and much of the history of humankind is ugly (αἰσχρός). Whether in the long run shame will assist human fellowship or ruin society is perhaps a political question, which does not belong here. But as long as an elbow in the food evokes more shame among the elite than rape and racism, there is still room for human culture to negotiate the biological substratum on which it grows.