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Emotioner i Bibeln

Emotions in the Bible

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Changes in Emotions in Greek-Speaking Judaism of Late Antiquity: The New Functions of Compassion and Envy[*]

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> Finally he bonds with the one he had envied, does not condemn those who love him, and so ceases from envy.
>
> Καὶ λοιπὸν συμπαθεῖ τῷ φθονουμένῳ, καὶ οὐ καταγινώσκει τῶν ἀγαπώντων αὐτον, καὶ οὕτως παύεται τοῦ φθόνου. (T. Sim. 3:6)

Early Jewish (and Christian) texts written in Greek, in the late Hellenistic and early Imperial periods, tend to display a marked interest in emotions. The affective life figures prominently in this body of texts. Narratives, for example, expand emotional descriptions and even add emotions where none are present in corresponding scriptural texts. Both wisdom literature and philosophical texts encourage some emotions and warn against others. Early Jewish (and Christian) authors also depict how emotions emerge, to which actions they lead, and how they can be transformed—as the above epigraph illustrates. Recent studies—in particular, Teresa Morgan's *Roman Faith and Christian Faith*, David A. Lambert's *How Repentance Became Biblical*, and Françoise Mirguet's *An Early History of Compassion*—have focused on discourses based on specific emotions.[1] In this paper, however, I am interested in the broader

[*] I presented an earlier version of this paper at the Swedish Exegetical Day on October 8, 2018. I thank the organizers for their invitation and kind welcome, as well as the participants for their questions and comments. My gratitude also goes to John Woodford for copy-editing the article and offering helpful feedback.

[1] Teresa Morgan, *Roman Faith and Christian Faith:* Pistis *and* Fides *in the Early*

change that affects emotions in late antique Jewish (and Christian) communities and underlies the above discourses. I suggest that an important aspect of this change consists in the new functions that emotions receive and the new roles that they start performing. While I focus on early Jewish literature, I include in this inquiry some texts on the border between Judaism and Christianity, such as the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs; these texts are used by both communities, at a time when the distinction between them is still in the making.

To explore these new functions of emotions, I concentrate on texts that rewrite, expand, or evoke scriptural texts—in particular, Philo, Josephus, and the pseudepigrapha. I have chosen to focus on narratives, as they are often the most explicit on both the contexts where emotions occur and the scenarios that these emotions tend to follow. I develop two sets of emotions: the pain felt for others' distress—often labeled as pity, compassion, or sympathy—and the pain felt for others' well-being—often labeled as jealousy or envy. These emotions are appraised in opposite ways: compassion and its related emotions are generally promoted, while painful feelings for others' well-being are mainly discouraged. Texts, at times, contrast the two emotions. For example, in the above epigraph, sympathy (συμπαθεία)—here an attunement to the other person and a concern for that person's well-being—is the culmination of an exercise by which the self eradicates its own envy (φθόνος). Case studies will show that emotions, which become more strictly defined in the late Hellenistic, early Roman period, progressively take on new roles, both in continuation with and in contrast to the Hebrew Bible. In line with a transforming conception of the human being, emotions are increasingly used to reveal the actual motives of actions, to validate others' pain or well-being, and to provide a space for self-fashion-

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Roman Empire and Early Churches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); David A. Lambert, *How Repentance Became Biblical* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Françoise Mirguet, *An Early History of Compassion: Emotion and Imagination in Hellenistic Judaism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

ing. Emotions, in other words, become a point of access to the inner self, a reinforcement of the social fabric, and a technique of self-transformation.

Compassion

Compassion and Other Emotional Responses to Others' Pain: Notes on Vocabulary

Compassion tends to be defined today primarily as an emotion. An oft-cited definition states that compassion is "the feeling that arises in witnessing another's suffering and that motivates a subsequent desire to help."[2] By contrast, in the Hebrew Bible, no single Hebrew term refers to compassion strictly as an emotion, although many biblical texts address human suffering and recommend its alleviation. The noun רחמים and its cognates tend to designate a constant bond or attachment, especially as it is activated in situations of suffering and vulnerability. These terms, however, do not denote distress felt for others' pain. Verbs like חמל and חוס at times indicate an emotional experience, but also frequently designate the action of sparing someone and refraining from killing.[3] More generally, ancient Hebrew terms translated by emotions in modern languages usually display a broader extension than the modern concept of emotion. These so-called emotional terms often include physical sensations, postures, acts, rituals, often in a way that engages social status.[4] These terms thus designate a more capacious experience than the modern concept and possess more fluid boundaries.

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[2] Jennifer L. Goetz, Dacher Keltner, Emiliana Simon-Thomas, "Compassion: An Evolutionary Analysis and Empirical Review," *Psychological Bulletin* 136/3 (2010): 351–374 (quotation from page 2).

[3] The verbs seem to refer to an emotion in Deut 19:21; Mal 3:17; 2 Sam 12:6; Isa 13:18, while they rather evoke an action in Gen 45:20; 1 Sam 15:9, 15; 2 Sam 12:4; 21:7.

[4] See Françoise Mirguet, "What is an 'Emotion' in the Hebrew Bible? An Experience That Exceeds Most Contemporary Concepts," *BI* 24/4–5 (2016): 442–465.

By contrast, Hellenistic literature as a whole, and Greek-speaking Jewish literature in particular, exhibits a narrower vocabulary for emotional responses to others' pain and even includes some lexical innovations. The term συμπαθεία, originally a scientific term rendering an attuned harmony between objects or bodies, receives an affective charge: it is first used to express affection between family members, and is then expanded to an empathic reaction to others' pain, both within and beyond the family. The Greek terms ἔλεος and οἶκτος—the standard terms expressing the emotions felt for others' pain—also tend to be used more broadly, in response not only to undeserved pain (as in Aristotle's definition) but also to all kinds of unfortunate situations.[5] In Jewish literature specifically, and then in early Christian texts, different terms based on σπλάγχνα (the "inner organs") are used to designate an embodied—gut-felt—response to others' pain. Beyond this lexical expansion, a comparison between biblical and early Jewish narratives reveals that an affective reaction to others' pain tends to be added where no such response is explicitly mentioned in corresponding biblical material. Rather than presupposing that something is missing in the Hebrew texts, I attempt to understand the functions of this emphasis on affective reactions to others' pain.

Additions of Emotional Responses to Others' Pain: Examples in Josephus and Philo

In Genesis 18, the divine character lets Abraham overhear that he is heading to Sodom and Gomorrah to determine their transgressions. Abraham's reaction is rendered by both his physical position—"Abraham approached..."—and by his words—"Will you really sweep away the righteous with the wicked?" (Gen 18:22–33). Facing the potential

[5] Aristotle defines pity [ἔλεος] in the following terms: "a pain about a perceived, destructive or painful, harm, happening to someone not deserving it, which one, or one of one's own, might expect to suffer oneself, and when it seems near" (*Rhetoric* 2.8.2, 1385b).

suffering of others, most of whom are unrelated to him (but including his nephew, Lot), Abraham immediately—and literally—steps in. The scene comprises no explicit emotion to explain Abraham's obstinate argument; what matters, rather, is his persistence and the deity's acceptance of his zealous disputation. Flavius Josephus, however, when he rewrites the scene in his *Antiquities*, imagines what Abraham is feeling: "Hearing this, Abraham felt grief [ἤλγησεν] for the Sodomites; arising, he entreated God..." (*Ant*. 1:199). Although Josephus condenses the whole conversation between Abraham and the divine character into two sentences, he nevertheless adds Abraham's emotional reaction to the Sodomites' fate. Here, the patriarch's courage in beseeching the deity stems from his distress at the prospect of Sodom's annihilation. This addition has been interpreted as an apologetic note, responding to anti-Jewish polemics.[6] While establishing a positive portrayal of the ancient Israelites was no doubt part of Josephus' endeavor, such an emotional addition seems to me wider in purpose; compassion, as we will see, is not limited to patriarchs. Here, Abraham's grief signals what motivates his concern for the Sodomites.

The encounter between King Saul and the necromancer of Ein Dor, both in the Hebrew scriptures (1 Sam 28) and in Josephus' retelling (*Ant*. 6:329–342), announces the impending demise of the king. At the end of the biblical story, the woman, noticing that Saul is "very agitated [נבהל מאד]" (28:21), urges him to eat and prepares her fatted calf, along with unleavened bread (28:21–25). Josephus expands this final scene; he stresses that the calf had been the object of the woman's care, fed by her, and her only possession (6:339). He continues with a full-fledged encomium of the necromancer, centered on her emotion: she "sympathized [συνεπάθησέ] and comforted him [Saul]" (6:341). In the scriptural narrative, the necromancer's care is prompted by what she sees—

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[6] See Louis H. Feldman, *Judean Antiquities 1–4: Translation and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 75, and, more generally, Louis H. Feldman, *Studies in Josephus' Rewritten Bible* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 546–551, 557–558.

"she saw that he was very dismayed" (1 Sam 28:21). In Josephus, her care is explained by what she feels. Sympathy is the impulse that brings the woman to show kindness to Saul—a complete stranger to her—who, furthermore, has made her livelihood illicit. Her sympathy also validates Saul's anguish: if the necromancer shows such emotional distress, then the king must really be in agony!

Philo, too, adds emotional responses to others' pain in his retelling of scripture—for example, in the narrative of baby Moses' rescue. The biblical narrative presents a two-step sequence, where visual perception is directly followed by action. Pharaoh's daughter, preparing to bathe in the Nile, catches sight of a basket: "She opened and saw him, the child—behold, a boy crying! And she spared [ותחמל עליו] him..." (Exod 2:6). The scene does not contain any strictly emotional terms, although the verb "to spare" (חמל), as noted above, may entail an affective dimension. The experience of Pharaoh's daughter is conveyed, rather, by what she sees. "Behold" (והנה) introduces her point of view and renders the scene as if it were seen through the girl's eyes.[7] Moses, heretofore referred to as "the child" (הילד), in connection with the one who gave birth (ילד) to him, is at this point called "a boy" (נער), without the definite article, thus from the perspective of Pharaoh's daughter. This visual perception leads the girl to transgress her father's command to kill all male Hebrew infants. Philo, by contrast, inserts an emotion into the sequence of events: "Then, having examined him [baby Moses] from head to foot, she [Pharaoh's daughter] admired his beauty and health; seeing him cry, she pitied [ἐλεεῖν] him, her soul already turning towards a maternal emotion as if he were her own child" (*Mos.* 1:15). In Philo's retelling, Pharaoh's daughter not only sees the baby, but also feels for him. Her compassion moves her to save the child and disobey her father's order.

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[7] On the use of הנה and its function in shifting points of view, see for example Adele Berlin, *Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative* (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1983), 43–82.

The Testament of Abraham: Abraham Has to Learn Compassion

Other texts are even more explicit in promoting compassion. I start with the Testament of Abraham, likely composed in the first centuries CE, probably in a Jewish milieu, although the text was later edited and transmitted by Christians. In one of its many facets, the Testament suggests that Abraham's actions of care—such as his hospitability toward and entreaty on behalf of others—are not quite sufficient on their own, but should proceed from an actual feeling: compassion. The Testament tells about Abraham's last days and, in particular, his attempts to delay the moment of his death. In one of these efforts, Abraham asks to look at the entire inhabited world, and God grants his request. During his trip, Abraham is appalled at sinners about to commit crimes; for each, he requests lethal punishment. The deity does not appreciate Abraham's ruthless justice: "For if he sees all those who live in sin, he will destroy all creation; for, behold: Abraham has not sinned, so he does not have pity [οὐκ ἐλεᾷ] for the sinners" (T. Ab. 10:13, long recension). Later in the text, Abraham learns to be compassionate. He implores the deity for the salvation of a soul, for the lives of the sinners he condemned, and finally for the lives of his servants, who were struck dead on seeing Death (14:1–9, 10–15; 18:9–10, long recension). The vocabulary of compassion is not explicit, but Abraham's tears betray his emotional involvement (14:12).

The Testament of Abraham thus suggests that Abraham has one last thing to learn before the end of his life: the felt partaking in others' pain. The scriptures portray his actions of care; the Testament tells how he eventually learns to be touched by human vulnerability. The Hellenistic narrative illustrates a new attitude towards emotions. First, acts of assistance are not sufficient in themselves; they must arise from an intimate sense of distress for the pain affecting others. Second, the Testament of Abraham also shows that an emotion like compassion is not only spontaneous; it can also be acquired. Through his visit to the heav-

ens and his encounter with Death, Abraham learns this felt participation in others' pain.

The Testament of Zebulun: Compassion as the Primary Response to Others' Pain

The most developed example of compassion in early Jewish literature (on the border with Christianity) is found in the Testament of Zebulun. The text is part of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, a collection of pseudepigraphic deathbed discourses attributed to the twelve sons of Jacob.[8] The consensus is that the collection developed from a Jewish core, probably composed during the first centuries CE, and was then expanded by Christians.[9] Each testament in the collection deals with one virtue, vice, or emotion; the Testament of Zebulun focuses on emotional responses to others' pain. It begins with an imaginative interpretation of what Zebulun felt when his brothers threatened to kill Joseph:

> "I was moved to pity [οἶκτον], and I began to cry, and my liver was pouring out within me, and all the foundation of my inner parts [σπλάγχνων] became porous in my soul. And Joseph cried, and I with him, and my heart was humming, and the joints of my body were shaken, and I was not able to stand." (T. Zeb. 2:4–5)

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[8] See Marinus de Jonge, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Critical Edition of the Greek Text* (Leiden: Brill, 1978).

[9] See James L. Kugel, "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs," in *Outside the Bible: Ancient Jewish Writings Related to Scripture* (ed. L. H. Feldman, J. L. Kugel, and L. H. Schiffman; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 2013), 1697–1855; Robert A. Kugler, "The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Not-So-Ambiguous Witness to Early Jewish Interpretive Practices," in *A Companion to Biblical Interpretation in Early Judaism* (ed. M. Henze; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 337–360; Robert A. Kugler, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* (Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 31–39; Jarl H. Ulrichsen, *Die Grundschrift der Testamente der zwölf Patriarchen. Eine Untersuchung zu Umfang, Inhalt und Eigenart der ursprünglichen Schrift* (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Historia Religionum 10; Stockolm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1991); Harm W. Hollander and Marinus de Jonge, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 1985).

The physical symptoms that Zebulun describes suggest that he experienced—bodily—the very terror felt by his brother Joseph, as if he himself were threatened. In contrast with the previous stories, the emotion, here, does not lead to action; Zebulun is unable to rescue Joseph (another brother, Reuben, does; see 2:7–8). Compassion plays a different role. While other examples in the Testament of Zebulun illustrate that compassion can prompt actions of care (see chapters 6 and 7), the vicarious pain felt by Zebulun distinguishes him from the murderous brothers. Even if Zebulun did not *do* anything, his gut-felt compassion manifests his "choice" or "inclination" (προαίρεσις; 5:2) and also protects him against sickness and other dangers (5:2, 4, 5). Further on in the text, Zebulun explains that, sometimes, compassion can be the only possible response to others' pain:

> "And if, at one time, you do not have anything to give to the one in need, suffer [with him] in inner feelings of pity. I know that my hand did not find anything available to give to the one in need; for seven stadia, walking with him, I cried and my inner parts turned towards him in sympathy." (T. Zeb. 7:3–4)

As we just saw, the Testament of Abraham suggests that actions of care alone are not sufficient to achieve virtue; they should be accompanied by sympathetic feelings. The Testament of Zebulun goes even further: sometimes compassion is the only available way to respond to others' pain. This new function of compassion stands in marked contrast to the more unitary view of experience in the Hebrew Bible, where actions, feelings, and sensations are rarely strictly dissociated from each other. Greek-speaking Jewish texts of late antiquity, by contrast, tend to distinguish different facets of experience. In the case of compassion, they hold that actions of care should proceed from a felt sensitivity to others' pain; in some instances, feelings are the only possible response.

The Testament of Zebulun, even more than the Testament of Abraham, makes clear that compassion can be actively cultivated and learned. Zebulun urges his descendants:

> "And now, my children, I declare to you to keep the commandments of the Lord and to do pity [ποιεῖν ἔλεος] to the neighbor and to have compassion

> [εὐσπλαγχνίαν] for all, not only for human beings, but also for animals." (T. Zeb. 5:1)

Compassion is thus associated with the other commandments; like them, it needs to be practiced. The narrative scene at the beginning of the text, where Zebulun describes the physiological symptoms of compassion—internal confusion, weakness, elevated heart rate—may even provide readers with actual bodily training. By minutely describing these sensations, the text teaches readers how to pay attention to what compassion actually feels like. Readers can then observe the same sensations in their own bodies as they cultivate sensitivity to others' distress.

New Functions of Emotional Responses to Others' Pain

Emotional responses to others' pain, very rarely expressed as such in the Hebrew scriptures, take on three major new roles in Greek-speaking early Jewish literature. First, the very consistency with which compassion and sympathy are added in narratives suggests that they have become a necessary component of social life. Compassion validates the other person's pain and gives it a social reality. It tightens the social fabric, beyond social status and ethnicity (as the examples of the necromancer and Pharaoh's daughter show). Second, emotional responses to others' pain are presented as impulses to perform actions that are costly or even dangerous to the self. Often, a sensory perception in the Hebrew scriptures is converted in its Hellenistic retelling into an emotion; not simple awareness, but rather the actual experience of distress moves the character to assist or care. In the Testament of Abraham, the emotion is necessary to give action its full value; in the Testament of Zebulun, the emotion may even *replace* action as an appropriate response. Emotions serve as an indicator of one's motivations and give access to the inner self. Third, compassion is constructed as an opportunity for self-transformation. Human beings can acquire compassion: the Testament of Abraham tells how its hero finally learned to experience the emotion, at the

threshold of death; the Testament of Zebulun trains its readers to notice and develop the bodily sensations that accompany compassion. Compassion and sympathy are tools for building a desirable self.

Envy and Jealousy

Envy and Jealousy: Notes on Vocabulary

With distress felt at the well-being of others, our perspective is broadened beyond socially appropriate emotions. In contemporary English, two words, "envy" and "jealousy," express this distress with a slight difference in meaning. Envy is caused by the realization of what another person has, whether one desires to possess it or not; the Oxford English Dictionary defines the term as "the feeling of mortification and ill-will occasioned by the contemplation of superior advantages possessed by another." Jealousy, by contrast, is mainly a fear; the same dictionary defines it as "[the] fear of losing some good through the rivalry of another"—for example, the affection of a loved one.

In the Hebrew Bible, the motif is expressed by the root קנא. Cognates in Syriac and in Arabic evoke the color red, perhaps suggesting that קנא initially described a physiological symptom: the reddening of the face.[10] Terms based on the root קנא function in two different ways, basically (but not exactly) fitting the modern uses of jealousy and envy.[11] In its first and most common use, the root קנא expresses a desire

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[10] See John H. Elliott, "God—Zealous or Jealous but Never Envious: The Theological Consequences of Linguistic and Social Distinctions," in *The Social Sciences and Biblical Translation* (ed. D. Neufeld; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008), 79–96, esp. 85.

[11] On the root קנא and its different uses, see John H. Elliott, "Envy, Jealousy, and Zeal in the Bible: Sorting out the Social Differences and Theological Implications—No Envy for Yhwh," in *To Break Every Yoke: Essays in Honor of Marvin L. Chaney* (ed. R. B. Coote and N. K. Gottwald; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2007), 344–364, as well as Elliott, "God—Zealous or Jealous but Never Envious." Elliott distinguishes three uses of the root—jealousy, envy, and zeal. I understand the different uses of the root in a way

for the exclusive enjoyment of a possession or status (the root often has this meaning when its subject is the deity). For example, Joshua requests that Moses prevent Eldad and Medad from prophesying in the camp. Moses demurs: "Are you jealous for me [המקנא אתה לי]?" (Num 11:29). Moses suspects that Joshua wants him to be the only one in possession of the divine spirit. The root קנא, here, expresses a desire for exclusivity: someone has a special status, and the jealous person does not want others to enjoy this prerogative. The same applies to the "spirit of jealousy" [רוח־קנאה] that animates the husband of the Sotah, the woman suspected of adultery (Num 5:14). The husband wants to be the only one to have sexual access to his wife. His קנאה is a response to a threatened sense of exclusivity. Positive connotations can also be attached to this use of the root קנא (which then tends to be translated as "zeal"). For example, the deity praises Phinehas for "being zealous of my own zeal" [בקנאו את־קנאתי] (Num 25:11)—as if Phinehas had internalized the divine desire for exclusivity.[12] In its second (and perhaps later) use, words based on קנא connote a desire to have what someone else has, but that one does not currently have oneself. A paradigmatic example is Jacob's sons' attitude towards their brother Joseph (Gen 37:11). The brothers perceive that Jacob loves Joseph more than he loves them; they are also annoyed at Joseph's dreams predicting his future dominance. They are envious [ויקנאו־בו]: they resist the idea of Joseph having more than they have; they also probably want for themselves this additional power and fatherly love. In its two uses, terms based on the root קנא exceed a strict emotion in the modern understanding; they refer, rather, to a negotiation of social standing and authority—who has it, over whom, and in exclusion of whom.[13]

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that is less dependent on current English terms and rather is based on the situations in which the terms occur in biblical texts.

[12] Phinehas' zeal or jealousy is recalled in several Hellenistic texts (Sir 45:23; 1 Macc 2:25; 4 Macc 18:12—all using the verb/adjective ζηλόω/ζηλωτός), which thus continue this scriptural tradition of positive zeal.

[13] See Elliott, "God—Zealous or Jealous but Never Envious," 79, 94–96.

Distress caused by the well-being of others frequently occurs in Greek-speaking early Jewish writings.[14] Several terms are used to express this emotion in Greek. The verb ζηλόω and the noun ζήλωσις are regular matches, in the Greek scriptures, for Hebrew terms based on the root קנא. According to Aristotle, ζῆλος (or ζήλωσις) refers to the pain arising from the perception that others possess certain goods, because the self does not possess them (*Rhet.* 2.11, 1388a). The noun ζηλοτυπία (absent in the texts examined in this article) is used in the Greek scriptures in only one text (Num 5). It refers to the pain felt when one realizes that someone else also has what one has; it thus suggests a desire for exclusivity. The verb βασκαίνω is used twice (Deut 28:54, 56) in the Greek scriptures. It translates the Hebrew תרע עינו/עינה ("his/her eye will do evil"); it tends to designate resentment at what the other has. The verb φθονέω, the noun φθόνος, and their cognates start appearing in later texts, such as Tobit (4:7, 16) and Sirach (14:10), and are then frequently used in texts first written in Greek. Aristotle distinguishes φθόνος from ζῆλος: φθόνος designates the pain arising from the perception of others' good fortune, not because one desires this success, but because one cannot accept that others may enjoy it (*Rhet.* 2.10, 1387b).[15] The early Jewish texts that I quote here, however, use these terms with little distinction between them.[16]

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[14] For an outline of the motif of envy in early Jewish and Christian literature, see Benjamin Lappenga, "James 3:13–4:10 and the Language of Envy in Proverbs 3," *JBL* 136/4 (2017): 989–1006.

[15] On jealousy and envy terms in ancient Greek, see David Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 219–243.

[16] For a similar observation about the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, see Tom de Bruin, *The Great Controversy: The Individual's Struggle between Good and Evil in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs and in their Jewish and Christian Contexts* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 126; Kugler, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, 45; Hollander, de Jonge, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, 109–110. About Josephus' treatment of envy, see Louis H. Feldman, "Josephus' Portrait of Joab," *Estudios Bíblicos* 51 (1993): 323–351, esp. 337–350. Feldman's review suggests that Josephus

I will highlight here what I perceive as three of the most prominent functions of envy and jealousy in a selection of late antique Jewish narrative texts (in Greek, or translating a Greek text). These functions are parallel to those observed for compassion: 1) a validation of the well-being of others; 2) an indication of the impetus of an action; 3) an occasion for self-fashioning. None of these functions are emphasized as such in the Hebrew Bible. The following examples successively illustrate these three functions.

Envy Validates the Well-Being of Others

Josephus frequently inserts envy in his retelling of scriptures, often with a similar pattern: the happiness, wealth, or status of a character—often an Israelite—is followed by the envy of others. After Abraham consents to the sacrifice of his (here compliant) son, God promises that Isaac will live "happily" to an advanced age, that his family will increase, and that his descendants will possess the land of Canaan. The deity then concludes, "they will be envied [ζηλωτούς] by all human beings" (*Ant.* 1:235). Regarding Jacob, Josephus asserts that "he came to greatness of happiness such that does not happen easily to someone else; he exceeded the inhabitants of the country in riches and he was envied [ζηλωτός] and admired for the virtues of his children" (*Ant.* 2:7). The Egyptians are seized "with envy" [κατὰ φθόνον] for the Hebrews, because of their happiness, number, and possessions (*Ant.* 2:201–202). Pharaoh is so envious [φθόνου] of Moses' leadership skills that he attempts to kill him (*Ant.* 2.255). David and Jonathan, when they part from each other, "lamented ... their companionship, which was envied [ἐφθονημένην]" (*Ant.* 6:241). Daniel, too, is envied: "[Held] in so great honor and in sumptuous care by Darius, alone entrusted with everything by him,... [Daniel] was envied [ἐφθονήθη] by the rest, for those who see others

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uses the Greek terms as synonyms. The Epistle of James, however, makes a distinction between the terms, according to Lappenga, "James 3:13–4:10."

[held] by kings in greater honor than themselves envy [βασκαίνουσι] them" (*Ant*. 10:250; see also 10:251, 256, and 3 Macc 6:7).

Commentators have interpreted Josephus' emphasis on envy in two complementary ways. First, they have perceived in Josephus' additions a representation—and perhaps a condemnation—of the envy to which the Jewish community of his time was subjected.[17] Second, they have understood the motif as Josephus' own identification with scriptural characters, since, in his *Life*, he frequently reports being the object of his rivals' envy (e.g., *Life* 85, 122, 189, 204, 423, 425).[18] It seems to me that the passages quoted above and these two cases of envy—for the Jewish people's (relative) prosperity and for Josephus' own success—actually serve to illustrate the same, broader function of envy. In all these instances, envy validates the well-being of a person or community. As Steve Mason writes about Josephus' *Life*, the envy of others reinforces the prestige of the self.[19] Just as compassion may confirm the pain of someone in distress, envy functions as an effective proof of good fortune.[20] In all the previous examples, envy contributes more to describing the character who is envied than the character who feels envy. Those who feel envy—when even mentioned—are often a vague, undefined group of people: "all human beings" (*Ant*. 1:235), "the inhabitants of the country" (2:7), "the Egyptians" (2:201), and "the rest" (10:250). The emotion contributes to building a set of social relations, where

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[17] See Feldman, *Judean Antiquities 1–4*, 130 (about the envy directed against Jacob): "Since Jacob is the direct ancestor of the Jewish people the envy directed toward him is probably to be viewed as predictive of the envy directed toward the Jews after him." See also Louis H. Feldman, "Josephus' Portrait of Moses: Part Two," *JQR* 83/1–2 (1992): 7–50.

[18] See Feldman, *Judean Antiquities 1–4*, 130: "This emphasis on the theme of envy is doubtless influenced by Josephus' own experience in being subjected to the envy of his arch-enemy John of Gischala."

[19] Steve Mason, *Life of Josephus: Translation and Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 11 and 78–79, as well as Steve Mason, *Flavius Josephus on the Pharisees: A Composition-Critical Study* (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 225–227.

[20] The same motif is found in Philo as well (e.g., *Dreams* 1:223; *Joseph* 5).

states like pain and well-being are defined not only by practical circumstances, but also by the feelings that these circumstances elicit in others.

Such a function of envy or jealousy is not prominent in the Hebrew Bible—if it is present at all. The jealousy [רוח־קנאה] of the Sotah's husband, for example, does not validate anything. In fact, the very ritual to which the unfortunate wife is submitted aims precisely at determining whether or not she has committed adultery. Joshua's jealous desire for Moses' exclusive status does not validate it; at most, it may suggest Joshua's anxiety about his own future leadership, after Moses' death. The Philistines' envy of Isaac is mentioned just after a report of his flock, cattle, and servants (Gen 26:14); their envy, however, is hardly necessary to confirm Isaac's wealth. More likely, the Philistines' envy introduces Abimelech's request that Isaac go away (26:16).

Envy Indicates the Impetus of an Action

A second prominent function of envy, in Jewish literature of late antiquity, is to reveal the impetus of an action—again, a role parallel to that played by compassion.[21] To illustrate this function, I turn to the motif of the serpent's envy. Absent in the Hebrew Bible, this theme is mentioned or developed in several different sources—the book of Wisdom, Josephus' *Antiquities*, the Latin version of the Life of Adam and Eve, and, briefly, in the Babylonian Talmud. Rather than following a chronological order (some texts are difficult to date anyway), I trace the motif as it progressively expands. I begin with an early occurrence of the devil's envy, found in the book of Wisdom:

> For God created the human being for incorruption,
> And he made him an image of his own eternity;
> But through the envy of the enemy/devil [φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου]
> death entered the world,
> Those who belong to his party experience it. (Wis 2:23–24)[22]

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[21] See a similar observation in Feldman, *Studies in Josephus' Rewritten Bible*, 567.

[22] John R. Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism: From Sirach to 2 Baruch* (JSP

Who is the *diabolos*, and of what is he envious—of divine power or of human privilege? Josephus, in his *Antiquities*, fleshes out the subject:

> While all living beings were speaking the same language, at that time, the serpent, living together with Adam and his wife, had envy [φθονερῶς] for them. Supposing that they would be happy believing in God's commands, but would fall into calamity if they were to disobey, he maliciously persuaded the woman... (*Ant*. 1:41–42)

The serpent's envy, in Josephus' account, is at the core of his deception. The serpent cannot stand human beings' happiness—the bliss that they enjoy in paradise and/or the bliss that they will experience by observing divine commands. The serpent devises his scheme of deception in order to deprive them of this happiness. Envy, here, is the inability to accept the well-being of others. It is presented by Josephus as the ultimate motive behind the serpent's deception.[23] A similar idea is found in the Babylonian Talmud, in tractate Sanhedrin, where the serpent is said to be envious [ונתקנא] of Adam's glory (b. Sanh. 59b).

The Latin version of the Life of Adam and Eve (itself the translation of a lost Greek text) includes the most developed expression of this motif. The LAE is dated between the first century BCE (by those who attribute the core of the text to a Jewish milieu) and the first centuries CE (by those who locate the origins of the text in the early Christian community).[24] The relevant scene is situated shortly after Adam and Eve's expulsion from paradise. The two humans try to repent, but the devil deceives Eve a second time. Upon realizing the subterfuge, Eve addresses the devil, and the following dialogue ensues:

Supp. 1; Sheffield: JSOT, 1988), 51–52, raises the possibility that διάβολος, here, may not refer to the devil, but rather to Cain ("the enemy").

[23] On this passage, see Levison, *Portraits of Adam in Early Judaism*, 104–105.

[24] For the critical edition of the Latin text, see Jean-Pierre Pettorelli, *Vita Latina Adae et Evae* (Corpus Christianorum; Series Apocryphorum 18–19; Turnhout: Brepols, 2012). I follow Paris ms. 3832 (lat-P), a Latin translation of a Greek text closely related to the Greek source of the Armenian and Georgian versions. Pettorelli deems that lat-P reflects an earlier text than the common Latin text (lat-V). There are no major variations between the Latin texts for the passage considered here.

> [Eve][25] cried out in a great moan: "Woe to you, devil, who fights us without reason. What is there between you and us? What have we done against you, that you pursue us with deceit? Why is your malice against us? Is it we who have taken away your glory, or we who have caused you to be without the glory that you possessed? Why do you pursue us unjustly and enviously [*inuidiose*]?" And the devil cried out, groaned, and said to Adam: "All my enmity, envy [*inuidia*], and deceit are from you, since, because of you, I have been expelled from my glory and my splendor that I had in heaven in the midst of the archangels. Because of you, I have even been thrown onto the earth." (LAE 11:2–12:1)

The devil explains that God threw him onto the earth on the day humans were created, because he refused to adore Adam. He continues:

> "When I understood that it was because of you that I had been expelled, I was moved to sadness because I had been expelled from such a great glory and I was seeing you in the joy of delights. Then, with deceit, I afflicted you through your wife and caused you to be expelled from the delights of paradise. For, as I had been expelled from my glory, in the same way I acted so that you would be expelled from paradise. Indeed, I did not want to suffer to see you there whence I had been expelled." (LAE 16:2–3)

In his confession, the devil details the genesis of his envy: the grief of losing his glory, the pain of witnessing the joy of others, and the desire not only to deprive others of their joy, but also to cause them the same grief that he suffered. The devil has no hope of recovering his glory; he just cannot bear that others enjoy what he has lost. As in Josephus, the devil's envy here reveals an inability to accept the happiness of others.

The Greek text of the Life of Adam and Eve does not include the motif of the devil's envy, but does contain an interesting mention of distress caused by the potential advantage of others. The emotion, attributed this time to the divine character, is situated in the scene of Eve's deception in paradise.[26] The serpent tries to convince Eve to eat the fruit; once the humans eat it, he promises, their eyes will be open and they

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[25] The subject of *clamauit* is not explicit and can be either Eve or Adam. I choose Eve, since she is the subject of the previous verbs.

[26] For the critical edition of the Greek text, see Johannes Tromp, *The Life of Adam and Eve in Greek* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005).

will become like gods. He adds: "God, knowing this, that you would be like him, envied/was jealous of [ἐφθόνησεν] you and said, 'Do not eat of it' (LAE 18:4).[27] The serpent pretends that the divine prohibition of eating from the tree proceeds from jealousy: God is jealous of his own knowledge and cannot stand the idea of humans sharing it. As in the Latin text, the emotion explains an action mentioned by the scriptural text but left without a motivation. Envy and jealousy, whether in a confession or in a false interpretation, provide the "why."

In these sources, the devil's envy (and, parenthetically, God's jealousy) unveils the impetus for an action left unexplained in the Hebrew Bible. These early Jewish texts illustrate a desire to "fill in the blanks" in scripture; more specifically, however, they suggest a shift of interest from acts to their motivations—from what is done to an exploration of the inner reasons that lead human beings (as well as their divine and diabolical counterparts) to behave the way they do. This drive is an emotion—the "why" behind the action. The emotional realm, here, is constructed as a supplemental layer in human experience, where actions find their ultimate motivations.

How new is this function of envy and jealousy? I mentioned above the Philistines' envy for Isaac's possessions and Abimelech's subsequent request that Isaac leave the territory (Gen 26:14, 16). Rachel's envy of her sister Leah (Gen 30:1) is similarly situated just before her request that Jacob have intercourse with the maidservant Bilhah (30:3). In these two examples, envy precedes a request. Rather than an investigation into a character's motivations, however, these passages suggest a temporal sequence where a disproportion of possessions or offspring leads to actions aimed at correcting this disparity. The story of Joseph's brothers' hate (Gen 37:4, 8) and envy (37:11) presents a more complex tableau, but still displays the same sequential model, where the emotion arises

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[27] On this passage, see Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta, "The Envy of God in the Paradise Story According to the Greek *Life of Adam and Eve*," in Flores Florentino: *Dead Sea Scrolls and Other Early Jewish Studies in Honour of Florentino García Martínez* (ed. A. Hilhorst, É. Puech, E. Tigchelaar; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 537–550.

and then leads to the action. The story, which may belong to the later strata of Genesis (as suggested by the motif of the wise adviser in a foreign court, also found in Esther and in Daniel), may offer an early anticipation of the role that emotions take in early Jewish literature. Outside of narrative literature, envy is explicitly presented as a motivation for action in Qohelet: "I have seen all toil and all skill in work—it is man's envy of another [קנאת־איש מרעהו]" (Qoh 4:4). The function of envy as a motivation for action, therefore, starts appearing in late biblical texts; there is no abrupt transition between scriptural texts and their late antique retellings.

While the Hebrew Bible tends to present a sequential view of human behavior, early Jewish narratives display a layered conception, where actions can be decrypted by their underlying emotions, revealed in confession-like discourses.[28] The structure of the Life of Adam and Eve, in both its Latin and Greek versions, reflects this stratified construction: it is only after the fact that the reader learns about the envious dispositions of the serpent (in the Latin version) and, as alleged by the serpent, of God's jealousy (in the Greek version). This *ex post facto* revelation contributes to an archaeological portrayal of characters; the action appears in plain sight, but a later confession or malicious interpretation may unveil its deeper, hidden motivations.

Envy is an Occasion for Self-Fashioning

In its third function in early Jewish sources, envy becomes an occasion for self-fashioning, with a potential cosmic impact. Envy is presented as an emotion that the self can and should eradicate. As we already noted for compassion, an emotion, by its very malleability, becomes a tool of self-transformation, whether the particular emotion should be cultivated or eliminated. The Testament of Simeon (part of the Testaments of the

[28] The vocabulary of the "layered self" (in the case of the Rabbinic conception of the human being) is used by Ishay Rosen-Zvi, *Demonic Desires:* Yetzer Hara *and the Problem of Evil in Late Antiquity* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 132.

Twelve Patriarchs) illustrates how envy should be suppressed.[29] It reports Simeon's deathbed discourse, in which he confesses his struggle with envy. The text presents a subtle analysis of envy, in which the emotion plays out both in human bodies and at a cosmic level. Simeon recognizes:

> "In that time, I was envious [ἐζήλωσα] of Joseph, because our father loved him." (T. Sim. 2:6)

The emotion is rooted within the familial context; it arises from Jacob's preferential love for Joseph. However, Simeon also reports that envy was sent to him by the "prince of deceit":

> "I strengthened my liver against him [Joseph] to destroy him because the prince of deceit [ὁ ἄρχων τῆς πλάνης], having sent the spirit of envy [τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ζήλου], blinded my mind, so that I did not care for him as a brother and did not spare Jacob my father." (2:7)

Envy, according to this text, has a dual origin: it is sent by the devil, but also develops within the human being—as Simeon says, within his body (liver) and mind.[30] The Testament of Zebulun, as we observed, describes the physical symptoms of compassion. The Testament of Simeon, likewise, depicts how envy feels:

> "Because this [envy] makes the soul mad and corrupts the body, it causes anger and war in thoughts; it provokes to blood; it leads the mind into a trance; it does not permit intelligence to work in human beings; it even seizes sleep and causes confusion in the soul and trembling in the body." (4:8)

Simeon goes on to describe the physical practices that, with divine assistance, delivered him from envy:

> "Repenting, I wept and I prayed to the Lord that I might be restored and that I might stay away from all defilement and envy [φθόνου] and all foolishness." (2:13)

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[29] For a discussion of envy in the Testament of Simeon, see Bruce J. Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 115–118.

[30] On the "prince of deceit" in the Testament of Simeon, see de Bruin, *The Great Controversy*, 125–131 and Kugler, *The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*, 46.

> "For two years of days, in fear of the Lord, I afflicted my soul with fasting and I knew that the relief from envy [φθόνου] comes through the fear of God. If someone flees to the Lord, the evil spirit runs away from him and the mind becomes light." (3:4–5)

While the eventual deliverance from envy comes from the deity, the process itself is within human hands. Repentance, tears, prayer, and fasting are all practices that, from within the body, allow the self to conquer envy, despite its strong grip. The emotion—and especially human control over it—constitutes a space for self-fashioning; it provides an opportunity for human beings to transform themselves. In fact, according to the Testament of Simeon, this change involves cultivating positive emotions. The last quote is followed by the epigraph cited at the beginning of this article:

> "Finally he bonds with [συμπαθεῖ] the one he had envied, does not condemn those who love him, and so ceases from envy." (3:6)

I do not read the verb συμπαθέω here as a response to pain, since its object is the person who was previously envied and thus enjoys some privilege. Rather, I read it in its classical meaning of "being attuned to" or "bonding with": the pain caused by the other's privilege is replaced by a feeling of attunement, which, one can suppose, makes the other's well-being a source of happiness for the self. Like bonding, generosity, too, can help uproot envy (4:5). This victory over envy, furthermore, extends beyond the human self. Simeon promises his children:

> "If you take away from yourselves envy [φθόνον] and all stubbornness..., then all the spirits of deceit will be given to trampling and human beings will reign over evil spirits." (6:2, 6)

Simeon lists the beneficial effects of eradicating envy from the self; these culminate in the human triumph over evil spirits. Since envy is sent by the prince of deceit, its defeat by human beings, with divine assistance, is an event of cosmic dimensions. Diligently fighting one's envy is a practice by which the human being not only fashions itself, but also participates in the final victory of good over evil.

This function of envy, as a tool of self-fashioning and, eventually, participation in the cosmic battle between good and evil, is absent from the Hebrew Bible. The book of Proverbs contains a few condemnations of envy, often specifically directed at wicked people (Prov 3:31; 23:17; 24:1, 19), but without developing concepts of self-control and self-fashioning. Envy, in one place, is compared to "rottenness of the bones" (Prov 14:30), but without hinting at its possible eradication. Clearly, the development of envy as an opportunity for the human being to work on and better itself is a new motif in early Jewish literature. These texts innovate particularly by describing the process by which envy can be countered, through the use of spiritual practices (such as prayer), embodied techniques (such as crying and fasting), and positive emotions (such as bonding). A new perception of the human being emerges behind the depiction of such emotional work: a being able to act on itself and transform.

Conclusion

A redefinition of the emotional realm—perhaps in part under the influence of the Greek language—allows Jewish (and later Christian) authors of late antiquity to attribute new functions to emotions, in both continuity with and contrast to the Bible. Emotions, in the Hebrew scriptures, tend to overlap with other experiences such as actions, sensations, and ritual practices; in later texts, stricter limits allow the affective realm to serve as a novel resource for building the human self. Each new function of emotion unveils a specific facet of the Jewish (and Christian) view of the human in the late Hellenistic, early imperial period.

First, compassion/sympathy and envy/jealousy are used in early Jewish (and Christian) narratives to validate the pain and well-being of others. These emotions confirm suffering and happiness as interpersonal phenomena: situations like success and destitution, bliss and despair, take on a social dimension, as they tend to be depicted alongside the emotional responses they provoke in others. Emotions tighten the social

fabric; happiness and pain transcend the individual and elicit emotions in others. Compassion and envy suggest an emotionally porous self. Emotions circulate between human beings, at times transgressing boundaries of ethnicity and social status.

Second, compassion and envy are used to reveal the inner motivations of actions—concern and malevolence, respectively. Texts suggest a shift of interest from what is *done* to what is *felt*, as many texts imagine the emotional purposes that compel scriptural characters to act the way they do. Emotions constitute the drive that leads human beings to perform both selfless and cruel actions. In the case of compassion, texts reveal the growing significance of the felt distress that drives an action: Abraham, in the eponymous Testament, is presented as a righteous and hospitable human being, but also as one who needs to learn compassion; Zebulun, in his Testament, insists that feeling compassion can at times be the only possible appropriate response to others' distress. The two emotions, here, unveil an archaeological conception of the human being, in which external actions are prompted by internal, hidden emotional purposes. While the Hebrew Bible displays a sequential view of the human, the early Jewish (and Christian) texts examined here tend to present a layered view.

Finally, compassion and envy are depicted as flexible emotions, which human beings can either cultivate or discourage. Jewish (and Christian) texts from late antiquity portray characters who change—more specifically, who actively *change themselves*. Texts present what can be interpreted as training programs, which detail spiritual, bodily, and emotional techniques for building the most desirable self. In particular, the Testament of Simeon recommends cultivating positive emotions, such as bonding (3:6) and generosity (4:5), as a way to counter envy. The new functions of emotions suggest an evolving perception of the human and sense of self: human beings are able—and ought—to work on and transform themselves.

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The Paradoxes of Fear in the Hebrew Bible

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Many researchers argue that fear is a universal human emotion.[1] Scholars frequently describe it as small number of basic emotions (other ones include happiness, sadness, anger, and surprise).[2] As a primary emotion, fear is understood as hardwired into the human brain. Our minds' neurological circuitry has dedicated channels that cause us to quickly and innately sense danger and respond rapidly.[3] From an evolutionary standpoint, fear has obvious advantages. People who rapidly sense danger are more likely to avoid threats than those who go tumbling forward unaware.[4]

Even if fear is a universal part of human experience, cultures differ widely in how they handle this emotion.[5] Segments of American cul-

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[1] An excellent article reviewing literature on the universal and cultural aspects of emotion, including fear, is James A. Russell, "Culture and the Categorization of Emotions," *Psychological Bulletin* 110/3 (1991): 426–50.

[2] See especially the work of Paul Ekman and Robert Plutchik. On the legacy of Ekman, see David Matsumoto, "Paul Ekman and the Legacy of Universals," *Journal of Research in Personality* 38/1 (2004): 45–51. On the legacy of Plutchik, see Ross Buck and Keith Oatley, "Robert Plutchik (1927–2006)," *American Psychologist* 62/2 (2007): 142.

[3] See Joseph LeDoux, "The Emotional Brain, Fear, and the Amygdala," *Cellular and Molecular Neurobiology* 23 (2003): 727–38.

[4] For more on the connection between evolution and fearing specifically God, see Dominic Johnson, *God Is Watching You: How the Fear of God Makes Us Human* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[5] On the ways in which emotions are culturally specific, see Matthew R. Schlimm, *From Fratricide to Forgiveness: The Language and Ethics of Anger in Genesis* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 19–34, cf. 35–47. Thomas Kazen makes a similar point

ture, for example, embrace machismoism. There is a driving conviction that men should be strong, tough, courageous, and self-reliant. Within these segments of American culture, there is a whole host of negative names associated with people who show fear: weakling, pansy, coward, scaredy-cat, sissy, and chicken, just to name a few. These segments of American culture teach children that fear should not be displayed. Becoming an adult means putting fears aside. Apart from horror movies, there are few outlets for expressing fears publically.

In fact, when a beloved American Senator, John McCain, recently died, his daughter spoke at his funeral. She said, "As a girl, I didn't appreciate what I most fully appreciate now—how he suffered and how he bore it with a stoic silence that was once the mark of an American man."[6] Notice what she said there. Of all the qualities she could have said that she most appreciated about her dad, she talked about his "stoic silence" when suffering. Meghan McCain did not praise her father for articulating the depth of his sorrows or for giving voice to the fears that naturally come in moments of suffering. It was rather her father's ability to remain calm, cool, collected, emotionless, and ultimately silent that she appreciated. Such words are all the more remarkable, given that her father suffered both as a prisoner of war earlier in life and as a victim of brain cancer later in life.

Anthropologists talk of "emotional styles."[7] By this term, they refer to the language, beliefs, attitudes, behaviors, expectations, and norms that cultures construct around emotions.[8] The emotional style that

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regarding humanitarian behavior (being both "rooted in the neurobiological constitution of human beings" and "shaped by culture"; see his "Emotional Ethics in Biblical Texts: Cultural Construction and Biological Bases of Morality," *HBAI* 6 [2017]: 431–56, here 440, https://doi.org/10.1628/219222717x15235367195631).

[6] Veronica Stracqualursi, "Meghan McCain Contrasts Father's Legacy with Trump's 'Cheap Rhetoric,'" *CNN*, 1 Sept. 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/01/politics/meghan-mccain-john-mccain-funeral/index.html.

[7] See Peter N. Stearns, *American Cool: Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style* (New York: New York University Press, 1994).

[8] It is especially important to keep emotional styles in mind, given that, as Françoise

many Americans have constructed around fear is fairly obvious from what I have already shared. Fear is associated with sub-human, animal behavior, so that if you are afraid, you're a scaredy-cat or chicken. You might not even be an animal, but rather a frail flower as the term "pansy" suggests. According to the logic of this emotional style, fear reduces the frightened person to a weakling: someone whose lack of strength is their defining quality. In the unfortunate event one feels fear despite immense societal pressures, the best one can do is experience this emotion privately. Hopefully, one will conquer it by facing whatever causes the fear.

This American emotional style is not the only possible one that can be or has been constructed around fear. Anthropologists working with peoples in the Southwest Pacific have encountered cultures that do not disparage fear but actually celebrate it. A common practice in these cultures is to tell stories of feeling afraid. Instead of being dismissed as cowards, people speaking of their fears receive respect. They make themselves vulnerable in revealing their fears, but this vulnerability creates communal bonds. These people communicate to others that they themselves need not be feared because they too sometimes feel afraid. The storytellers show that they are not a threat. Storyteller and listener are made one through their common humanity, which naturally entails sometimes feeling fear. Instead of marginalizing, animalizing, or dehumanizing people who feel afraid, people in these cultures appreciate and relate to those with experiences of this emotion.[9]

So, what we find, then, is that while fear is a fairly universal emotion, cultures can construct very different attitudes, judgments, and be-

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Mirguet points out, "The experiences [evoked by words like יראא] exceed what we call emotions, as they also include actions (ritual, legal, etc.) and bodily sensations" ("What Is an 'Emotion' in the Hebrew Bible? An Experience that Exceeds Most Contemporary Concepts," *BibInt* 24 [2016]: 442–65, here 455, see also 450–51).

[9] Catherine A. Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll & Their Challenge to Western Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 184–85; Robert I. Levy, Tahitians: *Mind and Experience in the Society Islands* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 307–308.

haviors around that same basic emotion. Certainly, the Bible presents fear in a very different light than many modern societies. It links fear with religion. As Daniel Castelo puts it, "When one looks at the Old Testament especially, there is no more pronounced claim within the canon as to how believers are to relate to their God than in the 'fear of the Lord.'"[10] In fact, biblical teaching about fear raises many questions. There are four questions I wish to address here:

The first is a preliminary question. What characterizes biblical fear? Is it best described in terms of perceived physiological symptoms? Is there another characteristic that lies at the heart of this emotion?

The second question relates to what exactly people fear when they fear God. What makes God frightening? Is the sheer size, grandeur, and majesty of God frightening in comparison with human finitude? Is the fear that God will judge our actions? Is the fear that God may be cruel and harm us for no reason?

Third, why do some traditions within the Bible emphasize the goodness of fearing God? What could possibly be the upside to feeling afraid of God?

Lastly, why is there a strong biblical emphasis on fearing God when the Bible so frequently tells people *not* to be afraid?

Characterizing Biblical Fear

Is there a perceived physiological experience that may lie at the heart of biblical fear? It can be difficult to tell with precision. Biblical texts sometimes prize brevity and concision, meaning they do not always describe everything a frightened character experiences. Some texts equate feelings of fear with shaking and trembling (e.g., Deut 2:25; Micah 7:17). It is even possible that many biblical words for fear originally related in some

[10] Daniel Castelo, "The Fear of the Lord as Theological Method," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 2/1 (2008): 147–60, here 148.

way to trembling or being short of breath.[11] Other texts say that the hearts of frightened people "melt."[12] At different times, the Bible says that the frightened person is frozen in fear, becoming quiet and still.[13] This diverse range of feelings actually aligns with what scientists have found. Those studying emotion have found that people who experience an emotion do not always perceive the same physiological symptom, even when they are from the same culture.[14] Analyses of perceived physiological symptoms can be illuminating, but these symptoms are not always uniform, particularly in the case of fear. Furthermore, emotions appear to entail more than simply a feeling.

Over the past two decades, researchers from the fields of neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have reached similar conclusions, namely, that emotions entail judgments the brain makes about what we care about but cannot control. There is debate over whether emotions are *primarily* feelings, evaluations, or motivations, but most researchers acknowledge some place for cognitive perceptions.[15]

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[11] Cf. H. F. Fuhs, "יָרֵא *yārē'*, יִרְאָה *yir'â*; מוֹרָא *môrā'*," *TDOT* 6:290–315, here 291; H.-P. Stähli, "ירא *yr'* to fear," *TLOT* 2:568–78, here 570.

[12] The Hebrew typically uses a verb from the root מסס ("melt") and the noun לב/לבב ("heart"). See Deut 1:28; 20:8; Josh 2:11; 5:1; 7:5; 2 Sam 17:10; Ps 22:15[14]; Isa 13:7; 19:1; Ezek 21:12[7]; Nah 2:11[10].

[13] Exod 15:16; Ps 76:9[8]; cf. Ps 4:5[4]; Amos 5:13.

[14] Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 97; Schlimm, *From Fratricide*, 83. Note also the following works, which show that fear can be associated with a variety of physiological symptoms in biblical literature: Julie B. Deluty, "The Embodiment of Fear in Ugaritic and Semitic Literature: Re-examining the Social Dynamic," *Arc* 40 (2012): 69–91, esp. 79–83; Paul A. Krüger, "A Cognitive Interpretation of the Emotion of Fear in the Hebrew Bible," *JNSL* 27/2 (2001): 77–89, esp. 80–85.

[15] See especially Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought;* Robert C. Roberts, *Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007). While I emphasize the cognitive aspects of biblical fear in this paper, my intent is not to say that affective dimensions are absent (a move that some scholars have erroneously made; see the helpful article Bill T. Arnold, "The Love-Fear Antinomy in Deuteronomy 5–11," *VT* 61 [2011]: 551–69, here 565–67). Rather, I seek to make the case that interpreters can learn much from these cognitive dimensions.

Certainly, there is an emerging consensus that emotions are not irrational phenomena they once were equated with.[16]

How then do emotions entail cognitive judgments? It's helpful to think about specific emotions. Happiness arises when our minds perceive that something good has happened in our lives. On the other hand, sadness envelops us when our brains perceive the loss of something important. When our minds judge that someone has committed a wrong against ourselves or those close to us, we naturally feel angry. Whatever the physical sensations that may arise with a given emotion, there tends to be a cognitive judgment at the heart of most emotions in most people.

In the case of fear, our brains perceive some sort of potential threat in our environment. An event we do not want to occur seems imminent. It might be a threat that never materializes. It might be something that initially seems scary but then turns out to be harmless. Children, for example, might fear the dark or a monster because they do not have enough experience to realize that they can be perfectly safe in the dark and that monsters do not exist. From their limited view of the world, however, their fear makes sense. At its heart, fear comes from the mental judgment that we face a potential threat.

Does the Hebrew Bible similarly present emotions as operating according to mental judgments? Even though there is an academic consensus about the cognitive dimension of emotions, it is important to ask such a question. As noted earlier, emotions have both universal dimensions and locally defined associations. As such, we want to ensure that something we think is universal is in fact universal and not a culturally bound dimension of emotion we presume is present everywhere.

When the Hebrew Bible talks about fear, it most commonly uses the verb יראּ, meaning "to fear" or "to be afraid," as well as the related adjective יראּ, meaning "afraid," and the nouns יראה and מוראּ, both of which

[16] Schlimm, *From Fratricide*, 35–47.

can be translated "fear." These words appear 419 times in the Bible.[17] There are approximately 150 times when the Bible uses these words to talk about people fearing other people.[18] In nearly every case, the people who fear are faced with a potential threat. One of the first instances of a human fearing another human comes in Genesis 32. Jacob approaches his homeland, which he fled decades earlier upon learning that his brother Esau wanted to kill him. As Jacob gets close, Esau advances with 400 men. Jacob is terrified. He perceives that not only he but his entire family may die. He prays to God, "Deliver me, please, from the hand of my brother, from the hand of Esau, for I am afraid [**ירא**] of him; he may come and kill us all, the mothers with the children" (Gen 32:12[11 NRSV]). Clearly, Jacob perceives a threat, which causes his fear.

In over a dozen cases, biblical characters do not fear other individuals but an aspect of creation.[19] Amos writes, "The lion has roared. Who

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[17] This number includes Ps 9:21[20], which spells מורא as מורה.

[18] I say "approximately" because there are some cases where the object of fear is unclear. For example, when God commands Jacob not to be afraid to go down to Egypt in Gen 46:3, it is unclear whether God issues this command to calm Jacob's fears of harsh desert conditions, the difficulty of travel when advanced in age, or threats from human beings such as robbers while traveling.

Verses where the frightened entity appears to fear a human being include Gen 9:2; 26:7; 31:31; 32:8[7], 12[11]; 43:18, 23; 50:19, 21; Exod 2:14; 14:10, 13; Lev 19:3; Num 12:8; 14:9; 21:34; Deut 1:21, 29; 2:4, 25; 3:2, 22; 7:18–19; 11:25; 20:1, 3, 8; 28:10; 31:6, 8; Josh 4:14; 8:1; 9:24; 10:2, 8, 25; 11:6; Judg 4:18; 6:27; 7:3, 10; 8:20; Ruth 3:11; 1 Sam 3:15; 7:7; 15:24; 17:11, 24; 18:12, 29; 21:13[12]; 22:23; 23:3, 17; 28:5, 13; 2 Sam 3:11; 9:7; 10:19; 12:18; 13:28; 14:15; 1 Kgs 1:50–51; 3:28; 2 Kgs 1:15; 6:16; 10:4; 19:6; 25:24, 26; 1 Chr 22:13; 28:20; 2 Chr 20:3, 15, 17; 32:7, 18; Neh 2:2; 4:8[14]; 6:9, 13–14, 16, 19; Job 5:21; 32:7; Ps 3:7[6]; 27:1, 3; 49:6[5], 17[16]; 55:6[5]; 56:4–5[3–4], 12[11]; 64:5[4]; 72:5; 91:5; 112:7–8; 118:6; Isa 7:4; 8:12; 10:24; 18:2, 7; 35:4; 37:6; 40:9; 41:10, 13–14; 43:5; 51:7, 12; 54:4, 14; Jer 1:8; 23:4; 26:21; 30:10; 40:9; 41:18; 42:11, 16; 46:27–28; 51:46; Lam 3:57; Ezek 2:6; 3:9; 11:8; Dan 1:10; Joel 2:21–22; Hab 1:7; Hag 2:5; Zeph 3:15–16.

[19] These verses (with objects of fear in parentheses) include Gen 46:3 (traveling); Deut 1:19 (desert); 8:15 (desert); 1 Kgs 17:13 (famine); Job 5:22 (wild beasts); Ps 46:3[2] (changing earth); Prov 31:21 (snow); Eccl 12:5 (heights, roadside terrors); Isa 7:25 (briars and thorns); 21:1 (desert); 43:1 (waters and fire); Jer 17:8 (heat); Amos 3:8 (lion); Jonah 1:5 (storm).

is not frightened?" (3:8).[20] Ecclesiastes 12:5 talks of the fear of heights, which is quite understandable given the unforgiving nature of gravity. Deuteronomy talks about the desert as a fearsome place (1:19; 8:15), and there is no doubt from the lack of water, the lack of food, and the encompassing death described in the book of Numbers that the wilderness poses ample threats. Isaiah 7:25 says that people will avoid certain hills because they fear the briars and thorns present. In a culture where boots were rare and denim had not yet been invented, the threat posed by this vegetation is apparent. So, we can safely say that when biblical characters fear people or elements of creation, they perceive a threat.

Fearing God

What then about God? When people fear God, what exactly are they fearing? In what way does God pose a threat for human beings?[21]

The Numinous

One of the most important works ever written on the fear of God is Rudolph Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*.[22] It talks of God in terms of the numinous: when faced with all of the mystery and greatness of God,

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[20] This translation is found in Göran Eidevall, *Amos: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AYB 24G (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 81. Job 5:22 similarly talks about fear of wild animals. Although Eliphaz talks about not needing to fear wild animals, the implication is that ordinarily they would be the object of fear.

[21] In what follows, I explicitly differ from a driving conviction found in Jason A. Fout's article "What Do I Fear When I Fear My God? A Theological Reexamination of a Biblical Theme," *Journal of Theological Interpretation* 9 (2015): 23–38. Fout maintains, "The fear of God as found in Scripture is *not* best understood by analogy with the typical human emotion of fear" (35, italics mine). To the contrary, I argue that there *is* an analogy to human emotion, and it centers on the cognitive dimension of fear, namely, the perception of a potential threat.

[22] Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational*, trans. John W. Harvey, revised with additions (London: Oxford University Press, 1936).

human beings encounter the holy—something beyond us and beyond our modes of understanding, something that we are simultaneously attracted to and repelled from. The idea of being repelled away certainly seems to have connections with a fear of the divine. Otto himself uses the term *mysterium tremendum*, and he defines this expression by talking about the emotion of fear.[23]

There certainly are moments when the Bible describes people as fearing God, and their fear seems related to something like the phenomenon that Otto has described.[24] At the foot of a wild and windy mountain, the Israelites encounter God, who gives them the Ten Commandments. Amid thunder, lightning, fire, and smoke, they—like Isaiah during his calling—fear for their lives. They withdraw while Moses alone enters into the smoke to speak with God (see Exod 20:20; Deut 5:5). The idea is that God's presence is so magnificent, so grand, so powerful, so threatening that people cannot help but stand in fearful awe of it. We often talk about fear of the unknown, and there is much about God that is unknown. When adults encounter something beyond

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[23] Ibid., 12–14. Otto uses this term because he seeks to describe a lexical gap in English (ibid., 7). Additional characteristics of this term include feeling [1] "nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures" (ibid., 10), [2] the uncanny and sublime (ibid., e.g., 17), [3] the "'absolute overpoweringness'" of the divine (ibid., 19), [4] "the 'urgency' or 'energy' of the numinous object" (ibid., 23), and [5] "the *stupor* before something 'wholly other'" (ibid., 26, italics his). Although Moberly rightly warns against imposing inappropriate categories onto the text (R. W. L. Moberly, *The Bible, Theology, and Faith: A Study of Abraham and Jesus* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 91), Otto's ideas have much in common with the Bible. The totality of ideas conveyed by words from the root **ירא** is not exhausted by Otto, but Otto's thinking is clearly inspired by particular Old Testament passages.

[24] Otto's influence can be clearly seen in Walther Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, trans. J. A. Baker, 2 vols., OTL (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961–67), 2:268–77; Vernon H. Kooy, "The Fear and Love of God in Deuteronomy," *Grace upon Grace: Essays in Honor of Lester J. Kuyper,* ed. James I. Cook (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 106–116, here 109. While I have chosen Otto's work as a point of departure, my focus here is more on fear of the mysterious than the schemes of diachronic development found in Otto's or Eichrodt's works (cf. Moberly, *The Bible, Theology, and Faith*, 88–91).

their frame of reason—something mysterious and supernatural—they naturally sense that threats may be present and feel some element of fear.

A recurrent biblical question is, Who can behold the face of God and live?[25] With that question lingering in the minds of countless biblical characters, threat to one's life accompanies encounters with the divine, and threats lead to fear. So, biblical evidence exists suggesting that the fear of God—at least sometimes—entails a fear of the holy and the supernatural.

We frequently find this idea referenced when the Bible uses a Niphal participle of ירא (e.g., נורא) to describe God and God's works. This word is usually translated "awesome." However, the sense of the word has more to do with the original meaning of awesome—that is, "awe-inspiring" or "frightening"—than with contemporary uses of "awesome" (i.e., a synonym of "cool"). Forty four times, the Hebrew Bible uses this form of the verb that means "frightening."[26] Repeatedly, the Bible describes God's miraculous defeat of the Egyptian army at the Sea of Reeds as frightening.[27] In the book of Joel, we read, "The sun will be turned to darkness, and the moon to blood before the coming of the great and frightening day of the Lord" (Joel 3:4 [2:31 translation mine]).

Remarkably, over one-third of the times that the Hebrew Bible uses this verbal adjective that means "frightening," it also uses the Hebrew adjective גדול, meaning "great."[28] The text envisions greatness that over-

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[25] Cf. Gen 16:13; 32:31[30]; Exod 3:6; 19:21; 20:19; 24:10–11; 33:20, 23; Deut 4:33; 5:24–26; Judg 6:22–23; 13:22–23; 1 Sam 6:19; 1 Kgs 19:13; Isa 6:5; John 1:18.

[26] On both this translation of the participle and its connections with the numinous, see Fuhs, *TDOT* 6:300; Stähli, *TLOT* 2:571.

[27] Exod 15:11; cf. Deut 10:21; 1 Chr 17:21; Ps 106:22.

[28] There are 17 verses that contain both a *niphal* participle of ירא and the adjective גדול: Deut 1:19; 7:21; 8:15; 10:17, 21; 1 Chr 16:25; Neh 1:5; 4:8; 9:32; Ps 47:3[2]; 96:4; 99:3; Dan 9:4; Joel 2:11; 3:4[2:31]; Mal 1:14; 3:23[4:5]; cf. Josh 4:14; 1 Sam 12:24; 2 Sam 7:23; 1 Chr 17:21; Ps 145:6; Joel 2:21. These verses offer exceptionally strong support to Otto's repeated insistence that encounters with the numinous involve

whelms human beings, making them feel puny, allowing them to see how little they really know and how vast and powerful God really is. The attraction between the verbal construction meaning "frightening" and this word meaning "great" is so strong that readers are over 17 times more likely to find the word "frightening" in a verse containing the word "great" that in a random verse from the Bible as a whole.[29] All in all, this type of divine fear relating to God's greatness and mystery occurs approximately 20% of the time that the fear of God is referenced.[30] So, while the numinous does not provide the sole explanation of why humans fear God,[31] the idea of God's greatness, incomparability, and in-

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a creature's feeling "submerged and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures" (*Idea of the Holy*, 10; cf. 13, 21, 40).

[29] Suppose a = the verses containing a *niphal* participle of יראּ (of which there are 44), b = verses containing גדול (of which there are 495), and HB = verses in the Hebrew Bible (excluding the Aramaic, of which there are 22,946). Then, using formulas from conditional probability, we find that a verse containing this participle is over 17 times more likely to appear in a verse with "great" (גדול) in it than in a randomly selected verse from the Hebrew Bible as a whole (cf. Schlimm, *From Fratricide*, 185–92):

$$\frac{P(a|b)}{P(a|HB)} = \frac{n(a\cap b)}{n(b)} \div \frac{n(a)}{n(HB)} = \frac{n(a\cap b)}{n(b)} \times \frac{n(HB)}{n(a)} = \frac{n(a\cap b)\times n(HB)}{n(a)\times n(b)} = \frac{17\times 22{,}946}{44\times 495} \approx 17.9$$

[30] The following texts evoke ideas of the numinous by talking about God's incomprehensibility, greatness, incomparability, and miraculous acts: Exod 3:6; 14:31; 15:11; 34:10; Deut 7:21; 10:17; Josh 4:24; 1 Sam 12:24; 2 Sam 7:23; 2 Kgs 17:36; 1 Chr 16:25; 17:21; Neh 1:5; 4:8[14]; 9:32; Job 37:22; Ps 2:11; 5:8[7]; 22:24[23]; 33:8; 45:5[4]; 47:3[2]; 64:10[9]; 66:5; 67:8[7]; 68:36[35]; 76:13[12]; 89:8[7]; 96:4; 99:3; 102:16[15]; 106:22; 111:9; 135:20; 145:6; Isa 8:13; 25:3; 64:2[3]; Jer 5:22; 10:7; 32:21; Dan 9:4; Joel 2:11; 3:4[2:31]; Mic 7:17; Zeph 2:11; Mal 1:14.

Some of these texts also hint at additional reasons to fear God. For example, Ps 64:10[9] talks about the works of God. These works are not only miraculous (and thus beyond human comprehension), but they also involve judgment against sinners, pointing to God's threatening punishment.

[31] Scholars sometimes argue that a single meaning lies behind the Bible's accounts about fearing God (e.g., Fout, "What Do I Fear," passim, e.g., 26). However, it is important to recognize that biblical texts are often quite diverse, and words frequently have multiple interrelated definitions. Methodologically, it does not work to examine a few texts—or even a few key texts—and argue that because they talk about fear in a certain sense, that sense is present in all biblical expressions about fear.

comprehensibility makes a significant mark on the Bible's portrayals of fear.[32]

Retribution

In the Bible, the most common reason that people fear God stems from the perception that God will judge them for their sins.[33] This sort of sentiment may be behind as many as three-quarters of the Bible's 200+ references to divine fear.[34] Readers see this type of fear with crystal clari-

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[32] Jason A. Fout argues against understanding "the fear of God" in terms of the numinous. He writes, for example, "The phrase 'the fear of God' or 'the fear of the Lord' is never used to describe the human being overawed in God's presence" ("What Do I Fear," 28). While Fout's observation is technically correct, the phrases יראת אלהים ("the fear of God") and יראת יהוה ("the fear of the Lord") only show up 25 times in the Hebrew Bible. That's only 6% of the time that a word from the root ירא is used in the Bible. As this article shows, there are many instances where people do fear God in the sense of being overawed by God's presence.

[33] Some scholars have debated whether biblical fear of God is an emotion or simply a reference to obedience (e.g., Fout, "What Do I Fear," 25). I prefer not to make such a distinction and wonder if it is a false dichotomy. As evidenced in the next footnote, fearing God frequently correlates with obeying God. It is, however, difficult to decide whether an emotion is present for at least two reasons. First, such a decision depends in large part on how precisely the term "emotion" is defined and whether this term is understood prototypically or technically. Second, it can be difficult to say whether an emotion is present because many biblical texts give only limited access to characters' interior feelings (e.g., Gen 22). Here, it is sufficient to note that a key conceptual component of fear in the Bible is perceiving a potential threat, and biblical descriptions of fearing God usually involve awareness of at least a potential threat, whether that threat involves God's encroaching grandeur, inscrutability, justice, or wrath.

[34] Fearing God is strongly connected with either obeying God, being faithful to God, doing the right thing, or seeking to avoid God's punishments in Gen 3:10; 18:15; 20:8, 11; 22:12; 42:18; Exod 1:17, 21; 9:20, 30; 18:21; 20:20; Lev 19:14, 32; 25:17, 36, 43; Deut 4:10; 5:29; 6:2, 13, 24; 8:6; 10:12, 20; 13:5[4], 12[11]; 14:23; 17:19; 25:18; 28:58; 31:12–13; Josh 22:25; 24:14; 1 Sam 4:7; 12:14, 20, 24; 31:4; 2 Sam 23:3; 1 Kgs 8:40, 43; 18:3, 12; 2 Kgs 4:1; 17:25, 28, 32–34, 36, 39, 41; 1 Chr 17:21; 2 Chr 6:31, 33; 19:9; Neh 1:11; 5:9, 15; 7:2; Job 1:1, 8–9; 2:3; 4:6; 6:14; 9:35; 15:4; 22:4; 28:28; 37:24; Ps 15:4; 19:10[9]; 22:26[25]; 25:12, 14; 31:20[19]; 33:18; 34:8[7]; 34:10[9], 12[11]; 40:4[3]; 52:8[6]; 55:20[19]; 60:6[4]; 61:6[5]; 66:16; 76:8–9[7–8],

ty in the Psalms. In the 76th psalm, the person praying says to God, "You! You are frightening [נורא]! Who can stand before you when you are angry? From the heavens you announced judgment. The land feared [ירא] and became silent when God arose for justice, to save all the afflicted of the land" (76:8–10 [7–9 translation mine]).[35] Here, God's anger is a clear expression of God's passion for judgment and justice. The land perceives the threat that this angry God poses. The wicked fear because the day of judgment comes (cf. Ps 119:120).

In the book of Leviticus, the command to fear God immediately follows several commands. So, Leviticus 19:14 reads, "You must not insult a deaf person or put some obstacle in front of a blind person that would cause them to trip. Instead, fear your God; I am the Lord" (CEB). Here, the idea is that people should fear the punishment God will send on those who harm the disabled. The same phrases appear after people are commanded to honor the elderly (19:32), as well as after prohibitions against wronging another person (25:17), taking interest (25:36), and ruling over servants harshly (25:43). God should be feared because God will punish those who harm the disabled, the elderly, and the poor.

In the book of Genesis, Abraham worries that the Philistines will kill him to get his wife because, in his words, "there is no fear of God in this place" (Gen 20:11 NASB). Abraham here suggests that the Philistines do not believe that God will hold them accountable for their actions.

12–13[11–12]; 85:10[9]; 86:11; 90:11; 103:11, 13, 17; 111:5, 10; 112:1; 115:11, 13; 118:4; 119:38, 63, 74, 79, 120; 128:1, 4; 130:4; 145:19; 147:11; Prov 1:7, 29; 2:5; 3:7; 8:13; 9:10; 10:27; 13:13; 14:2, 26–27; 15:16, 33; 16:6; 19:23; 22:4; 23:17; 24:21; 31:30; Eccl 3:14; 5:6[7]; 7:18; 8:12–13; 12:13; Isa 11:2–3; 29:13; 33:6; 50:10; 59:19; 63:17; Jer 5:24; 26:19; 32:39–32:40; 44:10; Hos 10:3; Jonah 1:9, 16; Hab 3:2; Zeph 3:7; Hag 1:12; Mal 1:6; 2:5; 3:5, 16; 3:20[4:2]; cf. 1 Sam 14:26; Jonah 1:10; Zech 8:13, 15.

[35] This verse obviously stands in contrast to Fout's statement that the fear of God "is ... not to be understood primarily as ... a reaction to the anger of God" ("What Do I Fear," 35). In fairness to Fout, he focuses on the Torah and Gospel of Matthew, not the Psalms. Nevertheless, it is important to note that his summary statement does not extend to the canon as a whole.

Elsewhere, texts make clear that God-fearers will avoid various types of wrongdoing because they fear what consequences God will send if they commit evil.[36]

Other than Psalms, the book of the Bible that uses the words from the root **ירא** ("fear") most frequently is Deuteronomy.[37] More than half of Deuteronomy's references to fear talk specifically about fearing God.[38] It makes perfect sense that Deuteronomy of all books would emphasize fearing God so strongly. Anyone who has read the detailed and horrifying description of punishments in Deuteronomy 28 knows that this God isn't messing around when it comes to matters of obedience. This God poses a threat to anyone capable of breaking the terms of the covenant. God will ensure that justice comes. So, we can safely say that one of the most important things people fear when they fear God is the threat of God's justice.

Cruelty?

Should interpreters even go so far as to say that the biblical God is a "loose cannon" who may randomly strike people down for no reason at all? Does the Bible portray God as an oppressive, malevolent, or capricious deity who may threaten human beings for no reason?

In recent decades, biblical scholars have explored this idea in several publications. James Crenshaw looks at it in his book *A Whirlpool of Torment: Israelite Traditions of God as an Oppressive Presence*, as well as a

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[36] Perhaps the most explicit text is Proverbs 16:6b: "And by the fear [יראה] of the Lord one keeps away from evil" (NASB). Knowing that evil actions lead to calamity, those who fear God embrace goodness. They know that God's covenant and instruction offer rewards to those most concerned with what God wants. Stähli, *TLOT*, 2:575, 577. See, e.g., Gen 42:18; Deut 31:12; Ps 25:14; 111:5.

[37] A treatment of the fear of God in these two books can be found in Patrick D. Miller, "Deuteronomy and Psalms: Evoking a Biblical Conversation," *JBL* 118 (1999): 3–18, here 15–16.

[38] In this number, I include elements closely related to God that the Israelites fear, such as the fire that encompasses God's presence.

chapter of his book *Defending God*.[39] Meanwhile, Walter Brueggemann's *Theology of the Old Testament* devotes extensive time to portrayals of God as hidden, abusive, contradictory, unreliable, and irrational.[40] If biblical writers conceived of God in these ways, it seems that they would naturally fear such a deity. So, it raises the question, does the Bible speak explicitly about fearing God when God might be seen as an oppressive presence?

Amid the Bible's brutal honesty, people who suffer sometimes accuse God of somehow causing their pain. In this context, they can talk about their fears. So, Job speaks of feeling dread over how God has treated him (3:25; 6:4; 7:14; 9:28, 34; 13:21; 21:6; 23:15–16). Psalm 88 sounds a similar note. The psalmist addresses God and says, "I have been afflicted and near death since I was a youth. I carry a dread of you. I am helpless" (88:16 [15 translation mine]; cf. Ps 30:8[7]). Jeremiah makes a similar comment (17:17).

These verses, interestingly, avoid the typical language used to describe fearing God. As noted above, the verb **ירא** and its cognates show up over 400 times in the Bible. These verses in Job, Psalms, and Jeremiah, however, use other words.[41] It may be that the idea of fearing God carried such positive connotations in ancient Israel that the normal word for "fear" did not work when biblical characters tried to express

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[39] James L. Crenshaw, *A Whirlpool of Torment: Israelite Traditions of God as an Oppressive Presence*, OBT (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984); idem, *Defending God: Biblical Responses to the Problem of Evil* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 55–71.

[40] Walter Brueggemann, *Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 333–358 (hidden), 359–62 (abusive), 362–67 (contradictory), 367–72 (unreliable), 383–85 (irrational).

[41] These words usually refer to an experience of dread or terror. They include אימה ("terror"), בעת ("terrify"), בעתה ("terror"), חתת ("be terrorized"), יגר ("dread"), מחתה ("terror"), פחד ("dread"), and פלצות ("horror"). While verses exist that contain both a word from the root **ירא** and one of these rough synonyms, these verses do not usually envision God acting with irrational cruelty. Instead, we find expressions like "Feel no fear, and feel no terror" (אל־תירא ואל־תחת, Deut 1:21; Josh 8:1; 1 Chr 22:13; 28:20; cf. Deut 31:8; Josh 10:25; 2 Chr 20:15, 17; 32:7; Isa 51:7; Jer 23:4; 30:10; 46:27; Ezek 2:6; 3:9).

their concern that God seemed to treat them unfairly. In fact, when the normal word for "fear" is used to talk about God, it appears in verses like Psalm 103:11, which clearly does *not* present God as cruel. Instead, we read, "as the heavens are high above the earth, so great is his steadfast love toward those who fear [יראֵ] him" (NRSV).

At this point, it is useful to think about prototype theory. Cognitive linguists working with this theory argue that most people do not form mental categories on the basis of a set of essential qualities that every member of a set must have. Instead, when dealing with non-scientific fields, people's thinking tends to operate with three types of members belonging to a given category. There are prototypical members: the very first thing people think of when they conceptualize a member of that category. There are non-prototypical members of categories, which people do not usually think of immediately but clearly belong in the category. Lastly, there are marginal members of categories that people would disagree about. The following table provides examples:

Category	Prototypical Member(s)	Less Central Member(s)	Marginal Member(s)
Chair	Kitchen Chair	Reclining Armchair, Wheelchair, Highchair	Barstool
Books of the Bible	Genesis, Psalms, Isaiah, Gospels, Romans	Job, Daniel, Obadiah	Tobit, 1 & 2 Maccabees, Baruch
Glove	Leather glove, ski glove, knit glove	Surgical glove, baseball glove, welding glove	Mitten

When it comes to fear in the Bible, there are some verses that suggest that some biblical characters perceive God as treating them with cruelty. They fear this deity because of how much they have suffered. However, this type of fear is not a prototypical example of fearing God in the Bible. Passages describing this kind of fear of God avoid fear's most common language and vocabulary.[42] This idea is emphasized in a few

[42] In other words, if the prototypical category is experiences related to the word יראֵ, then perceptions of a haphazard and cruel God would be on the far margins.

books of the Bible like Job and Psalms, rather than across the canon as a whole. Prototypically, human beings fear God in the sense that they are frightened by God's greatness, God's mysterious nature, or God's justice. Fearing God for being cruel is not prototypical, certainly not a way that the word יראּ is normally employed.[43]

The Goodness of Fear

We come now to our third major question. Another noteworthy feature of the Bible is that fearing God is often a very good thing. We read several times in Proverbs and the Psalms that "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Prov 9:10 NASB; cf. 1:7; 15:33; Ps 111:10). Isaiah 33:6 says that "the fear of the Lord is Zion's treasure" (NRSV). Meanwhile, Nehemiah 1:11, Psalm 112:1, and Isaiah 11:3 all talk about the utter "delight" that comes from fearing God.[44]

How on earth can delight—which suggests happiness—occur alongside fear—which suggests being under threat? Usually, I do not think of frightened people as operating at their fullest potential, much less embodying wisdom. So, how can fear exist alongside wisdom and delight?[45]

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[43] The canon as a whole thus strikes a delicate balance. On the one hand, it gives those who feel mistreated by God both the words and the permission to express their experiences. On the other hand, it upholds the goodness of fearing God by restricting usage of the word יראּ. This balance is important to keep in mind, given that the concept of fearing God can otherwise result in problematic thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors, as noted by Pieter G.R. De Villiers, "Fear as Dread of a God who Kills and Abuses? About a Darker Side of a Key, But Still Forgotten Biblical Motif," *HvTSt* 69/1 (2013): 1–9, http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v69i1.2018; cf. Alvera Mickelsen, "Healthy and Unhealthy Fear of the Lord," *Leadership* 6/2 (1985): 83–85.

[44] Castelo writes, "The 'fear of the Lord,' as a motif, suggests goodness (Ps 31:19), delight (Neh 1:11; Isa 11:3), praise (Ps 22:23), salvation (Ps 85:9), and life itself (Prov 14:27; 19:23)" ("Fear of the Lord," 153). See also Sir 1:12: "The fear of the Lord delights the heart, and gives gladness and joy and long life" (NRSV).

[45] These questions are sharpened because, as Castelo puts it, "the Johannine literature is a (if not the) dominant voice in the minds of contemporary Christians so that when one reads, 'There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear; for fear has to do with

Fear and Blessing

Obviously, the type of fear envisioned in these passages is not dread of a capricious deity who will haphazardly harm random individuals.[46] Such terror could not lead to wisdom or delight. Rather, divine fear here relates to recognizing God's greatness and God's justice.[47] It helpfully allows people to avoid danger. Those who fear God realize the threats that come from disobedience. They know that evil actions eventually catch up with evildoers. With that knowledge—with that perception of a threat—they avoid disobedience. They choose obedience because they fear what will come otherwise.[48] In choosing obedience, they open themselves to all the blessings that come from faithfulness. As God says to humanity in Job 28:28, "Listen up: the fear of the Lord—that's wisdom. To depart from evil—that's understanding" (translation mine).

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punishment, and whoever fears has not reached perfection in love' (1 John 4:18), the assumption can be drawn that fear is a negative disposition, one implying punishment and suggesting an innate incompatibility with love" ("Fear of the Lord," 148). Before taking 1 John 4:18 and moving in a Marcionite direction, however, one needs to reckon with divine fear as praised by several New Testament books (Matt 10:28; Luke 23:40; 2 Cor 5:11; Phil 2:12; Heb 10:31; 1 Pet 1:17).

[46] Thus, Bill Arnold argues that the discourse of Deut 5–11 intentionally brings together "love" and "fear" to teach ancient Israel that these emotions "are not, in fact, mutually exclusive, but complement each other, so that love prevents terror and fear prevents irreverent familiarity" ("The Love-Fear Antinomy," 567). This work is a helpful correction to earlier works such as that of Bernard J. Bamberger, who argues, "Fear and love of God refer not so much to an inward emotional state [as] to some type of overt action" ("Fear and Love of God in the Old Testament," *HUCA* 6 [1929]: 39–53, here 39).

[47] Drawing on the work of Sara Ahmed, Jennifer L. Koosed recognizes fear's positive attributes, writing, "Fear is a constituent part of other more positive emotions; fear is integral to relationship.... [F]ear and anxiety are, at least in part, products of love.... [T]he relationship between the people and their God is complex, multifaceted, and subject to all the vicissitudes of life itself" ("Moses: The Face of Fear," *BibInt* 22 [2014]: 414–29, here 426).

[48] Fout correctly observes, "the fear of God is not the hiatus of human agency but is properly central to it" ("What Do I Fear," 29).

Or, to use imagery present in a book like Proverbs, there are two paths.[49] One path is the way of goodness, righteousness, and justice. It leads to blessings and the good life. The other path is the path of wickedness that leads only to death. Fearing God means acknowledging that God, as creator, has built morality into the framework of creation. Evil leads to disaster. Goodness leads to blessing. The God-fearer avoids the evil path, trusts in God, and finds the simple and great rewards that come from faithfulness.

Fear and Learning

When the Bible talks about teaching and learning, one of the most common things to be taught and learned is how to fear God.[50] In Psalm 34, we read:

> Come, O children, listen to me;
> I will teach you the fear of the Lord. (34:12 [11 NRSV])

Next, this fear of God is taught, and the content of this teaching focuses on God's justice.[51] First, readers learn how God brings goodness to the obedient:

> Which of you desires life,
> and covets many days to enjoy good?

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[49] The word דרך ("way") appears approximately 70 times in the book of Proverbs, almost always to talk about either the "way" of wisdom or the "way" of folly (e.g., 1:15, 31; 2:8, 12–13, 20). Several synonyms get at similar ideas, such as מעגל ("track"), ארח ("path"), and מסלה ("highway"); see, e.g., Prov 1:19; 2:8–9, 13, 15, 18–20.

[50] Seven of 80 verses mentioning למד ("teach") also include either the word יראה, יראה, or מורא. Of the 46 verses where the verb ירה refers to teaching (see definition III of the word in *HALOT*), four verses contain יראה, יראה, or מורא: 2 Kgs 17:28; Ps 25:12; 45:5[4]; 86:11.

[51] Translators frequently debate whether words referring to fearing God would be better translated as "revering God" (e.g., Castelo, "Fear of the Lord," 155). When reading the Bible takes place amid faith communities that place a premium on instruction, I prefer to talk about "fearing God" rather than merely "revering God." However, when the content of that fear cannot be taught, the language of "revering God" may be an imperfect but helpful substitute.

> Keep your tongue from evil,
> and your lips from speaking deceit.
> Depart from evil, and do good;
> seek peace, and pursue it.
> The eyes of the Lord are on the righteous,
> and his ears are open to their cry. (Ps 34:13–16 [12–15 NRSV])

Next, readers learn how God threatens the disobedient:

> The face of the Lord is against evildoers,
> to cut off the remembrance of them from the earth....
> Evil brings death to the wicked,
> and those who hate the righteous will be condemned.
> (Ps 34:17, 22 [16, 21 NRSV])

To fear God means to live in awareness of this psalm's content: the righteous find God on their side while evildoers face death.[52]

Fear and Learning

Frequently, the Bible equates fearing God with obeying all of God's commandments.[53] Deuteronomy 6:2 goes so far as to say, "You will fear

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[52] It has been claimed, "The idea of fearing God appears many times in the Bible but its content is nowhere explicitly articulated" (Job Y. Jindo, "On the Biblical Notion of Human Dignity: 'Fear of God' as a Condition for Authentic Existence," *BibInt* 19 (2011): 433–53, here 437). However, Psalm 34 appears to articulate this content quite clearly.

[53] David J. A. Clines writes, "My conclusion is that the **ירא** word group always signifies the emotion of fear (which is its sense or denotation), but that sometimes that emotion leads to actions (or avoidance of actions) of an ethical or cultic kind (which are then its reference or connotation). In brief, when people do not lie, for example, because of the 'fear of God', it does not mean that they do not lie because they behave ethically but because they are afraid of God and of the consequences he may exact of them for lying" ("'The Fear of the Lord Is Wisdom' [Job 28:28]: A Semantic and Contextual Study," in *Job 28: Cognition in Context*, ed. Ellen van Wolde [Leiden: Brill, 2003], 57–92, here 64). While I tend to agree with Clines, I also believe that metonymy can exert powerful influence within a language. In this case, a key component of obedience (i.e., fearing God, a motivation for obedience) can be used to speak about obedience as a whole. Furthermore, just as there are dead metaphors (that is, metaphors so worn out that their figurative qualities are not usually recognized), so there are also dead

the Lord your God by keeping all his regulations and his commandments" (CEB). Or, at the end of Ecclesiastes, in 12:13, we read, "The end of the matter; all has been heard. Fear God, and keep his commandments; for that is the whole duty of everyone" (NRSV). The verse is not saying both to fear God and also to keep God's commandments as though fear and commandment-keeping were two distinct parts of obedience. The two phrases refer to the same thing. Why should one fear God and keep commandments? The last verse of the book explains: "For God will bring every deed into judgment, including every secret thing, whether good or evil" (Eccl 12:14 NRSV).

Earlier, I described how fearing God entails not only acting with awareness of God's justice, but also acting in awe of God's greatness. That awe of God's greatness also comes into play with obedience. Those who are awed by God's greatness have their world rightly ordered.[54] God is over all—over creation, including oneself. The Bible warns repeated against idolatry, which involves exalting objects of creation too highly. It also warns against pride, which involves exalting oneself too highly. When holy reverence is kindled and one is aware of God's greatness, then the temptations of idolatry and pride melt away.[55] In the light of God's greatness, majesty, and holiness, individuals realize just how small they are, as well as the inadequacies of idols. The only appropriate attitude about oneself is humility.[56] Submission to God's will no longer be-

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metonyms. One cannot rule out the possibility that for some readers in some contexts, "the fear of the Lord" was simply a shorthand notation for obedience (cf. Jindo, "Human Dignity," 434; Fuhs, *TDOT* 6:298). However, it is a mistake to think that the emotional qualities of the fear always recede completely into the background, especially when potential threats are usually present in one way or another (contra Bamberger, "Fear and Love," 39).

[54] As Castelo ("Fear of the Lord," 155) observes, "Both vulnerability and worship are two aspects to the biblical motif of 'fearing God' that ought to be continuously maintained in tandem."

[55] Kooy also notes that fear of God is the antidote to idolatry ("Fear and Love," 114).

[56] Cf. Castelo, "Fear of the Lord," 157; Tremper Longman III, "The 'Fear of God' in the Book of Ecclesiastes," *BBR* 25/1 (2015): 13–21, here 13–14; Jindo, "Human

comes oppressive. It becomes natural. Obedience is no longer about gritting one's teeth and trying harder. It's logical. As Proverbs 16:6 puts it, "by fearing the Lord, one departs from evil" (translation mine). In the light of God's greatness, a highly appropriate response is to praise God—to proclaim God's goodness before others.[57] Little wonder that Hebrew words for "praise" are 3 times more likely to appear in a verse that talks about "fear" than in a random verse from the Bible as a whole.[58] Initially, it might seem foolish for people to praise a God they are afraid of. However, the biblical idea of fear—which relates to God's grandeur and justice—naturally fits with praise.

The Folly of Fearing Humans

Fearing God also ensures that we avoid the theological pitfall of fearing other human beings, which repeatedly leads to disaster in the Bible. In 1 Samuel 15, King Saul is supposed to offer up to God all the spoils of battle. He fails to do so, and the prophet Samuel tells Saul that he will

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Dignity," 452. Note also that Abigail Marsh, *The Fear Factor: How One Emotion Connects Altruists, Psychopaths, & Everyone In-Between* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), e.g., 253–54 finds close connections between altruistic behavior and humility, specifically while discussing the emotion of fear.

[57] For more on the connection between fearing and praising God, see Eichrodt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, 2:270–71.

[58] There are 11 verses that contain a reference to "fear" (ירא, יראה, or מורא) and a reference to "praise" (תהלה or הלל): Exod 15:11; Deut 10:21; 1 Chr 16:25; Ps 22:24[23], 26[25]; 40:4[3]; 56:5[4]; 96:4; 111:10; 112:1; Prov 31:30.

Suppose a = the verses containing ירא, יראה, or מורא (of which there are 419 [counting Ps 9:21(20), which spells מורא as מורה]), b = verses containing תהלה or the verb הלל when the verb refers to praise (see definition II of the word in *HALOT*; there are 177 of these verses), and HB = verses in the Hebrew Bible (excluding the Aramaic, of which there are 22,946). Then, using formulas from conditional probability, we find that a reference to "praise" (as defined here) is over 3 times more likely to appear in a verse mentioning "fear" (as defined here) than in a random verse from the Hebrew Bible as a whole:

$$\frac{P(a|b)}{P(a|HB)} = \frac{n(a\cap b)}{n(b)} \div \frac{n(a)}{n(HB)} = \frac{n(a\cap b)}{n(b)} \times \frac{n(HB)}{n(a)} = \frac{n(a\cap b)\times n(HB)}{n(a)\times n(b)} = \frac{11\times 22{,}946}{419\times 177} \approx 3.4$$

consequently lose the throne. As Saul realizes the enormity of his mistake, he admits what he did wrong: "Saul said to Samuel, 'I have sinned; for I have transgressed the commandment of the Lord and your words, because I feared the people and obeyed their voice'" (1 Sam 15:24 NRSV). When Saul should have been fearing and obeying God, he instead feared and obeyed the people, thus rendering himself unfit to lead the people (cf. Ps 56:12[11]).[59]

In the first chapter of Exodus, just the opposite happens. Pharaoh tells midwives to kill all newborn boys. But then in 1:17, we read, "The midwives, fearing [ירא] God, did not do as the king of Egypt had told them; they let the boys live" (NJPS). An interesting feature of this verse is that most people would feel enormous fear about disobeying Pharaoh's orders. Yet, the text stresses that the midwives instead feared God. Their actions correspond to their fear of God, rather than fear of Pharaoh. Characters tend to fear whatever they see as the greatest power.[60] When God is that greatest power, people act with faithfulness like the midwives. If they instead fear human beings like Saul, they encounter ruin.[61]

Fear and Purity

A final point can be made about why biblical writers thought that this language of fear was so appropriate for talking about obedience to God. As is well documented, many biblical laws have a ceremonial flavor to them. They pertain to right worship. They involve what can and cannot come into the presence of God. In particular, and this point has been persuasively made by Thomas Kazen, they involve not bringing disgust-

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[59] It is also interesting that Saul's distress about David appears related to his fear of him (see 1 Sam 18:12, 29).

[60] As Michael J. Ovey puts it, "What we fear reveals a lot about where we think power truly lies" ("Off the Record: Choose Your Fears Carefully," *Themelios* 41 [2016]: 410–12, here 412).

[61] Matthew Richard Schlimm, *70 Hebrew Words Every Christian Should Know* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2018), 137–38.

ing things into the presence of the divine king.[62] Here is my point: when individuals have grasped God's grandeur, this type of obedience becomes second nature. Leviticus 26:2 reads, "You shall fear my sanctuary; I am the Lord" (translation mine). The Bible suggests that when people understand how great God is, they naturally have a holy and fearful reverence of God, and consequently they know not to bring what is unclean into God's most holy space.

To Fear or Not to Fear

We now arrive at our final question: if the Bible emphasizes the importance of fearing God, why does it so frequently tell people *not* to be afraid? Of the 309 verses containing the verb **ירא** in the Bible, approximately one-fourth of them forbid fear.[63]

So, which one is it? Are people supposed to fear God? Are they supposed to fear human beings? Or, are they supposed to refrain from fearing either one?

The answers to these questions depend to some extent on the passage that one examines, but the following observations can be made about why the Bible commands people *not* to be afraid.

First, the Bible does attest to individuals sometimes fearing God in the wrong kind of way. In Judges 6, when Gideon sees God face-to-face,

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[62] Thomas Kazen, *Emotions in Biblical Law: A Cognitive Science Approach* (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2011), esp. 33–36, 71–94.

[63] Seventy-four of the 309 verses containing the verb **ירא** ("be afraid") have the negative imperative particle **אל** ("Do not") immediately preceding the verb: Gen 15:1; 21:17; 26:24; 35:17; 43:23; 46:3; 50:19, 21; Exod 14:13; 20:20; Num 14:9; 21:34; Deut 1:21; 3:2; 20:3; 31:6; Josh 8:1; 10:8, 25; 11:6; Judg 4:18; 6:23; Ruth 3:11; 1 Sam 4:20; 12:20; 22:23; 23:17; 28:13; 2 Sam 9:7; 13:28; 1 Kgs 17:13; 2 Kgs 1:15; 6:16; 19:6; 25:24; 1 Chr 22:13; 28:20; 2 Chr 20:15, 17; 32:7; Neh 4:8[14]; Job 5:22; Ps 49:17[16]; Prov 3:25; Isa 7:4; 10:24; 35:4; 37:6; 40:9; 41:10, 13–14; 43:1, 5; 44:2; 51:7; 54:4; Jer 1:8; 10:5; 30:10; 40:9; 42:11; 46:27–28; Lam 3:57; Ezek 2:6; Dan 10:12, 19; Joel 2:21–22; Zeph 3:16; Hag 2:5; Zech 8:13, 15. Additionally, other verses convey similar ideas without the **אל** ("Do not") construction, such as Deut 1:29.

he is sure he will die. His fear of being in God's presence, however, appears to be too strong. He does not have a simple holy reverence; he is literally scared to death. So, God's word in that context is, "Peace be to you; do not fear, you shall not die" (6:23 NRSV). In cases like this one, human emotion fails to get things right. The command not to fear offers correction.[64]

Second, there are times when the Bible describes people who have suffered for their wrongdoing. Their fear is that they will suffer for it forever. In these cases, God has a comforting message. Thus, in Zephaniah, we read: "The Lord has taken away your punishment, he has turned back your enemy. The Lord, the King of Israel, is with you; never again will you fear [יראָ] any harm" (3:15 NIV).[65] Exilic and post-exilic prophets dare to envision the end of punishment and consequently the end of fear.

Finally, people throughout the Bible are told not to fear other human beings, usually because God is on their side.[66] Of all the reasons that biblical characters are told not to fear, this one is the most common. Fear entails an assessment of power.[67] As people learn the fear of God, they recognize that God's power is greater than any human force,

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[64] Verses where people are told not to fear the immediate presence of God include: Exod 20:20; Dan 10:12, 19; cf. Gen 15:1; 26:24; Lam 3:57. On this interpretation of Exod 20:20, cf. Fout, "What Do I Fear," 31.

[65] Verses where people are told not to fear the consequences of their sins include: 1 Sam 12:20; Isa 54:4; Zeph 3:16; Zech 8:13, 15; cf. Isa 40:9; 43:1, 5; 54:14; Jer 46:27–28.

[66] Verses where people are told not to fear other human beings include: Exod 14:13; Num 14:9; 21:34; Deut 1:21, 29; 3:2, 22; 7:18; 20:1, 3; 31:6, 8; Josh 8:1; 10:8, 25; 11:6; 2 Kgs 1:15; 6:16; 19:6; 1 Chr 22:13; 28:20; 2 Chr 20:15, 17; 32:7; Neh 4:8[14]; Ps 49:17[16]; 91:5; Prov 3:25; Isa 7:4; 8:12–13; 10:24; 35:4; 37:6; 41:10–14; 51:7, 12; Jer 1:8; 30:10; 42:11; Ezek 2:6; 3:9; Joel 2:21; Hag 2:5; cf. Gen 43:23; 50:19, 21; Judg 4:18; Ruth 3:11; 1 Sam 28:13; 2 Sam 9:7; 13:28; 2 Kgs 25:24.

[67] Drawing on the work of David Konstan, Ari Mermelstein rightly points out that fear entails an assessment of power in relationships ("Constructing Fear and Pride in the Book of Daniel: The Profile of a Second Temple Emotional Community," *JSJ* 46 (2015): 449–83, here 455–56, 459, https://doi.org/10.1163/15700631-12340109).

including their enemies. Their world becomes rightly ordered with God over all creation, even human foes. Those who fear God have placed themselves on God's side, and consequently they therefore no longer need to fear human beings (cf. Ps 9:21[20]; 56:5[4], 12[11]).

Initially, it seems foolish to place one's trust in a party whom one fears. However, when the object of that fear is a good God, then trusting that same God actually makes a great deal of sense. Thus, a couple psalms and the book of Isaiah draw close connections between fearing God and trusting in God.[68] Jason Fout correctly observes, "Fearing God does not equate to fearfulness of things in general; quite the opposite: fearing God relativizes all other fears. To fear God and not fear others means placing all of one's hopes, trust, status, identity—indeed, one's very life—in God."[69]

I would like to end on that note. Saint Francis of Assisi writes, "It is in giving that we receive, it is in pardoning that we are pardoned, it is in dying that we are born again to eternal life." In the light of the texts we've examined, we could add, "It is in fearing God that we no longer need to be afraid." By revering a good God, the world becomes rightly ordered. And the Bible insists that when things are right with God, there is nothing else to fear.[70]

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[68] Ps 40:4[3]; 115:11; Isa 50:10.

[69] Fout, "What Do I Fear," 33.

[70] Schlimm, *70 Words*, 141; note also that Walther Zimmerli writes, "Whoever fears Yahweh need have no fear, but whoever does not fear Yahweh must have fear" (*Old Testament Theology in Outline*, trans. David E. Green [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1978], 146); cf. Mayer I. Gruber, "Fear, Anxiety and Reverence in Akkadian, Biblical Hebrew and Other North-West Semitic Languages," *VT* 40 (1990): 411–22, here 420.

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Viewing Oneself through Others' Eyes: Shame between Biology and Culture in Biblical Texts

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A further problem presented by the affections of soul is this: are they all affections of the complex of body and soul, or is there any one among them peculiar to the soul by itself? To determine this is indispensable but difficult. If we consider the majority of them, there seems to be no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body; e.g. anger, courage, appetite, and sensation generally. Thinking seems the most probable exception; but if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination, it too requires a body as a condition of its existence. If there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul, soul will be capable of separate existence; if there is none, its separate existence is impossible.... It therefore seems that all the affections of soul involve a body-passion, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, joy, loving, and hating; in all these there is a concurrent affection of the body. (Aristotle, *De an.* 403a)[1]

Let shame (αἰσχύνη) then be defined as a kind of pain or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present, or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonor; and shamelessness (ἀναισχυντία) as contempt and indifference in regard to these same things. If this definition of shame (αἰσχύνη) is correct, it follows that we are ashamed (αἰσχύνεσθαι) of all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful (αἰσχρά), either for ourselves or for those whom we care for. (Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1383b)[2]

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[1] Translation from John Alexander Smith, *The Works of Aristotle: De Anima* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1931).

[2] Translation from John Henry Freese, *Aristotle: The "Art" of Rhetoric* (London: William Heinemann, 1926).

There is little consensus on what emotions really are. Are they feelings, motivations, or evaluations? Not only do evolutionary biologists, neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers differ in perspective, but they also disagree within their own guilds, at times vehemently. As Andrea Scarantino points out, in *The Handbook of Emotions*, "we are apparently not much closer to reaching consensus on what emotions are than we were in Ancient Greece."[3] Nevertheless, Scarantino lists fifteen characteristics that are acknowledged by most emotion theorists. The list will not be rehearsed here, except for the third and the fourth point: there are evolutionary explanations for at least some emotions or their components and emotions are generally affected by sociocultural factors.[4]

This may seem commonplace enough, but for those of us who study emotional expressions in ancient cultures through ancient texts, a keen awareness of the interaction between biological underpinnings and cultural constructions is crucial to avoid at least the worst forms of anachronisms and generalisations.

In this article I will focus on the emotion of shame in the Bible, but I will largely leave the traditional discussion of a Mediterranean honour-shame culture aside. Instead I will discuss expressions of shame in biblical texts and I will relate my observations to the biological, evolutionary, and social functions of shame as an embodied emotion and to the ways in which emotional shame is culturally shaped, interpreted, and exploited. As will become clear, our concept of shame only partly overlaps with ancient constructs and terminologies, such as Hebrew בּוֹשׁ, בּוּשָׁה, or בּוֹשֶׁת, together with word stems like חפר, כלם, and חרף, with which בּוֹשׁ is often juxtaposed and paralleled, and Greek αἰδῶς or αἰσχύνη together with their corresponding verbs and compounds. This fact requires attention and careful analysis, something that has been amply demonstrated by scholars like Douglas Cairns, David Konstan, and Yael

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[3] Andrea Scarantino, "The Philosophy of Emotions and Its Impact on Affective Science," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 3–48 (37).

[4] Scarantino, "Philosophy," 37.

Avrahami, to name a few, similarly to what for example David Konstan, Jan Joosten, and Françoise Mirguet have done with regard to pity.[5]

Aware of this, I will outline a variety of emotional patterns and relate them to the biological and psychological emotion complex of which shame is part, the shame family of emotions. I will pay special attention to ways in which shame is part of a social web of relationships, in particular to patterns of dominance and subordination. I will try to be aware of aspects of mutualism and hierarchy, power and deference. The first step, however, is to look at the development of shame as one of a cluster of self-conscious emotions.

The Development of Shame

The field of human emotions is sometimes divided into three types. Other-condemning emotions include contempt, anger, and disgust, and guard the moral order. Other-praising emotions include awe, elevation, and gratitude, and respond to good deeds. Self-conscious emotions include shame, embarrassment, guilt, and pride, and constrain individual behaviour in a social context.[6]

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[5] Douglas L. Cairns, *Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); idem, "Honour and Shame: Modern Controversies and Ancient Values," *Critical Quarterly* 53 (2011): 23–41; David Konstan, *Pity Transformed* (London: Duckworth, 2001); idem, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006); Yael Avrahami, "בוש in the Psalms—Shame or Disappointment?," *JSOT* 34 (2010): 295–313; Jan Joosten, "חסד 'bienveillance' et ἔλεος 'pitié': Réflexions sur une equivalence lexicale dans la Septante," in *"Car c'est l'amour qui me plait, non le sacrifice...": Recherche sur Osée 6:6 et son interpretation juive et chrétienne,* ed. E. Bons, JSJ Sup 88 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 25–42; Françoise Mirguet, *An Early History of Compassion: Emotion and Imagination in Hellenistic Judaism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

[6] Jonathan Haidt, "The Moral Emotions," in *Handbook of Affective Sciences,* ed. Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 852–70. One may rightly argue that all types of emotions influence moral behaviour. Other-condemning emotions, however, are understood to guard especially against moral transgressions of others.

Another way for theorists is to distinguish between basic or primary emotions and cognitive or secondary emotions. Basic emotions are generally understood to be innate, firmly anchored in human evolutionary biology, having evolved for adaptive functions, and expressed in involuntary reactions to stimuli, including universally recognisable facial expressions.[7] A classic example is Paul Ekman's use of cross-cultural recognition of facial expressions to identify six basic emotions: fear, anger, sadness, disgust, happiness, and surprise.[8] This focus on external responses may in fact have caused some emotions to be overlooked.[9] But even when priority is given to external signals for identifying emotions, the category of basic emotions is not so clear-cut, as we will soon see.

It is of course true that self-conscious emotions, as we normally understand them and carve them up, require a conscious self. But even the basic emotions do at least require "cognition necessary for perception," as Michael Lewis points out.[10] Lewis describes infant development: at the age of 15-18 months, self-awareness emerges in the child, but of a non-evaluative kind, which gives rise to "self-conscious exposed emotions," such as envy, empathy, and non-evaluative embarrassment. Embarrassment is caused by the self being observed. Around the age of three, cognition has evolved to a point where the child can conceptualize rules and goals, which goes together with the emergence of "self-con-

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[7] Sherri C. Widen, "The Development of Children's Concepts of Emotions," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 307–18 (310–11).

[8] Paul Ekman, "Facial Expression and Emotion," *American Psychologist* 48 (1993): 384–92.

[9] Naomi I. Eisenberger, "Social Pain and Social Pleasure: Two Overlooked but Fundamental Mammalian Emotions," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 440–52 (446).

[10] Michael Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotional Development," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 134–49 (134).

scious evaluative emotions," including evaluative embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt.[11]

Embarrassment, shame, and guilt are often distinguished from each other, with embarrassment requiring self-attention or self-conciousness, shame signalling a threat to the social self, and guilt responding to undesirable behaviour. Shame involves a loss of (self-) esteem and concern for loss of social status, while guilt can be thought of as more active and intent on reparation. Some see embarrassment as fairly distanced from both shame and guilt, while others regard it as a weak form of shame, in which the core self is not questioned.[12] The latter suggestion would fit with Lewis' evaluative embarrassment, but less with his non-evaluative embarrassment. Non-evaluative embarrassment, in fact, is more akin to shyness, which is less often discussed, and which Rowland Miller finds to be a "*future-oriented* mood state," rather than an emotion.[13] Be that as it may, shyness can be placed at one end of a spectrum in which guilt belongs to the other and embarrassment "is a cousin of both shyness and shame, but is clearly different from either one."[14]

The fact that self-conscious emotions require a conscious self does not mean that they are less biologically based than the so-called basic emotions. The argument for a secondary status from the lack of global facial expressions is not so strong as one would think. Embarrassment is often accompanied by blushing, although individual tendencies to blush vary and visibility depends on skin colour. The physical reaction is automatic and due to constrictions and expansions of blood vessels. Experi-

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[11] Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotional Development," 134–35.

[12] Tara L. Gruenewald, Sally S. Dickerson, and Margaret E. Kemeny, "A Social Function for Self-Conscious Emotions: The Social Self Preservation Theory," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 68–87 (68-71).

[13] Rowland S. Miller, "Is Embarrassment a Blessing or a Curse?," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 245–62 (246).

[14] Miller, "Embarrassment," 246.

ments show that people who blush at mishaps are regarded more sympathetically and judged more leniently than those who do not. The reaction cannot be faked and it signals sincerity.[15]

Blushing may also accompany shame, although not so frequently, and the role of blushing ascribed by Darwin is partly unwarranted. Moreover, the fluid border between embarrassment and shame complicates our assessment.[16] Shame, embarrassment, and guilt, however, do have certain body signals in common. These revolve around body posture: people lower their face and sometimes tilt their head downward to the side, they avoid looks and slump their shoulders, in a shrivelled-up posture, which is virtually the opposite to displays of pride.[17] Interestingly, these are similar to defensive responses by infants to interpersonal disruptions.[18] There are several arguments for these signals being innate and the results of evolutionary adaptation. First, both pride and shame displays are equally exhibited in response to success and failure, and equally recognized as such in remotely diverse cultures like the industrialised West and in small-scale societies in Burkina Faso and Fiji.[19] Secondly, these behaviours were displayed similarly by sighted, blind, and congenitally blind athletes from more than thirty countries at victory

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[15] Miller, "Embarrassment," 251–52. However, the embarrassment displayed needs to correspond to the context; exaggerated reactions have an opposite effect.

[16] Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, The Works of Charles Darwin 23 (New York: New York University Press, 1989 [originally published 1872]), chapter 13; cf. Michael Lewis, "Self-Conscious Emotions: Embarrassment, Pride, Shame, Guilt, and Hubris," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 792–814 (793–795).

[17] Gruenewald, Dickerson, and Kemeny, "A Social Function," 73.

[18] Paul Gilbert, "The Evolution of Shame as a Marker for Relationship Security: A Biopsychosocial Approach," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 283–309 (291).

[19] Dacher Keltner et al., "Expression of Emotion," in *Handbook of Emotions*, 4th ed., ed. Lisa Feldman Barrett, Michael Lewis, and Jeanette Haviland-Jones (New York: Guilford, 2016), 467–82 (470).

and defeat respectively, in the Paralympics. The only difference was that individuals from Western, highly individualistic cultures, moderated their shame responses, *except* for the congenitally blind, which further underscores that these behaviours tend to be innate.[20] Thirdly, these displays are similar to dominance and submission behaviours among other animals, studied by researchers.[21]

The last point of course raises the question of the evolutionary roots of the shame family of emotions. On the one hand, shame requires certain cognitive capacities necessary for self-consciousness and self-evaluation. These requirements basically correspond to what evolutionary theorists call Theory of Mind, the capacity to understand other individuals to the extent that one can see oneself through their eyes, that is, simulate how others evaluate and appraise one's own behaviour.[22] This makes for an *inner* inner world,[23] something human beings share to at least some extent with other intelligent social species, such as higher primates, elephants, and dolphins. On the other hand, shame (or embarrassment) displays apparently have an innate, biological substratum behind, or independent of, conscious behaviour. Although bodily reactions can be partially controlled, this is difficult, and public shame displays hardly enhance status, but openly declare failure. In spite of this, they are adaptive, if shame is understood within the framework of

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[20] Jessica L. Tracy and David Matsumoto, "The Spontaneous Expression of Pride and Shame: Evidence for Biologically Innate Nonverbal Displays," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 105 (2008): 11655–60.

[21] Gruenewald, Dickerson, and Kemeny, "A Social Function," 73.

[22] For a short overview with research history and a discussion of the evolutionary origins of Theory of Mind, see Ioannis Tsoukalas, "Theory of Mind: Towards an Evolutionary Theory," *Evolutionary Psychological Science* 4 (2018): 38–66. For now classical studies, see David Premack and Guy Woodruff, "Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind?," *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 4 (1978): 515–26; Alan M. Leslie, "Pretense and Representation: The Origins of 'Theory of Mind'," *Psychological Review* 94 (1987): 412–26.

[23] For this expression, see Peter Gärdenfors, *How Homo Became Sapiens: On the Evolution of Thinking* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 111–40.

a social hierarchy as a sign of submission to those in power and of loyalty to the group.[24]

We usually associate shame with the public failure to comply with some cultural or moral standards for behaviour, meaning that we know that others are aware of our failure. When shame is studied cross-culturally, however, it becomes evident that there need not be any failure to comply with social or moral rules, but the mere encounter with superiors or people of higher status is sufficient to trigger shame. Daniel Fessler talks of this as "subordinance shame."[25] Such shame, says Fessler

> is evolutionarily ancient [and] is bolstered by the fact that recognizing that one occupies an inferior position in a social hierarchy requires far less cognitive complexity than does recognizing that others know that one has failed.... It is ... likely that the common ancestor of humans and primates likewise lacked the cognitive capacity for a theory of mind, and hence that any emotions experienced by this species were not dependent on this capacity, making it all the more plausible that subordinance shame is the original or primordial aspect of this emotion.[26]

Fessler suggests that for nonhuman primates, lacking cultural criteria to measure success, social position was a function of dominance, but human societies developed prestige hierarchies in which dominant positions were given rather than taken.[27] The history of humankind suggests that both models coexist and that culture is perhaps a thin veneer. But the theory makes sense of shame behaviours as originally appeasement

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[24] Dacher Keltner and LeeAnne Harker, "The Forms and Functions of the Nonverbal Signals of Shame," in *Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture*, ed. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 78–98; Gruenewald, Dickerson, and Kemeny, "A Social Function"; Elizabeth Jacqueline Dansie, "An Empirical Investigation of the Adaptive Nature of Shame" (M.Sc. diss., Utah State University, 2009).

[25] Daniel M. T. Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity: Evolutionary and Cultural Perspectives on Shame, Competition, and Cooperation," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 174–93 (175–76).

[26] Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity," 176.

[27] Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity," 176.

displays, which signalled submission rather than fight, and helped losers avoid injury or death. On the other hand they lost in status. The reason for shame displays still being part of the human involuntary repertoire is probably that they communicate submission, cooperation, loyalty to superiors, and willingness to follow group norms. In the long run, there was more to gain by cooperation and coordination. By displaying submissive or subordinance shame, one could perhaps partner with the winners instead of being killed by them.[28] Self-conscious emotions facilitated and regulated both group cooperation and group organisation.[29]

Shame in Continuum

In human groups, innate and biologically based capacities are largely formed by culture and cultural diversity leads to a variety of expressions. This becomes visible not least in language. Historical and contextual factors shape the ways in which emotions are expressed by actions as well as by words and harness emotions in the service of cultural ideals and practices. Embarrassment, guilt, and shame concepts are not identical between cultures, but overlap in various ways. The meaning of shame varies considerably depending on whether it expresses failure to uphold norms of reciprocity or norms of hierarchy.[30] Emotions are valued differently in different cultures. Western, individualistic cultures have little patience with shame and more or less ignore subordinance shame, even though they have the capacity to understand it. Many non-Western cultures, on the other hand, regard subordinance, shyness, and

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[28] Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity," 177–82.

[29] Jennifer L. Goetz and Dacher Keltner, "Shifting Meanings of Self-Conscious Emotions Across Cultures: A Social-Functional Approach," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 153–73 (154–56).

[30] Cf. Goetz and Keltner, "Shifting Meanings," 168.

respect as shame's core, while guilt is less prominent, or even lacking.[31] To note this is not the same as affirming the old dichotomy between shame cultures and guilt cultures, which is far too simplified.

Emotion words in one language lose nuances and take on partly new meanings when translated. In a cross-cultural study, Robin Edelstein and Phillip Shaver demonstrate that shame words in a specific language can be identified as part of particular emotion clusters, but these clusters vary. In English and Italian, shame and guilt are clustered together within the sadness cluster. In Indonesian and Dutch, however, shame and embarrassment fall into the fear cluster (but not guilt in Indonesian). In certain languages, shame is not even distinguished from fear. These examples may suffice to prove that differences depend on cultural contexts, as whether shame is associated primarily with anxiety or regret. Also, some languages use separate concepts for emotions which in other languages are identified by one word and only regarded as degrees of intensity.[32]

Based on all of the considerations discussed so far, I shall propose a scheme of emotions belonging to the shame family along a continuum, in order to differentiate as far as possible between various nuances and aspects. I should strongly emphasize that I do this entirely for heuristic purposes. The ways in which we carve up the field of self-conscious emotions is, although based on biopsychosocial considerations, still in many ways arbitrary, or at least highly culture-specific and contextual. I do this, however, to get a handle on shame and shame-related texts from the Bible.

The point of this scheme is *not* to nail characteristics or reactions to a particular "phase," but to illustrate the overlaps and fuzzy borders between various self-conscious emotional categories. Many details are in-

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[31] Fessler, "From Appeasement to Conformity," 184–85.

[32] Robin S. Edelstein and Phillip R. Shaver, "A Cross-Cultural Examination of Lexical Studies of Self-Conscious Emotions," in *The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research*, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford, 2007), 194–208 (198–99).

	SHYNESS I	SHYNESS II EMBARRASSMENT I	EMBARRASSMENT II SHAME I	SHAME II (FEAR?)	SHAME III GUILT I	GUILT II
Character	Future-oriented mood	Non-evaluative social attention	Negative social evaluation	**Negative social evaluation and self-evaluation,**	Negative social evaluation and self-evaluation	Negative social evaluation and self-evaluation
	Long-term Non-event	Event	*Subordinance shame*	***Subordinance shame***		Moral responsibility
Problem	Uncomfortable with self-awareness	Uncomfortable with others' observation	Judgment	**Undesirable self**	Undesirable action	Undesirable action
			Lack of status	**Loss of status and control**	Loss of integrity	Loss of integrity Loss of self-respect
				Failure		
Body Reaction	Hide	Hide	Sheepish smile			
		Blush	Blush	**Blush or pale?**	Blush or pale?	
	Look away	Look away	Look away	**Look away**	Look away	Look away
		Nervous touching	Lower face, tilt head, slump shoulders etc.	**Lower face, tilt head, slump shoulders etc.**	Lower face, tilt head, slump shoulders etc.	Lower face, tilt head, slump shoulders etc.
Signal	I don't want to be here	I am interested, but nervous	I want to be accepted	**I accept my place**	I accept norms	I make reparation
			I adapt	**I submit**	I show respect	I reform
				I appease		I subscribe to norms
				I am no threat		
				I am not faking	I am not faking	I am not faking
Function	Avoidance	Divert attention	Receive empathy	**Survival**	Resume cooperation	Resume trustworthiness
				Avoid punishment		Display loyalty

deed open to question and in several instances one could discuss whether items belong here or there or under several columns. The visual column structure itself in a way counteracts or contradicts the message about the shame family emotions along a continuum.

The two types of embarrassment, which were already previously mentioned, overlap with shyness as well as with shame, and shame and guilt are not clearly separable. Different cultures and languages construct different categories along this continuum and there are no hard and fast rules. In some cases, even certain types of shyness and shame may be subsumed under the same concept, as we will see with the Greek αἰδώς.

The most conspicuous observation is perhaps that SHAME II, which I have marked in bold above, has very little, if anything at all, to do with norm transgression or morality, but entirely with failure and loss of status. There is no wrongdoing behind such shame, but plain failure to stay in control and defend one's honour or privileged position visavi competitors or enemies. Loss of control in this sense might incur real danger, which makes concomitant body reactions related to fear just as predictable as those related to embarrassment. The fact that some languages relate shame vocabulary to the fear cluster gives support to such an explanation and to an explicit association of SHAME II with FEAR, as indicated in the scheme above. An example of this is the Hebrew בוש, which is occasionally associated with a pale face, as we will se examples of.

SHAME II corresponds largely to what Fessler calls subordinance shame, although some important characteristics of subordinance shame are also displayed in EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I. It is marked in italics in the scheme above. From an evolutionary point of view, subordinance shame, especially as represented in SHAME II, reflects a prototypical or ancient type of shame. Body reactions and signals have evolved to ensure survival within a hierarchical structure, in a way analogous to how many social animal species behave. The character of negative evaluation is in a way secondary to, or dependent on, the fact that one has been forced to hand over power and/or status to others, or somehow lost con-

trol regardless of any specific norm-breaking behaviour. One could discuss whether SHAME II or subordinance shame should be regarded as paradigmatic for the shame family, or rather as an archaic, underlying substratum, or perhaps as both. As we will see, it accounts for no small part of the textual examples we now turn to.

SHAME IN THE HEBREW BIBLE

The primary term for shame in the Hebrew Bible is the root בוש. The verb is found more than 130 times and there are a few instances of the two nouns, בּוּשָׁה and בֹּשֶׁת.[33] בוש is generally translated into Greek with αἰσχύνειν, occasionally with καταισχύνειν, in the LXX. It is often used in the Psalms and in the major prophets Isaiah and Jeremiah, with a few other references scattered in other books. It is fairly often paralleled with חפר, כְּלִמָּה/כלם, and חֶרְפָּה (the latter root is mostly represented by ὀνειδίζειν, while the two former are normally rendered by ἐντρέπειν in the LXX). The cluster of meanings focus on humiliation, insult, and infringement.[34]

The three roots, בוש, כלם, and חפר, are carefully analysed in Martin Klopfenstein's classical "concept-historical" (*begriffsgeschichtliche*) study on shame in the Hebrew Bible from 1972.[35] Klopfenstein argues that shame and guilt are intrinsically (*von Haus aus*) associated, shame being

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[33] There is also the less common מְבוּשִׁים and בָּשְׁנָה. בֹּשֶׁת is conspicuously used as a dysphemism for various "foreign" gods, in particular Baal, by replacing the theophoric element in names such as Ish-Baal (>Ish-Boshet), and by its vowels replacing the original ones in divine names such as Ashtart (>Ashtoreth) and perhaps Molech. Marvin H. Pope, "Bible, Euphemism and Dysphemism in the," *ABD* 1:720–25.

[34] Alexandra Grund-Wittenberg, "Scham/Schande (AT)," 2015, in *Das wissenschaftliche Bibellexikon im Internet (WiBiLex)*, http://www.bibelwissenschaft.de/stichwort/26305/; Horst Seebass, "בוֹשׁ *bôsh*; בּוּשָׁה *bûshāh*; בֹּשֶׁת *bōsheth*; מְבוּשִׁים *mᵉbûshîm*," *TDOT*, vol. 2, eds. G. Johannes Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, rev. ed., 1977), 169–71 (169).

[35] Martin Klopfenstein, *Scham und Schande nach dem Alten Testament: Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu den hebräischen Wurzeln bôš, klm und ḥpr*, ATANT 62 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1972).

the subjective expression of feeling guilt and shaming being the objective expression of exposed guilt.[36] The near equation of shame with guilt has been criticised among others by Lyn Bechtel Huber, who demonstrates how both formal (judicial and political) and informal (social) shaming function as sanctions of behaviour for a number of contexts in which sanctions involving guilt would not have been appropriate, and that shaming would often have been more powerful, due to the group-oriented character of society.[37]

Separating guilt from shame is admittedly more easily said than done, as already indicated in the preceding section, and Johanna Stiebert, who has written another monograph on shame in the Hebrew Bible, commends Klopfenstein for keeping shame and guilt together. She is, however, critical of his understanding of how בוש-language developed from its purported first use in the sexual domain in Hosea.[38] Stiebert's own monograph takes inspiration from psychological research and focuses on the three major prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. She attempts to prove the insufficiency of the honour-shame paradigm from Mediterranean studies for studying shame in the Hebrew Bible.[39]

In spite of Klopfenstein's detailed analyses, there are some major weaknesses. His view of בוש finding its origins in the sexual sphere (Gen 2:25; Hos 2:7) depends at least partly (for Genesis) on outdated or highly questionable source theories; his close association of בוש with cultic issues is arguably a result of over-interpretation; and his fundamental distinction between secular and theological usages of shame-terminology is strained and results from a certain theological bias.[40]

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[36] Klopfenstein, *Scham und Schande*, 33, 49.

[37] Lyn M. Bechtel, "Shame as Sanction of Social Control in Biblical Israel: Judicial, Political, and Social Shaming," *JSOT* 49: 47–76.

[38] Johanna Stiebert, *The Construction of Shame in the Hebrew Bible: The Prophetic Contribution*, JSOTSup 346 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 44–50.

[39] Stiebert, *Construction of Shame*, 165–73.

[40] Klopfenstein, *Scham und Schande*, 31–33, 58–60; for the secular-theological distinction, see the whole structure of Klopfenstein's work.

Many scholars point out that shame in the Hebrew Bible is mainly about loss of status, and has little to do with an inner experience or introvert feeling, but is associated with rather physical aspect.[41] Shame can result from one's own failure, or from being let down by significant others, as when Joab complains about David's behaviour against those who have saved him (2 Sam 19:6). Yael Avrahami suggests that the meaning of the root בוש is often "disappointment" or "failure," rather than shame in our sense. In her investigation of בוש-language in the Psalms, she demonstrates that such translations work well. The synonyms that בוש is juxtaposed to, belong to the semantic field of worthlessness and suggest that בוש is a negative experience. Only some of the synonyms are shame words. Moreover, none of the antonyms that appear is an honour word, but they all refer to positive experiences: to save, to be happy, to be satisfied.[42] Avrahami suggests that בוש "has to do with the experience of a disconnection between expectations and reality"[43] and she concludes with a few additional examples from the prophets. She suggests that the idea of two or three homonymic roots (בוש I, II, and III) is quite unnecessary and that texts in which a homonymic root has been supposed would also receive a simpler and more plausible interpretation, assuming a single root and taking her suggestions into account.[44] To spell this out: Moses *failed* to come down from the mountain (Exod 32:1), Sisera's mother asks "why does his chariot *fail* to return?" (Judg 5:24), Ezra says that he *failed* to ask for soldiers (Ezra 8:22), and the expression עד־בוש simply means "to the point of despair."

Avrahami's suggestion fits well with SHAME II in our scheme, which has a focus on failure and loss of control. For example, Psalm 35

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[41] Margaret S. Odell, "The Inversion of Shame and Forgiveness in Ezekiel 16.59–63," *JSOT* 56 (1992): 101–12 (103); Matthew J. Lynch, "Neglected Physical Dimensions of 'Shame'," *Bib* 91 (2010): 499–517, who suggests physical experiences of diminishment or harm.

[42] Avrahami, "בוש in the Psalms."

[43] Avrahami, "בוש in the Psalms," 308.

[44] Avrahami, "בוש in the Psalms," 310–13.

is framed by a prayer to YHWH for the failure of the author's opponents.

v. 4 יבשו ויכלמו מבקשי נפשי יסגו אחור ויחפרו חשבי רעתי

> Let them be ashamed and humiliated who seek my life. May they be turned back and embarrassed who plan my evil.

v. 26 יבשו ויחפרו יחדו שמחי רעתי ילבשו־בשת וכלמה המגדילים עלי

> Let them be ashamed and embarrassed together who rejoiced over my distress. May they be clothed with shame and reproach who magnify themselves over me.

The author hopes that those who seek his life, those who rejoice over his distress, will be shamed, covered with shame, meaning that he wishes them to be disappointed, unsuccessful, and fail in their intention. Here is a case of possible loss of status and control, perhaps a matter of survival. Shame can be similarly interpreted in Isa 54:5, where it is explicitly associated with widowhood, i.e., being let down without support, and in Jer 20:11, where בוש is juxtaposed to failure (stumbling; כשל *niphal*). And in Isa 24:23 the sun and the moon are shamed before YHWH, meaning that they submit to his authority: a clear example of subordinance shame.

In 2 Kings 19:26, Isaiah says about Sennacherib's destruction of cities: וישביהן קצרי־יד חתו ויבשו ("their inhabitants are powerless, terrified and shamed"). The "shame" is here juxtaposed to fear and concerns mere survival, it has little to do with norm infringement or loss of integrity. The association with fear makes sense of Isa 29:22, in which shame is paralleled to faces growing pale or white:

לא־עתה יבוש יעקב ולא עתה פניו יחורו

> Jacob will no longer be shamed and his face will no longer grow pale.

The verb חור can hardly be translated as "blushing," as is occasionally done. This is not the reddening of embarrassment, but a sign of fear, a paling associated with subordinance shame.

This does not mean that בוש and other shame vocabulary are *only* used in contexts of what I call SHAME II, but meanings like failure, dis-

appointment, or being let down, go a long way, even taking figures like being "wrapped in shame" or "shame covers my head" into regard. There are instances, however, which go beyond a SHAME II framework, even though Isaiah's idol worshippers may probably pass for failures (e.g., Isa 42:17; 44:9, 11; 45:16, 17; cf. Ps 97:7) and Jeremiah's oracles against the nations being put to shame, too (e.g., Egypt, Jer 46:24; Moab, 48:39; Damascus, 49:23; Bel and his idols, 50:2; Babylon, 50:12; 51:47). In Ezekiel shame is clearly associated with sexual misconduct (Ezek 16:52, 63) and explicitly associated with sinful and abominable behaviour (36:31–32).[45] The framework for shame here is clearly SHAME III/GUILT I. Although the shame of nakedness (or rather, lack of shame) in the garden of Eden narrative (Gen 2:25) might possibly be understood as "they suffered no harm," this is contrived. It seems reasonable to read this text within the framework of EMBARRASSMENT II/ SHAME I: there is no negative social evaluation or lack of acceptance, in spite of the fact that the man and the woman are unclothed. The meaning of shame does move along a continuum, but subordinance shame and failure have the capacity to account for more than we might have thought and there is little need for overly theological explanations.

SHAME IN GREEK, IN THE LXX, AND IN BEN SIRA

The translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek introduces terminology with different connotations and overlaps. The main Greek terms revolve around two stems, αἰδ- and αἰσχ-. Douglas Cairns' major study on αἰδῶς in Homer and classical literature lays the groundwork for all subsequent discussion.[46] Cairns also discusses αἰσχύνη, αἰσχρός and other relevant terms. For our purpose, similarities and differences between αἰδ- and αἰσχ-terms are of most interest.

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[45] The attempt by Odell ("Inversion of Shame") to explain the mouth opening in Ezek 16:63 does not change this fact.

[46] Cairns, *Aidôs*.

From Homer and onwards, αἰδῶς and αἰδεῖσθαι describe a sense of propriety and respect, an emotion of bashfulness, embarrassment, or inhibition, especially before people of higher status or with more power. Basically, the vocabulary suggests "shame" of a sort that belongs within the frameworks of SHYNESS II/EMBARRASSMENT I and EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I. Cairns states that αἰδῶς cannot be equated with shame precisely because it covers both shame and embarrassment.[47] To feel and express αἰδῶς is then, in a slightly paradoxical way, equal to showing honour to those stronger or of more status than you. In that sense, it is typical of subordinance shame, although not *necessarily* associated with *loss* of status and control, but often just representing the appropriate behaviour towards someone with a higher position on the hierarchical ladder, for whatever reason.

The example of Nausikaa, from the Odyssey's sixth song, is a classical one, which also indicates the extent to which αἰδῶς was a particularly female virtue; at least it induced certain behaviours for women and partly others for men. In spite of her initiative and endeavour for liberty, Nausikaa displays deference and restraint, she is modest as befits women in Greek archaic and classical culture.

The gendered aspects of αἰδῶς/αἰδεῖσθαι are elaborated by the tragedist Euripides (fifth century BCE) in *Ifigenia in Aulis* 558–72, a passage in which the chorus clearly delineates the role of shame as modesty within the context of the current hierarchical social order:

> διάφοροι δὲ φύσεις βροτῶν, διάφοροι δὲ τρόποι: τὸ δ' ὀρθῶς ἐσθλὸν σαφὲς αἰεί: τροφαί θ' αἱ παιδευόμεναι μέγα φέρουσ' ἐς τὰν ἀρετάν: τό τε γὰρ αἰδεῖσθαι σοφία, τάν τ' ἐξαλλάσσουσαν ἔχει χάριν ὑπὸ γνώμας ἐσορᾶν τὸ δέον, ἔνθα δόξα φέρει κλέος ἀγήρατον βιοτᾷ. μέγα τι θηρεύειν ἀρετάν, γυναιξὶ μὲν κατὰ Κύπριν κρυπτάν, ἐν ἀνδράσι δ' αὖ κόσμος ἐνὼν ὁ μυριοπληθὴς μείζω πόλιν αὔξει.
>
> The natures of mortals vary and their habits differ, but the truly good is always plain: educated upbringings greatly lead to virtue; for modesty is wisdom and has the extraordinary gift to judiciously discern what is fitting. Then reputation brings ageless renown to life. Great it is to hunt for virtue, for women according

[47] Cairns, *Aidôs*, 7.

> to the covert Kypris [i.e., a discrete gender role], while for men, the infinite and innate [sense of] order makes a city grow big.

In contrast to αἰδῶς, αἰσχρός basically means "ugly" in opposition to καλός and although αἰσχύνη is generally "shame," or "disgrace," the active αἰσχύνειν is to disfigure. To be ashamed (αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπαισχύνεσθαι), or to shame (καταισχύνειν), are basically aesthetic terms, applied also, but not exclusively within moral frameworks.

In his study on shame and necessity in ancient Greece, Bernard Williams explains that he does not separate uses of the two roots αἰδ- and αἰσχύν-, because he finds variations to be mainly diachronic, so that αἰσχύνη (shame) increasingly took the place of αἰδῶς (respect).[48] Rudolf Bultmann had already pointed out that although αἰδεῖσθαι was always in use, αἰδῶς "became rare in the time of Hellenism, but was brought back into use by the late Stoics."[49]

The fact that αἰσχύνεσθαι can be found as an equivalent to αἰδῶς already in Homer and that αἰδῶς/αἰδεῖσθαι continued in use with two senses as well gives David Konstan reason to protest against a simplified chronological argument.[50] In any case, Homer only has three occurrances of αἰσχύνεσθαι, all in the *Odyssey*, and Cairns concludes, after having discussed them one by one, that Homer's passages should not be use as "evidence for any fundamental difference in the function and significance of the two verbs."[51] Nevertheless, says Konstan, there is a slight difference in that αἰδῶς normally has a prospective or inhibitory sense, while αἰσχύνη also can reflect back on disapproved behaviour with regret—something that Konstan demonstrates from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.[52] To what extent such a differentiation is relevant to

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[48] Bernard Williams, *Shame and Necessity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 194, n. 9.

[49] Rudolf Bultmann, "αἰδῶς," in *TDNT*, vol. 1, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964), 169–71 (169).

[50] Konstan, *Emotions*, 93–94.

[51] Cairns, *Aidōs*, 138–39.

[52] Konstan, *Emotions*, 94–96; the example he quotes is from *Eth. nic.* 1128b.

more general usage is debatable; Bultmann suggests that this is a Stoic disctinction that does not really correspond to actual usage, and that both terms can be used in a prospective as well as a reflective sense.[53]

In relation to our heuristic scheme, we might suggest that αἰσχ- terminology perhaps fits best within the frameworks of SHAME III/GUILT I and GUILT II, but can also be used in the framework of EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I. This reminds us again, first that the scheme is heuristic and not meant to draw borders but to point to overlaps within a continuum, and secondly that an underlying stratum of subordinance shame often makes itself known all along the continuum.

When the Hebrew Bible is translated into Greek, בוש is usually translated with αἰσχύνη and αἰσχύνεσθαι. This introduces connotations of social and moral norms that were not unknown to בוש, but fairly marginal, at least not dominant. It is not difficult to imagine the effect when the struggle for status and control, reflected in Ps 35, is read through the lens of Greek expressions for shame and shaming. The fearful shame easily becomes moralised if fear is understood to mean fear of punishment for bad behaviour, and faces and heads covered with shame are possible to interpret as blushing and strong feelings of remorse, the effects of which we can see above all in modern translations.

Ben Sira provides a window into this cultural blending process, since his writing is packed with shame and some of his passages on shame are extant in both Hebrew and Greek. After having admonished his son not be ashamed of himself (ואל נפשך אל תבוש/περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς σου μὴ αἰσχυνθῇς), Ben Sira distinguishes between two types of shame, or embarrassment in 4:21:

כי יש בֹּשֶׁת משאת עון ויש בשת כבוד וחן:[54]

ἔστιν γὰρ αἰσχύνη ἐπάγουσα ἁμαρτίαν καὶ ἔστιν αἰσχύνη δόξα καὶ χάρις

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[53] Bultmann, "αἰδῶς," 170.

[54] Manuscript A1 Verso, Martin Abegg's transcription. Manuscript C1 Verso has חן וכבוד, i.e., the opposite order.

The Hebrew text uses בוש here in a sense already influenced by Greek conceptualisation and the term is consequently translated with αἰσχύνη. If we were to claim a clear distinction between different terms in Greek shame vocabulary, the second instance of בוש would rather be represented by αἰδῶς, but this is not the case, as αἰσχύνη also takes on the meaning of "sense of shame." αἰσχύνη can obviously be used along the whole continuum, from embarrassment to guilt. The shame that leads to sin would most probably refer to disapproved behaviour,[55] but the shame that leads to honour and praise could refer not only to inhibitory shame, preventing misdeeds, but also to subordinance shame, resulting in appropriate behaviour towards superiors and seniors in a hierarchical society. This is at least what Ben Sira recommends in the beginning of chapter 4: μεγιστᾶνι ταπείνου τὴν κεφαλήν σου—"lower your head before the mighty" (4:7b).

In 41:14–42:8, Ben Sira provides lists of behaviours of which one should and should not be ashamed of. One *should* be ashamed (בוש/αἰσχύνεσθε) of adultery, lies, and a number of named crimes, but also of placing one's elbow in the food. Sex and money figure repeatedly, as we would expect. One should *not* be ashamed of the law, so as to be partial and aquit the ungodly, nor of keeping accounts, making a profit, disciplining one's children, or maltreating one's slave. Of the behaviours in the first list, Ben Sira says, "you may be legitimately ashamed (והייתי בוש באמת/ἔσῃ αἰσχυντηρὸς ἀληθινῶς) and find grace in all people's eyes" (Sir 42:1; LXX 41:27). This is a shame which looks forward and makes

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[55] We would perhaps expect the reverse, that sin leads to shame, but the Greek meaning is probably that shame (αἰσχύνη) in the sense of shameful *behaviour* leads (ἐπάγουσα) to sin. On the other hand the Greek formulation may be the result of struggling with the Hebrew *Vorlage*: the translator seems to have taken משאת as a verbal noun derived from נשא and hence a raising or carrying, which has been interpreted in Greek as leading to, or bringing (out) sin. Based on the same root the Hebrew could also be taken to mean that shame is an offering to sin, a burden of sin, or even a signal or sign of sin (cf. the use of מַשְׂאֵ for beacon, fire-signal; Judg 20:38; Jer 6:1). There is an additional possibility: מִשְׂאַת (מִן + שׂוֹאָה cstr, as in Prov 3:25), which would render the meaning "there is a shame from the disaster of sin."

a person anticipate the detrimental results of acting against the norms so as to avoid such actions. One could possibly sense a difference in nuance here between the Hebrew and the Greek: the Hebrew may be interpreted as "you will be truly embarrassed for such behaviour (and thus avoid it)," while the Greek could perhaps be taken to mean "if you show the right shame and avoid such behaviour, you will become truly 'shameful,' in the sense of a 'modest person'."[56] In any case, the shame vocabulary employed here, in Hebrew as well as in Greek, stretches over the frameworks of at least SHAME I, II, and III. The fundamentally hierarchic character of the emotion of shame is not affected, but the process through which Israel is becoming embedded in Hellenistic culture seems to have shifted the emphasis of shame also in Hebrew, at least in Ben Sira, towards the moralistic side.[57]

SHAME IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

If we expect to see a continuation of such a "moral turn" in the New Testament writings, we may be disappointed. Space does not allow for

[56] For somewhat related examples of possible differences in nuance between Ben Sira's Hebrew text in a Second Temple Jewish context and the Greek translation in a Hellenistic diaspora community, see Giuseppe Bellia, "An Historico-Anthropological Reading of the Work of Ben Sira," in *The Wisdom of Ben Sira: Studies on Tradition, Redaction, and Theology*, ed. Angelo Passaro and Giuseppe Bellia (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008), 49–74 (67–68).

[57] The extent of Hellenistic influences in Ben Sira has been subject to much discussion through the past decades. Ben Sira can be seen to display signs of resistance against the ongoing Hellenising process, but also to reflect Hellenistic ideology, philosophy, and education, at least to some extent. For overviews, also discussing previous research, see Oda Wischmeyer, "Die Konstruktion von Kultur im Sirachbuch," in *Texts and Contexts of the Book of Sirach/Texte und Kontexte des Sirachbuches*, ed. Gerhard Karner, Frank Ueberschaer, and Bukard M. Zapff; SCS 66 (Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2017), 71–98; John J. Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*; OTL (Louisville, KY: WJK, 1997), especially chapter 2: "Ben Sira in His Hellenistic Context," 23–41; Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. Di Lella, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira*; AB 39 (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 46–50.

more than a cursory overview of the most relevant material, but this is hopefully enough to discern a general picture.

Only once in the New Testament do we find αἰδῶς being used. The term is paired with σωφροσύνη in a highly patriarchal attempt to regulate women's dress (1 Tim 2:9–10), followed by detailed instructions about their submission (1 Tim 2:11–15): women should be shy, embarrassed, or have a sense of shame sufficient to avoid calling attention to themselves, and in particular to avoid speaking in public. This corresponds fairly well with the meaning of αἰδῶς in early Greek usage and is a clear example of subordinance shame. The corresponding verb, αἰδεῖσθαι, is not found in the New Testament at all.[58]

Elsewhere in the New Testament, shame terminology is dominated by the αἰσχ-family (αἰσχρός, αἰσχύνη, αἰσχύνειν, αἰσχύνεσθαι, ἐπαισχύνεσθαι, καταισχύνειν, and a few rare compounds). The scope of this terminology is fairly broad, but can be focused around a few nodes, one of which is gender roles. For example, Paul assumes that everyone finds it αἰσχρός for women to cut their hair (εἰ δὲ αἰσχρὸν γυναικὶ τὸ κείρασθαι ἢ ξυρᾶσθαι; 1 Cor 11:6). Does this mean that Paul found short-haired women ugly? Perhaps not, since the statement is part of an argument that a woman who prays without a head-covering shames her head (καταισχύνει τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτῆς; 1 Cor 11:5)—an argument to which we will soon return. On the other hand, we might suspect that these aspects were not necessarily or fully kept apart, if we suppose that an aesthetic notion adhered to the concepts of shame that Greek speakers used for thinking and feeling. Another example is the Pauline interpolator (as I take him to be)[59] of 1 Cor 14:35 who, similarly to the au-

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[58] The exception being the variant reading of Heb 12:28, found in the ninth century manuscripts K and L, also attested by a twelwth century corrector (א^{2}) to Codex Sinaiticus.

[59] The literature on 1 Cor 14:34–35 is vast. Gordon Fee's arguments from mainly content and language are by now classic (Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*; NICNT [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1987], 699–708), and the text-critical argument has been reinforced recently by Philip Payne's study of the distigme-obelos symbols in Codex Vaticanus (Philip B. Payne, "Vaticanus Distigme-obelos

thor of 1 Tim 2, finds it αἰσχρός for women to speak at public meetings (αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστιν γυναικὶ λαλεῖν ἐν ἐκκλησία). These examples reflect a subordinance shame perhaps as much of the EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I type as of the SHAME II type. It signals submission and acceptance, even though the problem is lack rather than loss of status.

What about other norm infringements or "moral" issues? It may come as a surprise that such matters are far from the main focus of shame. In addition to texts dealing with gender roles, there are few which explicitly associate shame with immoral behaviour. Paul does it, in Rom 6:21, when he rhetorically asks his addressees what payback ("fruit") they received (τίνα οὖν καρπὸν εἴχετε) when they were slaves under sin, and himself answers: such things you are now ashamed of (ἐφ' οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε), which lead to death. Although the shameful rewards are not explicitly spelled out, it is a fair guess, based on chapter 1, that Paul at least in part has sins of a sexual nature in mind. The author of Eph 5:12 finds it αἰσχρός to speak of what people do in secret (τὰ γὰρ κρυφῇ γινόμενα ὑπ' αὐτῶν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν καὶ λέγειν).[60] We could just imagine what the topic of such conversations might be – in the *Dialogues of the Courtesans*, Lucian lets Leaina express herself similarly, when Clonarion asks for details about how Megilla seduced her: don't ask me for details, they are shameful (αἰσχρά).[61] Jude denounces his opponents (Jude 1:13) by among other things accusing them for "foaming their shames" (ἐπαφρίζοντα τὰς ἑαυτῶν αἰσχύνας), which in the context likely refers to some kind of sexual licentiousness. In a few instances, αἰσχύνη functions as a euphemism for genitals (Phil 3:19; Rev 3:18).[62] Sexual norm infringments are clearly subject to feelings of

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Symbols Marking Added Text, Including 1 Corinthians 14.34–5," *New Testament Studies* 63 [2017]: 604–25).

[60] An association between secrecy and shame is also found in 2 Cor 4:2 (ἀπειπάμεθα τὰ κρυπτὰ τῆς αἰσχύνης).

[61] Lucian, *Dial. meretr.* 5.3.

[62] Cf. the similarly euphemistic use in Rom 1:27 and Rev 16:15 of ἀσχημοσύνη, which in the LXX is mainly found in Leviticus 18 and 20 and usually translates עֶרְוָה.

shame, although it is not evident where on a scale such shame should be placed. One could argue that somewhere within the GUILT spectrum makes sense, but neither loss of integrity, nor a negative self-evaluation is a completely necessary company to the shame involved. In addition to these examples there is surprisingly little evidence in the New Testament for shame language and moral discourse being associated or juxtaposed.[63]

The truth is that much of the shame language in the New Testament relates, just as בוש in the Hebrew Bible, to failure and success. Beginning with Paul, he employs a LXX expression from Isa 28:16 when he assures his addressees that a believer in Christ will not be let down (ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ οὐ καταισχυνθήσεται; Rom 9:33; 10:11). Similarly, in Rom 5:5, hope does not fail (ἡ δὲ ἐλπὶς οὐ καταισχύνει), and in 2 Cor 10:8 he claims that his boasting is valid, he will not lose face (οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσομαι). In 2 Cor 9:4 shame is for him, as well as for his addressees, to fail in the Jerusalem collection. Even his imprisonment will not lead to shame (ἐν οὐδενὶ αἰσχυνθήσομαι), meaning failure (Phil 1:20).

Outside of Paul, 1 Peter displays a similar pattern, quoting the same passage from Isaiah (ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ οὐ μὴ καταισχυνθῇ, 1 Pet 2:6). Believers who suffer, not for wrongs, but for their faith, should not be ashamed (μὴ αἰσχυνέσθω), that is, they should not regard this as a failure (1 Pet 4:16), and those who slander Christians will be "put to shame" (καταισχυνθῶσιν), that is, they will be proven wrong (1 Pet 3:16).[64] Although the issue is Christian conduct (ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφή), the shame mentioned does not concern or threat that conduct but the opponents, whose vilifications will fail.[65]

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[63] Paul also reprimands the Corinthians (πρὸς ἐντροπὴν ὑμῖν λέγω), i.e., he shames them, for turning to outside judges (1 Cor 6:5) and for bad company leading to sin (1 Cor 15:33–34). However, in this context he does not employ αἰσχ-terminology,

[64] συνείδησιν ἔχοντες ἀγαθήν, ἵνα ἐν ᾧ καταλαλεῖσθε καταισχυνθῶσιν οἱ ἐπηρεάζοντες ὑμῶν τὴν ἀγαθὴν ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστροφήν.

[65] Several scholars have discussed the way in which 1 Peter turns shame into honour.

The examples I provide here are not comprehensive but representative enough. They demonstrate a primary focus for shame language in the New Testament: shame is a feeling of failure and defeat, the opposite of pride over success, and corresponds largely to the characteristics of SHAME II. We may register the cultural layers, but closely below them we detect an emotion inherited from our pre-human ancestors.

The other important focus for shame language in the New Testament is status and hierarchy. The unfaithful steward (οἰκονόμος) in Luke 16 is ashamed of the prospect of begging (ἐπαιτεῖν αἰσχύνομαι, 16:3); this would be below his status or dignity. Questions of status and hierarchy are also intrinsic to any discussions of gender roles, such as those already mentioned from 1 Timothy and 1 Corinthians. The context for Paul's discussion of hair length and head coverings in 1 Cor 11 has all to do with navigating earthly and heavenly hierarchies. A fixed hierarchy of "heads" is assumed, God – Christ – man – woman (παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἡ κεφαλὴ ὁ Χριστός ἐστιν, κεφαλὴ δὲ γυναικὸς ὁ ἀνήρ, κεφαλὴ δὲ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ὁ θεός, 1 Cor 11:3), and the ways in which men and women cover their heads during prayer and prophecy are entirely related to this hierarchy (vv. 5–8).

Other hierarchies are overturned or inverted. Experiences that would normally be interpreted as failure, loss of control, and deprivation of status, are reinterpreted as signs of loyalty and success from a divine perspective of reversal. Paul claims that God elected the foolish and weak of the world in order to shame (καταισχύνῃ) the strong and wise, i.e., God reverses their status (1 Cor 1:27). Paul also warns believers against despising and "shaming" those of lower status, the have-nots (καταισχύνετε τοὺς μὴ ἔχοντας, 1 Cor 11:22). Numerous texts argue against feeling shame for involvment with issues and people below one's own status level. Paul is not ashamed of the gospel (οὐ γὰρ

See for example John H. Elliott, "Disgraced yet Graced: The Gospel according to 1 Peter in the Key of Honor and Shame," *BTB* 25 (1995): 166–78; David A. DeSilva, "Turning Shame into Honor: The Pastoral Strategy of 1 Peter, in *The Shame Factor: How Shame Shapes Society*, ed. Robert Jewett (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), 159–86.

ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, Rom 1:16). According to Hebrews, God is not ashamed to be called the God of the faithful (διὸ οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς θεὸς ἐπικαλεῖσθαι αὐτῶν, Heb 11:16), Jesus is not ashamed of calling believers brothers (οὐκ ἐπαισχύνεται ἀδελφοὺς αὐτοὺς καλεῖν, Heb 2:11), and he was not even ashamed of the cross (ὑπέμεινεν σταυρὸν αἰσχύνης καταφρονήσας, Heb 12:2).[66]

Second Timothy talks repeatedly of the shame of imprisonment: the letter's "Paul" is not ashamed of his sufferings (δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ ταῦτα πάσχω· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπαισχύνομαι, 2 Tim 1:12), Onesiphorus was not ashamed of "Paul's" imprisonment (τὴν ἅλυσίν μου οὐκ ἐπαισχύνθη, 2 Tim 1:16), and the author asks Timothy to be ashamed neither of the witness/suffering of the Lord, nor of him as a prisoner (μὴ οὖν ἐπαισχυνθῇς τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν μηδὲ ἐμὲ τὸν δέσμιον αὐτοῦ, 2 Tim 1:8).

Even the synoptic Son of Man saying about reciprocal shame (Mark 8:38) fits into this pattern.

> ὃς γὰρ ἐὰν ἐπαισχυνθῇ με καὶ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους ἐν τῇ γενεᾷ ταύτῃ τῇ μοιχαλίδι καὶ ἁμαρτωλῷ, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπαισχυνθήσεται αὐτόν, ὅταν ἔλθῃ ἐν τῇ δόξῃ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ μετὰ τῶν ἀγγέλων τῶν ἁγίων.
>
> The person who is ashamed of me and my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of him will the son of man be ashamed, when he comes in the glory of his father with the holy angels.

Without entering the discussion of how to relate "me" with the son of man,[67] we notice the plain message: recipients are encouraged not to feel shame for the lowly conditions of the earthly Jesus, but rather (as is

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[66] For a thorough socio-cultural analysis of shame language in the Epistle to the Hebrews, with an emphasis on reversal of values and a "corrective emphasis" on patronage, see David De Silva, *Despising Shame: Honor Discourse and Community Maintenance in the Epistle to the Hebrews*; Rev. ed.; SBLStBL 21 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008).

[67] Cf. Thomas Kazen, "Son of Man and Early Christian Identity Formation," in *Identity Formation in the New Testament*, ed. Bengt Holmberg and Mikael Winninge; WUNT 1/227 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 97–122.

clear from the preceding verses, Mark 8:34–37) to identify with them, because in the end the tables will be turned and conditions reversed. Loyalty will, in other words, be rewarded.

In 1 John 2:28 we find a similar passage and some degree of influence either from Mark or from some related Jesus tradition is likely.[68] The recipients are encouraged to remain loyal in order to have confidence and not be shamed by him (referent unclear) at his appearance (μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ, ἵνα ἐὰν φανερωθῇ σχῶμεν παρρησίαν καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ). It is a debated issue whether this verse closes the previous or introduces the subsequent section.[69] In the latter case, the references to righteousness in v. 29 may suggest a moral interpretation, so that the prospective shaming is associated with immoral behaviour, but there are strong reasons for v. 28 somehow pulling together the preceding christological section.[70] In that case, the text rather talks about loyalty to God/Christ ("remain in him") in contrast to those who listen to the antichrist. However, we must take a further aspect into account: the implications of the assurance or boldness (παρρησία) that is the opposite of being shamed. Although the term παρρησία often refers to frank (and critical) speech, and sometimes to rhetorical speech, or moral exhortation, this "freedom of speech" is rooted in the democratic right of citizens in classical Athens to express their views in the assembly. For many philosophers, such freedom was an inner virtue or capacity regardless of civic rights.[71] From this perspective, the contrast between παρρησία and shaming in 1 John 2:28 indi-

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[68] Judith M. Lieu, *I, II, & III John: A Commentary*; NTL (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 115.

[69] For a review of various options and attempts, concluding there is no consensus at all, see Matthew D. Jensen, "The Structure and Argument of 1 John: A Survey of Proposals," *CurBR* 12 (2014): 194–215.

[70] Lieu, *I, II, & III John*, 114.

[71] Cf. essays in John T. Fizgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn Stanfield Holland (ed.), *Philodemus and the New Testament World*; NovTSup 111 (Leiden: Brill, 2004); and essays in John T. Fitzgerald (ed.), *Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World* (Leiden: Brill, 1996).

cates two opposites with regard to status before the divine judge: subordinance shame versus integrity and positive self-evaluation, based on acceptance, even if not on equality. It could thus be argued that this passage reflects multi-faceted aspects of shame, but particularly attests to the predominance and paradigmatic nature of subordinance shame.

In sum, shame language in the New Testament is much less about social and moral norm infringement than many would expect. Expressions move along most of the shame continuum, but with dominance for frameworks represented especially by SHAME II and to some extent by EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I, in which issues of preventing or overcoming failure and defending or winning status are of crucial importance. Also in the New Testament, subordinance shame plays a major role.

CONCLUSIONS

Shame is a self-conscious emotion which contributes to the cooperation and survival of humanity, characterised as a highly advanced social species. Close to the biological roots we find a subordinance shame which navigates social hierarchies and mitigates failures. The texts and contexts we have visited indicate and support an understanding of this type of "primordial" shame cutting across layers of cultural development and construction, making itself visible along much of the continuum of shame-related emotions. The majority of cases seem to reflect shame of the EMBARRASSMENT II/SHAME I and the SHAME II types. More often than not, shame means failure. Most conspicuously, shame is only occasionally associated with moral norm infringments, and then almost exclusively with trespasses of a sexual character and with transgressions of gender norms, which often also have hierarchical aspects and are status-related.[72]

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[72] Cf. Thomas Kazen, *Smuts, skam, status: Perspektiv på samkönad sexualitet i Bibeln och antiken* (Göteborg: Makadam, 2018).

The texts and contexts we have discussed also suggest that social fear may play a more global role than we might think, as it has proved to be one of the underlying basic emotions associated with shame. Shame appears, in fact, as more visceral and closer to the basic emotions than we might have thought.

The cultural forms of shame, evidenced in the texts we have studied, accommodate to the highly hierarchical structures that dominated through the periods to which these texts belong. Some of these structures trace their roots far back into our primate past. Shame evolved for survival, but its social role is double-edged, or ambiguous. On the one hand, our capacity to feel shame facilitates cooperation and makes reciprocity and mutuality possible. This creates a problem for strongly individualistic cultures that often suppress shame. On the other hand, shame is easily and typically subsumed under hierarchical structures; shame is, in a sense, made for subordination and much of the history of humankind is ugly (αἰσχρός). Whether in the long run shame will assist human fellowship or ruin society is perhaps a political question, which does not belong here. But as long as an elbow in the food evokes more shame among the elite than rape and racism, there is still room for human culture to negotiate the biological substratum on which it grows.

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Exegetik och det offentliga rummet: då och nu

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Akademin för bibelvetenskap samlades den 9 oktober 2018 till föreningsstämma i Stockholm för att bland annat ta ställning till sitt fortsatta vara eller inte vara. Såsom initiativtagare till akademien blev jag ombedd att hålla ett föredrag om dess tillkomst och syften. Sedan ändrade styrelsen rubriken till den ovan givna och tog den som tema för en hel dag med föredrag, paneldebatt, samtal och årsmöte. Jag gick med på det med viss tvekan. Jag tillhör en äldre generation. Jag har levt i ett annat samhälle. Sociala medier tillhör inte min vardag. Det är därför tveksamt om mina exempel kan säga så mycket om exegetiken i det officiella rummet idag. Men de kan möjligen ställa några frågor med tanke på ämnet. En tidig idé om en enkel enkät om våra exegeters vistelser i det officiella rummet föll på grund av tidsbrist. Nu får var och en vittna i det samtal som följer på paneldebatten. Det som jag skriver här bevarar i stort föredragets muntliga form.

Den viktigaste bakgrunden till bildandet av en akademi för exegeter i tjänst var ökningen av antalet exegeter i landet. När jag kom till Uppsala hösten 1959 för att läsa teologi fanns där en professor i GT och en professor i NT och en tjänstgörande docent i dessa två ämnen, sammanlagt fyra personer. Docenttjänsten var mest en meriteringstjänst på normalt sex år med undervisning två timmar i veckan, onekligen den bästa forskningstjänsten vid universitetet. En anställning som assistent i exegetik hade också börjat växa fram vid denna tid.

Läget i Lund var detsamma. Det blir sammanlagt fyra fasta och fyra tidsbegränsade tjänster i exegetik i landet, eller i exegetisk teologi som

det hette på den tiden för att markera bundenheten till övriga ämnen i den teologiska fakulteten. När jag våren 1993 kom till Lund som professor i Nya testamentets exegetik var läget annorlunda. Under 80-talet försvann docenttjänsterna och vi fick en rad fasta lektorstjänster. I Lund hade vi åtta tjänster i Nya testamentets exegetik, lika många som det fanns i hela landet när jag började läsa teologi. Ämnet bibelvetenskap fanns också vid andra universitet, i Linköping, Umeå och Göteborg, och flera teologiska seminarier närmade sig högskolenivå, Teologiska Högskolan i Stockholm, Johannelunds teologiska institut i Uppsala, Örebro Missionsskola och senare Newmaninstitutet i Uppsala.[1] När jag i början av 2000-talet räknade antal heltidstjänster i landet blev det 29 personer.

Inbjudan i januari 2003 till att bilda en akademi för bibelvetenskap i Sverige gick alltså ut till 29 personer.[2] Syftet var enligt stadgarna ”att i kontakt med samhälle, kyrka och kultur främja samtalet om undervisning och forskning i bibelvetenskap vid svenska universitet och högskolor”. Tillsvidareanställda lärare i bibelvetenskap och doktorer med undervisning i bibelvetenskap vid svenska universitet och högskolor kunde efter ansökan bli medlemmar i akademin. Tanken var att när man lämnade sin tjänst lämnade man också akademin.[3] Den hade formen av en förening och skulle samlas till ordinarie föreningsstämma vart annat år.

Min tanke var att dessa i tjänst varande lärare i bibelvetenskap skulle lära känna varandra, dela med sig av sina erfarenheter av undervisning och forskning och hitta former av konstruktiva samtal om centrala teman i Gamla och Nya testamentet. Om de övade sig att diskutera bibel-

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[1] Även inom pingströrelsen sökte man omkring år 2000 få fram en högskoleutbildning för predikanter inom pingströrelsen. Se Göte Olingdahl, ”Pingströrelsen och den teologiska högskoleutbildningen”, *Tro och Liv* 2, 3–4 (2008).

[2] Inbjudan var undertecknad av Birger Olsson, Teologiska fakulteten i Lund, Samuel Byrskog, Humanistiska fakulteten i Göteborg, och LarsOlov Eriksson, Johannelunds teologiska institut i Uppsala.

[3] Detta har senare ändrats så att man kan vara med i akademin så länge man vill.

frågor sinsemellan skulle de nog också oftare kunna delta i diskussioner i det offentliga rummet.

Akademin har nu samlats åtta gånger på olika ställen i Sverige. Jag bildade ett sällskap där jag själv inte kunde vara medlem, eftersom jag lämnade min tjänst år 2003. Jag kan alltså här inte på något sätt utvärdera akademins verksamhet och dess historia.

Fakultet, kyrka och skola då och nu

Den teologiska fakultetens uppgift för hundra år sedan var att utbilda präster i Svenska kyrkan och lärare i kristendomskunskap.[4] Dess professorer var en del av Svenska kyrkan och många av dem avancerade också till biskopar, till exempel de två professorerna i exegetisk teologi i Lund Erik Aurelius 1927 och Erling Eidem 1932. 1945 var 7 av rikets biskopar före detta teologie professorer.

De stora förändringar som ägt rum i fråga om högskoleexegeternas status och funktion under det senaste seklet kan knytas till några årtal.

1923 Prebendeinstitutionen upphör, det vill säga att varje teologie professor skulle inneha en tjänst som kyrkoherde i någon församling nära Lund eller Uppsala. Även andra professorer kunde ha prebenden. Professorn i praktisk teologi i Lund förblev domprost ända fram till 1941.

1934 Biskoparna i Uppsala och Lund upphör att vara universitetens prokanslerer. Detta ämbete var en mellaninstans mellan det centrala kanslersämbetet och universiteten och kunde få rätt stort inflytande i vissa frågor.

1937 Professorerna tillsammans med biskopen upphör att vara domkapitel i Uppsala och Lund men får fortsättningsvis välja två ledamöter till respektive domkapitel.

1953 Den gamla lydelsen i regeringsformen om att endast den som ”bekänner den rena evangeliska läran” kan anställas som lärare i teologi

[4] För det som här följer se framför allt Birger Olsson, Göran Bexell och Göran Gustafsson, red., *Theologicum i Lund: Undervisning och forskning i tusen år* (Lund: Arcus, 2001).

ändras till att Konungen skulle ”taga den hänsyn till de sökandes trosåskådning som därav må påkallas”. Den nuvarande formuleringen sedan 1974 lyder: ”Vid tillsättning av statlig tjänst skall avseende fästas endast vid sakliga grunder, såsom förtjänst och skicklighet”.

1955 En ny studieordning införs för att tillfredsställa behovet av kristendomslärare med en översiktskurs på tre terminer och ett ämnesstudium på fyra terminer. Den gamla teol-filen avskaffades och dess innehåll, grekiska, hebreiska och filosofi bakades in i teologie kandidatstudiet. Det innebar en minskning av kursfordringarna i exegetik för en teol.kand. Översiktskursen räckte för blivande lärare medan blivande präster måste avlägga en teologie kandidat.

1963 Professorerna upphör att delta i biskopsval i Svenska kyrkan.

1965/69 Ämnet Kristendomskunskap i grundskola och gymnasium ändras till Religionskunskap med tonvikt på religionernas grundläggande uttrycksformer, tro och idéer och på deras sätt att påverka människors handlingar och tankar. Lektorstjänster i kristendom försvinner efter hand.

1969 Ny studieordning utifrån skolans krav med en grundkurs ”i religionskunskap” (*sic*) på två terminer utifrån skolans läroplaner. Exegetisk teologi döptes om till bibelkunskap. Den som ville bli präst läste sedan grekiska och hebreiska en termin (utan krav på grekiska och latin i gymnasiet) och sedan ett ämnesstudium på fyra terminer.

1970 Professorerna upphör att bland sig välja in två ledamöter i domkapitlet och två ledamöter i kyrkomötet.

1973 Ny studieordning där fakultetens utbildningsmål förändras kraftigt. Utbildningen ska ge ”redskap för analys och förståelse av religioners och livsåskådningars roll för den enskilde och i samhället”. Den mynnar ut i ”högskoleexamen på religionsvetenskaplig linje”. Studiet omfattar tre delar: baskursen i religionsvetenskap, 40 poäng, ämnesblocksstudier, 80 eller 100 poäng, och en så kallad tematermin på 20 poäng, efterhand ersatt med ett så kallat examensarbete. De exegetiska studierna reducerades än mera och sattes in i ett religionsvetenskapligt sammanhang.

1977 Den nedärvda formen av fakultetsstyre, sammanträden med fakultetens samtliga professorer, ersätts med en fakultetsnämnd bestående av dekan, prodekan och fyra lärare valda av fakultetskollegiet med rätt för två studenter och två representanter för övrig personal att delta i sammanträdena. Till detta kom särskilda ämneslinjer för undervisningsfrå-

gor. Alla professorerna samlades alltså inte längre till sammanträden, fler personalkategorier kom med i ledningsgruppen och forskning och undervisning skildes åt.

1977 Högskolelagen kräver att till verksamheten inom högskolan skall höra att sprida kännedom om forskning och utvecklingsarbete (tredje uppgiften vid sidan av undervisning och forskning). Se vidare nedan.

1980 Den praktiska prästutbildningen överförs till Svenska kyrkans pastoralinstitut i Uppsala och Lund.

1980-talet En rad nya professurer inrättas utifrån målsättningarna 1969 och 1973, till exempel för Lunds del religionssociologi 1975, islamologi 1983, judaistik 1987, religionspsykologi 1988 och missionsvetenskap med ekumenik 1992. Exegetik blir ett litet ämne bland många andra små ämnen med konkurrens om studenterna som följd.

1993 En gemensam fakultetsnämnd för humaniora och teologi bildas i Lund (kallad områdesstyrelsen) med ett gemensamt kansli. En rad ärenden delegerades till ett fakultetsråd.

Dessa förändringar innebär att professorer vid de teologiska fakulteterna efter år 1970 inte längre har någon formell koppling till ledningsfunktioner inom Svenska kyrkan.[5] Deras plats inom den officiella kyrkliga sfären har alltså reducerats efterhand. Samtidigt har fakulteten som helhet knutits mera till universitetet. De olika ämnena har blivit mer specialiserade och isolerade och även förminskade.

När det gäller exegetiken har dess omfattning och funktion i det teologiska studiet alltså kraftigt förändrats under en längre tid. Fram till 1955 skulle en studerande (som läst både latin och grekiska i gymnasiet) vid tentamen svara för hela Nya testamentet på grekiska. I dag läses mindre än 20 procent av Novum i en normal teol.kand., om man över huvud läser grekiska.[6] Det minimum av studium i Nya testamentet, som krävs av en som vill bli präst i Svenska kyrkan är idag drygt fem veckors studium.[7]

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[5] Det nya kyrkomötet 1983 har alltid valt in några teologiska lärare i Lund och Uppsala i sin läronämnd men de representerar inte fakulteterna.

[6] Se stapeldiagrammet i Olsson, Bexell och Gustafsson, *Theologicum*, 62.

[7] Svenska kyrkan kräver minst 60 hp i Bibelvetenskap av de som vill prästvigas, det

De nya teologiska högskolorna har en fortsatt rätt nära relation till sina privata huvudmän. Det märks mest vid tillsättning av lärare och i internationella kontakter med andra teologiska institutioner. Närheten mellan exegetik och kyrka har alltså successivt minskats vid våra statsfakulteter medan de nya teologiska högskolorna har bidragit med en ny form av närhet mellan dessa två områden. Detta påverkar på flera sätt exegetikens plats i det offentliga rummet.

Exegetiken då och nu[8]

Exegetikens innehåll och karaktär har också förändrats under de år som ligger bakom. Med tanke på vårt ämne kan vi kanske tala om tre skeden.[9]

1) Kring första världskriget växer en mer självständig exegetik fram i Sverige med betoning på ett vetenskapligt, språkligt och historiskt studium av Nya testamentet. Man lämnar det tyska språket som avhandlingsspråk och börjar skriva på svenska. Ett nytt intresse för tidshistoriska frågor kom genom Erik Aurelius i Lund och Sven Linder i Uppsala. Båda hade goda relationer till Gustaf Dalman, Jerusalem/Greifswald, och hans Palestinastudier.

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vill säga ett års studier. Alla skall läsa A kursen (ca 3 hp Nya testamentet) och den följande B kursen (Bibelvetenskap, ca 7,5 hp Nya testamentet). Det blir sammanlagt 10,5 hp, det vill säga drygt fem veckors studium av Nya testamentet. Den som sedan fyller ut med hebreiska fortsätter i regel och läser kurser i Gamla testamentet upp till 60 hp.

[8] Jag utgår här från exegetiken vid våra teologiska fakulteter. De exegetiska tendenserna de sista tjugofem åren har i stort förstärkts genom exegetiken vid de nya teologiska högskolorna från slutet av 1900-talet.

[9] För det som följer se, förutom Olsson, Bexell och Gustafsson, *Theologicum*, vad Helmer Ringgren och Lars Hartman skriver i Helmer Ringgren, red., *Faculty of Theology at Uppsala University* (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis; Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 1976) och Birger Olsson, ”Förändringar inom svensk bibelforskning under 1900-talet”, i *Modern svensk teologi*, red. Lars Lindberg och Gert Nilsson (Stockholm: Verbum, 1999), 69–135, och där anförd litteratur.

Samtidigt kom språkliga studier mer i centrum, till exempel hos Erling Eidem och hans Paulusstudier, inspirerade av Adolf Deissmann, Heidelberg/Berlin, och religionshistoriska studier under påverkan av Wilhelm Bousset, Göttingen/Giessen, och andra i den tyska religionshistoriska skolan. Gillis P:son Wetter i Uppsala är ett utmärkt exempel på detta. Dessa religionshistoriska forskare hade ett brinnande intresse för att föra ut exegetikens landvinningar till allmänheten och skrev mest på svenska med undantag av Wetter som också skrev mycket på tyska.[10] På många områden kom deras forskning i konflikt med nedärvda kristna uppfattningar.

2) Kring andra världskriget präglades den nytestamentliga exegetiken i Sverige av två professorer som börjat sin bana med religionshistoriska analyser, Hugo Odeberg som disputerade i London 1924 på en judisk mystik skrift och Anton Fridrichsen som disputerade i Sorbonne på en avhandling om Jesu under. Tidshistoria, filologi och litterärkritik fick efter hand ge plats för en allmän bibelteologisk inriktning. Kriser i samtiden lockade fram mer övergripande trossystem och en strävan att komma fram till egenarten i den bibliska eller kristna föreställningen. Johannes Lindblom i Lund, en mångsysslare som också ägnade sig åt bibelns receptionshistoria, tillhör detta skede liksom Ivan Engnell med flera i Uppsala som ville nå fram till orientaliska mönster om den sakrale kungen i de gammaltestamentliga texterna, den så kallade Uppsalaskolan. Presentationen av den sakrale kungen kunde på flera sätt kopplas till föreställningar om Messias och därmed överbrygga gapet mellan Gamla och Nya testamentet.

Kyrka och universitet fördes vid denna tid närmare varandra genom den så kallade realistiska bibeltolkningen hos Fridrichsen och den så kallade immanenta bibeltolkningen hos Odeberg.[11] De mer kritiska mo-

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[10] Religionshistoriska föreningen i Göteborg översatte och gav ut en rad mindre, mer populära häften/små böcker, 17 stycken, skrivna av kända företrädare för den religionshistoriska skolan, *Religionshistoriska folkböcker* (Stockholm 1906-1910).

[11] Se här också Birger Gerhardsson, *Fridrichsen, Odeberg, Aulén, Nygren: Fyra teologer* (Lund: Bakhåll, 1994).

menten i den exegetiska analysen reducerades påtagligt. Det gällde bara att överföra de dåtida texternas innehåll till nutiden. Det är i detta skede som merparten av de nytestamentliga exegeterna i Sverige går ut och hävdar att enligt Nya testamentet kan kvinnor inte bli präster (den s.k. exegetdeklarationen 1953).

År 1936 grundade Anton Fridrichsen Uppsala exegetiska sällskap som genom årliga samlingar och publikationen *Svensk Exegetisk Årsbok* ville föra de nya vetenskapliga landvinningarna vidare till präster, lärare och andra intresserade.[12] Fridrichsen hänvisade till den positiva utvecklingen inom bibelvetenskapen att mer och mer ”tränga in i Bibelns egen verklighetssyn” och till den allt mer skrämmande kulturella och politiska situationen på 30-talet. ”Våra heliga skrifter framträda som den frälsande arken i syndafloden”, säger han. Tiden är nu inne ”att sammanföra de krafter som finnas, och att vidga sambandet med en vidare kyrklig miljö”.[13] Årsboken sågs som en bro mellan vetenskapen och kyrkan och innehöll de första åren många artiklar om praktiskt bruk av Bibeln. I dag är väl årsboken mest skriven för exegeter och en mer internationell läsekrets.[14] Sällskapet ökade snabbt i antal, efter tio år nära 500 medlemmar, efter 25 år 1126 medlemmar. Efter 1970 har medlemsantalet efter hand minskat avsevärt. Fridrichsen betraktade sig själv som *doctor ecclesiae*.

De svenska exegeterna gav också under detta skede ut ett ambitiöst uppslagsverk i två band 1946 och 1952[15], skrev ett otal textutredningar i diverse tidskrifter till kyrkoårets texter som sedan samlades i ett band

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[12] Se särskilt Lars Hartman, *Uppsala exegetiska sällskap 1936-1986* (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 1986).

[13] Enligt Hartman, *Uppsala*, 1.

[14] Se Göran Eidevall, ”80 år senare: Exegetiska sällskapet, SEÅ och de exegetiska dagarna – tal vid exegetiska sällskapets 80-årsjubileum”, *SEÅ* 82 (2017), 1–5. Han tecknar där ”några viktiga utvecklingslinjer”, särskilt olika former av internationalisering av årsboken och en mindre fokusering av ”kyrkliga avnämare”.

[15] Ivan Engnell och Anton Fridrichsen (red.), *Svenskt Bibliskt Uppslagsverk I–II* (Gävle: Skolförlaget, 1946 och 1952, i en andra reviderad upplaga 1962 och 1963).

1958, *Fyrahanda sädesåker*, med flera efterföljare i olika former.[16] Grundläggande läroböcker producerades också för studenter och intresserade.[17] Hugo Odeberg i Lund grundade under mottot Tillbaka till Bibeln! en särskild bibelstudieförening 1943 kallad Erevna och hans korta bibelstudier där gavs ut i en tidskrift, också den kallad *Erevna*. Nationalkyrkan i landet upplevde en bibelstudieväckelse som den inte varit med om tidigare bland annat genom projektet Bibeltjänst. De svenska exegeterna var i detta skede mycket närvarande i det offentliga rummet.

3) Under det sista kvartalet av 1900-talet bleknade den bibelteologiska eran bort och vi fick en stor mångfald av nya metoder.[18] Den nedärvda tyska exegetikmetoden med dess historiskt-genetiska inriktning mötte allvarlig kritik både från vetenskapligt och kyrkligt håll. Också det sammanhållande teologiska greppet om fakulteternas arbete faller sönder i olika enskilda ämnen. Bibelvetenskapen specialiseras och fragmenteras och enskilda svenska exegeter har mer kontakt med forskare världen över som håller på med samma forskningsproblem som de än med kolleger i Sverige. I jämförelse med den bibelteologiska eran minskas exegeternas närvaro påtagligt i det offentliga rummet. I vilken mån det beror på mångfalden i det exegetiska arbetet vill jag låta vara osagt.

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[16] Svensk Pastoraltidskrift gav ut en egen serie och Verbum likaså till både nytestamentliga och gammaltestamentliga predikotexter på 80-talet, Verbums exegetisk-homiletiska Kommentarserie.

[17] Jag tänker på Bertil Albrektson och Helmer Ringgren, *En bok om Gamla testamentet* (Lund: LiberLäromedel, 1969), Gillis Gerleman och Bo Johnson, *Ur Gamla testamentet* (Lund: LiberLäromedel, 1969), Birger Gerhardsson, *En bok om Nya testamentet* (Lund: LiberLäromedel, 1969) och Lars Hartman, *Ur Nya testamentet* (Lund: LiberLäromedel, 1970).

[18] Birger Olsson, ”Vägar till texten”, i *Jesus och de första kristna*, red. Dieter Mitternacht och Anders Runesson (Stockholm: Verbum, 2006), 401–403. Där nämns bland annat semiotiska anlyser, textlingvistiska analyser, retoriska analyser, narrativa analyser, sociologiska analyser, antropologiska analyser, psykologiska analyser och feministiska analyser.

Min egen verksamhet som exempel

Harald Riesenfeld, professor i Nya testamentets exegetik i Uppsala 1953-1977 berättade en gång att han när han åkte skidor i Dalarna med sin fru Blenda kom till en liten by där det fanns en skola. Han spände av skidorna och gick in i skolan och presenterade sig och förhörde sig om vad barnen kunde om Bibeln.

Några sådana offentliga framträdanden har jag inte ägnat mig åt men jag har dristat mig till att här högst översiktligt presentera min egen verksamhet som exeget för att ringa in vad som kan avses med exegetik i det offentliga rummet.

Jag tar här begreppet ”det offentliga rummet” i en allmän och vid mening som omfattar allt som inte med nödvändighet kan sägas höra till min tjänst som professor i Nya testamentets exegetik. Undervisning och forskning och det som krävs av planering, handledning och information för att detta ska fungera tas inte med i det som följer. Jag skulle i princip ha kunnat säga nej till alla dessa verksamheter och då fått tid till annat.

Jag tar alltså inte upp sådant som tydligt hör till mitt ”ämnesrum” om jag får uttrycka mig så. För översiktens skull – även om gränserna är flytande – kan vi säga att vid sidan av ämbetsrummet finns ett fakultetsrum, ett universitetsrum, ett skolrum, ett kyrkorum och ett samhällsrum Jag tar inte med något internationellt rum med uppgifter utanför Sverige: gästföreläsningar, sakkunniguppdrag, utredningsuppdrag, konferensbidrag, ledning av internationella seminarier (SNTS), ledamotskap i internationella ledningsgrupper som är knutet till Nya testamentets exegetik eller ledamotskap i European Regional Translation Committee 1973-1987. I grova drag återstår då följande ”verksamhetsrum”:

4.1 **Fakultetsrummet**, det vill säga sånt som omfattar mer än mitt eget ämne och rör fakultetens arbete som helhet.

* prodekanus 1995-1999.
* ledamot i fakultetsrådet 1993-2002.
* ledamot i diverse utredningar, arbete med remissvar med mera.

* initiativtagare till en bok om fakulteten under 1900-talet, huvudredaktör och ledare för en seminarieserie i ämnet med fakultetens professorer, även emeriti.
* initiativtagare och ansvarig för en kurs under några år om nattvarden som inkluderade fakultetens fem ämnesområden.

4.2 **Universitetsrummet**, det vill säga sånt som omfattar mer än min egen fakultet och inkluderar den högre undervisningen i landet.

* ledamot av HSFRs beredningsgrupp för bland annat teologi 1984, 1996-1999.
* ledamot av Vetenskapsrådets beredningsgrupp för bland annat teologi 2007.
* ledamot i styrelsen för Universitetsbiblioteket i Lund 2001-2003
* ledamot i Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskapssamfundet i Lund 1993-, ordförande 1999-2001.
* ledamot i Natan Söderblomsällskapet 1976-, preses 1987.
* initiativtagare och ledare för ett stort forskningsprojekt (12 milj) om den antika synagogan 1997-2001. Ett samarbete mellan flera ämnen i teologi och humaniora inkluderande seminarier med internationella rådgivare, en internationell konferens redovisad i en konferensvolym och information om projektet i tidskrifter och tidningar och vid en SBL konferens.
* utställning om Karl XII:s bibel 1703-2003 på universitetsbiblioteket i Lund.
* konferens 2003 om Karl XII:s bibel som föregicks av högre seminarier inom området teologi och humaniora och redovisades i en konferensvolym.
* utredningar om olika universitetsfrågor i Sverige och Norge, till exempel utvärdering av Menighetsfakulteten i Göteborg och av doktorsutbildningen i Norge.

4.3 **Skolrummet**, det vill säga sånt som riktar sig till den svenska skolan.

* föredrag och seminarier för lärare i den allmänna skolan, mest om bibeltolkning och översättning av bibeln (bibelkommissionens provöversättningar, NT 81, Bibel 2000).
* olika försök att ge plats för bibelns receptionshistoria i universitetsämnet exegetik med tanke på bibelns plats i skola och samhälle.

Denna sista punkt hör också hemma under punkt 5. Jag tar upp den under en särskild rubrik nedan.

4.4 **Kyrkorummet**, det vill säga sånt som är relaterat till kyrkornas verksamhet.

* tjänst vid Johannelunds teologiska institut/högskola 1964-1988: lärare i NT och grekiska, studierektor, rektor, ordförande i skolstyrelsen. Har skrivit ett stort antal exegetiska kommentarer för texter i söndagsskolan i tidskriften *Medhjälparen*, så kallade textutredningar till predikotexter (för sammanlagt mer än ett och ett halvt kyrkoår) i *Förkunnaren* och andra teologiska tidskrifter och hållit offentliga föredrag och seminarier i bibliska och teologiska ämnen.
* tjänst som EFS missionsföreståndare 1988-1992 med många inlägg i tidningar i bibelrelaterade ämnen och ett stort antal artiklar i *EFS Budbäraren* om bibelöversättningsproblem i anslutning till bibelkommissionens arbete (svar på frågor) samt ett större antal föredrag och predikningar på många orter i Sverige.
* *Kommentar till Nya testamentet*: initiativtagare, redaktionsmedlem och kommentarförfattare.
* ledamot i Svenska bibelsällskapets styrelse 1977-1987.
* ledamot i Uppsala Exegetiska Sällskaps styrelse 1978-1987.
* ledamot i Frikyrkliga forskningsrådet 1986-1988.
* ledamot i Kyrkomötets läronämnd 1987-1998.
* ledamot och ordförande i Lunds Missionssällskap 1993-2008.
* ledamot och ordförande i styrelsen för Pastoralinstitutet i Lund 2000-2006.
* ledamot i styrelsen för Svenska Institutet för Missionsforskning 2001-2008.
* ledamot i styrelsen för Svenska Teologiska Institutet i Jerusalem 2006-2008.
* ledamot i en samarbetskommitté mellan CTR och Pastoralinstitutet i Lund om en ny prästutbildning 2003-2004.
* ett stort antal föredrag i församlingar, kontrakt, prästkonvent, stift och olika konferenser i bibelöversättningsfrågor och bibelrelaterade ämnen
* ett stort antal exegetiska recensioner i tidskrifter och tidningar.

4.5 **Samhällsrummet**, det vill säga sånt som rör samhället i stort, kulturellt, etiskt, socialt och politiskt. En del som är nämnt tidigare kan också tas upp här, till exempel utställningen och konferensen om den gamla översättningen (Karl XII:s bibel), arbetet med en kommentar till Nya testamentet på svenska eller det som sägs om bibelns receptionshistoria.

* arbete med en ny officiell översättning av bibeln till svenska 1963-2000: sekreterare i en statlig utredning, ledamot av två statliga

kommittéer, sakkunnig i utbildningsdepartement, ledamot av Bibelkommissionen (översättare, koordinator, referent, styrelseledamot).
* ett stort antal föredrag och seminarier om i första hand översättningsfrågor utanför de områden som är nämnda ovan.
* medverkan i radioprogram.
* artiklar om arbetet med Bibel 2000 och recensioner av exegetiska böcker i allmänna tidningar och tidskrifter, till exempel i *Svenska Dagbladet*, *Upsala Nya Tidning*, *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, *Tidningen Ångermanland* och i *Signums svenska kulturhistoria* och *Sveriges kyrkohistoria*.
* böcker om den svenska bibeln och svenskt bibelöversättningsarbete för en mer allmän publik, bland annat *En bok om Rut* (1979) och *Från Birgitta till Bibel 2000* (2000).

Några kommentarer till verksamhetslistan

Ja, listan blev lång. Jag får väl dra den slutsatsen att jag inte har varit lat i mitt liv. Och kanske är det mer en översikt om en exegets närvaro i det offentliga rummet än exegetik i det offentliga rummet. Men ingen exegetik utan exegeter. Längden beror i hög grad på att jag har varit anställd inom två verksamhetsområden utöver min universitetstjänst, två kyrkliga tjänster (lärare på Johannelund och missionsföreståndare inom EFS) och en annan statlig tjänst (bibelöversättningsarbetet). Mycket av det jag gjort faller utanför det som varit kärnan i min universitetstjänst. Jag har dock vid två tillfällen gjort en kraftig reducering av mina ”frivilliga” uppgifter när de enligt egen beräkning började omfatta mer än tre arbetsmånader per år. Det som fått lida mest av denna snedvridning är min forskning. Men anställningar endast som lärare och forskare inom universitetet torde minska möjligheterna till närvaro i det offentliga rummet.

Det kan vara nyttigt med tanke på kommande samtal att försöka vaska fram vilka kanaler för och former av exegetisk verksamhet som kan finnas i det offentliga rummet som jag nu har definierat det:

* anställningar[19]

[19] 14 personer disputerade i Nya testamentet under mina elva år som professor i

* utredningar, expertuppdrag
* sakkunniguppdrag, opponentskap
* ledningsuppdrag i styrelser och kommittéer
* forskningsprojekt
* konferenser och utställningar
* böcker, artiklar och recensioner
* tidningsbidrag och debattinlägg
* föredrag och seminarier
* kurser
* radio (och TV)

Att sociala medier inte kommer med på min lista är väl mest en påminnelse om min höga ålder.

Bibeln i bruk tiderna igenom (receptionshistoria)

Bibeln intar en stor plats i vårt kulturarv, i litteraturen, konsten, musiken och filmen, i lagar, etiska värderingar, sedvänjor, osv. Därför vill jag ta upp bibelns receptionshistoria som en särskild punkt. John F. A. Sawyer ger följande definition: ”The history of how a book or a passage or a word has been contextualized and interpreted down the centuries in different parts of the world.”[20]

Jag har mest under den senare delen av min verksamhet försökt få in bibelns receptionshistoria som en del av bibelvetenskapen men inte lyckats så väl. Jag började nog för sent. Det är lätt att hitta trender i vår egen tid som förklarar att receptionshistoria har blivit mer och mer aktuell.[21] Bakgrunden till mitt intresse finns i min tidiga betoning av att

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Lund, 12 av dem har tjänst som lärare på högskolenivå i Sverige och utomlands, två av dem är präster. Få doktorer i exegetik idag söker av olika skäl inte tjänster inom kyrka och skola.

[20] John F. A. Sawyer, *A Concise Dictionary of the Bible and Its Reception* (Lousville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2009), artikeln ”Reception History”.

[21] Minskad tilltro till gängse exegetik, framväxten av nya former av analyser sedan 1980-talet, ökat intresse för tolkningshistoria, för analys av äldre översättningar, för texten som den nu föreligger (synkroni) och den moderna hermeneutikens ifrågasättande av möjligheterna att komma fram till en ursprunglig mening i texten.

analysera texterna som vi nu har dem – texten som det primära språkliga tecknet – och i mitt intresse för översättningshistoria. Det märks redan i *En bok om Rut* som kom 1979. Mina två senaste böcker handlar om Dina och Shekem i Barsta fiskekapell i Höga kusten.[22]

Jag har arbetat internationellt genom att bilda en seminariegrupp inom SNTS och även valt ett receptionshistoriskt ämne för mitt main paper för SNTS konferensen i Bonn 2003.[23] Mina kolleger var intresserade men när det kommer till kritan ville de syssla med det som de redan kunde. Alltså höll de sig kvar inom sina forskningsfält. Det finns ju ingen fast metod för såna studier, säger somliga, och det är ju sant. Men metoder växer väl fram när man börjar forska i ämnet?

Jag har givit flera kurser i Lund om Bibeln i vårt kulturarv, ansökt om pengar för ett större projekt i detta ämne tillsammans med forskare vid universiteten i Jönköping och Karlstad,[24] recenserat en rad avhandlingar i ämnet och även skrivit en artikel om receptionshistoriska avhandlingar i Sverige.[25] Men utan större resultat. Inga stora forskningsprojekt. Inga specialtjänster. Ingen större betydelse vid tjänstetillsättningar. Inga markeringar i ämnesbeskrivningar. Mycket återstår att göra. Och intresset i Sverige för receptionshistoria har ökat. För att exegeter ska kunna delta i debatten om bibeln i vårt kulturarv måste de kunna en del om detta ämne. *Scriptura sacra cum legentibus crescit*.[26]

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[22] Jag försökte göra en bok som tillfredsställde både forskaren och turisten som kom till kapellet men det visade sig för svårt. Så därför blev det två böcker: *Barsta fiskekapell: En synnerligen märklig byggnad från 1600-talet* (Uppsala: Själand, 2013) och *Dina och Shekem i Barsta: Ett fiskekapell i Höga kusten från 1600-talet och dess takmålningar* (Umeå: Kungliga Skytteanska samfundet, 2015).

[23] Det receptionshistoriska seminariet inom SNTS, "The New Testament in History and Culture", leddes av Robert M. Fowler, Werner Kelber och mig. Mitt föredrag "The Canticle of the Heavenly Host (Luk 2:14) in History and Culture" publicerades sedan i *NTS* 50 (2004), 147–66.

[24] Projektet hette "Bibeln i bruk" men Riksbanken beviljade inga pengar till det.

[25] Birger Olsson, "Att läsa Bibeln tillsammans med de döda: Om svensk receptionskritik på 2000-talet", *SEÅ* 73 (2008), 143–59.

[26] Gregorius den store, *Moralia in Job 20:11*.

I en utvärdering av forskarutbildningen i Norge 2001 fann jag goda skäl att relatera den till det som sägs om ämnet ”kristendomskunskap med religions- och livssynsorientering” i den norska skolan, förkortat KRL. KRL skall ha sin utgångspunkt och sin tyngdpunkt i kristendomen som den finns i Norge, i norsk kultur och samhälle. Till detta kommer kunskap om andra kristna trosinriktningar, god kunskap om andra religioner och livssyner och om etiska och filosofiska frågor. Ämnet är alltså tydligt kopplat till norska (och västerländska) förhållanden. Ämnet ses som en del av norsk kultur och historia, nödvändigt för att förstå språk, litteratur, konst, normer och värderingar. Kännedom om de klassiska bibelberättelser och annat bibelstoff är då en nödvändig förutsättning. Om bibeln sägs sammanfattningsvis: Grundlig kunskap om Bibeln som kulturarv och som levande källa för tro, moral och livsföring är helt nödvändig.

En sådan beskrivning av religionsämnet borde få följder för både kursutbud och bibelforskning vid våra universitet och högskolor och främja ämnen om bibeltolkningsmekanismer och bibeltolkningshistoria, om bibeln som litteratur, om bibelns receptionshistoria, om vissa bibliska teman och om den etiska dimensionen i de bibliska texterna. Även komparativa studier av till exempel Bibeln och Koranen bör finnas med här. Jag har sett mycket litet av detta i Sverige.

Tredje uppgiften

Det finns skäl att här säga något kort om högskolors och universitets uppgift att dela med sig av sin kunskap, den så kallade tredje uppgiften. Den kom med i Högskolelagen 1977:

> Till verksamheten inom högskolan skall höra att sprida kännedom om forskning och utvecklingsarbete. Kännedom skall också spridas om vilka erfarenheter och kunskaper som har vunnits och om hur dessa erfarenheter och kunskaper skall kunna tillämpas.[27]

[27] Högskolelagen 1977, 218.

Det sägs också att vid tillsättning av lärare skall vikt även fästas vid förmåga att informera om forskning och utvecklingsarbete. Denna uppgift har beskrivits på lite olika sätt, nu senast i högskolelagen 2009:

> I högskolornas uppgift ska ingå att samverka med det omgivande samhället och informera om sin verksamhet samt verka för att forskningsresultat tillkomna vid högskolan kommer till nytta.[28]

Denna uppgift ska fortsatt beaktas också vid tillsättning av lärare tillsammans med ”graden av skicklighet att leda verksamhet och personal vid högskolan”.

Denna så kallade tredje uppgiften har fått mycket olika nedslag i olika delar av högskolan och hos enskilda lärare. Många frågor är inte lösta. Om det är en del av min tjänst hur beräknas det då i min tjänstgöring? Eller får jag då ta betalt för mina uppgifter i det offentliga rummet? Har denna typ av uppgifter någon betydelse när jag söker tjänster inom universitetet? ”Det är ju bara populärvetenskapliga artiklar!” Har min förmåga att ”leda verksamhet och personal vid högskolan” någon effekt på min lön? Kan artiklar i uppslagsverket Wikipedia räknas som en god informationskanal?[29] Vilken roll kan sociala medier ha? Som jag ser det är det bara ett fåtal exegeter som ägnar tid åt tredje uppgiften medan merparten förhåller sig rätt njugga till denna verksamhet. Dagens tema sätter onekligen tredje uppgiften i centrum.

Några slutreflektioner

Ett minskande rum för exegeter i skola, kyrka och samhälle

Översikterna ovan säger tydligt att det offentliga rummet för exegetiken har minskat under en lång tid, tydligast i skolan och i kyrkan. Utarbetandet av en officiell bibelöversättning under min tid ledde till att flera exegeter fick anställning. Flera av er har medverkat i olika former i detta projekt. Men hur många har fortsatt att arbeta med översättnings-

[28] Högskolelagen 2009, 45.

[29] Se artikeln ”Tredje uppgiften” i *Wikipedia* och de referenser som finns där.

problem: recenserat översättningar som kommit efter Bibel 2000, den nya versionen av Folkbibeln 2014, Svenska bibelsällskapets försök till en ny översättning, The Message eller den så kallade nuBibeln? Hur många skrev om den nya läroboken *Jesus och de första kristna* när den kom? Jag har fått två svenska recensioner av min kommentar till Johannesbreven. Hur många exegeter har deltagit i den långa svenska debatten om homosexualitet som ju har tydliga relationer till bibeltexter?

Ja säger någon, men det är ingen som har frågat oss? Ibland sitter vi och väntar på att andra ska ta initiativ. Det ska vi göra, men jag tror att vi själva också måste göra något. Här tror jag mycket på en yngre generation. Och kanske också på de nya möjligheter som internet ger. En ordentlig bearbetning av vad den tredje uppgiften innebär idag skulle kunna bli till stor hjälp. Om inte exegetiken återvinner en del av det offentliga rummet kommer den att tvina bort.

Specialisering, isolering, internationalisering

Det är också lätt att konstatera att vi exegeter har specialiserat oss mer och mer. Se den senaste boken av svenska GT exegeter, festskriften till LarsOlov Eriksson, *Ordet är dig mycket nära*.[30] Mångfalden är en rikedom, men samtidigt kan de centrala frågorna i vårt ämne bli undernärda, såna ting som folk frågar efter. Vi isolerar oss inom det specialområde vi valt och söker meningsfränder utanför Sverige. Det inomsvenska samtalet lyser med sin frånvaro.

Kyrkorummets roll idag[31]

Jag har vistats mycket i ”kyrkorummet”, både genom anställningar och genom frivilliga insatser. Somliga menar att vi inte alls ska vistas där. Relationen mellan universitet och kyrka har förändrats radikalt under vår livstid och gjort det naturligt att vi begränsar oss till samhällsrummet.

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[30] James Starr och Birger Olsson, red. *Ordet är dig mycket nära* (Skellefteå: Artos, 2018).

[31] För mig är det mest relevant att tala om ”kyrkorummet” men andra kan tala om ”synagogrummet” eller om ”moskérummet”.

Jag håller inte med om det, även om exegeter idag ofta inte är kyrkorelaterade eller teologer. Bibeln har haft och har en så central roll inom kristendomen att vi exegeter bör kunna bidra till den kyrkliga debatten, till exempel om den senaste evangelieboken eller om handboken eller om antisemitismen eller om korantolkning.

Denna roll i kyrkorummet ska dock inte hindra oss att vistas i det offentliga rummet som religionsvetare och exegeter. Men detta är faktiskt, sett i ett längre perspektiv, något nytt som kräver både eftertanke, gemensam satsning och nya former. Exegeter är väl inte än så goda experter på ”religioners och livsåskådningars roll för den enskilde och i samhället” för att citera målformuleringen för de teologiska fakulteterna 1973. Inte ens på bibelns roll för den enskilde och i samhället. Ivern att hitta former i samhällsrummet hos några yngre exegeter är dock hoppingivande.

Kulturarvet ett viktigt område

Sedan skulle jag vilja att vi exegeter tog upp kampen om bibelns plats i den svenska skolan. Bibeln är en central del av vårt kulturarv och skulle motivera en plats inom många ämnen. Men om vi inte intresserar oss för Bibelns receptionshistoria vem skulle då göra det? Initiativet ligger hos oss.

Jag har sagt mycket lite om innehållet i den exegetik som bör finnas i det offentliga rummet.[32] Mina tillbakablickar antyder att det har ändrats beroende på förändringar i kultur, religion och samhälle. Här kan jag känna ett handicap beroende på min ålder. Exegeten bör ta del i de frågor som nu är aktuella. Det finns många tillfällen: bibelsynsdebatter, religionsdebatter, kulturdebatter, etiska debatter, teologiska debatter, äm-

[32] Akademin diskuterade vid sitt möte i Lund 2010 exegetikundervisning och samhällsansvar och jag kan här bara hänvisa till de minnesanteckningar som Hanna Stenström gjorde och de goda litteraturtips som hon skrev ner. Temat exegetik och etik är här ett centralt område för diskussion och handling.

nen som bibeln och koranen, judar och kristna, antisemitism och homofobi, osv.

Jag har ibland ställt mig frågan: Om svenska exegeter inte diskuterar centrala bibelproblem när de kommer samman kommer de då att delta i någon debatt i det offentliga rummet? Knappast. Akademin för bibelvetenskap hade som ett mål att främja den inomsvenska exegetiska debatten. Det råder i Sverige en viss tystnadskultur. Jämför bara med förhållandena i Danmark. En annan fråga: Måste jag anse innehållet i bibeln vara viktigt (av något skäl) för att fungera i debatter. Även om Akademin för bibelvetenskap försvinner hoppas jag att exegetiken kan få en större plats i det offentliga rummet. Det är viktigt för dess överlevnad.

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Βίβλος γενέσεως: The Opening of Matthew's Gospel and Ethnic Ambiguity

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Introduction

"Although Matthew's Gospel is the most carefully structured of the four Gospels, there is no agreed understanding of Matthew's plan."[1] Paradoxical as it may sound, this statement in an introductory textbook on the Gospels seems essentially to represent the common opinion in scholarship. In fact, the perceived superiority of the Gospel of Matthew in terms of structure has for a long time been one of the major arguments against Luke's dependence on Matthew—who would even venture to improve on such a perfected outline, and with such a messy result as that of Luke?—although this received wisdom is currently being challenged with some success.[2] Regardless of how they evaluate Matthew's ordering of his material vis-à-vis that of the other evangelists, most scholars apparently agree that it reflects a very well-thought purpose, although they do not agree as to exactly what this purpose was. But the unanimous sentiment seems to be that very few aspects, if any, of Matthew's composition are the result of random processes or unsystematic scribbling. In view of this, it seems reasonable to surmise that the

[1] Edward Adams, *Parallel Lives of Jesus: Four Gospels – One Story* (London: SPCK, 2011), 61.

[2] See, e.g., Heather M. Gorman, "Crank or Creative Genius? How Ancient Rhetoric Makes Sense of Luke's Order," in *Marcan Priority without Q: Explorations in the Farrer Hypothesis*, ed. J. C. Poirier and J. Peterson, LNTS 455 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 62–81.

opening of the Gospel of Matthew also reflects a conscious and deliberate choice on the evangelist's part. Why did the author choose to open his book about the life and teachings of Jesus with the words Βίβλος γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Matt 1:1)?

This opening is susceptible of multiple interpretations in terms of its reference and meaning, and in fact the aim of the present contribution is to suggest that it was meant to be so. I will argue that the phrase serves as a deliberately ambiguous title of a Gospel that tells a story of how ethnic boundaries are gradually redefined through the ministry of the Messiah and different reactions to it.[3] My argument consists of three parts. First of all, I will review different proposals concerning the range of the opening phrase, coming to the conclusion that, while it may certainly carry special reference to the genealogy of Jesus, the infancy narrative and the introductory section of Matthew's Gospel, it should also be viewed as a superscript to the Gospel as a whole. Secondly, I will discuss how the Pentateuchal background of the phrase invites the reader to interpret it as a signal that one of the major themes of the Gospel will be that of ethnic origins. Thirdly, I will demonstrate how this fits into the overall pattern of ethnic ambiguity and redefinition in the Gospel of Matthew. What seems to begin as the book of the origin of Jesus Christ

[3] In linguistics, ambiguity can be and has been defined in many different ways, for example, as a "property of expressions that can be interpreted in several ways, or, rather, that can be multiply specified in linguistic description from lexical, semantic, syntactic and other aspects" (Hadumod Bussmann, *Routledge Dictionary of Language and Linguistics*, trans. G. P. Trauth and K. Kazzazi [London: Routledge, 1996], 50), as the property of an "expression that has two or more meanings ... if there are at least two distinct semantic specifications underlying a single overt form" (William Frawley, *Linguistic Semantics* [New York: Routledge, 2009], 58), or simply as the phenomenon of a word, clause or phrase "hav[ing] more than one meaning" (Kristin Denham and Anne *Lobeck, Linguistics for Everyone: An Introduction* [Boston: Wadsworth, 2010], 248). Although in some contexts it might be crucial to distinguish ambiguity from neighbouring, overlapping or more precisely defined linguistic and literary phenomena such as irony, double-entendre and polysemy, for the present purposes I deem it superfluous to go beyond the broadest description: to be ambiguous is to have more than one meaning.

turns out, in the end, to be not only that, but also and above all the book of the posterity of Jesus Christ.

Studies of ethnicity in the Gospel of Matthew have commonly taken a social-scientific approach, aiming not only to assess the topic as a theme within the narrative world of the Gospel but also—even primarily—to discuss whatever role ethnic identities played in the real-world community whose circumstances and concerns the narrative allegedly addresses.[4] By contrast, the perspective of the present study is entirely literary-theological. The ethnic ambiguity and redefinition recognised here belong to the narrative strategies employed by the evangelist and perceived by his ideal audience. Whether or not they also reflect a real-world situation in the lives of the author and/or the audience is a quite different question, which lies beyond the scope of this contribution.

Matthew 1:1 as Title of the Gospel

In this first section of the article, I will begin by arguing that the reference of Matt 1:1 extends throughout the Gospel as a whole. Put differently, one of its functions is that of the Gospel's title.[5] I will then go on

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[4] See J. Andrew Overman, *Matthew's Gospel and Formative Judaism: The Social World of the Matthean Community* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990); Anthony J. Saldarini, *Matthew's Christian-Jewish Community* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); David C. Sim, "Christianity and Ethnicity in the Gospel of Matthew," in *Ethnicity in the Bible*, ed. M. G. Brett, BIS 19 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 171–95; David C. Sim, *The Gospel of Matthew and Christian Judaism: The History and Social Setting of the Matthean Community* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998); Anders Runesson, "Judging Gentiles in the Gospel of Matthew: Between 'Othering' and Inclusion," in *Jesus, Matthew's Gospel and Early Christianity: Studies in Memory of Graham N. Stanton*, ed. D. M. Gurtner, J. Willitts and R. A. Burridge (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 133–51.

[5] "Title" is to be understood here in a functional, non-technical sense, as distinguished from *titulus* as a specific *Gattung*. See Moisés Mayordomo-Marín, *Den Anfang hören: Leserorientierte Evangelienexegese am Beispiel von Matthäus 1–2*, FRLANT 180 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 207.

to discuss the interpretation of the title as an expression of the alleged "new creation" theme of Matthew's Gospel and some weak points in this interpretation.

Prolegomena or Gospel? The Opening's Referential Extent

Most modern translations of the New Testament take βίβλος γενέσεως in the sense of "[record/book/roll of the] genealogy" ([NET/RSV/NJB] NIV) and thus seem to understand the first verse of the Gospel with reference to the genealogy in Matt 1:2–17. A good number of commentaries take the same position.[6] This is not at all surprising, since one of the two occurrences of βίβλος γενέσεως in the Septuagint introduces the list of generations from Adam to Shem, Ham and Japheth in Gen 5:1–32. Several similar lists in the Septuagint are introduced by the phrase "these are the generations" (αὕται αἱ γενέσεις, Gen 10:1; 11:10, 27; 25:12; 36:9; Ruth 4:18; 1 Chron 1:29), and it is well known that both the singular γένεσις and the plural γενέσεις in these cases translate the Hebrew תולדת. It is not far-fetched, then, to take βίβλος γενέσεως as the superscript of the genealogy of Jesus to follow in Matt 1:2–17.

On the other hand, this understanding is far from self-evident. Of the two occurrences of βίβλος γενέσεως in the Greek text of Genesis, neither really performs the function ascribed to the phrase in Matt 1:1. English translations correctly render the Hebrew ספר תולדת אדם in Gen 5:1 as "the record of the family line of Adam" (NET), "the roll of Adam's descendants" (NJB) or "the written account of Adam's family line" (NIV). David Carr remarks that here, as elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, תולדת is "followed by the parent who produced the 'descendants'" and not "by the items which were themselves produced."[7] Since the Matthean genealogy does not list Jesus' descendants, but rather his

[6] See, e.g., John Nolland, *The Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 71.

[7] David Carr, "Βίβλος γενέσεως Revisited: A Synchronic Analysis of Patterns in Genesis as Part of the Torah (Part One)," *ZAW* 110 (1998): 159–72 (165).

ancestors, an interpretation of Matthew's βίβλος γενέσεως as strictly equivalent to ספר תולדת in Gen 5:1 is difficult to maintain. The genealogy in Matt 1:2–17 does not describe "what came of" Jesus Christ but from what and whom Jesus Christ came.

Already the Greek translators of Genesis seem to have twisted the meaning of ספר תולדת. The translation of Gen 5:1 as αὕτη ἡ βίβλος γενέσεως ἀνθρώπων cannot plausibly be understood to mean that "the human beings" are the "parents" of the "descendants" to be listed; rather, "the human beings" are themselves the "descendants."[8] By introducing the same phrase in Gen 2:4, the Greek translators solved the exegetical difficulty of the Hebrew text's seeming mention of the "descendants of heaven and earth" (תולדות השמים והארץ).[9] In both Gen 2:4 and 5:1, βίβλος γενέσεως must be taken in the sense "account of the origin" of something or someone.

If this understanding is applied to the Gospel of Matthew, βίβλος γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ could be construed as the title of the genealogy and birth narrative proper (1:2–25),[10] of the infancy narrative as a whole (1:2–2:23)[11] or of the Gospel's entire introductory section up to the beginning of Jesus' public ministry (1:2–4:16).[12] These readings could be supported by the occurrence of the phrase τοῦ ... Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἡ γένεσις with reference to the events preceding Jesus' birth in

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[8] See also Thomas Hieke, "Biblos Geneseos: Mt 1,1 vom Buch Genesis her gelesen," in *The Biblical Canons*, ed. J.-M. Auwers and H. J. de Jonge, BETL 163 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 635–49 (640–41).

[9] See John William Wevers, *Notes on the Greek Text of Genesis*, SBLSCSS 35 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 22.

[10] Anton Vögtle, "Die Genealogie Mt 1:2-16 und die matthäische Kindheitsgeschichte," *BZ* 8 (1964): 45–58.

[11] See, e.g., Willoughby C. Allen, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to S. Matthew*, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1912), 1–2; more recently, but with some hesitation, R. T. France, *The Gospel of Matthew* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 34.

[12] Edgar Krentz, "The Extent of Matthew's Prologue: Toward the Structure of the First Gospel," *JBL* 83 (1964): 409–14.

1:18. It would not be out of place for Matthew to use βίβλος γενέσεως in order to indicate that the first section of the Gospel is an account of the origin of Jesus Christ.

In view of what has already been said about the careful compositional strategies evident in the Gospel of Matthew, one may ask whether it is likely that the evangelist should have opened his narrative by a phrase that pertained exclusively to its prolegomena. More importantly, W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison point to the fact that several early Jewish and Christian writings open with a phrase combining "book" (ספר/βίβλος/βιβλίον) with a personal name referring to the author or the subject. For instance, the Book of Tobit is introduced by the phrase "Book of the words of Tobit son of Tobiel" (Βίβλος λόγων Τωβιτ τοῦ Τωβιηλ); the Testament of Job opens with "Book of [the words of] Job who was called Jobab" (Βίβλος [λόγων] Ἰὼβ τοῦ καλουμένου Ἰωβάβ); and 2 Esdras begins "Book of the prophet Ezra son of Seraiah" (*liber Ezrae prophetae filii Sarei*).[13] As Davies and Allison remark,

> it is noteworthy that several of these openings have an anarthrous βίβλος or βιβλίον ... and further that in five out of seven instances a υἱός-formula follows the mention of the author or subject ... Now because Mt 1.1 likewise opens with an anarthrous βίβλος which is immediately followed by a υἱός-formula and then a genealogy, the texts cited offer firm support for understanding 1.1 as a general title.[14]

Although Gen 2:4 and 5:1 provide unobjectionable evidence to the fact that βίβλος γενέσεως might indeed designate a section within a larger document, it is dubitable that this would be the self-evident understanding of the formula when it stands at the beginning of a text, particularly as the text in its entirety is concerned with the person mentioned in connection with the formula.[15] There seem to be good reasons, then,

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[13] W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel according to Saint Matthew*, 3 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988–1997), 1:151–52.

[14] Davies and Allison, *Matthew*, 1:152.

[15] See Ulrich Luz, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus (Mt 1–7)*, 5th ed., EKK I/1 (Düsseldorf: Benziger Verlag, 2002), 117–18.

for the conclusion that βίβλος γενέσεως is "a *double entendre* that refers both to an introductory section and to the entire text."[16] The phrase also introduces Matthew's Gospel as a whole, rather than only the genealogy, the birth narrative, or the introductory part of the Gospel.

A Book of (New) Creation? The Opening's Thematic Coherence with the Gospel

If this much can be agreed, it still remains to be explained what this title conveys to an ideal reader of the text. Moisés Mayordomo-Marín claims that an ancient audience would not necessarily expect "extensive congruence" between the title and the work "in all its individual parts." He points to the use of "Genesis" as title of a book that begins with, but does not limit itself to, a description of the origin of the world, and to the use of "the Law" as a *pars pro toto* designation of the Pentateuch. According to Mayordomo-Marín, it is quite possible to understand the function of Matt 1:1 as the title, and at the same time to recognise that the theme of γένεσις strictly speaking only occurs in the first chapter of the Gospel.[17] It is questionable, however, that the alleged analogies warrant this conclusion. The giving of the law, while not the only matter dealt with in the Pentateuch, is one of the dominant themes in that collection of books and does not seem out of place as a title covering the whole. The theme of the world's origin is hardly marginal to the Book of Genesis, and Philo's discussion of the title indicates that he saw the rest of the book's contents as closely related to that theme (*Abr*. 1–2). By contrast, the theme of Jesus' origin and birth is confined to Matt 1–2 and cannot in any way be regarded as a dominant theme in the Gospel.

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[16] David E. Aune, "Genre Theory and the Genre-Function of Mark and Matthew," in *Mark and Matthew I: Comparative Readings: Understanding the Earliest Gospels in their First-Century Settings*, ed. E.-M. Becker and A. Runesson, WUNT 271 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 145–75 (172).

[17] Mayordomo-Marín, *Den Anfang hören*, 211–13.

It seems reasonable to search for some thematic coherence between Matt 1:1 and the main part of the Gospel, albeit not necessarily "in all its individual parts."

Davies and Allison see an allusion to the first book of the Hebrew Bible, which was known as Γένεσις in Greek-speaking quarters already by the former half of the first century CE. The sections to which βίβλος γενέσεως refers in Gen 2:4 and 5:1 recount, among other things, the creation of the cosmos and of the first human beings. Davies and Allison suggest that the use of the same formula to introduce Matthew's book about Jesus fits well with the early Jewish eschatological notion of the end as a new beginning, with the interpretation of the coming of Jesus as a "new creation" in several New Testament texts, and with the recurring allusions to creation motives in Matthew's portrayal of Jesus. Accordingly, they propose that Matt 1:1 should be interpreted as "Book of the New Genesis wrought by Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham."[18]

Graham Stanton and John Nolland, as part of their endeavours to demonstrate that Matt 1:1 is unlikely to be understood as the title of the Gospel in its entirety, have raised a number of objections to the specific interpretation of βίβλος γενέσεως in terms of "book of (new) creation." Some of Nolland's counter-arguments to the thesis of Davies and Allison seem to be quite strained. It is true that only Philo provides us with secure first-century evidence that the Book of Genesis was already so called, but this is evidence nonetheless; it is true that the genitive relationship between Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ and γενέσεως is of a different kind than that between Δαυίδ/Ἀβραάμ and υἱοῦ on Davies and Allison's reading, but so it is on any reasonable reading of the passage; and it may be true that Gen 2:4 LXX and 5:1 LXX are retrospective summaries of

[18] Davies and Allison, *Matthew*, 1:151, 153. See also Dale C. Allison, *Studies in Matthew: Interpretation Past and Present* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005), 157–62; J. Andrew Doole, *What Was Mark for Matthew? An Examination of Matthew's Relationship and Attitude to his Primary Source*, WUNT II 344 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013), 181–83.

what has just been told in the Greek Book of Genesis, but this can hardly throw any light on the Gospel of Matthew, where there is no preceding narrative to be summarised.[19] Moreover, Nolland's claim that since the beginning of the Gospel emphasises continuity with Israel's past, the theme of new creation would "introduce a jarring note of discontinuity"[20] does not carry much force in view of Matthew's general tendency to portray Jesus as someone who simultaneously upholds continuity with the past and brings about a new era (e.g., Matt 5:17; 9:16–17; 13:52).

Two other objections to the interpretation of Davies and Allison are stronger. Firstly, Nolland observes that whereas the semantic range of γένεσις does allow for the word to be used in a wide variety of senses beside the basic "origin," there is nothing in the literature earlier than or contemporaneous with Matthew to suggest that the precise meaning "creation" had developed for it.[21] Even on the assumption that βίβλος γενέσεως in Matt 1:1 refers back to the Book of Genesis in general and to the sections referred to by the same expression in Gen 2:4; 5:1 in particular, one cannot assume that it is precisely the theme of creation that is being invoked. Secondly, that theme does not seem to be prominent in Matthew's Gospel, despite Davies and Allison's attempts to underscore it. Stanton remarks that "[w]hile Paul (and perhaps John 1,1) sees the coming of Jesus as the counterpart of the creation account narrated in Genesis, there is no evidence which suggests that Matthew did so."[22] As Nolland points out, Matthew does refer to a future eschatological recreation in 19:28, but the term used there is παλιγγενεσία, with no significant links to γένεσις in 1:1.[23] One might add here that some of the

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[19] Cf. J. Nolland, "What Kind of Genesis Do We Have in Matt 1.1?," *NTS* 42 (1996): 463–71 (465–66, 467–68).

[20] Nolland, "What Kind of Genesis," 467.

[21] Nolland, "What Kind of Genesis," 469 n. 25.

[22] Graham N. Stanton, "Matthew: βίβλος, εὐαγγέλιον, or βίος?," in *The Four Gospels 1992, FS Frans Neirnyck*, ed. F. Van Segbroeck et al., BETL 100 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 1187–1201 (1189).

[23] Nolland, "What Kind of Genesis," 465.

further instances of an alleged "new creation" theme in Matthew, such as Jesus going to Egypt and returning from there in an Exodus-like manner (2:15),[24] are quite tenuous.

While these valid points cannot serve to undermine the understanding of Matt 1:1 as the entire Gospel's title, they do invite us to consider the possibility that βίβλος γενέσεως is not as closely linked to the theme of creation as Davies and Allison argue. But if the expression does introduce – beside the genealogy and infancy narrative – the Gospel in its entirety, and if it does allude to Gen 2:4 and 5:1 (and even to the Book of Genesis as a whole), but does not evoke the theme of creation specifically, then what is its purpose? In my opinion, scholarship has not paid sufficient attention to a more obvious common denominator between the uses of the expression in the Book of Genesis on the one hand, and the Gospel of Matthew on the other, that is, the discourse of ethnicity. I will devote the next section of this article to unfolding the theme of ethnicity as connected to the term γένεσις in the Old Testament, with special reference to the Book of Genesis. After that we will come back to the Gospel of Matthew.

Ethnic Aspects of the Γενέσεις in Genesis

Apart from the expression βίβλος γενέσεως (Gen 2:4; 5:1), the Greek Old Testament employs the term γένεσις in the singular a number of times in the sense of an individual's "birth" or "origin" (Gen 31:13; 32:10; 40:20; Ruth 2:11). Not to be overlooked, however, are the sections connected with the plural γενέσεις, translating the Hebrew תולדת, which more often than not seem to have "ethnic" implications, that is, they function to explain the origins of and distinctions between different peoples. The plural γενέσεις in these contexts can often be appropriately translated as "[record of] descendants."

[24] Cf. Davies and Allison, *Matthew*, 1:153.

Occasionally, the set phrase "these are the descendants of..." (αὗται αἱ γενέσεις τινός) refers back to the preceding section (Exod 6:24; 1 Chron 4:2). More commonly, the phrase introduces a list of a person's descendants (Gen 11:10, 27; Ruth 4:18; 1 Chron 1:29) or a narrative section of a person's achievements, including the names of his offspring (Gen 6:9; 37:2; Num 3:1). In the constructions κατὰ (τὰς) γενέσεις αὐτῶν or ἐν ταῖς γενέσεσιν αὐτῶν, the plural γενέσεις translates not only תולדת (Exod 28:10; 1 Chron 5:7) but also משפחת (Exod 6:25; Num 1:18; 1 Chron 4:38) and denotes categories based on common descent: "families" or "clans."

Of primary interest here are the genealogies in Genesis 10 (the so-called Table of Nations); 25 (the records of Ishmael's and Isaac's descendants); 36 (the record of Esau's descendants). All three of these are "segmented genealogies," that is, genealogies which contain "more than one line of descent from a given ancestor."[25] Each of the three genealogies is introduced with the phrase "these are the descendants..." (αὗται αἱ γενέσεις), and each of the three includes explicitly "ethnic" vocabulary (ἔθνος and λαός). These three genealogies will be considered in more detail.

The Descendants of the Sons of Noah (Gen 10:1–32)

The "Table of Nations" in Genesis 10 opens with the heading "These are the descendants (תולדת/γενέσεις) of the sons of Noah: Shem, Ham and Japheth" (10:1). On this follow lists of descendants from each of the three brothers: Japheth (10:2–5), Ham (10:6–20) and Shem (10:21–31) before the conclusion of the genealogy as a whole (10:32).

Each list of descendants concludes by juxtaposing "peoples" (ἔθνη) with references to distinctive languages and territories. The list of Japheth's descendants concludes: "From these were designated islands of the peoples in their land, each one according to (his) tongue, by their

[25] Robert R. Wilson, *Genealogy and History in the Biblical World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 9.

tribes and by their peoples' (בגויהם/ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν αὐτῶν, 10:5), while those of Ham's and Shem's posterity both end with similar formulae: "these are the sons ... by their tribes, according to their tongues, by their territories and by their peoples (בגויהם/ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν αὐτῶν)" (10:20, 31).

The entire chapter concludes with "These are the tribes of the sons of Noah, according to their generations (לתולדתם/κατὰ γενέσεις αὐτῶν) and according to their peoples (בגויהם/κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη αὐτῶν). From these were scattered islands of the peoples on the earth after the flood" (10:32). Again, descent is juxtaposed with peoplehood and territories, which makes clear the genealogy's function of establishing the origins of ethnic identities.

The Descendants of Ishmael and Isaac (Gen 25:12–26)

In Genesis 25, we find the records of the descendants of the two sons of Abraham, beginning with "These are the descendants (תולדת/γενέσεις) of Ishmael, the son of Abraham" (25:12) and "these are the descendants (תולדת/γενέσεις) of Isaac, the son of Abraham" (25:19) respectively.

The list of Ishmael's descendants (25:13–16) concludes with "These are the sons of Ishmael and these are their names ... twelve rulers, according to their peoples (לאמתם/κατὰ ἔθνη αὐτῶν)" (25:16). When it comes to the record of Isaac's descendants, no genealogy is given, apart from the brief mention of the fact that Abraham fathered Isaac. Instead, what follows on the introductory formula is a short narrative about Isaac's marriage to Rebecca, Rebecca's pregnancy and the birth and naming of Esau and Jacob (25:18–26). Accordingly, no concluding formula such as that in 25:16 is found, but the oracle given to Rebecca is clear enough in its ethnic implications:

> Two nations (גיים/ἔθνη) are in your belly,
>
> and two peoples (לאמים/λαοί) will be sent forth from your womb,
>
> and [one] people (לאם/λαός) will dominate [the other] people (מלאם/λαοῦ),
>
> and the greater will be a slave to the lesser. (Gen 25:23)

In different ways, the γενέσεις of Ishmael and Isaac confirm the pattern already established in connection with the Table of Nations. Overtly ethnic vocabulary is employed, suggesting that the function of these "records" is to explain how ethnic identities originated.

The Descendants of Esau (Gen 36:1–43)

Finally, Genesis 36 contains several units of genealogical material connected with Esau. Following Robert Wilson, we can divide the chapter into the following parts: a first record of the descendants of Esau, which in reality consists of a list of Esau's wives and sons and a narrative about his migration to Seir (36:1–8); a second record of the descendants of Esau, consisting of a list of his sons and grandsons (36:9–10); a list of the chiefs of Esau (36:11–19); a list of the descendants of Seir the Horite (36:20–28); a list of the chiefs of the Horites (36:29–30); a list of the kings of Edom (36:31–39); and another list of the chiefs of Esau (36:40–43).[26] The heading "These are the descendants (תולדת/γενέσεις) of Esau" occurs twice. The first time, Esau is said to be identical with Edom (36:1); the second time, he is called "father of Edom" (36:9). Both formulations serve to connect Esau closely with an ethnic identity.

At the beginning of the last unit, in the Masoretic Text, we find the concluding formula "These are the names of the chiefs of Esau, according to their tribes, according to their places, by their names" (36:40). The Greek translator, under influence from Gen 10 and 25, expanded this into a fuller formula: "These are the names of the chiefs of Esau, by their tribes, according to their place, by their territories and by their peoples (ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν αὐτῶν)," thus introducing explicitly "ethnic" language also in this list of descendants. At the end, it is once again stated that Esau is "father of Edom" (36:43).

[26] Wilson, *Genealogy and History*, 167.

Γενέσεις and Ethnic Origins

The genealogies of Genesis, then, indicate that ethnic origins are a matter of major importance in the γενέσεις or תולדת. This pertains especially to the three genealogies discussed above. In the words of Matthew Thomas, these genealogies are "reminding us that the story of Israel is not alone in the world, but part of a much bigger drama in which God is involved."[27] The "universalistic" tendency of these genealogies is made explicit through the use of "ethnic" vocabulary.

What is the relevance of the γενέσεις for the understanding of Matt 1:1? If the expression βίβλος γενέσεως alludes not only to Gen 2:4 and 5:1, but also to the Book of Genesis as a whole, it is not unreasonable to consider an allusion to the γενέσεις to be present in Matt 1:1. The formal pattern "x begat y," which dominates Matt 1:2–16, imitates not only Gen 5:1b–32 but also Gen 10:1b–32. Reading Matthew's Gospel in the light of the γενέσεις would then lead us to expect the story of how Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham gave rise to a specific ethnic identity (or specific ethnic identities). In the next section, I will argue that this reading of Matthew as a narrative about ethnic origins is far more natural than Davies and Allison's suggestion about the theme of "new creation" being present in the Gospel.

Matthew 1:1 and Ethnic Ambiguity in the Gospel

It can hardly be contested that notions of ethnicity are of central importance in the Gospel of Matthew. Several passages of crucial significance for the interpretation of the Gospel as a whole employ "ethnic" vocabulary, the precise implications of which are under much discussion (see Matt 1:21; 21:43; 27:25; 28:19). In this section, after briefly outlining Matthew's theology of "ethnic inclusion," I will address the Gospel's often ambiguous use of "ethnic" vocabulary in some of those passages and

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[27] Matthew A. Thomas, *These are the Generations: Identity, Covenant, and the "Toledot" Formula*, LHBOTS 637 (New York: T&T Clark, 2011), 93.

then consider βίβλος γενέσεως in 1:1 as another ambiguous expression that functions to convey the redefinition of ethnic categories in the Gospel of Matthew.

God's People and the Peoples: Matthew's Theology of Ethnic Inclusion

The Gospel of Matthew has traditionally been interpreted along the lines of a theology of "replacement." On this reading of the narrative, Jesus' and his disciples' initial mission only to "the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Matt 10:6; 15:24) is met by increasing hostility on the part of the Jewish people, culminating in "all the people" taking responsibility for the death of Jesus (27:25), thereby rejecting definitively the Messiah. As a consequence, "the kingdom of God" is "taken away" from Israel and "given to a people that bears the fruits" of the kingdom (21:43), that is, the Church (16:18), which is made up of "all the nations" (28:19). Israel may certainly be included among "all the nations," but the original people of God has lost its special status. Israelites who become disciples of Jesus belong to the people on exactly the same premises as do Gentiles, with the latter seeming even to make up the majority (8:11–12). A complete substitution of ethnic identities appears to have taken place.[28]

This old consensus view is rarely maintained in current scholarship. More careful study of the pertinent passages and of the narrative as a whole has resulted in more nuanced interpretations of Matthew's depiction of the relationships between Jesus, the people of Israel, the Gentiles and the Church (ἐκκλησία).[29] While strictly speaking no new consensus

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[28] See Kenneth W. Clark, "The Gentile Bias in Matthew," *JBL* 66 (1947): 165–172, for a straightforward formulation of this reading.

[29] See, e.g., Amy-Jill Levine, *The Social and Ethnic Dimensions of Matthean Salvation History* (Lewinston: Mellen, 1988); David L. Turner, *Israel's Last Prophet: Jesus and the Jewish Leaders in Matthew 23* (Minneapolis: Fortess, 2003); Anders Runesson, *Divine Wrath and Salvation in Matthew: The Narrative World of the First Gospel* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2016).

has emerged to replace the old one, Matthias Konradt's important study represents the current tendency in Matthean studies and argues for a view that, on the whole, does justice to the text from the literary-theological perspective also applied in the present contribution.[30] It will therefore be used here in order to provide the theological backdrop against which Matthew's use of "ethnic" vocabulary will then be analysed in more detail.

Konradt's investigation confirms the obvious point that the pre-Easter mission of Jesus and his disciples is, in principle, confined to Israelites. Although Jesus occasionally encounters non-Jews in his healing ministry (8:5–13, 28–34; 15:21–28), there are textual signals that make clear that these healings are proleptic, extraordinary events, as they take place before the appointed time (πρὸ καιροῦ, 8:29), that is, before the death and resurrection of Jesus (cf. 26:18) which will open the gates to the Gentiles.[31] The most explicit limitation of the pre-Easter mission comes at the beginning of the mission discourse where, as Konradt points out, Jesus defines the mission not only in ethnic terms but also in geographical ones: at this point in the narrative, the disciples must not depart on a Gentile road or enter into a Samaritan city, that is, they are to stay in Galilee (10:5).[32] Only at a later stage is a mission to all "the cities of Israel" envisioned. This is a mission that will not be completed even at the time of the coming of the Son of Man (10:23). Accordingly, it cannot be the case that the commissioning of the disciples to go to

[30] Matthias Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles in the Gospel of Matthew*, trans. K. Ess (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2014). The English translation incorporates some revisions and updates as compared to the German original, *Israel, Kirche und die Völker im Matthäusevangelium*, WUNT 215 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).

[31] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 55–74. On a marginal note that does not weaken his argument as a whole, Konradt's identification of the Gadarene demoniacs (8:28–34) as non-Jews is less persuasive. See Florian Wilk, *Jesus und die Völker in der Sicht der Synoptiker*, BZNW 109 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2002), 139; more cautiously, Levine, *Social and Ethnic Dimensions*, 112–13.

[32] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 78.

"all the nations" in 28:19 causes or presumes an abortion of the mission to Israel specifically.[33] That mandate remains in force.

The continued mission to Israel is congruent with the fact that, despite earlier scholarly claim to that effect, Matthew never portrays the Jewish people as rejecting the Messiah. When "all the people" accepts responsibility for Jesus' death (27:25), this refers not to Israel as a whole but to the inhabitants of Jerusalem, who have earlier been depicted as in conflict with Jesus (2:3; 21:10) and who will ultimately be punished for their rejection (22:7).[34] Jerusalem is also connected with the religious leaders, who from the beginning of the narrative to its end indeed reject Jesus. It is against these leaders, and not against the people of Israel as a whole, that Jesus directs the prediction that "the kingdom of God will be taken away from you" (21:43).[35] In other words, what is replaced according to Matthew is not the people of Israel but its leadership.

The positive stance towards non-Jews that comes to overt expression in 28:16–20 is introduced at the beginning of the Gospel, where the designation of Jesus as "son of Abraham" (1:1) alludes to God's promises of a universal blessing through Abraham (Gen 12:3; 18:18; 22:18; 26:4). The same theme is evoked by John the Baptist's proclamation of God's ability to raise up children of Abraham from the stones (Matt 3:9) and by the reference to the "many [who] will come from east and west to recline with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven" (8:11). Further evidence of a positive view of the inclusion of Gentiles can be found in the genealogy (1:2–16), in the episode about the magi (2:1–12) and in several of Matthew's quotations from Isaiah (Matt 4:15–16; 12:18–21).[36] The commission to include fully the Gentiles in 28:16–20 is, thus, the culmination of tendency present throughout the Gospel.

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[33] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 82–84.

[34] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 153–66; see also Runesson, *Divine Wrath and Salvation*, 301–303.

[35] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 172–93.

[36] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 265–81.

In the end, the Church includes both Israel and Gentiles. Israel has not lost its privileged position, but Gentiles have been invited too. This could be described as a theology of inclusion rather than one of replacement. According to Konradt, the Church is an overarching, non-ethnic category: the Church is never depicted as the (new) people of God; Israel is still God's people, although the Church in fact takes over Israel's role as the community of salvation in what Konradt calls a new "system of coordinates."[37] Ethnic identities as such are not redefined. It is here that I wish to take issue with Konradt's conclusions.

A People Redefined: Matthew's Ambiguous Use of "Ethnic" Vocabulary

Is it really the case that Matthew does not employ "ethnic" vocabulary for the ἐκκλησία, that is, that the Church is never called a (new) "people" (of God) in the Gospel of Matthew? On the surface level of the text, this may indeed be so; granted the observation that the Church does seem to assume some of the traditional functions of Israel as God's people, and in view of Matthew's use of ambiguity (or irony, double-entendre) as a literary strategy,[38] the answer may be less clear-cut. Two passages are to be considered here: Jesus' statement about the kingdom of God being given to an ἔθνος that bears the fruits of the kingdom (21:43), and the angel's announcement that Jesus will save his λαός from their sins (1:21).

Matt 21:43. Whereas the plural ἔθνη is used frequently in the Gospel of Matthew, the singular occurs only here and in 24:7. The traditional translation of ἔθνος as "nation" or "people" is often challenged in current scholarship, especially since Anthony Saldarini suggested that the term can refer to a "voluntary organization or small social group" and that it

[37] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 327–53.

[38] See especially Karl McDaniel, *Experiencing Irony in the First Gospel: Suspense, Surprise, and Curiosity*, LNTS 488 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013).

should be understood here as "a group of leaders."[39] Wesley Olmstead has questioned that this interpretation is at all natural in view of how ἔθνος is commonly used in biblical literature.[40] While Konradt demonstrates that "group of people" in a non-ethnic sense is clearly within the semantic range of ἔθνος also in early Jewish literature,[41] the word is used in the ethnic sense in an overwhelming majority of instances, and only the context would invite consideration of another meaning.

It is precisely the context that is usually invoked as an argument against the traditional interpretation. Jesus is speaking to "the high priests and the elders among the people" (21:23). It is "the high priests and the Pharisees" who realise that Jesus has been speaking "about them" in the parables (21:44), that is, they are the vinedressers in the parable of 21:33–41; they are the ones from whom the kingdom of God will be taken away (21:43). Since 21:43 is addressed, not to the people of Israel, but to the leaders, it seems natural to understand ἔθνος as referring to the new group of leaders that will replace the old ones (cf. 21:41).[42]

This line of interpretation, however, overlooks the asymmetry between the parable's conclusion and the saying of Jesus introduced by the formulation ποιοῦντι τοὺς καρπούς in 21:43. While 21:41 calls for new vinedressers who will "hand over" (ἀποδιδόναι) the produce in due time, the ἔθνος of 21:43 will not only hand over but itself "bear (ποιεῖν) the fruits," which means that the ἔθνος is not analogous to the vinedressers but to the vineyard (cf. 3:10; 7:17; 13:8, 26). There is, within 21:43, a

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[39] Saldarini, *Matthew's Christian-Jewish Community*, 59–61.

[40] Wesley G. Olmstead, "A Gospel for a New Nation: Once More, the ἔθνος of Matthew 21.43," in *Jesus, Matthew's Gospel and Early Christianity: Studies in Memory of Graham N. Stanton*, ed. D. M. Gurtner, J. Willitts and R. A. Burridge (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 115–32.

[41] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 181–83.

[42] See, e.g., John S. Kloppenborg, *The Tenants in the Vineyard: Ideology, Economics, and Agrarian Conflict in Jewish Palestine*, WUNT 195 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 191–93; Turner, *Israel's Last Prophet*, 243–47; Runesson, *Divine Wrath and Salvation*, 50 n. 26.

subtle shift that makes the saying go beyond the parable and its conclusion: not only will the leadership be replaced, but the people itself will also be redefined.

It is likely, therefore, that ἔθνος does refer to Jesus' future community of both Jews and Gentiles and that the choice of vocabulary alludes to biblical texts that promise the future formation of a nation. Especially noteworthy are the promises in Genesis that God would make Abraham "into a great nation" and that all nations of the earth would be blessed by his seed (Gen 12:2; 18:18). As mentioned already, the theme of inclusiveness through Abraham is present elsewhere in the Gospel.[43] As Olmstead remarks,

> ... not only will all nations be blessed through Abraham and his descendants ... but also ... many from the nations will help compose the great ἔθνος that God promised to make from Abraham ... The nations who are blessed by their interaction with the nation in the end are incorporated into that nation! Sadly, many of the original citizens lose their heritage.[44]

Matt 1:21. It is commonly recognized that the angel's words to Joseph in Matt 1:21 are of crucial importance as a programmatic statement of Jesus' task according to the Gospel of Matthew: "She will give birth to a son, and you shall call him by the name Jesus; for he will save his people (τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ) from their sins." Many have noticed that this statement is ambiguous and that its interpretation depends on whether it is read in the context of Matthew 1 alone or in the light of the subsequent narrative development of the Gospel as a whole. Since Jesus' lineage from Abraham and David has been spelled out in detail in 1:1–17, and Joseph's identity as a "son of David" has just been reaffirmed by the angel in 1:20, a first-time reader of the Gospel would have no reason to suppose that "his people" refers to anything else than the Jewish people.

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[43] See also Wesley G. Olmstead, *Matthew's Trilogy of Parables: The Nation, the Nations and the Reader in Matthew 21.28–22.14*, SNTSMS 127 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 89–95.

[44] Olmstead, *Matthew's Trilogy of Parables*, 95.

Moreover, all other instances of λαός ("people") in the Gospel of Matthew seem to refer to the people of Israel, either in whole or in part.[45]

On the other hand, there are good reasons for reading this phrasing as an ambiguous statement. Matt 1:21 seems to be modelled on LXX-Psalm 129:8: "He [the Lord] will redeem Israel from all their transgressions" (καὶ αὐτὸς λυτρώσεται τὸν Ισραηλ ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀνομιῶν αὐτοῦ). Matthew's substitution of "his people" for "Israel" opens the possibility of doubting that the reference is indeed to the Jewish people. Later in the Gospel, Jesus will speak of "my church" (16:18) and "his [the Son of Man's] kingdom" (13:41; 16:28; cf. 20:21). When the statement in 1:21 is reread in the light of these later formulations, it becomes more likely that it refers not only to the people from which Jesus was born but, in the end, to the composite people of which he is the progenitor and ruler.[46] Karl McDaniel has substantiated this understanding by demonstrating that it is commonplace for ancient reports of prophecy and dreams to utilize ambiguity in this way. The narratives studied by McDaniel "indicate that Greek literature assumed a place for reader manipulation. Authors deliberately crafted texts to provoke false anticipation that, when the expected outcome fails to realize, demands correction through retrospective reinterpretation."[47] As Matt 1:21 is part of a dream-report, its ambiguous nature is fully in line with ancient Greek literary conventions.

The reader's initial expectation, that Jesus will save his Jewish compatriots from their sins, is modified within the Gospel narrative. Jesus does shed his blood "for many for the forgiveness of sins" (26:28; cf. 20:28),

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[45] J. R. C. Cousland, *The Crowds in the Gospel of Matthew*, NovTSup 102 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 75–86.

[46] See, e.g., Lidija Novakovic, *Messiah, the Healer of the Sick: A Study of Jesus as the Son of David in the Gospel of Matthew*, WUNT II 170 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 65–66.

[47] McDaniel, *Experiencing Irony in the First Gospel*, 42–62 (quotation on p. 62).

but "the many" includes both Israelites and Gentiles.[48] In the end, the λαός of 1:21 also seems to suggest a redefined ethnic identity.

Progeny and Progenitor: Matthew's Gospel as Βίβλος γενέσεως

Noting the anomaly of Matthew's genealogy of Jesus as a list of ancestors rather than descendants, Raymond Brown claims that "[i]n Christian salvific history there can be no genealogy of Jesus' descendants because history has reached its goal in Jesus."[49] This does not seem to be true of Matthew's outlook. Matthew presupposes that history will continue and that Jesus' death and resurrection will be followed by the time of the Church (Matt 16:18–19; 18:15–20). There is certainly no place for *physical* descendants of Jesus within Matthew's narrative world, but the theme of the disciples as Jesus' true family (12:49–50) can be extended into the notion of a new people of which Jesus is the progenitor.

If the reading advocated above is correct—that one important theme of Matthew's Gospel is the Son of Abraham's establishment of the "great nation"—then one should question the judgment on seeing Matt 1:1 as the title of the entire Gospel as either "fanciful"[50] or "over-subtle."[51] If it is reasonable that the statement that Jesus "will save his people from their sins" (1:21) is indeed ambiguous and open to re-evaluation as the narrative develops, then it is just as reasonable to understand βίβλος γενέσεως (1:1) as marked by the same ambiguity. On a first hearing or reading of the Gospel, it is quite natural to take the expression to refer to the genealogy that follows immediately upon it, and thus as pertaining to the ancestral line of Jesus. In view of the Gospel as a whole, how-

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[48] Konradt, *Israel, Church, and the Gentiles*, 340–45.

[49] Raymond E. Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah: A Commentary on the Infancy Narratives in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke*, 2nd ed., ABRL (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 67.

[50] Brown, *The Birth of the Messiah*, 59.

[51] Graham N. Stanton, *A Gospel for a New People: Studies in Matthew* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), 13.

ever, it makes sense to understand it as the title of the work—the book about how Jesus, son of David, son of Abraham, gave rise to a new people including both Israelites and Gentiles.

Conclusion

I have argued three points in this article: (1) That the identification of Matt 1:1 as a heading of the Gospel of Matthew as a whole is correct, in view of the comparative evidence and Matthew's competence as an author. (2) That in order to elucidate the conceptual background of βίβλος γενέσεως we should not restrict ourselves to the two occurrences of that exact phrase in the book of Genesis, but also consider the γενέσεις, the Pentateuchal genealogies at large, several of which employ the explicit language of "ethnicity." (3) That the reading of βίβλος γενέσεως within the discourse of ethnic origins, rather than the discourse of "new creation" as proposed by Davies and Allison, fits very well with the overall Matthean plot and should thus be preferred.

How, then, would ancient hearers or readers of Matthew's Gospel understand the introductory phrase of the Gospel: Βίβλος γενέσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ υἱοῦ Δαυὶδ υἱοῦ Ἀβραάμ? Initially, they would probably catch the reference to Gen 2:4 and 5:1 and thus expect the following narrative to tell the story of Jesus in a mode akin to the Genesis narrative. The subsequent genealogy would modify this expectation somewhat, as it would not be entirely out of place to understand βίβλος γενέσεως as introducing the genealogy, even if it does not enlist Jesus' descendants but his ancestors, in contrast to the Old Testament תולדת. But as the story of Jesus unfolded, they would have reason to reconsider again the significance of the Gospel's introduction. The mention of Jesus' "people" in Matt 1:21 is ambiguous. It takes on a new meaning in the light of the Gospel as a whole, a meaning that was unexpected at the outset but seems fully plausible in retrospect. In the same way, the introduction of the Gospel as βίβλος γενέσεως is marked by ambiguity, and it is only gradually that the hearer or reader discovers its deeper sig-

nificance: to signal the beginning of the story about how the great people promised to Abraham originated with Jesus Christ.

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Stop Being Fricative! The Hebrew *Šĕwā' Medium*, Syllabic Consonants, *Tidʿāl* and the Aesthetics of Linguistic and Exegetical Models[*]

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Introduction

The objective of this article is to discuss two cases of seeming "irregularity" in the Tiberian Masoretic stop and fricative systems, especially concerning the relationship between those two systems—and to ponder the

[*] This article was conceived and written by Wikander, who is responsible for the formulation of the text and the underlying ideas. The section called "Surface Realizations and Autosegmental Phonology" was, however, created in dialogue with Aljoša Šorgo, and the ideas in that segment are mostly his, as is the specific formulation of the syllabification rule there suggested.

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methodological implications of this for the study of Masoretic orthography and analysis. The first case has to do with the question of the *šĕwā' medium* (known in Hebrew as *šĕwā' měraḥēf*, "hovering *šĕwā*"), the strange and seemingly incongruous phenomenon giving rise to fricativized *beghadhkefath* letters appearing where they logically "shouldn't," i.e. where there is no preceding audible vowel (cases such as *birχōθ*, "blessings of" or *biqβūrāθô*, "in his grave")[1]—especially cases like these, where Tiberian vocalization produces an *i* due to the so-called *rule of šĕwā'*, which stipulates that two audible *šĕwā's* cannot be tolerated in successive syllables (a rule operating together with the *law of attenuation*, which turns etymological **a*-s in closed unstressed syllables into *i*). The second question has to do with a specific word showing vacillation between a stop and a fricative in various traditions of Hebrew, viz. the royal name preserved in Tiberian Hebrew as *Tiḏʿāl* in Genesis 14. This name, which is often (and in my view correctly) regarded as a Hebrew version of the Hittite royal name *Tudḫaliya*-, has been argued to preserve an early differentiation between etymological *ʿayin* and *ġayin* in its LXX Greek version, Θαργαλ. The discrepancy between the Tiberian and LXX versions of this name may tell us more about the relationship between certain stops and fricatives in the history of Hebrew than has previously been thought.

As a bridge between the two main parts of the article, I will also touch upon some methodological and perhaps even philosophical issues that arise when discussing these questions, regarding how matters of phonological reconstruction may disclose certain ideas of an almost aes-

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[1] Here, I use a sort of cross between the standard "Anglo-American" scholarly transliteration of Classical Hebrew (using *ĕ* for *šĕwā'* etc.) and a more phonetic-style rendering—the latter in the case of the *beghadhkefath* letters, whose fricative variants I represent as *β*, *γ*, *ð*, *χ*, *f* and *θ*, respectively. Despite the fact that I discuss the Tiberian tradition, I keep to the common rendering of *qāmeṣ* as *ā* (instead of *å*, *vel sim.*), even though the Tiberians pronounced it as a rounded back vowel. This is just a matter of keeping closer to standard transliteration. I use capital letters for the syllabified consonants that I will argue for later. In certain cases, I use overt IPA transcription, using the standard brackets [...].

thetic nature on the part of both the modern scholar and the historical tradents of the textual material.

The Sound of Silence: The *Šĕwā' Medium* and "Magical *Ḥireqs*"

The first question concerns Hebrew words in which, etymologically and structurally, two pronounced *šĕwā's* would have followed each other—an impossibility due to the rules of Tiberian syllabification—and how this relates to the question of *beghadhkefath* spirantization. One such example is the construct form that in pre-Hebrew must have sounded something like **barakōt* ("blessings of," ultimately from Proto-Northwest Semitic **barakātu*). Because this is a noun in the construct state, the vowels thereby undergoing reduction in open syllables, this could have been expected to turn into ***bĕrĕχōθ* (with the two postvocalic *beghadhkefath* letters *k* and *t* being turned into their respective fricative allophones). However, as Tiberian Hebrew does not tolerate two audible *šĕwā's* in succession, the second one is deleted from pronunciation (becoming known as a *šĕwā' medium*[2]—which is "there, yet not there"), and the law of attenuation (which turns historical **a*-s in to *i*-s in

[2] Introductions to the phenomenon can be found in many standard handbooks; see, e.g., Joshua Blau, *Phonology and Morphology of Biblical Hebrew: An Introduction* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2010), 114–115; Ivan Engnell, *Grammatik i gammaltestamentlig hebreiska* (Stockholm: Nordstedts, 1963), 21; Willhelm Gesenius, E. Kautzsch, and A. E. Cowley, *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar: As Edited and Enlarged by the Late E. Kautzsch ... Revised in Accordance with the Twenty-Eighth German Edition (1909) by A.E. Cowley*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1910), 51–52 (§10*d*) (in the latter case, though, wanting to do away with the term itself, though still describing the same phenomenon—while arguing that the fricativizing vowel was entirely elided and that this means that the fricativization is "older than the elision," with reference to Sievers); Paul Joüon and Takamitsu Muraoka, *A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew.* 2nd, rev. ed., SubBi 27 (Roma: Editrice Pontificio Istituto, 2006), 49–50 (§8*e*, with the same attitude as Gesenius, Kautzsch, and Cowley).

unstressed closed syllables)[3] or the "rule of *šĕwā'*" turns the entire word into *birχōθ*, with the *k* still spiranticized into *χ* even though there is no longer any pronounced vowel directly preceding it.[4] Another example consists of imperatives such as *qirβû* ("draw close! [plural masculine]"), which stands in a regular morphological relationship with the corresponding imperfect form *tiqrĕβû*; as the *qal* imperative in Hebrew normally is synchronically identical with the imperfect without its prefix, the morphologically (as opposed to phonologically and phonetically) expected synchronic form could be argued to be ***qĕrĕβû*, again a phonotactic impossibility due to the two pronounced *šĕwā's* in consecutive syllables—solved by turning the first *šĕwā'* into *ḥīreq* and the second into a *šĕwā' medium*, producing the actually attested form, *qirβû*. An even more illustrative example would be the (biblically unattested but formally certain) feminine singular imperative *qirβî*, which would form a minimal pair (in orthographical terms, at least) with *qirbî*, "my midst."

Even though the etymological background of these cases is clear, these phonotactic structures constitute an anomaly within the confines of the Tiberian phonological system. The situation here at hand—spirantized/fricativized *beghadhkefath* letters appearing without a synchronically pronounced vowel preceding them—breaks the usual rules of the

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[3] On the law of attenuation, see now the highly illuminating account in Benjamin D. Suchard, *The Development of the Biblical Hebrew Vowels* (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2016), 189–212.

[4] This historical analysis – that these cases go back to a subsequently elided vowel having already fricativized the following stop before disappearing – originally goes back all the way to Eduard Sievers, *Metrische Studien I: Studien zur hebräischen Metrik: Erster Teil: Untersuchungen,* Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Classe der Königl. Sächsichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften 21 (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1901), 22–23. A concise description of the whole process generating *birχōθ* and similar forms can be found in Hans Bauer and Pontus Leander, *Historische Grammatik der hebräischen Sprache des Alten Testamentes* (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1922), 240–241 (§26*w*'). They describe the process in terms of only the second vowel being elided, but this means essentially the same thing, as two vocal *šĕwā's* in successive syllables are not tolerated. See also page 595 (§74*a*') in the same publication.

synchronic Tiberian sound-system, and is often regarded as a sign of the dual pronunciation of these letters actually being on the way to becoming phonemic (more on this later).

A New Proposed Analysis: Syllabic Consonants

However, positing what is in effect a new set of rule-breaking phonemes for these cases need not be the most parsimonious route to take. I would like to propose a new type of analysis of this sort of syllabic structure, one involving no "deleted *šĕwā'*s" that are "magically" turned into *ḥīreqs* (or in some cases *paθaḥs*). Rather, a fitting analysis would be to regard these cases as involving *syllabified consonants* (or at least consonants forming syllabic nuclei), which themselves turn subsequent *beghadhkefath* letters into fricatives (or perhaps better: are vocalic enough to keep them fricative).

The reason for this is the place in which the "*šĕwā' medium* + fricative stop" type syllabic structure has in the Tiberian phonological system. If one keeps with the classical analysis—that the vowel that has subsequently been made silent ("medium") fricativized the following stop before quiescing—one would in effect have to presuppose that the Tiberian Masoretes performed a type of etymological/morphophonemic analysis every time they encountered such a word (to "change it back" into its etymological shape, or rather: to keep it from changing into the form expected by phonologically automatic processes, which would have yielded a form with *dāγēš lene* in the relevant consonant, i.e. the stop allophone). To be sure, the Masoretes could have received "by tradition" a fricativized form, but the odds of that form staying fricative would have been slim, given the pervasive "fricative = audible vowel preceding" rule of the Tiberian system. The main attitude of the Masoretes seems to have been to write down *what they thought they heard* (in the sense of *their subjective feeling for what was demanded for the realization of the underlying phonology*), even though the grammatical rules strictly mandated something else (the use of *ḥāṭēfs* instead of *šĕwā'*s under guttural letters is a classic example of this). I would argue that the Tiberian

system of notation included some features that were closer to being *phonetic* than *phonological* in a historical sense.[5] Therefore, given that the

[5] Thus, my approach here is somewhat different from, e.g., that employed in Benjamin D. Suchard, "Sound Changes in the (Pre-)Masoretic Reading Tradition and the Original Pronunciation of Biblical Aramaic," *Studia Orientalia Electronica* 7 (2019), 52–65 (55), where it is posited that "... the Tiberian vocalization only marks phonemic contrasts, which sits well with the fact that speakers are typically unaware of the allophony they produce and the phonological rules they employ." Suchard mentions a number of demonstrable differences in surface realizations that are not recorded in the Tiberian pointing but which can be reconstructed with the help of mediaeval transcriptional material (following Geoffrey Khan), and there I agree, but I would not say that this necessarily implies that the Tiberian pointing as such was *only* based on phonemic contrasts, simply that there may have been additional allophonic processes that were not recorded in the writing at all. On the question of the *ḥāṭēfs*, Suchard argues in another article—with some hesitation—that they probably were phonemic in some contexts (as they exceptionally appear in other contexts than near gutturals, their usual—and predictable—distribution): see Benjamin D. Suchard, "The Vocalic Phonemes of Tiberian Hebrew," *HS* 59 (2018), 139–207 (202–203). He also refers to Geoffrey Khan's ("Syllable Structure: Biblical Hebrew," in *Encyclopedia of Hebrew Language and Linguistics*, vol. 3, ed. G. Khan, Sh. Bolozky et al. [Leiden: Brill, 2013], 666–676 [666–668]) argument that some such *ḥāṭēfs* must be regarded as phonemic, as they appear to have influenced the realization of /r/ in Tiberian Hebrew in a way only consistent with an underlying, syllable-creating phoneme (determining whether the /r/ was realized as uvular or alveolar—cf. footnote 67 in the present article). Although I find those arguments in themselves reasonably convincing, it does not change the fact that this phonemization of the *ḥāṭēfs* was quite marginal, and that the overwhelming number of *ḥāṭēfs* was entirely predictable from the surrounding phonological environment. N.b. that Khan himself mentions ("Syllable Structure," 667) that the marking of *ḥāṭēf paθaḥ* under consonants other than the guttural ones "is not consistent and is written more frequently in some manuscripts than others" (with reference to Israel Yeivin, *Introduction to the Tiberian Masorah*, Masoretic Studies [Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1980])—and later, on p. 673, that syllables with non-guttural-conditioned *ḥāṭēfs* are of "the non-canonical weight of a single mora" and thus "highly marked," which indicates their unusualness. All in all, while I agree that much of the Tiberian pointing system does indicate the underlying phonemic system, it cannot be presupposed that it does so *exclusively*. As mentioned in the main text, the continuous operation of post-vocalic fricativization as an automatic surface-filter creates many pointing differences that must be regarded as entirely allophonic, for example. Also, as concerns the question of the allophonically conditioned pronunciation of /r/ (present in transcriptions and mediaeval descriptions but not indicated in the Tiberian pointing

beghadhkefath spirantization rule was synchronically operative as a phonological surface filter (as opposed to a grammatical rule) within the Tiberian morphophonological system, one would have expected the Masoretes to "correct" the letters back into the corresponding stop version, since no audible vowel directly preceded them—which would have meant them having to have applied the above-mentioned etymological or morphophonemic analysis to refrain from doing so.[6] This is hardly a parsimonious scenario.

Rather, the facts suggest the probability of the Masoretes actually having subjectively "heard" something that they regarded as a vowel before the fricativized consonant.[7] This vowel-like element, I suggest, was

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itself), it must be remembered that pronunciation among Masoretes may have varied (as I argue below in the main text), which means that the surface realization of /r/ need not necessarily have been identical among *all* proponents of the Tiberian reading tradition (which makes the distinction somewhat less probative). Also, the Khan-Suchard argument for at least some *ḥāṭēfs* being phonemically underlying (due to their effect on the pronunciation of adjacent /r/ in Tiberian Hebrew), whereas many need not have been (being conditioned by gutturals), could actually be used as an argument for Masoretic pointing both having features representing underlying phonology and ones related only to surface realization.

[6] Interestingly, according to Alan S. Prince, *The Phonology and Morphology of Tiberian Hebrew* (PhD diss., Massachussetts Instititute of Technology, 1975), 81, there is data suggesting that there were "some die-hard surfacists among the earlier medieval grammarians" who insisted on actually pronouncing *šĕwā' medium* as a vocal *šĕwā'* simply to make the rules add up, so to speak (when the next letter was fricativized). If this is correct, it underscores that the fricativization rule was regarded as being quite "alive" in the language (and not just an earlier process), and that the apparent lack of match-up was seen as a problem. This, in a way, would be a type of reverse of the idea of "correcting" the fricatives back into stops (theoretically discussed earlier in the present article), and would show that such inclinations could exist. The fact that the Masoretes did *not* do this (nor follow the "die-hard surfacists") is, I argue, highly relevant.

[7] The early suggestion along similar (but still significantly different) lines, that the Masoretes heard some sort of "half-reduced *šĕwā'*," has rightly been abandoned in modern scholarship—see the above reference to Sievers, *Metrische Studien*, which did in fact polemicize against this possible (though highly unlikely) position. One could perhaps say that the position I argue here gets close to it, but I would like to underscore that my point here is an underlying syllabic consonant, not some sort of "half-pronounced" *šĕwā'*, so to speak. See also the previous footnote.

the simplest one possible: a syllabic version of the consonant itself. The various ways of writing this pseudo-vowel (*ḥīreq* before, *paθaḥ* before) should then only be regarded as allophonic surface realizations or even as graphic conventions, possibly influenced by etymological associations (such as in the example *malχê*, "kings of," for which there is an entire battalion of forms with actual *paθaḥ* that could act as analogical templates—*malkî*, etc.). Note also that the choice of *a*- or *i*-vowels in the root syllable in such cases seems partly motivated by purely phonetic concerns (a second root consonant being *l* or *r* favoring *a*, for example, as guttural letters), a fact established by Yuditsky.[8]

This may perhaps seem like an outlandish suggestion at first, but an illustrative typological parallel to this analysis can be found in Sanskrit and Avestan, both of which possess a syllabic version of *r* or a historical descendant thereof. In Sanskrit spelling, there is a special sign for this phoneme, transcribed *ṛ*, but in Avestan, it has developed into what is graphically rendered as *ərə*, which shows that typological similarity to the Hebrew situation quite clearly. Also, one should note that many reading traditions of Sanskrit tend actually to pronounce *ṛ* as [ri].[9] This is a perfect parallel to the situation that I want so suggest for Tiberian Hebrew: the underlying phonemic reality of the language was still a syllabic *r*, notwithstanding its synchronic realization as *ərə* or [ri].

In fact, the tension created between what the Masoretes appear to have "heard" (as in "wanted to transcribe") and what the morphophonological system demanded indicates a very sophisticated problem sphere as regards how we as scholars are to regard their activity. The

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[8] Alexey (Eliyahu) Yuditsky, "'Al 'ĕkhôt tĕnû'â biltî mûṭ'emet šel-lĕyad *r* wĕ-'îṣûrîm 'ăḥērîm" (Modern Hebrew; "On the Quality of Unstressed Vowels in the Vicinity of *r* and Other Consonants"), *Leshonenu* 73 (2010), 55–68 (57–59; cf. also the table on pp. 64–65). I also refer to the convenient overview and development of the idea in Suchard, *Development of the Biblical Hebrew Vowels*, 197–199. Note that Suchard explicitly invokes paradigmatic leveling as an argument in cases that do not fit with Yuditsky's suggested rules, much as I do in the main text above.

[9] Or, in some pronunciation traditions, [ru] or even [ro].

Tiberian reading tradition not being directly attested in any living tradition of Biblical Hebrew, we have to put ourselves, as it were, *in loco masoretarum* when analyzing their transcription principles and the relationship between the (synagogally prescribed?) pronunciation that they wanted to convey and preserve and the phonological rules that they wanted to see or impose on the material. Another type of evidence is supplied by contemporary transcriptional material, studied in the work and scholarly tradition of Geoffrey Khan.

Note again the usage of *ḥāṭēfs* instead of "normal" vocalized *šĕwā'*s under guttural letters as a sign of the tension between the two abovementioned ideals: simply using a normal *šĕwā'* would often have violated the acoustic properties of what the Masoretes actually heard, whereas using a simple, full vowel would have broken the morphophonological rules that the Tiberians were apparently aware of.[10] Thus, *ḥāṭēfs* provided an ideal middle ground between mophophonological prescriptivism and phonetic transcription; my argument for syllabic consonants entails something similar: the Masoretes transcribed what they "heard," but the underlying phonological reality in that case was something different (we will return in greater detail to what "heard" may actually have entailed in this case). Also, one should remember that the assumed consensus culture of "the Masoretes" (as a unified collective) should not be postulated as an *a priori* axiom: there certainly is large degree of analytical uniformity present in the work of the Tiberians, but one need not necessarily assume that all the people engaged in the establishment of the vocalized, Tiberian text must have agreed on each and every point, which allows for some possibility in variation. The positions on which they agreed may in some cases have represented compromises between rivalling views and analyses.[11]

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[10] A similar analysis is found in Bauer and Leander, *Historische Grammatik*, 111 (§7*l'*).

[11] I would like here to refer to the view of Blau, *Phonology and Morphology*, 117–118, who argues that the use of *šĕwā'* in Tiberian Hebrew is a sign that the language

Of course, it could be objected that, on a phonological level, what is going on is rather a matter of *two* surface filters being active and not one: first the fricativization of stops and subsequently the vowel deletion rule that hides the historic reason for that fricativization and "cheshirizes"[12] it (so that the order of the rules represents not only a historical sequence but a layered system of synchronic rules).[13] This, by itself, is quite a possible scenario, but the problem with that analysis is that Masoretic Hebrew was not a natural, spoken language but one "generated" through the complex interplay of handed-down reading tradition and the grammatical/phonological sensibilities of the Masoretes themselves (who, of course, where not native speakers of Hebrew), superimposing their somewhat idealized system on the consonantal text that they had received. The way in which the fricitivization/spirantization rule operates seems to constitute a totally automatic surface filter, applied at the "end stage" of phonological generation—as shown, for example, by the fact that it normally operates across word boundaries when a preceding word ends in a vowel—which makes it less likely that the historical

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encoded by the Tiberian Masoretes is in a stage of transition and does not represent a single, unified vocalic system. However, I do not necessarily agree with his use (pp. 79–80) of this idea of "transitionality" as an argument for *beghadhkefath* spirantization being allophonic word-initially (due to the sandhi-like surface filter of a previous vowel) but semi-phonemic in medial and final position (due to seeming exceptions such as *šĕwā' medium*). Each such situation has to be examined on its own in relation to the surface filter rule (see later in this article).

[12] "Cheshirization" is a somewhat jocular term for the phenomenon of phonological changes that are conditioned by certain contexts, after which these contexts have subsequently disappeared, leaving only the conditioned result behind as evidence of having existed – the inspiration being, of course, the Cheshire Cat of *Alice in Wonderland* fame (the cat that disappears, leaving only its smile behind, prompting Alice to think: "I've often seen a cat without a grin ... but a grin without a cat! It's the most curious thing I ever saw in my life!"). The term was coined by James Matisoff, "Areal and Universal Dimensions of Grammatization in Lahu," in *Approaches to Grammaticalization*, ed. E.C. Traugott and B. Heine (Amsterdam/Philadelphia PA: Benjamins, 1991), 383–453 (443).

[13] I would like to thank Nicholas Zair for neatly formulating this objection.

vowel reduction giving rise to *šĕwā' medium* was operating as an equally synchronic surface process (and one following *after* the fricativization, at that). The fricativization applies across the board, so to speak, in a way that the vocalic reduction can hardly be said to do.[14] For some other possible evidence for the "internalization" of the relation between fricativizing and preceding audible vowels, see also footnote 6, above.

In this context, note specifically that the fricativization also affects old loanwords, such as the Persian *paθ-bay* in Dan 1:5 ("food, morsel, provisions," from Old Persian *patibaga*); there is one single case in which a loanword (also a Persian one) demonstrably kept a unique—and non-fricativized—*beghadhkefath* letter all the way down into the Tiberian manuscripts, viz. the *p* in *'appaðnô* ("his palace/hall," Dan 11:45, from Old Persian *apadāna*, notably not with a geminate *p*), which according both to mediaeval texts and the much earlier reports of Jerome was pronounced in an uncharacteristic way: as an unaspirated, emphatic *p*, a phoneme occurring only here in the entirety of the Hebrew Bible. This would therefore probably be a tradition going back all the way to the Persian source word, preserving its unaspirated *p*.[15] The

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[14] Note the differing analysis found in Geoffrey Khan, "How was the *Dageš* in Biblical Hebrew בְּתִּים Pronounced and Why is it There?," *JSS* 63 (2018): 323–351 (328), where it is argued that cases of spirantization after *šĕwā' medium* indicate that the vowel loss postdates the working of the spirantization process in these words (which was also the position apparently taken by Gesenius, Kautzsch, and Cowley—see above, footnote 2). As argued in the main text, I believe that the persistent effect of spirantization across word-boundaries militates against such an approach—at least against one that views the spirantization as a one-time event, so to speak, that necessarily stopped operating after the vowel loss. See also footnote 6, above. Khan does, however, also adduce forms like 2nd fem sing *lāqaḥat*, which I do believe is relevant in the present context, but in a rather different way (see below, under the heading *Fewer Unnecessary Phonemes?*).

[15] On this, see Geoffrey Khan, *A Short Introduction to the Tiberian Masoretic Bible and its Reading Tradition*, Gorgias Handbooks (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2013), 55. Indeed, Khan uses this word and its ancient pedigree as a sign of the conservatism and stability of the Tiberian reading tradition itself. For the original Persian form of the word, cf. *HALOT*, s.v. **'appeðen*).

existence of such a conservative feature in a loan-word means that such a phenomenon could have "preserved" other loan-words from fricativization if that process were just something of the past and not a living, final step in phonetic generation, yet *paθ-baγ* shows us that this normally did not happen. If a word was felt as being "alien," it could demonstrably have had its stop pronunciation preserved by the introduction of an atypical phoneme, but in most cases, the loanwords were totally assimilated to the Tiberian sound system and thus underwent fricativization where appropriate. This, though partly an *argumentum e silentio*, also suggests that the fricativization was an automatic, surface rule, exceptions from which were highly strange and noteworthy to the Tiberians themselves.

Thus, one would have expected the Masoretes to "correct" a fricative following a *šĕwā' medium* back into the corresponding stop, which they obviously did not do—unless they somehow experienced that there was some sort of underlying vocalic syllabic structure (which is what I am suggesting here that they did).[16]

In actual surface phonetic realization, it is of course harder to think that stops were in some cases realized as true syllabics—they may, in fact, even have involved a phonetic [i]. But this is a question of *phonetic realization*, not of the underlying phonological system, which is easier explained by regarding the consonant itself as being syllabic and thus inducing fricativization of a following *beghadhkefath* letter. The Masoretes were working with phonology, to be sure, but in their *niqqûḏ*, they were closer to phonetics than phonology in this case (we will soon be returning to the question of the exact "levels" involved).[17]

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[16] But see the next section for the strange behavior of construct infinitives in this context and the "flames" word also discussed later in this article.

[17] Interestingly, the idea that Hebrew may at some point have had syllabic consonants in its prehistory is also mentioned (very obliquely) in A. Murtonen, *Hebrew in its West Semitic Setting: A Comparative Study of Non-Masoretic Hebrew Dialects and Traditions*, part 2–3 (Leiden/New York, NY: Brill), 174. There, however, the argument concerns far earlier periods than the Masoretic stage discussed here.

One may note with some interest that a suggestion of a syllabic version of at least resonant consonants was made already in the grammar of Bauer and Leander (1922), referring, however, not to the Tiberian Masoretic tradition but to the one represented by the *Babylonian* Masoretes. The grammar mentions cases in which two consonants would have been followed by a *šĕwā'* but where a an actual vowel was written between them instead (the paradigmatic example being *Yirimyāhū* for Tiberian *Yirmĕyāhû*), and adds: "Da von den beiden zusammenstossenden Konsonanten der zweite gewöhnlich *r*, *l* oder *m* ist, so hat man sich wohl ein sonantisches *r̥*, *l̥* oder *m̥*, als Zwischenstufe zu denken."[18] This analysis is quite similar to the one proposed here, with the differences that (a) the present proposal involves the Tiberian tradition and not only the Babylonian one and (b) it widens the idea beyond resonants, at least as far as the underlying level of syllabification is concerned (see further below, in the sections on the "Skin'em Levi" consonants and on autosegmental phonology for further discussions of the surface phonetic realizations of resonant and non-resonant syllabic consonants).

Morphophonological Conundra

One could object that the above model involving syllabic consonants is too complex an explanation of the phenomenon here under scrutiny. In cases like *biqβūrāθô* ("in his grave"), one could easily imagine a conscious etymologization on the part of the Masoretes having played a role, keeping the *bēθ* fricative due to its being so in the form without the prefixed preposition (*qĕβūrāθô*). In cases like the above-mentioned imperative *qirβû*, however, such an explanation is much harder to maintain. There, the (synchronically, at least) underlying spirantizing form of the word corresponds mechanically to another inflectional paradigm altogether, the imperfect *tiqrĕβû*—due to the general synchronic principle

[18] Bauer and Leander, *Historische Grammatik*, 211 (§20*h-j*).

in Biblical Hebrew that most imperatives look like the imperfect with its prefix taken away—a form which would have had to have been artificially constructed for every relevant verb and the phonotactics of which would have had to have to been reprojected onto the imperative by the Masoretes to "keep" the *β* fricative in spite of the general rules. This is hardly a credible analysis of what is going on.

An especially intriguing problem connected with this whole issue is the fact that infinitives construct with a prefixed preposition behave strangely in relation to *šĕwā' medium*. When the prefixed preposition is the most common one, *l-*, the resulting form (e.g. *liχtoβ*, "[in order] to write") is treated as though the *šĕwā'* were really quiescent (with no fricativization of the second radical, *t* in this case), but when the other two one-letter prepositions a (*b-* and *k-*) are involved, the resulting forms *do* show fricativization (and thus, in the classical analysis, *šĕwā' medium* must be in evidence): *biχθoβ* ("in writing") and *kiχθoβ* ("like writing/when writing").[19] This strange and asymmetric state of affairs probably has to be explained as a case of analogy: given that the infinitive construct with *l-* is so very common as almost to become a verbal form in and of itself (which, indeed, it practically does in later stages of Hebrew), it is easy to imagine a scenario in which the analogical pressure for this phonetic realization came not from the historically parallel ones with *b-* and *k-* but rather from the imperfect of the *o*-stem verbs (*yiχtoβ* etc., from historical **yaktubu*).[20] The non-fricativization of

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[19] Bruce K. Waltke and M. O'Connor, *An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 599 (§36.1.1d). The specific example forms for "in writing" and "like writing" are unattested in the Bible, but quite certain due to the general patterning with other verbs. The same examples are used in Gesenius, Kautzsch, and Cowley, *Hebrew Grammar*, 348 (§114*f*), n. 8, which also suggests a real verb form coming into effect in the case of *l-* and seeing the different treatment of *beghadhkefath* as a sign of this.

[20] One may also note that the difference in treatment of the infinitive construct depending on the choice of preposition is correlated with whether or not that preposition does itself involve a *beghadhkefath* letter: *kĕ-* and *bĕ-* do—and those two do cause spirantization of the initial letter of the infinitive—whereas *lĕ-* does not—and

the middle radical in this form is thus no obstacle to the phonological analysis offered here: it is the result of an analogical restructuring, which in itself says something about how the Masoretic phonological tradition viewed the forms in question (i.e. as being closer to the actual finite inflectional system than to the "gerund-like" constructions of the other two prepositions). However, one could argue that it is *here*, not in cases like *qirβû* etc., that we find steps towards a phonemization of the fricative allophones: after the analogy had done its work, separating *biχθoβ* from *liχtoβ*, one almost ends up with a minimal pair. Yet, the process leading to this is still analogical at the level of Tiberian pointing. And, again, it bears pointing out that this difference in form could not have arisen due to "dual surface filters" but needs a morphophonological process to produce the data at hand (as two patterns that were structurally identical from a historical point of view turn out in different ways,[21] apparently due to the morphological connection made synchronically by the Masoretes—or, theoretically, some predecessor of theirs).

Allophonic Analogy (?)

The idea of an allophonic difference in pronunciation spreading by analogy may seem strange at first sight; analogies normally affect

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causes no spirantization. Whether this is really a relevant correlation is much less certain, however, as the letters making up the prepositions need not be spirantized themselves, which means that some sort of sandhi-like spread of the feature [SPIRANTIZED] seems less likely here than the morphophonological conditioning mentioned in the main text.

[21] One could, of course, argue that the three prepositions originally possessed some difference in vocalization at the proto-level, that could possibly influence their treatment here. However, as pointed out in Leonid Kogan, *Genealogical Classification of Semitic: The Lexical Isoglosses* (Boston, MA/Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015), 119, n. 341, the original vocalization of **b*- and **l*- is highly uncertain and seems to have varied among languages in unpredictable ways (some showing original **i*-vowels and some showing **e*, with syllabic transcriptions of Ugaritic even giving the strange pairing of *bī*- versus *lē*- [n.b. the long *ē*!]). Different forms of analogical replacement must have taken place in various places, and thus, no firm argument should be based on these discrepancies.

morphemes, not allophones.[22] But again, there are typological (extra-Semitic) parallels to such a development. One can be found in the complex sandhi rules of classical Sanskrit, which include the (on the surface) quite strange rule that word-final *-ān* is transformed into *-āṃs* before an unvoiced dental stop. The rest of the sandhi system tends to be quite logical from a phonetic point of view, but this case is baffling. The reason for the strange sandhi development is, however, etymological: one of the most common sources of word-final *-ān* in Sanskrit is the Proto-Indo-European thematic accusative plural masculine ending **-ōns*. It is the final sibilant of this ending that is preserved before dental stops, such as in the sentence *tāṃs titikṣasva*, *bhārata* ("Endure them, son of Bharata!"), appearing in the second chapter of the Bhagavad-Gītā. However, this sandhi-ized structure spread throughout the Sanskrit phonological system, so that words ending in *-āṃs* appeared where it was never etymologically motivated, the rule even extending to all cases of final *-n* before unvoiced dental stop (and, with a slight variation, palatal or retroflex stop).[23] As sandhi is basically a purely allophonic process (at least at first), this process provides a nice parallel to the *beghadhkefath* case, showing that allophones can be analogically induced and spread based on etymological considerations. A similar "analogical allophone" is in evidence in the possessive suffixes *–χā/–χem/-χen*, which appear with a fricative *χ* even if the word stem ends in a consonant (as in the object marker with 2pl suffix: *'eθχem*, *'eθχen*). In that case, however, one could well speak of the entire morpheme being in involved in the ana-

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[22] One may, however, note with some interest that E. A. Speiser argued already in the 1920's that basically *all* cases of *šĕwā' medium* were due to analogy! By reason of this, he was one of those calling for a dismantling of the category. See Ephraim Avigdor Speiser, "The Pronunciation of Hebrew According to the Transliterations in the Hexapla," *JQR* 4 (1926), 343–382 (373–378).

[23] For the Sanskrit rule and its background, see, e.g., Arthur A. Macdonnel, *A Sanskrit Grammar for Students* (New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1991 [1927]), 18, n. 1. Macdonnel also mentions the old nominative singular **-ns* of *n*-stems as part of the background, but the argument works in that case, too.

logy.[24] To be sure, that case and the Sanskrit one are not exactly parallel (being actually somewhat opposite in their development), as the Sanskrit case involves a conditioning environment, but the point is that the example illustrates that a normally allophonic process can be influenced by etymological "background noise." The existence of such cases do not necessarily constitute a defeater for the fact that most cases of the interchange between fricative and stop actually are allophonic.

One argument that might make this sort of process more likely is the fact that the process of *beghadhkefath* spirantization was probably in origin a phenomenon appearing due to adstrate influence from Aramaic.[25] That is: its beginnings are not entirely "at home" in Hebrew itself, which could increase the probability of allophones behaving in a way not entirely concordant with their normal conditioning factors.

The parallel from Sanskrit "allophonic analogy" and the sandhi system is illustrative from a wider perspective: it highlights how a spelling system which is to a large extent phonemic in its construction can still include features that do not express the underlying phonology in a clear-cut way (but rather surface phonetic phenomena), and how sometimes, phonetic processes can get retrojected onto and influence the underlying phonological structure in a kind of dialectic process—a process especially likely in the case of canonized, reading-tradition based languages in which the ancient phonological system(s) of the various periods behind the text meet the synchronic pronunciation of the codifiers. This, I suggest, is a quite relevant principle and possibility in the case of Tiberian Hebrew spelling, as well.

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[24] Joüon and Muraoka (*Grammar of Biblical Hebrew*, 77 [§19*f*]) talk of the realization of the *beghadhkefath* letters sometimes being "built into a morphological and lexical pattern," which is similar to what I am referring to here.

[25] See, for example, Paul Kahle, *The Cairo Geniza*, The Schweich Lectures, 1941 (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), 102–108.

The Evidence of *Qiṭṭālôn* Nouns and *Dāgēš Forte Dirimens*

One type of noun that may initially be seen as a stumbling block to the analysis offered here—but may actually rather provide direct support for it—is those belonging to the *qiṭṭālôn* pattern. Such nouns have a geminated second radical in the singular absolute state, whereas the gemination is mostly lost in all other forms (the standard example is *zikkārôn*, "remembrance," and its construct, *ziχrôn*). If a *beghadhkefath* letter is found in radical slot number three, one would imagine—based on the behavior of other nouns in the construct state or other forms with a rightward shift in accentuation—that this letter would still be fricativized even though the gemination is gone and the reduced vowel after it (normally a *šĕwā'*) would become quiescent (thus a classic case of *šĕwā' medium*).

However, this is not what happens. In the forms actually attested of *qiṭṭālôn* nouns with a *beghadhkefath* letter as the third radical, something entirely different tends to occur: the *dāγēš* is still there, even though it "should not":[26] see examples such as *'iṣṣĕβônēχ* ("your hardship," Gen 3:16, from *'iṣṣāβôn*), the construct singular *'iṣṣĕβôn* of the same word (in Gen 5:29) and the plural *ḥiššĕβōnôθ* ("strategems, plans, inventions") in Qoh 7:29 and 2 Chr 26:15. In these words, the root-final *beghadhkefath* letter is indeed fricativized, but the *dāγēš* in the preceding consonant is still there (even though it ought not to, due to the normal patterning in *qiṭṭālôn* nouns), and thus the *šĕwā'* is audible and technically not a *šĕwā' medium* at all (which, again, would have been expected in *qiṭṭālôn* nouns).

The unexpected *dāγēš* in these forms is usually explained (or rather just referred to) as a "*dāγēš forte dirimens*," meant to remind the reader

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[26] The reasons for this discrepancy have not always been sufficiently appreciated. For example, Joüon and Muraoka (*Grammar of Biblical Hebrew*, 240 [§88*b*]) simply state that the construct or suffixed forms of *qiṭṭālôn* nouns are "usually without doubling," without further comment.

that the following *šĕwā'* is indeed audible.[27] However, I would like to propose a different analysis: maybe it is actually there to show that the consonant is syllabic? This type of spelling may well represent an actual attempt by the Masoretes to encode this strange syllabic structure in writing.[28] Thus, far from providing evidence against the present suggestion, these words may in fact represent evidence *for* it.

Speaking of "*dāγēš forte dirimens*," it is interesting to note that this rather "weird" phenomenon occurs especially often in the letters *lāmeð*, *mēm*, *nûn*, *qôf* and the various sibilant letters, and that it appears in construct forms such as *'innĕβê* ("grapes of," Lev 25:5, Deut 32:32) and *'iqqĕβê* ("heels of," Gen 49:17), which "ought" to have been ***'inβê* and ***'iqβê*, no *dāγēš* but fricativized third radical—and thus, by implication, *šĕwā' medium*.[29] Using this device in sonorant letters such as these (as well as the highly marked uvular [ʔ] emphatic *qôf* and the sibilants,

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[27] See, e.g., Viktor Golinets, "*Dageš*," *Encyclopedia of Hebrew Language and Linguistics*, vol. 1, ed. G. Khan, Sh. Bolozky et al. [Leiden: Brill, 2013], 649–654 [652]). I here render the *dirimens* as gemination in the transliteration, even though that is probably not really "what it means": this is just a matter of convenience.

[28] Compare, in a type of roundabout way, with the "orthoepic" strategies that Geoffrey Khan has suggested as the reason for historically unmotivated geminate readings in the Tiberian tradition in cases where a syllable-initial consonant has *dāγēš lene*, in order to maximize the difference between spirantized and non-spirantized forms—Khan refers to this phenomenon as "extended *dagesh* forte" (see Geoffrey Khan, "Orthoepy in the Tiberian Reading Tradition of the Hebrew Bible and Its Historical Roots in the Second Temple Period," *VT* 68 [2018], 378–401 [380–383] and the longer exposition in Geoffrey Khan, "Remarks on the Pronunciation of Dageš in the Tiberian Reading Tradition of Biblical Hebrew," in *Semitic, Biblical, and Jewish Studies: Festschrift for Richard C. Steiner*, ed. Mordechai Z. Cohen, A. Koller, and Adina Moshavi [Jerusalem/New York, NY: Bialik and Yeshiva University Press, 2018], 433–441 [*non vidi*]). The analogy is only an imperfect one, it must be granted, as the *dāγēš forte dirimens* was not, it must be presupposed, actually *pronounced* as a gemination (which Khan's Karaite transcriptions into Arabic suggest that the "orthoepic" and "extended" *dāγēš forte* was), but it would still be a case of *dāγēš* being used to underscore certain other linguistic phenomena (in this case, I argue, consonantal syllabicity, which does, after all, possess a kind of associative similarity with gemination).

[29] See Joüon and Muraoka, *Grammar of Biblical Hebrew*, 74 (§18*k*) for the common letters with *dāγēš forte dirimens* and the two construct plural examples.

which are obviously continuants) may represent another case of the Masoretes trying as best they could to encode a syllabic consonant.[30]

More Difficult Cases—And More on the "Skin'em Levi" Consonants

There is another type of *šĕwā' medium* structure that needs to be explained in a way similar to this if the present analysis is to be adopted. This consists in words in which grammatically predicted preforms have a geminate letter (normally a non-*beghadhkefath* one, and not seldom a resonant) with a vocal *šĕwā'*, but in which the letter itself subsequently becoming degeminated, which leads to the *šĕwā'* quiescing even though a subsequent *beghadhkefath* letter retains is fricative pronunciation. This occurs quite regularly in the *wayyiqṭol* forms of verbs in the *pi'el*: as an example, we can take the word *wayyallaḥ* ("and he shaved himself") from Gen 41:14. Under the standard theory, this word simply represents degemination and *šĕwā'*-silencing based on the preform **wayyĕyallaḥ* with the fricativized *gīmel* (that is, *ɣ*) kept the way it was. In this case too, it could be possible to argue that analogical processes are at work: the analogical pressure from the *wa*-less form *yĕɣallaḥ* would certainly be great indeed. This solution may seem *ad hoc*, but note that a process such as this *must* be posited to explain such cases as the *liχtoβ*/*biχθoβ* distinction delineated above. Note that forms like *'ălammĕðâ* (cohortative 1 sing., "let me teach"), *yĕlammĕðûn* (imperfect 3 plur. masc., "they will teach"), etc., do not show degemination of the middle

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[30] Bauer and Leander (*Historische Grammatik*, 211–212 [§20*j*–*k*]) discuss the intrusive reduced vowels after sibilants, resonants and *q* (on which see also further below) and their often being marked by *dāɣēš forte dirimens* when the ordinary *šĕwā'* sign was used; they argue that the use of the *dāɣēš* is due to the fact that the *šĕwā'* sign "in der tib. Schrift zweideutig geworden war." They also point out that this behavior appears after word-internal closed syllables that do not carry the stress ("am Ende druckloser Silben in Wortinnern").

radical before the fricativized *beghdhkefath* letter (and thus no *šĕwā' medium*) even though they theoretically could—fitting, as no such analogical pressure would have been present in those cases.

In discussing these cases, it may be fruitful to think of which letters undergo this degemination process—or, rather, possess the possibility of doing so (as it does not happen in every case). This group of letters is sometimes grouped together using the mnemotechnic phrase *Skin'em Levi*—which again refers to the unvoiced sibilants (*s*, *š*, *ś* and *ṣ*),[31] *q*, *n*, *m*, *l*, *w* and *y* (the same letters appearing with *dāγēš forte dirimens*, which is certainly not a coincidence). It is highly interesting to note that these letters are all—with the exception of *q*—either sibilants or resonants, in a word: continuants. Almost all of them are, therefore, excellent candidates for syllabicity.[32] Thus, one could well believe that a word such as *mil'û* (for perfect *pi'el* 3pl *millĕ'û*, "they filled") represents underlying /mL'û/.[33] The *i*-vowel here is, after all, the same filler-vowel used in the earlier cases we have looked at, and need not necessarily represent the etymological vowel of the *pi'el* form. A word of this type with a *šĕwā' medium* structure like *hamðabbĕrîm* (for **hammĕðabbĕrîm*, "the speak-

[31] And in rare cases *z*, as in 2 Sam 22:40, which has *wattazrēnî* for **wattazzĕrênî*. The following resonant could well be part of the reason here. A practical presentation of the *Skin'em Levi* rules, with textual examples and references to relevant literature, can be found online in J. Beckman "SQin eM, LeVY" (2011), https://www.hebrewsyntax.org/hebrew_resources/sqin_em_levy.pdf. The mnemonic is also used, e.g., in Jo Ann Hackett, *A Basic Introduction to Biblical Hebrew* (Peabody, MS: Hendrickson, 2010), 89, n. 2 (not mentioning all sibilants, though). For presentations of the phenomenon in the standard grammars, see, e.g., Joüon and Muraoka, *Grammar of Biblical Hebrew*, 75 (§18*m*) and Gesenius, Kautzsch, and Cowley, *Hebrew Grammar*, 74 (§20*m*).

[32] The same would, of course, also apply to *r*, but that letter can obviously not appear in this list, as it may normally never have a *dāγēš* at all in Tiberian Hebrew. The same goes for the guttural fricatives.

[33] Note that this form shows that the phenomenon is more widespread than mentioned, e.g., by Golinets, who says that the degemination happens only in the *wayyiqṭol* forms and participles of the *pi'el* and *pu'al* stems (as well as after the definite article, and some other cases in the Codex Leningradensis)—see Golinets, "*Dageš*," 650–651.

ers"), which occurs in Exod 6:27 and 2 Chr 33:18, would then represent /hMðabbĕrîm/, with the *M* forming a syllabic nucleus. Joüon and Muraoka simply refer to this phenomenon as "semi-gemination" or "weak gemination,"[34] which is a mere *obscurum per obscurius* and hardly an explanation at all. Interestingly, Joshua Blau in a way almost hints at the analysis offered here when he discusses degemination: he argues that the reason for the degemination is "the difficulty of pronouncing a double consonant with the help of only an ultra-short vowel," but then adding that the *beghadhkefath* letters, being stops and therefore having less phonetic duration than continuants, would be even more difficult to pronounce geminated without a full vowel, which (to Blau) makes their non-degemination surprising.[35] Given what I have argued here, the question is rather one of the phonetic duration of continuants making them excellent candidates for syllabicity (which would be rather more difficult for stop versions of the non-emphatic occlusives—remember again that the cases in which *beghadhkefath* letters show *šĕwā' medium*/are syllabic, they perforce always appear in their fricative/continuant forms).

This means that—again—what may have seemed like a possible objection against the "syllabic consonant" interpretation actually turns out to provide support for it. The *q* is, it must be admitted, somewhat strange in this context, but I would suggest that a backed/uvular pronunciation of this consonant helped attract *šĕwā'*-like vocalic elements due to its markedness (something that I have already argued in an earlier article on the pronunciation and history of the Hebrew emphatics).[36]

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[34] Joüon and Muraoka, *Grammar of Biblical Hebrew*, 75 (§18*m*), with reference to the longer exposition on p. 70 (§18*b*), which still only talks (in uncharacteristically vague terms) about "some kind of lengthening of the consonant," while not being true gemination. This "some kind of lengthening" is, I propose, exactly the syllabicity that I am arguing for in this article.

[35] Blau, *Phonology and Morphology*, 80.

[36] See Ola Wikander, "Emphatics, Sibilants and Interdentals in Hebrew and Ugaritic: An Interlocking Model," *UF* 46 (2015), 373–397 (379–380) (discussing

Note specifically words such as *ʾălaqŏṭâ-nnāʾ* ("let me glean," Ruth 2:7), which shows degemination of the *q* in combination with a *ḥāṭēf*, which could suggest an underlying /ʾălQṭâ/. If this is the case, the present problem would also provide indirect support for the idea that *q* was a uvular stop in Tiberian Hebrew as opposed to an ejective velar (ejectivity being the older pronunciation of emphatic letters in Semitic and sometimes suggested as the realization in Classical Hebrew as well). It is quite difficult to imagine a velar ejective stop [kʾ] being used as a syllabic nucleus by virtue of attracting (or rather generating) epenthetic vowels, whereas such a possibility fits rather well with a marked back obstruent [q].[37]

Another type of verbal pattern that is interesting from the present perspective is I-guttural imperfects of the type exemplified by *yaʿamðû* ("they [will] stand") or (with two *beghadhkefath* letters) *yaʿaβðû* ("they [will] serve"). This type of verb would, if it had strictly followed the paradigm of the strong verb, have produced a form ***yaʿmĕðû* (cf. the similarly formed *nifʿal* perfect type *neʿezβâ*, "she was forsaken," also with *šĕwāʾ medium*). As pointed out by Gesenius, there are cases where this substitution of the vowel pattern does not occur, such as in *yaḥbĕlû* ("they [will] take as a pledge").[38]

What are we to think of these patterns? Based on the arguments put forward earlier, an easy possibility presents itself, viz. to view the "revowelled" cases as instances of consonantal syllabic nuclei as well. *Yaʿaβðû* would then, at a phonological level, represent /yaʿBdû/, with the /b/ being pronounced as its fricative allophone *β*, which would make the consonantal pronunciation easier, and then itself fricativizing /d/ into *ð*

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words such as *qoṭoβχā* ["your destruction"/"your sting," Hos 13:14] and *qoroβχem* ["your drawing close," Deut 20:2]).

[37] A uvular (or post-velar) pronunciation is also supported for Tiberian Hebrew in Khan, *A Short Introduction to the Tiberian Masoretic Bible*, 91–92, based on a mediaeval description.

[38] Gesenius, Kautzsch, and Cowley, *Hebrew Grammar*, 166 (§63*g*).

(like in words such as *liðβar*, "to the word of," which would represent *lDbar* with the /d/ realized as syllabic *ð*).

Interestingly, Alvestad and Edzard note that roots beginning with *ḥ* normally do not show the apparent anaptyctic vowel (as we saw in the case of *yaḥbĕlû*), though there are exceptions (they mention, among others, *wayyaḥalmû*, "and they dreamt," from Gen 40:5).[39] After a survey of the evidence, they conclude that these exceptions, where the anaptyctic vowel is written in I-*ḥ* roots as well, tend to appear in cases where the following second radical is high in the sonority hierarchy (almost all cases concern resonants—the only other examples being from the root *ḥṭ'*, "to sin").[40] This would fit extremely well with the analysis that we are really dealing with a consonantal syllabic nucleus, i.e. /wayyaḥLmû/ etc.

Fewer Unnecessary Phonemes?

An added benefit of the analysis offered here is the removal or at least lessening of the need to view the fricativized variants of the *beghadhkefath* letters as eventually being marginally phonemicized due to deletion of conditioning vowels in Tiberian Hebrew.[41] If most cases of *šĕwā' medium* really represent something else (syllabification/vocalization of consonants), this typological anomaly disappears. To be sure, there are cases of "phonemic" fricativized letters in a very few other types of cases as well, such as in the distinction between *lāqaḥat* ("you took," perfect *qal* 2fs) and *lāqaḥaθ* (*l* + infinitive construct *qal*), but it would be rather easy to explain the anomalous form *lāqaḥat* not as a case of phonolo-

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[39] Silje Alvestad and Lutz Edzard, *la-ḥšōḇ, but la-ḥăzōr? Sonority, Optimality, and the Hebrew* פ״ח *Forms*, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 66 (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 2009), 92–93.

[40] Alvestad and Edzard, *la-ḥšōḇ, but la-ḥăzōr*, 94–95.

[41] Thus, e.g., Richard C. Steiner, "Ancient Hebrew," in *The Semitic Languages*, ed. R. Hetzron, Routledge Language Descriptions (London/New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), 145–173 (147).

gization of the *t-θ* distinction but rather as a reflection of the simple fact that the underlying phonological form was actually *lāqaḥt* all along. I would suggest that the intrusive (and non-fricativizing) *paθaḥ* here is to be viewed as an analogue of *paθaḥ furtivum*, and not as a "real" vowel (note that both are used to break up hard-to-pronounce final phonological structure that are generally not allowed in Tiberian syllabification), which may well have appeared as an even "later" realization filter than the fricativization.[42] Thus, it appears that, in these cases, the distinction between plosive and fricativized pronunciation of the *beghadhkefath* letters basically *is* allophonic in Tiberian Hebrew. To be sure, it *was* later phonologized (most clearly, of course, in Modern Israeli Hebrew), but there is no certain need to retroject this development onto the Tiberian system itself. We must not presuppose that the Tiberian writing system necessarily reflects the phonologically underlying system in this case. Indeed, Geoffrey Khan also points to cases of vacillating between stop and fricative realization in Tiberian cases of *šĕwā' medium*, such as in the words *rišfê* ("flames of"), which also appears (in Cant 8:6) as *rišpê*.[43] Sporadic cases of non-fricativization such as that one could, I would say, provide isolated examples of the Tiberian Masoretes actually (and erroneously) carrying out the above-mentioned "correction" that they generally did not in cases such as these.

Cases like the vacillating *rišpê*/*rišfê* example militate against an incipient phonemization, as the two words would in practice form a minimal pair with no difference in meaning and the distinction between *p* and *f* carrying no functional load. The vacillation would, however, make ex-

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[42] Note that Khan ("Syllable Structure," 670) views the final consonant of syllables with *paθaḥ furtivum* as extrasyllabic and the vowel as a case of surface phonetic epenthesis.

[43] Khan, "How was the Dageš in Biblical Hebrew בְּתִּים Pronounced and Why is it There?," 328; *A Short Introduction to the Tiberian Masoretic Bible*, 94. A similar strange interplay between fricativized and non-fricativized forms can be found in the words *kaðχōð* and *kaðkōð*, occurring in Isa 54:12 and Ezek 27:16, respectively, and both meaning "pinnacle," in the singular absolute state (see Golinets, "*Dageš*," 652). Again, this type of strange and unmotivated interchange does not suggest phonemicity.

cellent sense if the Tiberians subjectively "heard" a syllabic consonant, their phonetics being unsure if it ought to be treated as a vowel or a consonant (and, thus, whether or not it ought to fricativize the following consonant). Similarly, one could argue that the difference discussed above between *biχθoβ* and *liχtoβ* (and similar cases) represents another concrete example of this type of morphophonological Masoretic "correction" to a stop pronunciation, as the forms with *l-* would then have been interpreted as no longer containing a syllabic consonant with an epenthetic surface *i* to make it pronounceable but as an actual closed syllable with *i* (based on the analogy with *yiχtoβ* discussed earlier), which would then in itself work as a synchronic motivation for the stop pronunciation of the *beghadhkefath* letter.

In a case such as *qirβû*, thus, the underlying phonological structure is *qRbû*, or (if one prefers that way of expressing oneself) *qĕrĕbû*, without any phonologized fricative whatsoever.[44] The *surface phonetic realization* of this syllabic sequence is *qirβû* (or, to be more accurate, a sequence of phones that the Tiberians chose to transcribe in that way), but that is something else altogether. There is really no "*šĕwā' medium*" here, nor is there a separate phoneme *β*. The same applies for a theoretical feminine imperative *riχβî*, "ride!," which would underlyingly represent *rKbî* or *rĕkĕbî*.

If one wants to argue for an incipient phonemization of the *beghadhkefath* spirantization, one must look elsewhere: in the case of the above-mentioned "analogically induced allophones," one could speak of such a process beginning to operate, as the suffixes *–χā*/*–χem*/*-χen* are

[44] The basic fact that even a pronounced *šĕwā'* must be regarded as representing underlying, synchronic zero at the phonological level is pointed out, for example, in Geoffrey Khan, "Shewa: Pre-Modern Hebrew," in *Encyclopedia of Hebrew Language and Linguistics*, vol. 3, ed. G. Khan, Sh. Bolozky et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 543–554 (554). Even though it may occur in places that had an actual, phonological vowel in pre-Tiberian Hebrew, those vowels themselves are not the predecessors of the *šĕwā's* that actually are pronounced, which must be regarded as *svarabhakti* vowels.

actually starting to acquire a phonological shape with "canonical" *χ*[45] (and possibly also the incipient "almost minimal pairs" in infinitives after prepositions; these could, however, alternatively be explained as a phonologized difference between a syllabic consonant and an actual, phonemic *i*, as we have just seen). The "*i* plus *šĕwā' medium*" cases are, however, in themselves no good argument for the phonologization of the fricative allophones, and the case with the suffixes was probably still an analogical process when the Tiberians were working.

Surface Realizations and Autosegmental Phonology: Three Levels

The question is, however, how this suggested deeper phonological structure relates to phonetic reality. In at least a few of the proposed cases (though not very many), the syllabic consonants would be stops (this would, however, only happen in the case of *ṭ* and *q*, because of the spirantization of the *beghadhkefath* syllabic stops themselves when appropriate), which is typologically highly uncommon and would create an oddity in the system. In most cases, the syllabic nuclei would be continuants (fricativized *beghadhkefath* letters, sibilants or resonants), which fits very well with an analysis involving syllabicity, but cases with *ṭ* and *q* are more difficult, and the Masoretic spelling actually attested needs a good and succinct explanation. Thus, one would like to formulate a more probable way in which this structure was realized phonetically (or at least graphically) even though the underlying structure was one of syl-

[45] I am not quite convinced by the suggestion (found in John T. McCarthy, "OCP Effects: Gemination and Antigemination," *Linguistic Inquiry* 17 (1986), 207–263 [235]) that words ending in *k* and followed by the *χā*-suffix are to be pronounced without an intervening *šĕwā'* despite the homorganic stops, like the one meaning "she will bless you" in Gen 27:4 being supposedly read *tĕβārexχā*, which would, in essence, create a geminated *and at the same time* fricativized *beghadhkefath* letter, a phonological structure quite alien to the Tiberian sound system.

labic consonants—as well as one that would explain the Masoretic choice to spell it with an *i* or *a* before what is here analyzed as a syllabic consonant.

The present suggestion of consonants forming actual syllabic nuclei in clusters in cases with apparent *šĕwā' medium* could be formulated in another way as to its actual phonetic realization (and thereby, its relationship to actual Tiberian vocalic spelling), basing it on the concept of extrasyllabicity (i.e. underlying consonants that break the normal syllabic structure of the language and thus have to be "taken care of"). Any cluster of three consonants before a vowel violates the syllabic structure usually present in Masoretic Hebrew (the proposed syllabic consonants would be a case of this).

In this type of structure (the ones that show traditional *šĕwā' medium*),[46] the graphic surface realization of the proposed /CCC/ sequence (where C stands for consonant) could be argued to obey the following rule:

> In a pre-vocalic cluster of three consonants, assign syllabicity to the middle one. Epenthize anaptyctic vowel before syllabic consonant. Every syllabic consonant is fricativized if possible, as is the consonant following it.

This, it must be emphasized, is simply a mechanical statement of the rule giving rise to the attested Tiberian spelling of these structures—however, and this is important: it is a statement that begins with the underlying assumption of a /CCC/ structure, as opposed to one operating with fricativization followed by subsequent vowel loss. Thus, this rule generates phonetic surface realizations identical with Tiberian spelling while still operating on the basis of there having been underlying syllabic consonants.

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[46] I.e., ones that do not solve the extrasyllabicity in the usual and uncomplicated way, by inserting a normal vocal *šĕwā'* after the final consonant and creating a separation of syllables that way (such as the totally ordinary *tirkĕβû*, which needs no further explaining). It would be quite possible to argue that this completely normal syllabic structure represents an underlying syllabic consonant as well (i.e. *tirKbû*).

What this would mean, in essence, is that we need to postulate not only the underlying phonological level /CCC/ and the "overt" surface level /CiCC/ or /CaCC/, but also a kind of "middle ground" level, which is the level of syllabification. It is at this middle level that the syllabic consonants exist: the occurrence of syllabic consonants is entirely predictable due to the phonotactic context (which is why this is not the deepest level of underlying phonology), but neither is it the surface phonetic realization, which the Tiberian Masoretes reflected in their vowel pointing in these cases. Thus, this middle, "syllabification" level would, in a way, be analogous to suprasegmental concepts such as tonal contours, vowel harmony, the Danish *stød* laryngealization and similar phenomena, the basis of so-called *autosegmental phonology*, a theoretical framework that allows for (and even demands) the separation of phonological structures into different tiers that operate in tandem (with the sound segments themselves representing one tier, for example, and stress or tone another).[47]

If we look at the word written in Tiberian Hebrew as *birχōθ*, we can see the three levels of the present analysis in action thus:

Deep, phonological level:	*brkōt*
Middle, syllabified level:	*bR-kōt*
Final, purely phonetic level:[48]	*birχōθ*

To illustrate the processes even more clearly, we can look at the abovementioned feminine singular imperative *riχβî*, which includes two *beghadhkefath* letters in a row:

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[47] The foundational text of this theoretical current is John A. Goldsmith, *Autosegmental Phonology* (doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1976). An example of an application of the theory to Semitic languages (specifically to the root-and-pattern or transfixing morphology of the family) can be found in John J. McCarthy, "A Prosodic Theory of Nonconcatenative Morphology," *Linguistic Enquiry* 12 (1981), 373–418, which uses the idea of different tiers as an analysis of the root consonants and vowel patterns so common in Semitic morphology.

[48] Including anaptyctic vowel and fricativization based on the middle level form.

Deep, phonological level:	*rkbī*
Middle, syllabified level:	*rK-bī*
Final, purely phonetic level:[49]	*riχβî*

It must have been the middle, syllabified level that the Masoretes subjectively "heard" as the basis for the subsequent fricativization. Thus, we have now arrived at a formulation and analysis that (a) gives a parsimonious interpretation to the *šĕwā' medium* phenomenon without positing unnecessary non-occamistic phonemes, while still giving heed to the actual phonetically filtered spelling of the Tiberian Masoretes. As mentioned in footnote 46, it would be quite easy to posit that even "normal" underlying /CCC/ structures (such as in *tirkĕβú*) actually involve syllabic consonants on the second level (though solving the extrasyllabicity in a different and easier way—by simply putting a normal vocal *šĕwā'* after the second consonant).

Living Fricativization and Words Like *kāθĕβû*

One problem with the scenario espoused in this article—and one also involving extrasyllabicity—could be found in words such as *kāθĕβû* ("they have written"), *yārĕðâ* ("she has gone down"), *yēlĕχû* ("they [will] go") and similar words in which a long vowel (often written with *meθey* on the first vowel, indicating a secondary stress) is followed by a *šĕwā'* in the next syllable, a *šĕwā'* that historically represents an elided vowel. In Sephardi/Mizraḥi-based "Hebrew school grammar," these words are pronounced with a vocal *šĕwā*, which fits well with the fricativized letter following it: *kā-θĕ-βû*: indeed, this is often what the *meθey* is taking as indicating.[50] This creates no problem at all for the present purposes.

However, there is contemporary data that suggests that in the actual Tiberian reading tradition, these *šĕwā's* were in many cases silent: *kāθ-*

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[49] Including anaptyctic vowel and fricativization based on the middle level form.

[50] Thus, e.g. Blau, *Phonology and Morphology*, 116 (though noting the problem caused by the irregularity of *meθey* marking).

βû.[51] This could be taken to imply that the loss of the old vowel in the middle of Proto-Northwest Semitic **katabū* and **yaradat* post-dated the fricativization, which could allow for the above-mentioned interpretation that the fricativizing vowel in *šĕwā' medium* cases was "once there" but disappeared after influencing the following consonant. These cases could be explained through analogical influence ("allophonic analogy") from the morphologically underlying pausal forms *kāθāβû* and *yārāðâ*—or from the whole paradigm, which shows a fricative throughout. This explanation would, however, be somewhat *ad hoc*, as a such analogies could be adduced to explain unexpected fricatives in other verbal forms as well (including the ones argued above to contain syllabic consonants). More on point, in over-long syllables as these (like *kāθ-*), the consonant preceding the *šĕwā'* may actually have functioned "semi-vocalically" in a sense similar to what I suggested for the other cases with *šĕwā' medium*. Note that Geoffrey Khan himself views this type of syllable as including an extrasyllabic element,[52] which would mean that it would be a perfect candidate for exhibiting the same type of "syllable-like" behavior (fricativizing the following consonant) as an actual vowel: *kā-θ-βû*, so to speak. These explanations could, of course, be rejected, but it is hard to get around the fact that the fricativization rule is alive and active in the language in a way that the vocalic reductions seem not to be. Again: unless some sort of "vowel-like" element was there, it is hard to see why the forms were not "corrected" to *kāθ-bû* etc. on a large scale (see the above-mentioned *rišpê* for *rišfê*, which shows that such a "correcting" tendency could very well make itself heard as an exception—and note again the *biχθoβ-liχtoβ* difference also discussed earlier). Thus, words like *kāθ-βû* are in a way themselves signs that extrasyllabic consonants could be regarded as syllable nuclei.

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[51] See Khan, "Shewa: Pre-Modern Hebrew," 545. The same type of reading is espoused (without argumentation) in Golinets, "*Dageš*," 652.

[52] Khan, "Syllable structure," 670. At the bottom of the page, he explicitly mentions words like *šāmĕrû* (my orthography) as having an extrasyllabic *m*, i.e. a segmentation *šā-m-rû*. This would imply *kā-θ-βû* for what is "normally" transliterated *kāθĕβû*.

All of this illustrates the difference between underlying phonemic reality and surface realization, and raises interesting questions concerning the analytical ideals both of modern scholars and mediaeval Masoretes, a question to which we now turn.

"The Beauty of Ideas" and Linguistic Realities

In a classic sketch from the tv program *A Bit of Fry and Laurie*, the two titular comedians (Stephen Fry and Hugh Laurie) artfully parody hyper-aestheticizing academics or cultural figures by discussing—in a faux-cultural snobbish diction—"*The Beauty of Ideas and the Idea of Beauty*." Having formulated an analysis such as the above—which is conceptually simple yet requiring a number of specific explanations of seeming exceptions—one cannot help thinking of these more abstract and aesthetic considerations and the role the play in the genesis of scholarly thought, and of the motivations for positing such analytical models in the first place.

A striving for parsimony using a very simple meta-explanation often generates multiple sub-problems, which have to be tackled in what is hopefully a not too *ad hoc* manner. Natural languages—and perhaps even more scribally transmitted languages such as Classical Hebrew—often possess larger amounts of irregularity than one would like. I am reminded in this context of Angela Breitenbach's disquisition[53] (based on Kant) on the idea of "beauty in mathematics" (a common meta-scientific trope) being based not in the aesthetic "beauty" of the mathematical objects themselves in a sort of Platonist way but in the aesthetic pleasure derived from the cognitive processes used to arrive at mathematical demonstrations, i.e., the interaction between the mathematical objects and the human creative activity of logical cognition. The same may be said of the relationship between a linguistic system and the for-

[53] Angela Breitenbach, "Beauty in Proofs: Kant on Aesthetics in Mathematics," *European Journal of Philosophy* 23 (2013), 955–977.

malizing analysis thereof: the creation of a "right-angled," regular and comprehensive analytic model is to a large extent an aesthetic endeavor, and must be allowed to be so—not forgetting the lack of complete overlap sometimes found between such analytical systems and the multifarious reality of language. The difference between stop and fricative pronunciation in Tiberian Hebrew is *basically* allophonic, but there are signs of a process towards phonemization, though still mostly governed by allophonic rules and some analogical processes. This is, perhaps, not as neat as one would like, but it is a testament to the special character of Tiberian Hebrew, which is both a codification of (one interpretation of) the phonology of a dead language and a superimposition of synchronic reading rules onto that system. This means that there are methodological differences between studying it and a natural, spoken language from a phonological perspective. Too often, modern interpretations of ancient scribal practices are based on subjective (and often unstated) presuppositions of what a "good" or "beautiful" system of transcribing a spoken language should look like, as though the scribes of former days were trained in modern phonological analysis. To be sure, they often used quite phonemic spelling systems, but absolute consistency cannot and should not be expected.[54]

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[54] One notable field in which this tendency makes itself heard is the phonological study of cuneiform languages such as Akkadian and Hittite, in which one sometimes comes across an attitude that appears to represent a wish to find phonologically significant information in every spelling variation. We may of course hope and wish that ancient scribes always used systematic rules for each and every spelling and their correspondences with the spoken phonology, but this does not in itself make such a situation real, something that is readily apparent from studying the extremely varied spellings occurring in later languages such as English or Swedish (one example is the English spelling of the word *son* with an *o* instead of historical *u*, due mainly to purely aesthetic reasons relating to how the word was perceived as "looking" on the page). I would like here to refer to the views of Craig Melchert, *Anatolian Historical Phonology*, Leiden Studies in Indo-European 3 (Amsterdam/Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994), 2, who cautions against "seek[ing] a linguistic explanation for any orthographic variation...," while himself "prefer[ring] rather to seek first an orthographic motivation ... and to admit linguistic variation only when absolutely necessary." In light of my arguments in

In a way, the above-mentioned "aestheticizing" process of constructing a subjectively beautiful system may well have been present in the work of the Masoretes themselves. Thus, the "aesthetic bias" (so to speak) in the analysis of the Hebrew phonological system may have occurred on two levels: both a mediaeval and a modern one (and possibly also at the ancient scribal level).[55]

A question also arises related to parsimony and Occam's razor: is it more parsimonious to postulate marginal phonemes and rule breaking *šĕwā's* or to posit that consonants in Masoretic Hebrew could sometimes be thought of as syllabic? The former demands more sound changes, but the latter demands a specific analysis of the underlying phonology that is not directly represented in the orthographic and transcriptional data. Which, then, is the more parsimonious? That is not easy to judge. A point to realize from this is that parsimonious simplicity in one part of an idealized system can often create difficulties or even redundancies in another. Actual linguistic systems aren't always as aesthetically pleasing as we would like.

One could argue that the cases in which the fricative allophones seem to be closer to becoming phonemes (*–χā*/*–χem*/*-χen*, for example) would provide a sort of Occamististic reason for them to be regarded as such in the other cases as well.[56] Indeed, this would be more economical

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the main text, however, I would also like to point out that such an Occamistic view of the actual phonology of a dead language need not always lead to correct results in any given case, as the definition of parsimony can vary depending on what factor one is analyzing, which means that explanatory power always has to be a deciding factor.

[55] Note that Alvestad and Edzard (*la-ḥšōḇ, but la-ḥăzōr*, 74-75) discuss *šĕwā' medium* cases such as *malχê* in terms of analogy with the rest of the paradigm, and explicitly argue (based on a suggestion by Shmuel Bolozky) for the Masoretes in some cases changing vocalizations of I-*ḥ* verbs to fit with their feeling of what the spirantization rules ought to have produced. This argument is not identical to the present one, but it goes in the same direction: one involving the Tiberians confronting numerous cases of tension between their "heard" tradition, the demands of the phonology and morphological rules, and, perhaps, a sort of "aestheticizing" process in action.

[56] A fact pointed out to me by Benjamin Suchard (p.c.).

if Tiberian Hebrew were a natural, spoken language, which it is not. Given the "meta-scribalistic" nature of Tiberian Hebrew, I find it eminently plausible that there are what seem to be internal inconsistences at certain points of the system (note the unique emphatic, unaspirated *p* of *'appaðnô* discussed above!). Even if one goes with the "traditional" view of *šĕwā' medium*, one ends up with a complex and strange situation with a number of new phonemes with very low functional load and an old fricativization rule that still works automatically in some—indeed, most—contexts, but not others, which in itself creates an anti-Occamistic irregularity in the system. Again, we would *like* for the system to be more "coherent," but that is not always the case. The Tiberian Masoretes had a pronunciation system that they had received by tradition, and mostly, they did a wonderful job of trying to encode that. But one should not marvel at the possibility that there are cases in which the process was not absolutely perfect (note, as another example of this, the polyvalent use of *dāγēš* to represent different phonological features).

This is also relevant for the question of how the proposed syllabic consonants were spelled. We have seen different cases in which they seem to be marked both with a *dāγēš forte dirimens* (itself an anomaly) and without a *dāγēš* (the latter occurring much more often). This duality is a sign of the inability of the Masoretic pointing exactly to replicate the underlying phonological system of the language. Even though the Masoretes tried to create an aesthetically pleasing (and in many cases phonemic) system, it did not always portray the underlying language quite as well as we would have liked, and surface phenomena sometimes interacted with the underlying phonology.

This type of observation may also be of relevance to other parts of the exegetical endeavor. Take, for example, the reconstructions of redactional criticism, which in their more extreme forms seem sometimes to be at least partly based in aestheticizing ideas about how the genesis of textual material "ought" to look as opposed to completely empirically based reasoning. Much redaction-critical work is based on extensive postulation of models that may or may not possess explanatory power—

however, it can not seldom be said that the models themselves are based to a large extent in the aesthetic (or sometimes even ideological) ideas of the scholars constructing them, rather than being the direct, deductive results of the evidence.

My point here is not that these aesthetic "prejudices" need necessarily be a bad thing; my point is, rather, that they are sometimes unavoidable, and that we as scholars should always keep that fact in mind.

Tiḏʿāl and Preserved Velar Fricatives

We now move on to a case that concerns not the fricativization of stops, but the preservation of old Semitic fricatives that were subsequently lost in Hebrew, viz. the *ġayin* phoneme, which was present in earlier Hebrew and Aramaic (as it is in Arabic and Ugaritic), but subsequently merged with *ʿayin* (as it apparently did even earlier in Phoenician).
The name *Tiḏʿāl*, which appears in Gen 14:1, has been plausibly explained as a borrowed Hebrew version of the Hittite royal name Tudḫaliya-[57] and is also represented in a Ugaritic version as *tdġl* or

[57] This view can be found in many places; one example is Charles Burney, *Historical Dictionary of the Hittites*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 54. The identification was argued as early as in Franz M. Th. Böhl, "Die Könige von Genesis 14," *ZAW* 36 (1916), 65–73 (68) – but as an undeveloped suggestion, it is even prior to that, having been suggested in A. H. Sayce, "Was Tidal, King of Nations, a Hittite?," *Expository Times* 19 (1908), 283 (Sayce wrote the Hittite name as Dud-Khaliya and Böhl as *Du-ud-ḫa-li-ia*, the latter of which does indeed render one Hittite spelling of it). The alternative suggestion to equate *Tiḏʿāl* with the obscure ruler Tudḫula mentioned in the so-called Spartoli Tablets (a possibility mentioned, though not endorsed, in Gard Granerød, *Abraham and Mechizedek: Scribal Activity of Second Temple Times in Genesis 14 and Psalm 110*, BZAW 406 [Berlin/New York, NY, 2010], 114) is much less likely; the Hittite royal name would have been quite well known in a Late Bronze Age milieu, and it is thus quite plausible that it would have been passed on through narrative tradition. A recent publication supporting the identification with Tudḫula (which ultimately goes back to T. G. Pinches in 1897) is Gérard Gertoux, *Abraham and Chedorlaomer: Chronological, Historical and Archaeological Evidence* (*sine loco*, 2015), 34 (*et passim*). One may note with some interest that Sayce actually suggests identifying Tudḫaliya with the Tudḫula of the Spartoli tablets in his early comment (or Tud-ghula,

ttġl;[58] it is transcribed in the Greek of the LXX as Θαργαλ. This Greek rendering has been argued to represent an instance of retention (using *gamma*) of the *ġayin* phoneme, which would fit well with the velar/uvular fricatives in the Hittite and Ugaritic forms of the name.[59] However, the onomastic form has more peculiarities, which make it worthy of further consideration.

Regarding the Greek transcription, there have been two trajectories of interpretation. One of them is to follow Joshua Blau (1982), and to regard the *gamma* as signifying the persistence of a learned reading tradition preserving the original velar/uvular fricative *ġayin* of the name (as reflected in the Ugaritic version of the same). As is well known, there are many cases in which the transcriptions of the LXX show an etymologically consistent distinction between *ʿayin* and *ġayin*, whereas the Hebrew consonantal text shows no such difference and the mediaeval reading traditions have merged them in all places.[60] If Blau is right, then, the rendering Θαργαλ shows a persistence of the original phonological shape of this foreign name.[61]

The difference between the Tiberian *dāleθ* and the Greek *rhō* could easily be due to the similarity between *dāleθ* and *rēš* in Hebrew square script (making a confusion either on the part of early copyists or on the part of the Greek translators themselves a plausible explanation of the

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as he writes the latter), and indeed uses that purported identification as a step in arguing the connection between the Hittite name and Genesis 14!

[58] On the Ugaritic forms, see Frauke Gröndahl, *Die Personennamen der Texte aus Ugarit*, Studia Pohl 1 (Roma: Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, 1967), 268–269.

[59] A similar form, *Tergäl*, can be found in the Geʿez version of the Book of Jubilees (13:22); it is without a doubt dependent upon the LXX version of the name.

[60] On the preservation of *ġayin* in earlier Hebrew, see, e.g., Joshua Blau, "On Polyphony in Biblical Hebrew," *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities* 6 (1982), 105–183 and Richard C. Steiner, "On the Dating of Hebrew Sound Changes (**ḫ* > *ḥ* and **ġ* > ʿ) and Greek Translations (2 Esdras and Judith)," *JBL* 124 (2005), 229–267.

[61] One may note that by Josephus' time, the distinction was no longer upheld, as he gives the name in the genitive as Θαδάλου (*A.J.* 1.9.1 §173), showing no trace of a *gamma*.

discrepancy). Note, however, that Richard Steiner has suggested that the *r*-version could actually go back to a change in pronunciation in Hieroglyphic Luwian, which did indeed change many *d*-sounds into *r* (Luwian being a possible avenue of transmission for the Anatolian name).[62] However, one must agree with Joosten that this proposal, ingenious though it is, it too speculative to be convincing.[63] Crucially, it would depend on an (unattested) version of the Hittite name in *one specific Anatolian dialect* having influenced the *Hebrew* reading tradition, a proposition which stretches credibility. Also, the Hieroglyphic Luwian rhotacism occurred in *intervocalic* position, and not between a vowel and a consonant, as is the case here.[64]

Against the interpretation of the Greek *gamma* going back to the original velar/uvular fricative being preserved in Hebrew phonology (as opposed to spelling), Jan Joosten has argued (based on arguments by James Barr)[65] that the shape of the Greek name form militates against such an interpretation. According to Joosten, the graphical confusion

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[62] Steiner, "On the Dating of Hebrew Sound Changes," 247, n. 96.

[63] Jan Joosten, "The Septuagint as a Source of Information on Egyptian Aramaic in the Hellenistic Period," in idem., *Collected Studies on the Septuagint: From Language to Interpretation and Beyond*, FAT 83 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 211–225 (218, n. 38).

[64] On this process in general, see, e.g., Annick Payne, *Hieroglyphic Luwian: An Introduction with Original Texts*, 2nd rev. ed., Subsidia et Instrumenta Linguarum Orientis 2 (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 2010), 16 and Ilya Yakubovich "The Luwian Language," *Oxford Handbooks*, Online: http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935345.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935345-e-18 (2015), also available (with pagination and minor differences) at http://web-corpora.net/LuwianCorpus/library/Luw-grammar.pdf, p. 23, interpreting the rhotacizing change as the /d/ turning into a flap; whether Hebrew would transcribe an alveolar flap as an <r> is rather an open question.

[65] Joosten, "The Septuagint as a Source of Information on Egyptian Aramaic," 217–218. The article to which he refers is James Barr, "'Guessing' in the Septuagint," in *Studien zur Septuaginta: Robert Hanhart zu Ehren*, Mitteilungen des Septuaginta-Unternehmens 20; Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenchaften in Göttingen, Philologisch-Historische Klasse 3: 190, ed. D. Fraenkel, U. Quast and J.W. Wevers (Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht. 1990), 17–34.

between the Hebrew *dāleθ* and the *rēš* that the LXX translators apparently saw before them (prompting their use of the Greek *rhō*) does not fit the idea of a consistent reading tradition-based distinction between etymological *ʿayin* and *ġayin* (if such a tradition existed, the argument goes, the confusion between "simpler" letters would not be an issue—the reading tradition would have corrected them). Rather, Joosten argues, the many cases in which the LXX translators get the distinction between the letters *ʿayin* and *ġayin* right is due to their own knowledge of contemporary Aramaic, in which the distinction was still alive (as shown by Steiner, to whom Joosten refers). The "correct hits" in the distinction would have due, then, not to any sophisticated and detailed tradition of Hebrew pronunciation but rather to (mostly correct and perhaps unconscious) etymologizing on the parts of the translators. As, obviously, no such Aramaic etymological cognate was available for *Tiðʿāl*, one has to infer that the LXX translators would then just have chosen the *gamma* on a whim (which turned out, by pure chance, to be correct).

However, I would argue that the opposition between these points of view need not be as absolute as it may at first appear. There are two intermediate possibilities here that should not be ignored. The first is the simple fact that an existing (perhaps somewhat shaky) reading tradition could have been "buttressed" by the actual Hebrew manuscript that the translators had before them (for example one substituting a *rēš* for a *dāleθ* in this instance, which is not uncommon).[66] The tradition and the manuscript could have been "mixed together." This would mean that the tradition may have been uncertain as to whether *r* or *d* was to be

[66] Note that it has been suggested (James C. VanderKam, "The Textual Affinities of the Biblical Citations in the Genesis Apocryphon," *JBL* 97 [1978], 45–55 [51]) that the Qumran Genesis Apocryphon reads the name with a *rēš* as well, which would directly attest to such a Semitic-language textual tradition (1QApGen 21:23). However, the reading is unclear, and the normally adopted interpretation is that the letter is, indeed, a *dāleθ* in the Genesis Apocryphon—see Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, *The Genesis Apocryphon of Qumran Cave 1 (1Q20): A Commentary*, 3rd ed., BibOr 18/B (Roma: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2004), 232.

read, and a manuscript made the translators choose. However, one could also imagine that the tradition that the LXX translators represented in this case actually *preferred* an *r*. Why would this be? This question brings us to the second possibility.

This even more intriguing possibility is that the use of *rhō* was at least in part motivated by phonological concerns itself. One such could have been assimilation: a *ġayin*, which was often pronounced as a uvular fricative [ʁ] is, after all, phonetically very close to a uvular trill [ʀ], which could have provoked a shift to an alveolar trill instead of a dental stop. Combined with a dissimilatory influence from the unvoiced dental stop /t/, this could well have turned the phonetically complex [tadʁal] into [tarʁal]—or even something like [taʁʁal] or [taʀʀal], with two sounds perhaps coalescing into one and the -ργ- being used to represent this double trill-like fricative in Greek transcription.[67] If, additionally, there also was a manuscript tradition showing *rēš* instead of *dāleθ* here, the combined pressures of the assimilatory/dissimilatory process delineated above and the graphical data in front of the translator would have worked in tandem to create the form Θαργαλ, which would then be both linguistically innovative and archaic at the same time. It would also show an interesting example of the way in which historical phonology, reading tradition and orthographic processes can intersect to create an actual, attested word form.

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[67] This possible realization as a geminate uvular trill in "LXX Hebrew" is, of course, a different process than that which may have been involved in the suggested uvular pronunciation of *rēš* in Mediaeval Tiberian phonology (as the time depths are completely different). It is, however, interesting to note that Geoffrey Khan has argued that the distinction between what he regards as an apical (and, incidentally, also emphatic) pronunciation of the letter in Tiberian Hebrew and the uvular realization (which he regards as the normal one in that tradition) was due to contact with homorganic (alveolar or dental) stops: *d*, *z*, *ṣ*, *t*, *ṭ*, *s*, *l*, and *n* inducing the apical realization—see Geoffrey Khan, "The Pronunciation of the *reš* in the Tiberian Tradition of Biblical Hebrew," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 66 (1995), 67–80 (75–80). This would, in essence, an inverted case of what I am arguing concerning a uvular *rēš-ġayin* combination in the LXX rendering Θαργαλ, suggesting that this type of assimilatory effects on rhotic consonants are not unheard of in the history of Hebrew.

If this analysis holds true, it would mean that the ργ combination is due neither to misreading nor haphazard guesswork, but to rather sophisticated phonetic processes on the parts of the LXX translators. This would heighten the probability for an actual "reading pronunciation" having existed, and would thus lend credence to Blau's arguments. However, the same spelling would also argue for the proposition that those same translators did not always understand the reading tradition that they had received; much like the Tiberian Masoretes appear to have done in the question of the *šĕwā' medium*, they wrote down what they "heard," in the sense of "what they found to be there in the system," even when the spelling system that they were using could not quite record that sound sequence.[68]

In Conclusion

In both of the cases discussed above, the rise and fall of different fricative phonemes in the history of Biblical Hebrew forces us to think of the conundra created by standardized spelling systems being used while the phonological system itself was in flux, and of the difference between underlying phonological data and the surface forms—and the question of what is actually being written down. These factors force us to face the different levels of systemic "beauty," spoken or recited language, and philological/traditionalist codification of texts (and highlight the infeasibility of separating this type of linguistic material from the textual tradi-

[68] Interestingly, both processes discussed in this article have an illustrative parallel in a later instance of Hebrew vocabulary, viz. in an expression borrowed into the Judeo-Arabic dialect of Morocco. Here, the Hebrew phrase *ziχrô liβrāχâ* ("may his memory be a blessing") appears as *sḥo lbrāḥa* (with Arabic *ḥ* for the same sound as *χ*, which has devoiced the adjacent sibilant). Note here how the Hebrew combination *χr* has coalesced into a simple uvular fricative (as I suggest in the case of [таʁʁal]) and how the *šĕwā' medium*-sequence *liβr-* appears in Judeo-Arabic as the vowel-less CCC sequence *lbr-*, the latter perhaps suggesting a preservation of that structure into modern times in that tradition. I would like to thank Jonas Sibony for bringing this Judeo-Arabic phrase to my attention.

tion of its tradents). They also illustrate types of processes that may have been active at earlier points in the transmission of Northwest Semitic traditional literature at well, showing the relevance of this type of analysis to the larger field of long-term transmission of this type of literary tradition, which involves both oral and written textual survival—with a complex interplay between the two. Perhaps too often, historical linguistic study of ancient Near Eastern texts is based on an unstated yet great faith in the accuracy of spelling systems and a systemic view of the orthography in its relation to underlying phonology and surface realization, tending sometimes to attribute any difference in spelling to actual linguistic variation; cases such as these teach us always to remember the possibility of complex interplay between linguistic and sometimes semi-constructed surface realizations, writing systems (however phonemic in their theoretical principles) and the underlying phonemic realities.

Addendum: Regarding *šĕwā' medium*, two more forms should be addressed. One is the long imperative 2ms of the *koθβâ* type (with *o* rendering *qāmeṣ ḥāṭûf*). Such forms show *šĕwā' medium*, yet the vowel preceding it is not the predictable epenthetic *i* or *a*, but one representing the real etymological vowel of the form (**u*, appearing as *qāmeṣ ḥāṭûf* in this context). This seeming exception can be explained as the fricative third radical being analogical to all the other imperative forms (including the 2fs, *kiθβî*, which fits exactly with the idea of a syllabic consonant) or—more specifically and perhaps less likely—as an etymological persistence of the original vowel influencing the choice of synchronic, epenthetic vowel at the surface level though the form has a syllabic consonant because of analogy with *kiθβî* and *kiθβû*. The other case consists of construct infinitives with personal suffixes, such as *koθβî* ("my writing"), etc., to which the same explanations apply (especially the first, purely analogical one, given the synchronic pattern of the infinitive *kĕθōβ*, with fricative third radical). On the 2fs imperatives, it should be noted that I do not necessarily agree with the idea that the internal *i* vowel represents an alternative imperative stem of a type **qiṭil-*, but rather a reduced "short" imperative **q(u)ṭulī*, which also fits with the pausal version, *qĕṭōlî* (cf. the discussion in M. M. Bravmann, "The Forms of the Imperative (and Jussive) in the Semitic Languages," in idem, *Studies in Semitic Philology*, SSLL 6 [Leiden: Brill, 1977], 195–199 [198]). This strengthens the idea that *koθβâ* is somewhat anomalous, keeping the first vowel of the **quṭul-* in its etymological shape, whereas all the other imperative forms reduce it to zero (*šĕwā'* or syllabic consonant), and thereby making its final radical an excellent object of analogical fricativization when applicable.

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Who is the Blinder of Eyes and Hardener of Hearts in John 12:40?

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> After Jesus had said this, he departed and hid from them. Although he had performed so many signs in their presence, they did not believe in him. This was to fulfill the word spoken by the prophet Isaiah: "Lord, who has believed our message, and to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?" And so they could not believe, because Isaiah also said, "He has blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, so that they might not look with their eyes, and understand with their heart and turn—and I would heal them." Isaiah said this because he saw his glory and spoke about him. (John 12:36–41)[1]

In offering this summarizing explanation for why so many people did not believe in Jesus, John quotes Isaiah twice. The first quote is from Isaiah 53:1. The second quote, from Isaiah (6:9–10), is the one I will focus on. John uses this quote to say that to be saved, the people needed to understand with their heart who Jesus was and why he had come, but that they could not do this because their eyes had been blinded and their hearts hardened.[2] Isaiah 6 was central in early Christian apolo-

[1] Unless otherwise specified, biblical quotes are taken from the NRSV.

[2] Some manuscripts read ἐπώρωσεν (or other forms of this verb) while others read ἐπήρωσεν (or other forms of that verb). The UBS textual commentary favors the former reading, but ranks it "C" (Bruce M. Metzger, *A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament*, 2nd ed. [Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1998], 203). Πηρόω is translated as "to cause physical impairment, disable, maim" by Fredrick W. Danker, ed., *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 812, while πωρόω means to harden or petrify (Danker, ed., *Greek-English Lexicon*, 900). The difference in meaning is actually not great, and the two verbs are confused in other scriptural passages (cf. John Painter, "The Quotation of Scripture and Unbelief in John 12:36b–43," in *The Gospels and the*

getics; the synoptic evangelists also quote it to explain why some people believed and others did not.[3] But John's use of this passage deserves a closer look. Who is it that blinded people's eyes and their hardened their hearts? Commentators tend to assume that it is God that has hardened their hearts;[4] this interpretation finds support in the Masoretic text for

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Scriptures of Israel, ed. Craig A. Evans and W. Richard Stegner [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994], 429–458 [450]). Maarten J. J. Menken, *Old Testament Quotations in the Fourth Gospel: Studies in Textual Form* (Kampen, NL: Pharos, 1996), 104, argues that ἐπήρωσεν is more likely to be original, but his interpretation of the passage does not hinge on this verb. I follow the UBS reading.

[3] For a thorough study on the use of Isa 6:9–10 in the New Testament, see Craig A. Evans, *To See and Not Perceive: Isa 6:9–10 in Early Jewish and Christian Interpretation* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1989). I disagree with Evans' interpretation of John 12:40, however.

[4] C. K. Barrett, *The Gospel According to St. John: An Introduction with Commentary and Notes on the Greek Text*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978), 430–431: "It can hardly be questioned that John meant that the hardening of Israel was intended by God"; George R. Beasley-Murray, *John*, WBC 36 (Waco: Word, 1987), 216; Raymond E. Brown, *The Gospel According to John I–XII*, AB 29 (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 486: "In John's rendition it is God who has blinded the eyes of the people"; D. A. Carson, *The Gospel According to John*, Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 448; Scott Celsor, "The Human Response in the Creation and Formation of Faith: A Narrative Analysis of John 12:20–50 and Its Application to the Doctrine of Justification," *HBT* 30 (2008): 115–135 (121): "verses 38–40 portray God as one who blinds the eyes of humanity, so that they cannot believe"; Evans, *To See and Not Perceive*, 132: "according to vv. 39–40 this unbelief is not only predicted, but is actually produced by God: 'For this reason they were unable to believe,' because again Isaiah has said, 'He [God] <sic> has blinded their eyes...'"; Craig S. Keener, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary*, vol. 2 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2003), 883–885; Andreas J. Köstenberger, *A Theology of John's Gospel and Letters*, Biblical Theology of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009), 234, 459; J. Ramsey Michaels, *The Gospel of John*, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 710: "Not only has God not 'drawn' these people or 'given' them faith, but he has 'blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts' to make sure they would *not* repent and be healed!"; Leon Morris, *The Gospel According to John*, rev. ed., NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 536: "The Divine sovereignty is strongly insisted upon," 537: "John makes it clear that the hand of God is in the whole process." Heikki Räisänen, *The Idea of Divine Hardening: A Comparative Study of the Notion of Divine Hardening, Leading Astray and Inciting to Evil in the Bible*

Isaiah 6:9–10 where God tells his prophet to dull the minds, stop the ears, and shut the eyes of the people, so that they do not believe. Their inability to believe appears to be in accordance with God's will.[5]

> Go and say to this people: "Keep listening, but do not comprehend; keep looking, but do not understand." Make the mind of this people dull, and stop their ears, and shut their eyes, so that they may not look with their eyes, and listen with their ears, and comprehend with their minds, and turn and be healed. (Isa 6:9–10)

In the Hebrew text, it is God who has willed that the eyes of the people be shut and their hearts hardened; this reading fits well with the use given the passage in Mark 4:11–12. John does not give a straight translation of the Hebrew, however. Rather he seems to combine expressions from the Septuagint and the Masoretic text, in addition to making other changes to the text.[6] Silva's translation of the relevant passage in the Septuagint reads:

> For this people's heart has grown fat, and with their ears they have heard heavily, and they have shut their eyes so that they might not see with their eyes and hear with their ears and understand with their heart and turn—and I would heal them.[7]

In the Septuagint, God does not ask the prophet to make it impossible for the people to hear his word; here the people have closed their eyes all by themselves.[8] In John's version of the quote, someone else is responsi-

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and the Qur'an (Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 1972), 92; Rudolf Schnackenburg, *The Gospel According to John. Volume Two: Commentary on Chapters 5–12* (Burns & Oates, 1980), 416: [the Johannine text] "attributes the blinding and hardening to God directly and without disguise."

[5] Compare also Isa 63:17.

[6] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 99–122.

[7] Moisés Silva, trans., "Esaias," in *A New English Translation of the Septuagint*, ed. Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 823–875 (830).

[8] Compare Donald A. Hagner, *Matthew 1–13*, WBC 33A (Waco: Word Books, 1993), 374: "The LXX describes conditions for which the people are responsible... It is the unbelieving people who have shut their own eyes."

ble for the people not being able to see. The verbs "blinded" and "hardened" are in the third person singular, while the final verb "heal" is in the first person singular as in the Septuagint. While Barrett suggested that John may simply have been quoting from memory,[9] John generally chooses his words with care. Thus, John drops the reference to ears and hearing, because in the immediate context his guiding metaphor is belief as seeing. John presumably changed the verb forms for a reason, perhaps to show that they refer to two different agents. Who would he then be speaking about? Most commentators who address this issue suggest that John is implying that God had blinded the people, and that Jesus is the one who would have healed them. This interpretation is developed especially carefully by Menken.[10] But I will argue that John is implying that the people's blindness was caused by the "prince of this world," i.e., the devil. This interpretation was put forward by Blank in 1964 and by Painter first in 1974 and again in greater detail in 1994, but has since largely been ignored.[11] It deserves more attention. I begin by discussing Menken's interpretation, and then present Painter's explanation and explain why it is better. Finally, I briefly discuss theological implications of Painter's interpretation that may have contributed to its being ignored.

Menken's Interpretation

Maarten Menken, professor of New Testament at the Catholic Theological University, Utrecht, observed that John frequently quotes Old Testa-

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[9] Barrett, *The Gospel According to St. John*, 431, also referred to in Keener, *Gospel of John*, 883.

[10] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 99–122.

[11] Morris, *The Gospel according to John*, 537, mentions Painter's interpretation in a footnote but doesn't do anything with it. Celsor ("Human Response," 130–131) refers to Painter approvingly, but, as we shall see, only follows him halfway. Richard Bauckham, *The Gospel of Glory: Major Themes in Johannine Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015) and Margaret Davies, *Rhetoric and Reference in the Fourth Gospel* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992) do not refer to Painter's articles. For other authors that have advocated interpretations similar to Painter's see Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 109, n. 37.

ment passages in a form different from the Masoretic text and the Septuagint. In a series of articles Menken tries "first to establish the source of the quotation as precisely as possible, and then to explain the changes the evangelist made in the source."[12] In an article analyzing the Old Testament quote in John 12:40, Menken argues that John's quotes Isaiah 6 the way he does for a reason. Menken argues that where the Septuagint uses κύριος in Isaiah 6, John takes it to refer to the pre-existent Jesus. Thus, it was Jesus' glory that the prophet saw (Isaiah 6:1, cf. John 12:41 and 17:5), and it was with him that he spoke.[13] Hence the first person verb form refers to the pre-existent Jesus; Jesus wished to heal the people, but it was not possible.[14] The third person verb forms refer to God in Menken's view.[15] He explains: "In several passages in John, God is presented as the one who determines salvation, and Jesus as the one who brings or realizes salvation."[16] Menken implies that John teaches that God determines who will be saved and who won't, who will be able to receive Jesus' words and who will not. He writes, "the idea of a negative determination to unbelief by God does not only occur in 12:40, but it is also found in 6:64–65; 9:39; 10:26."[17] Menken notes how early Jewish interpreters reinterpret Isa 6:9–10 so as to lay the blame on the people (as in the Septuagint) rather than on God, but John goes completely

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[12] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 19.

[13] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 119–120.

[14] Compare Jesus' laments over not being able to protect Jerusalem and give it peace (Luke 13:34; 19:41–42). The view that the first person verb form refers to Jesus is shared by many commentators, including Painter ("Quotation of Scripture," 437); I do not question that interpretation in this article.

[15] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 120 "The evangelist can distinguish in the words that the Lord, who is for him Jesus, speaks in Isaiah 6, between the 1st pers. sg. referring to Jesus, and the 3rd pers. sg. referring to God."

[16] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 120. He refers to John 6:37, 39, 44–45; 10:27–29; 17:2, 6, 9, 24; 18:9.

[17] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 111. So also Catrin H. Williams, "Composite Citations in the Gospel of John," *Composite Citations in Antiquity, Volume 2: New Testament Uses*, ed. Sean A. Adams and Seth M. Ehorn (London: T&T Clark, 2018), 94–127 (112).

against this trend and therefore chooses not to quote the Septuagint.[18] Menken's interpretation also fits the Old Testament account of how God hardened Pharaoh's heart, so that he wouldn't listen to Moses despite all the miracles God wrought through him (Exod 4:21; 7:3; 9:12; 10:1, etc.). As Schnackenburg had pointed out earlier, John has previously mentioned that the people who would not believe Jesus asked him to prove himself by performing a miracle, just as Moses had miraculously provided his people with manna in the wilderness (John 6:31). The reader is therefore primed to read the lack of response on the part of the people to the miracles that Jesus carried out (John 12:37) in light of the Israelites' grumbling despite Moses' miracles.[19] They could not believe because God had not given them eyes to see. We find the same explanation in Deut 29:2–4; the people did not believe because God had not given them a mind to understand, ears to hear and eyes to see:

> Moses summoned all Israel and said to them: "You have seen all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh and to all his servants and to all his land, the great trials that your eyes saw, the signs, and those great wonders. But to this day the Lord has not given you a mind to understand, or eyes to see, or ears to hear."

Menken's interpretation yields a theology that matches Pauline passages like Rom 9:18 ("So then he [God] has mercy on whomever he chooses, and he hardens the heart of whomever he chooses") and 2 Thess 2:11–12 ("God sends them a powerful delusion, leading them to believe what is false, so that all who have not believed the truth but took pleasure in unrighteousness will be condemned").[20] The belief that God determined who would and who would not believe is clearly attested in the early Church; it is not unreasonable to suppose that John may have shared it. Most commentators interpret the passage along lines similar

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[18] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 114.

[19] Schnackenburg, *Gospel according to John*, 272.

[20] Cf. D. A. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Biblical Perspectives in Tension* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981), 196.

to Menken; see the references in footnote 4 above. But there is another way of reading this text, which I will look at now.

Painter's Interpretation

John Painter, professor of theology at Charles Sturt University, Canberra, argues that the only interpretation of John's modification of Isaiah 6:9–10 that fits the immediate context of the passage and the theology of the Gospel as a whole is the one that identifies the ruler of this world as the one who has blinded people's eyes.[21] The notion that God would be the one to blind people and keep them from being healed by Jesus reflects an "opposition between the Father and the Son" that is "irreconcilable with Johannine thought."[22] According to John's Gospel, the Son does his Father's work (cf. John 5:19);[23] they don't work at cross-purposes.[24] Menken's interpretation is consistent with the Masoretic text

[21] John Painter, "Eschatological Faith in the Gospel of John," in *Reconciliation and Hope*, ed. Robert Banks (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 36–52; and Painter, "Quotation of Scripture." According to Menken (*Old Testament Quotations*, 109) this interpretation is also found in Josef Blank, *Krisis: Untersuchungen zur johanneischen Christologie und Eschatologie* (Freiburg: Lambertus, 1964); R. A. Holst, *The Relation of John, Chapter Twelve, to the So-Called Johannine Book of Glory* (PhD diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1974). Loisy considers it. Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, 531, notes that this interpretation is found in Cyril of Alexandria, but does not explain why he does not accept it.

[22] Painter, "Eschatological Faith," 46.

[23] "Jesus said to them, 'Very truly, I tell you, the Son can do nothing on his own, but only what he sees the Father doing; for whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise.'"

[24] Schnackenburg has the same line of interpretation as Menken, but pretends that there is nothing contradictory in this reading. He writes, "God has ... deprived these people of the possibility of salvation and 'healing through his Son, the eschatological bringer of salvation. This allocation of 'roles' to God and Jesus, which at the same time shows their close cooperation, is so typically Johannine..." (*Gospel According to John*, 415).

of Isaiah, but as Painter asks, "If John did not want to change the meaning, why did he change the reading of the text?"[25] John could simply have quoted the MT, but he did not do so for a reason.

Painter writes that the interpretation of John 12:40 that he proposes is found already in Origen and in Cyril of Alexandria.[26] It should be noted however that in both cases the authorship of the extant texts is in question. Cyril of Alexandria deals with John 12:40 in book 8 of his commentary, which unfortunately can only be reconstructed on the basis of fragments found in catenae compiled by Nicetas of Heraclea in the eleventh century.[27] Their ascription to Cyril has been questioned. In this text "Cyril" also notes that John's text differs from the Greek text,[28] and interprets the text which reads, in Randell's translation, as follows:

> ... as the actual wording of the prophet goes, he has not said that "God" blinded them. And it is likely that some one else did this, in order that the Jews *should* not *convert* and find healing. But even though we should accept the supposition that God blinded them, yet it must be understood in this way—that He allowed them to suffer blinding at the hands of the devil...[29]

The commentator thus believes that the one doing the blinding is the devil, but he adds that God allowed that to happen.

Painter also refers to a catena fragment attributed to Origen that offers a similar interpretation, reading this passage in light of 2 Cor 4:3.[30] That fragment supposedly comes from a part of Origen's commentary on John that was otherwise not preserved. Heine does not in-

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[25] Painter, "Quotation of Scripture," 439.

[26] Painter, "Eschatological Faith," 46.

[27] Thomas Randell, *Commentary on the Gospel According to S. John. By S. Cyril, Archbishop of Alexandria*, Library of the Fathers (London: W. Smith, 1885), 160–161. The newer translation by David R. Maxwell (*Cyril of Alexandria: Commentary on John,* vol. 2., ed. Joel C. Elowsky, Ancient Christian Texts [Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2015], 111) does not differ substantially.

[28] Cyril incorrectly assumes that John is following the Hebrew text.

[29] Randell, *Commentary*, 160–161.

[30] For the Greek text see Erwin Preuschen, *Origenes Werke IV: Commentarius in Iohannem* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1903), 554–556.

clude this fragment in his translation of Origen's commentary, explaining, "where we have no corroborating evidence from other texts of Origen ... we can never be certain that we have his thoughts, much less his words, in a fragment from the catenae."[31] In short, we have evidence that an interpretation of John 12:40 along the same lines as Painter's was put forward in the Middle Ages or earlier, but we don't know who it was that advanced this interpretation.

Reading John in Light of the Combat Myth

Ten years ago, I wrote an article for this journal on the references to "the ruler of this world" in John's Gospel.[32] I was guided by the assumption that John has used the combat myth to structure his narrative of Jesus' ministry, death, and resurrection. The Near Eastern combat myth is a narrative telling of the battle between a good god and a dragon or other evil figure; it has been retold and reformulated in a variety of religious traditions. Forsyth has traced the course of this myth as from Gilgamesh to Augustine and offers the following summary of a common Christian version of the plot:

> A rebel god challenges the power of Yahweh, takes over the whole earth as an extension of his empire, and rules it through the power of sin and death.... This dark tyrant, the "god of this world" as Paul called him, is eventually thwarted by the son of God (or man) in the most mysterious episode of the Christian story, the crucifixion, which oddly combined both defeat and victory. As Luther would testify, the struggle with Satan continues, however, and we wait still for the end of his story in the end of history.[33]

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[31] Ronald E. Heine, *Origen: Commentary on the Gospel of John, Books 13–32* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 10. On Origen's fragments, see further Ronald E. Heine, "Can the Catena Fragments of Origen's Commentary on John Be Trusted?" *Vigiliae Christianae* 40/2 (1986): 118–134.

[32] Torsten Löfstedt, "The Ruler of this World," *SEÅ* 74 (2009): 55–79.

[33] Neil Forsyth, *The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 6–7.

Although he considers the combat myth central to many Christian traditions, Forsyth does not carefully examine its place in John's Gospel, where I find it receives one of its clearest expressions. I found that John uses the expression "the ruler of this world" to refer to the devil whom he treats as an independently acting supernatural being standing in opposition to God. John speaks of the ruler of this world being driven out of heaven and being condemned for having conspired to Christ's crucifixion. He no longer has any influence in the heavenly court over the followers of Jesus, but as evidenced in the high priestly prayer, he nevertheless remains a force to be reckoned with on earth.[34]

In studying the immediate contexts of John's references to "the ruler of this world," I noted that when John (12:40) quotes Isaiah 6:9–10 he introduces a curious change in the verb forms. I wondered whether this passage should also be read in the light of the combat myth. Is it not possible that John is attributing to the devil people's inability to believe? I consulted commentaries but found none that interpreted the text in this way. Reasoning that other scholars were better informed than I was, I abandoned that line of reasoning. However, in the course of my continued research I have found that scholars have consistently downplayed dualistic tendencies in New Testament texts. Therefore I decided to revisit this passage. In so doing, I found more support for my interpretation in Johannine literature, Pauline literature and in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Finally, I came across the aforementioned articles by Painter, which had been neglected by the exegetical community. In the pages that follow, I will once again read John in light of the combat myth and will argue for an interpretation of John 12:36–40 that builds on the one that Painter put forward.

While few exegetes interpret the devil as the one doing the blinding in this passage, the immediate context gives us reason to do so. The ruler of this world is referred to a few verses earlier (12:31): "Now is the judgment of this world; now the ruler of this world will be driven out."

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[34] Löfstedt, "The Ruler of this World," 76–77.

The Gospel does not explain on what grounds the ruler of the world would be driven out of heaven,[35] but in light of verse 12:40, we may surmise that one reason may be that he had kept people away from God. The verse that follows upon the reference to the judgment of the world and its ruler is also significant: "And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself" (12:32). While the ruler of this world had kept people from seeing the truth of the Gospel during Jesus' public ministry, that would change after Jesus had been "lifted up from the earth," that is to say after he had been crucified and glorified; the two are portrayed as a single event in John: "When Jesus was lifted up the power of evil was broken (12:31f) and faith on a universal scale became possible."[36] It was only now that the Spirit of truth could be given to people everywhere (cf. John 16:13).[37]

This interpretation fits the way that the devil is characterized in John in general. In John's Gospel sin is primarily unbelief (3:18; 8:24; 16:9) and the devil is characterized as a liar and deceiver, rather than as a tempter. The devil is the one who keeps people from believing:

> Why do you not understand what I say? It is because you cannot accept my word. You are from your father the devil, and you choose to do your father's desires. He was a murderer from the beginning and does not stand in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks according to his own nature, for he is a liar and the father of lies. But because I tell the truth, you do not believe me. Which of you convicts me of sin? If I tell the truth, why do you not believe me? Whoever is from God hears the words of God. The reason you do not hear them is that you are not from God. (John 8:43–47)

Belief in Jesus is both what God wants people to have and what he makes possible. John probably has both meanings in mind when he

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[35] Löfstedt, "The Ruler of this World," 64–68.

[36] Painter, "Eschatological Faith," 47.

[37] Compare also John 16:8–11: the Advocate would prove the world wrong about sin and righteousness and judgment—sin is not believing in Jesus, righteousness is about Jesus going to the Father, and judgment about the ruler of the world being condemned. I suggest again that he is condemned for not having let people believe in Jesus and thus come to God.

writes, "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent" (6:29). It follows that lack of belief is not God's work, but rather the work of the one who ruled this world.

Our passage is framed with references to light and darkness (John 12:35–36, 46).[38] These are central symbols for John. He introduces his Gospel with allusions to the light of creation, the light that gives life. This light, he says, was coming into the world (1:9), and the reader is led to understand that somehow the primordial light of life is none other than Jesus (12:46). In the prologue and again in the twelfth chapter, the light stands in opposition to darkness. Considering that John uses the abstract noun "light" to refer to a person, we might suspect that its antonym could also refer to a person, especially when it used in the same sentence. In the prologue John wrote, "The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not overcome it" (1:5). Interpreters disagree as to whether καταλαμβάνω should be translated "overcome" or "comprehend," rather like the English verb "to grasp," καταλαμβάνω can have both meanings. It is likely that John is letting the verb have both meanings at once, allowing the sentence to be understood in two ways that are both true.[39] Jesus is the light that brings enlightenment; those who reject him lack understanding. But Jesus is also the light that brings life, and the devil, a murderer from the beginning, tried to defeat him. One way that he sought to defeat Jesus was by keeping people from understanding who Jesus really is. We meet the same verb καταλαμβάνω again in the immediate context of our verse in the twelfth chapter:

> The light is with you for a little longer. Walk while you have the light, so that the darkness may not overtake you. If you walk in the darkness, you do not know where you are going. While you have the light, believe in the light, so that you may become children of light. (John 12:35–36)

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[38] So also Painter, "Quotation of Scripture," 443.

[39] Cf. Carson, *John*, 138.

Here καταλαμβάνω is translated "overtake"; "comprehend" would not make any sense in this context. In his concluding account of Jesus' public ministry in this twelfth chapter, John intentionally offers parallels to the prologue to the Gospel. This gives added support to the more physical understanding of the verb as 'overcome' in 1:5. Both in the prologue and in chapter 12, darkness is portrayed not only as the absence of light or the absence of understanding, but also as a force that actively opposed Jesus and those who would follow him. Those who do not walk with Jesus or believe in him are in the realm of darkness, that is, under the sway of the ruler of this world. Only those who believe in Jesus can become children of light, that is to say children of God (cf. 1 Thess 5:5; compare John 1:12).[40]

John 12:35–40 should also be read in the light of 1 John 2:11. There are striking similarities in vocabulary, style and theology between the two texts and there are good reasons to believe that John's Gospel and 1 John were written by the same man.[41] These similarities include the use of the imagery of light and darkness and of the verb τυφλόω "to blind" in these two passages. τυφλόω is not an especially common verb, being only found three times in the New Testament. As was the case in John's Gospel, darkness in 1 John is an active force.[42] In this passage, darkness personified causes blindness: "whoever hates another believer is in the darkness, walks in the darkness, and does not know the way to

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[40] Michaels, *Gospel of John*, 705.

[41] So also Donald A. Hagner, *The New Testament: A Historical and Theological Introduction* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012), 727, who remarks, "the language and theology of the two documents is the same." Also Richard Bauckham, *Testimony of the Beloved Disciple: Narrative, History, and Theology in the Gospel of John* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007), 73; Colin G. Kruse, *The Letters of John*, Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 9–14; Köstenberger, *Theology of John's Gospel*, 86–93, and many other commentators.

[42] Cf. Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, 271, who writes regarding darkness in 1 John 2:11: "the active formulation allows darkness to appear as an active force" and regarding John 12:35: "the language ... suggests a view of darkness as attacking men like a wicked aggressor."

go, because the darkness has brought on blindness" (1 John 2:11, NRSV).[43] The RSV reflects the original Greek better, even though it might grate on the ears of eye doctors: "the darkness has blinded his eyes." In his first epistle and in the Gospel, John associates God with light, never with darkness (1 John 1:5). Darkness opposed the light sent by God, but did not manage to overcome it. As in John 1:5, John doesn't care whether his metaphor is true to the laws of physics. For him darkness is a force, rather than just the absence of light. It tried to overcome the light, but without success. A few verses later, in 1 John 2, the author refers to his young readers as those who "have overcome the evil one" (1 John 2:13, 14), because the word of God abides in them. John is associating unbelief not only with the metaphorical darkness of ignorance and sin but also with an evil agent, the devil.[44] He does not clearly separate the two; the devil blinds the people with ignorance and the people let themselves be blinded.[45] As Painter notes, John's choice of verb is significant. While the Septuagint and Masoretic text speak of eyes being shut, John speaks of them being blinded.[46] Those who are blind cannot start seeing again simply by deciding to do so. In the first century context, it would take some form of divine intervention for them to see again.

Painter notes the striking similarities between our passage in John and 2 Cor 4:4: "the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, to keep them from seeing the light of the gospel of the glory

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[43] Cf. Painter, "Eschatological Faith," 46.

[44] Kruse, *Letters of John*, 86, does not identify the darkness with the devil: "In 1 John the expression 'darkness' stands for either sinful behaviour or the realm in which sinful behaviour predominates." But that realm is the same realm that "lies under the power of the evil one" (1 John 5:19).

[45] Compare Acts 26:17–18, where Jesus says to Paul in his vision: "I will rescue you from your people and from the Gentiles—to whom I am sending you to open their eyes so that they may turn from darkness to light and from the power of Satan to God, so that they may receive forgiveness of sins and a place among those who are sanctified by faith in me." See also 1 John 5:19–20.

[46] Painter, "Quotation of Scripture," 448–449.

of Christ, who is the image of God."[47] This is the third instance where the verb "to blind" is used in the New Testament; the other two being our text (John 12:40) and the passage in 1 John that was discussed above.[48] The expression "the god of this world" (ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου), which only occurs here in the New Testament, clearly refers to the devil, and may be compared with John's expression "the ruler of this world" (ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου) which was used as a reference to the devil just a few verses earlier in this chapter in John (12:31; see also 14:30; 16:11).[49] The terms used show how much power the devil was thought to have over mankind; he had the position God was supposed to have. In this context in 2 Corinthians, Paul also uses similar light imagery regarding Jesus as John does in his Gospel. 2 Cor 4:6 offers an especially striking parallel: "For it is the God who said, 'Let light shine out of darkness,' who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." If the early church was closely knit, it would not be surprising to find that two of its leaders, Paul and John, had similar ways of explaining why some cannot believe the Gospel; the god or ruler of the world had blinded them. Unfortunately for my argument, Paul is inconsistent in his explanations for why some people do not believe. As was mentioned, in other places Paul writes that God is ultimately behind their inability to believe (Rom 9:18; 2 Thess 2:11).[50]

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[47] Painter, "Eschatological Faith," 46.

[48] Recall that this verb was not used in the Septuagint of Isaiah 6:9–10, nor was its Hebrew counterpart used in the Masoretic text.

[49] See Derek R. Brown, *The God of This Age: Satan in the Churches and Letters of the Apostle Paul* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 130–140. Brown does not note the potential parallel in John 12:40. See also Paul Barnett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 218–219. Compare also Eph 2:2, 6:12.

[50] Like Paul, Luke is not too clear on who is ultimately behind people's inability to believe. Luke quotes Isa 6:9–10 at the end of his second book (Acts 28:26–27), where he follows the Septuagint; "This people's heart has grown dull, and their ears are hard of hearing, and they have shut their eyes." No third party is blamed for this. In his version

If John is indeed attributing the blindness and hardheartedness of people to an evil power, he was not alone in his time to do so. In addition to the Pauline parallel noted above, we find similar thoughts in texts used by Essenes at about the same time. The Essene Community Rule similarly attributes people's blindness of eyes, hardness of hearing, stiffness of neck and hardness of heart, not to God, but to an evil power, namely the spirit of deceit (1QS 4 9–11).

> To the spirit of deceit belong greed, sluggishness in the service of justice, wickedness, falsehood, pride, haughtiness of heart, dishonesty, trickery, cruelty, much insincerity, impatience, much foolishness, impudent enthusiasm for appalling acts performed in a lustful passion, filthy paths in the service of impurity, blasphemous tongue, blindness of eyes, hardness of hearing, stiffness of neck, hardness of heart in order to walk in all the paths of darkness and evil cunning.[51]

John uses the same dualistic terminology as the Community Rule in his First Epistle, speaking of the spirit of truth and the spirit of error (1 John 4:6).[52] In the context of this letter, the spirit of error is the same as the spirit of the antichrist (4:3), and is connected to "the one who is in the world" (4:4), which we may identify with the expression "the ruler of this world" in John's Gospel:

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of the parable of the sower, Luke echoes the language of Isa 6:9–10 twice. In explaining why he interprets this parable for his disciples and not for others (Luke 8:10), Jesus paraphrases this passage in Isaiah, suggesting that peoples' inability to understand is in accordance with his intentions and the word of Scripture. But in his interpretation of the parable, Jesus says among other things, "[t]he ones on the path are those who have heard; then the devil comes and takes away the word from their hearts, so that they may not believe and be saved" (Luke 8:12). The final words ("so that they may not believe and be saved") is again an allusion to our passage in Isaiah, but here the devil is the one to blame for people not believing (cf. Sydney H. T. Page, *Powers of Evil: A Biblical Study of Satan and Demons* [Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1995], 116).

[51] Florentino García Martínez and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar. *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Study Edition*, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 77.

[52] Cf. Painter ("Quotation of Scripture," 454) who writes regarding the Spirit of Error, "This title is more or less a Greek equivalent of the Semitic Spirit of Falsehood."

> By this you know the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesses that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh is from God, and every spirit that does not confess Jesus is not from God. And this is the spirit of the antichrist, of which you have heard that it is coming; and now it is already in the world. Little children, you are from God, and have conquered them; for the one who is in you is greater than the one who is in the world. They are from the world; therefore what they say is from the world, and the world listens to them. We are from God. Whoever knows God listens to us, and whoever is not from God does not listen to us. From this we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error. (1 John 4:2–6)

Those who do not believe that Jesus had come from God are under the influence of the spirit of error. In the context of John's writings, there is no reason to assume that the spirit of error was sent by God, considering that John specifically writes "every spirit that does not confess Jesus is not from God."[53]

Following this interpretation of John, it is God who gives belief, but he is not the one who causes unbelief. He gives his Word or light to the world; he is not the cause of darkness. He gave a select few individuals to his Son to keep already during his earthly ministry (John 6:37, 39, 44–45; 10:25–29; 17:2, 6, 9, 24; 18:9), but John says nothing about him consigning others to the devil, contrary to what some have asserted. Being under the devil is the default option for humanity in John; those who have not been drawn to God or chosen by Christ belong to the world and remain under the power of darkness (see John 15:19; 1 John 5:19–20).[54] Painter hints that a similar state of affairs is reflected in the Synoptic accounts of the Beelzebub controversy.[55] In Matthew's Gospel, Jesus explains his exorcisms by asking rhetorically: "How can one enter a strong man's house and plunder his property, without first tying up the strong man?" (Matt 12:29; cf. Mark 3:27; Luke 11:21–22). Jesus'

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[53] In 2 Thess 2:11 that it was God who sent the powerful delusion that caused people not to believe, but we are focusing on understanding John's theology, not Paul's.

[54] Cf. Carson, *Divine Sovereignty*, 196: "Jesus does not come to assign some neutral men to life and other neutral men to condemnation. He comes rather to a world already condemned (3.36) and proceeds to save."

[55] Painter, "Eschatological Faith," 45.

point is that all those people whom he had delivered from demons had been under Satan's power. In the Synoptic Gospels, exorcisms show how Jesus liberates people from Satan's dominion. John does not include any exorcisms in his Gospel, however, perhaps because his point is that Satan was *de facto* ruler of all people, not just an unfortunate few.[56]

Evil in John's Gospel is the work of people and of the devil, not of God. There are elements of determinism and predestination in John,[57] but, with the significant exception of Judas (John 6:64; 13:11), there are no traces of God predestining people to destruction in this Gospel.[58] In the case of Judas, Jesus knew that he was the one who would betray him (John 6:64; 13:11), but arguably this speaks of Jesus' conviction that Scripture must be fulfilled and his knowledge of Judas' heart (cf. John 2:24–25; 13:11, 18), not individual reprobation strictly speaking. Jesus recognized that even though he had chosen him, Judas served the devil (6:70). He even speaks of Judas as "the devil" himself.[59] The devil is the one who lies behind apostasy in John's text. It was the devil, not God, who put it in the heart of Judas Iscariot to betray Jesus (John 13:2).

John 17:12 is somewhat problematical for my thesis, as it refers to Judas as "the one destined to be lost" in the NRSV.[60] The expression "the one destined to be lost" is literally "the son of perdition" or "the son of destruction" (ὁ υἱὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας). The same expression is found in

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[56] Graham H. Twelftree, *In the Name of Jesus: Exorcism among Early Christians* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2007), 196, 204. Other reasons John does not include exorcisms could be that he considered them "commonplace and of ambiguous origin" (Graham H. Twelftree, "In the Name of Jesus: A Conversation with Critics," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 17 (2008): 157–169 [162]).

[57] James D. G. Dunn, *Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: An Inquiry into the Character of Earliest Christianity*, 3rd ed. (London: SCM, 2006), 326.

[58] Cf. Schnackenburg, *Gospel According to John*, 273: "the evangelist does not envisage absolute reprobation of individuals."

[59] On the translation "the devil," see Löfstedt, "The Ruler of this World," 71, and Michaels, *Gospel of John*, 417.

[60] "While I was with them, I protected them in your name that you have given me. I guarded them, and not one of them was lost except the one destined to be lost, so that the scripture might be fulfilled."

2 Thess 2:3 in reference to the man of lawlessness.[61] As the NRSV translates it, Judas was destined to be lost, but we don't have to think of it in terms of double predestination. Carson explains that while "son of perdition" may designate someone who is destined to be destroyed, other translations are also possible. For example, "in Is. 57:4 MT's 'children of unrighteousness' becomes, in the LXX, *tekna apōleias*, 'children of perdition.'"[62] Those who are unrighteous will be destroyed. Judas will be destroyed because he turned against Jesus, as scripture promised someone would do. Although scripture was fulfilled, it remains the case that it was the devil's work that Judas carried out.

Did Jesus Cause People Not to Be Able to See?

A case can be made against my interpretation if John 12:40 is read in the light of John 9:39, which also reflects Isaiah 6:9. In the Masoretic text of Isaiah 6, the prophet's preaching results in the doom of the people,[63] and in John 9:39 Jesus says that for some people blindness is the result of his coming to the world:

> Jesus said, "I came into this world for judgment so that those who do not see may see, and those who do see may become blind." Some of the Pharisees near him heard this and said to him, "Surely we are not blind, are we?" Jesus said to them, "If you were blind, you would not have sin. But now that you say, 'We see,' your sin remains." (John 9:39–41)

Blindness is not said to be the devil's doing here; on the contrary, Jesus knows that a result of his ministry is that some will become blind. Some have argued on this basis that it is God, or Jesus acting on behalf of

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[61] "Let no one deceive you in any way; for that day will not come unless the rebellion comes first and the lawless one is revealed, the one destined for destruction." The equivalent Hebrew expression is also found in the Essene Community Rule (1QS 9 17) and the Damascus Document (CD 6 15, 13 14).

[62] Carson, *John*, 563.

[63] John N. Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah, Chapters 1–39*, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 188.

God, that blinded the people also in John 12:40.[64] But unlike the Masoretic text, John does not say outright that God willed their unbelief, and I don't think he implies it either. John's language in 9:39–41 is intentionally paradoxical. It follows on the story of how Jesus healed a man who was born blind which John relates in considerable detail. Here he makes it clear that this blindness was not divine punishment for sin, contrary to what his disciples thought, but the reason he was blind was "so that God's works might be revealed in him" (John 9:3). Jesus heals the man, and shows how he truly is the light of the world (9:5). Is it now the case that Jesus actually causes blindness? As Carson notes, on the surface John 9:39 contradicts John 3:17 and 12:47, where Jesus says he did not come to judge or condemn the world.[65] The contradiction has been perhaps too readily resolved by commentators. Carson writes, for example, that Jesus did come to save; "but saving some entails condemning others."[66] The point is rather that people's reactions to Jesus show their true loyalties. Bultmann explains, "This is the paradox of the revelation, that in order to bring grace it must also give offence, and so can turn to judgment. In order to be grace it must uncover sin; he who resists this binds himself to his sin, and so through the revelation sin for the first time becomes definitive."[67] It is their servitude to sin (8:34), which amounts to servitude to the devil (8:44), that causes some people to reject Jesus' message and thus become blind.[68]

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[64] E.g. Michaels, *Gospel of John*, 710: "In some sense he who 'has blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart'... is Jesus himself, or God acting through him. This is not as far-fetched as it sounds, given that Jesus earlier claimed for himself a role in this hardening process after the healing of the man born blind."

[65] Carson, *John*, 377.

[66] Carson, *John*, 377.

[67] Rudolf Bultmann, *The Gospel of John: A Commentary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), 341–342, also quoted in Carson, *John*, 377.

[68] Compare also 1 John 3:8 "Everyone who commits sin is a child of the devil." In Romans Paul also uses sin personified in the same contexts as others refer to the devil (Torsten Löfstedt, "Paul, Sin and Satan: The Root of Evil according to Romans," *SEÅ* 75 [2010]: 109–134).

The paradoxical language in John 9:39 ("I came into this world for judgment so that those who do not see may see, and those who do see may become blind") serves a rhetorical purpose. John has Jesus express himself in the way he does so that readers may ask themselves whether they too are in denial of their own blindness and their need of healing.[69] Rather than causing their blindness, Jesus' words and deeds make the spiritual blindness of his opponents evident.

Why has Painter's Reading Been Rejected?

Painter's interpretation of John 12:36–40 fits the theology of John's Gospel quite well. One might ask why so few commentators have even considered this reading. Perhaps the main reason that scholars have not accepted Painter's interpretation is that it goes against what they have been taught. Church tradition is strong. Scott Celsor agrees with Painter that John 12:40 should be read in the light of 1 John 2:11, but he seeks to combine this reading with the established reading that ultimately God determines which people will be blinded.

> With the introduction of the fact that in 1 John 2:11 it is the darkness, as a personified force opposing God, that blinds people, one could understand John 12:40 as only an indirect action of God. It can be justly argued that God only indirectly blinds people by abandoning them, or perhaps better, that people are blinded as a result of abandoning God. Then, once unprotected by God, the forces of evil, the darkness, actually blind the people.[70]

Celsor is on the right track, but I would argue that there is no reason to think John would consider blindness to be even an indirect action of God.[71] Celsor claims to agree with Painter's interpretation, but he cannot keep himself from saying that these verses teach that God "blinds the

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[69] Compare 1 John 1:8 "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."

[70] Celsor, "Human Response," 130.

[71] His interpretation is similar to the one ascribed to Cyril of Alexandria quoted above.

eyes of humanity."[72] Celsor is consciously writing within the Roman Catholic tradition;[73] this might constrain his interpretative freedom.

Another reason that this interpretation has been neglected is that there has long been a tendency to downplay the place of the devil in John's theology.[74] The devil doesn't take much space in this Gospel. As van der Watt notes, John focuses on "the positive side of the message"; he tells more about Jesus than about his enemies.[75] But that does not mean that the devil does not play a significant role here. The devil, also referred to as the ruler of this world (John 12:31; 14:30; 16:11) and the evil one (John 17:15; 1 John 2:13; 5:18), and as darkness personified, keeps people from God, from believing in God's Word.[76] In John's writings, the devil is not someone who does God's dirty work, as some would characterize him based on Old Testament texts.[77] Rather he is the enemy of God; he is referred to as a sinner (1 John 3:18), a liar and a murderer (John 8:44). He is the opposite of God who gives life and truth, who loves humanity (John 3:16) and in whom there is no darkness (cf. 1 John 1:5). As the prologue implies, he tried to overcome the light of God but without success. As Twelftree writes, "the whole Johan-

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[72] Celsor, "Human Response," 121.

[73] Celsor's explicit goal is to defend the Roman Catholic view of the doctrine of justification; he concludes: "In this critical passage [John 12:20–50]... one discovers that John corroborates Catholic concerns that the gift of God's grace, God's light, empowers and requires a human response" (Celsor, "Human Response," 115).

[74] Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament, With a new introduction by Robert Morgan*, vol. 2 (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 17, considered it "very doubtful" that the devil was "a reality for John in the mythical sense" I discuss this in Löfstedt, "The Ruler of this World."

[75] Jan van der Watt, *An Introduction to the Johannine Gospel and Letters* (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 39.

[76] That the evil one is the same as the ruler of this world is clearly implied in 1 John 5:19. Compare also the expression "the deceiver of the whole world" (Rev 12:9; 20:3, 10). See also "the world deceiver" (Did. 16:4). Apos. Con. 7:32 identifies the world deceiver with the devil.

[77] Cf. Henry Ansgar Kelly, *Satan: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Ryan E. Stokes, "Satan, YHWH's Executioner," *JBL* 133 (2014): 251–270.

nine ministry of Jesus remains a battlefield with Satan."[78] Satan is a formidable foe; it is only through Jesus' death and resurrection that he is driven out from his heavenly position of power (John 12:31).[79] Indeed, he evidently remains a threat to Jesus' followers even after this, for John relates that Jesus intercedes for his disciples that they not fall prey to him (John 17:15).

Menken downplays Satan's role as an independent character in John. He grants that there are passages in John that speak of the devil working through people, such as the Jews who had believed in Jesus (8:43–44) and Judas (6:70–71; 13:2), but he counters that these verses do not say anything regarding who it is that determines the devil's actions.[80] He implies that John shares the view that ultimately God determines what the devil does; the devil does not act in opposition to God. In this view, God can influence people to make both good and bad moral decisions;[81] there is thus no reason to think God is not the one who blinded peoples' hearts. We can find support for such a view of the relationship between God and the devil in the prologue to Job or in Luke 22:31, but I do not find support for it in John.

If we follow Menken's interpretation of our passage, God at one point intended for most people to not be able to believe, but then for some reason he decided to make it possible for them to believe again.[82] Following Painter's explanation on the other hand, God's will was con-

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[78] Twelftree, *In the Name of Jesus*, 196. Similarly, Graham R. Smith (who writes within the Charismatic Anglican tradition) notes, "for John the whole of Jesus's ministry is a battle with Satan and the realm of darkness" (*The Church Militant: Spiritual Warfare in the Anglican Charismatic Renewal* [Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2016], 194).

[79] For this interpretation see Löfstedt, "The Ruler of this World."

[80] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 109.

[81] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 109: "The idea that God somehow causes morally wrong human decisions, occurs not only in some Johannine passages... but also several times in the OT and elsewhere in early Jewish and early Christian literature..."

[82] Morris, *The Gospel According to John*, 537, speculates (presumably inspired by Romans 11:25) that God kept Jews from believing so that the gentiles could be given the opportunity to respond to the Gospel.

sistently for all to be saved, but people's slavery to sin and the devil made that impossible. People's inability to believe was foretold in Scripture, but according to my reading of John's reading of Isaiah, that does not mean that it was willed by God.[83] Until he was deposed through Jesus' exaltation, the ruler of this world kept people away from God against God's wishes. As Painter notes, John has modified the tenses of the verbs in his quote from Isaiah; while the Masoretic text uses the imperative (the prophet is told to shut the eyes of the people), John uses the perfect tense, signifying a completed event in the past; "he has blinded their eyes."[84] John explains why it was people did not believe in Jesus when he was with them; but now after the exaltation the situation is different, Satan's firm hold over humanity has been broken.

Interpreters who are accustomed to seeing scripture as a whole read John in the light of other biblical authors, and therefore downplay its dualism. Menken rejects Painter's interpretation in part because "the substitution of God by the devil is too much at variance with the obvious meaning of Isaiah's text."[85] Menken argues that had John been referring to the ruler of this world, he would have made that clearer in the preceding context. But perhaps the problem is that we are too well acquainted with the Masoretic text of Isaiah and to Paul's references to predestination to read what John has actually written. John's words could be seen as his interpretation of Isaiah; he explains how it is that people became blind. It was not in accordance with God's will and it

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[83] Contra Köstenberger, *Theology of John's Gospel*, 234: "the Jews' rejection of Jesus as Messiah fulfilled scriptural prophecy and thus occurred in keeping with the predestination and foreknowledge of God."

[84] Painter, "Quotation of Scripture," 447. According to Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 110, the Hebrew verbs may be interpreted either as imperatives or as *hiphil* perfects, depending on their vocalization; John chose to interpret them as *hiphil* perfects. According to R. T. France, *The Gospel of Mark: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 200, the Targum of Isa 6:9–10 "turns the whole of the first part of the pronouncement into a description of the antecedent state of the people..."

[85] Menken, *Old Testament Quotations*, 109.

was not just their own doing. It was the work of the devil. Perhaps we are unwilling to appreciate the extent to which John's theology, and that of his original readers, is dualistic.

The Gospel according to John lies on the more dualistic side of a trajectory stretching from some brutally monotheistic Old Testament texts attributing the very existence of evil to God (see especially Isa 45:7) toward outright cosmological dualism, as we encounter later in Manichaeism.[86] In some forms of Second Temple Judaism we see a tendency over time to move away from attributing evil or temptation to God to attributing it only to people or to other spiritual powers. We find a classic example of such a shift when we compare how 2 Samuel (24:1) and 1 Chronicles (21:1) account for David's census. We can find another example in a retelling of the Exodus story. As was noted earlier, in Exodus it is clearly stated that God hardened Pharaoh's heart. But in a later retelling of this episode, it seems to have been Mastema who hardened the hearts of the Egyptians:

> And on the fourteenth day, and on the fifteenth, and on the sixteenth, and on the seventeenth, and on the eighteenth Prince Mastema was bound and shut up from (coming) after the children of Israel so that he might not accuse them. And on the nineteenth day we released them so that they might help the Egyptians and pursue after the children of Israel. And he hardened their hearts and strengthened them. And it was conceived of by the Lord our God that he might smite the Egyptians and throw them into the midst of the sea. (Jub. 48:15–17)[87]

Clearly, there were those in the late Second Temple period who avoided seeing God's actions in any way being behind unbelief and sin, preferring to attribute it rather to his enemy. I believe we can observe the same trajectory in how the Masoretic text of Isaiah was interpreted over

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[86] On different kinds of dualism in relation to John's Gospel, see Bauckham, *Gospel of Glory*, 109–129.

[87] Translation by O.S. Wintermute, "Jubilees: A New Translation and Introduction," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, vol. 2, ed. James Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 35–142, quote from p. 140. Michael Segal, *The Book of Jubilees: Rewritten Bible, Redaction, Ideology and Theology* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 218–222, argues, however, that in Jubilees 48:17, God is the one who hardened their hearts.

time. On a surface reading of the Hebrew text, God willed his people not to hear.[88] When the text was translated into Greek, the people themselves were made responsible for their lack of belief; they had decided to reject the word. If the interpretation that I argue for here is right, John follows this trajectory a step further. Now the people were unable to believe despite Jesus' signs because the devil had blinded them and hardened their hearts. As was noted earlier, this notion that an evil power (the god of this world or the spirit of deceit) lay behind unbelief is found also in 2 Cor 4:4 and in the Essene Community Rule. If John interpreted the blinder of eyes and hardener of hearts in Isaiah 6:10 as Satan, he may well have shared this interpretation with many contemporaries. Menken argued that this reading is so radically unlike the surface meaning of the Masoretic text that one would have expected John to specify more clearly that it was the devil that he was referring to, if that is indeed what he meant. But considering that John had just referred to the ruler of this world a few verses earlier, and considering his use of the imagery of light and darkness in the immediate context and his personification of darkness elsewhere in his Gospel and the First Epistle as an evil power, and considering that this kind of reinterpretation of Old Testament passages was not so unusual, I would argue that he saw no need to further specify who he was referring to: the devil was the blinder of eyes and hardener of hearts who had made it impossible for people to believe.

[88] It is of course possible that the prophet did not intend for these words to be taken literally, but that he, like Jesus in John 9:39, is speaking paradoxically. See discussion in France, *Gospel of Mark*, 200–201.

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The Angel of Satan: 2 Corinthians 12:7 Within a Social-Scientific Framework

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Introduction

The question regarding the angel of Satan in 2 Cor 12:7 has puzzled many interpreters.[1] The verse says, "And, for the sake of these great revelations, therefore, in order that I may not be conceited, I was given a thorn in my flesh, an angel of Satan, in order to keep beating me, in order that I may not be conceited."[2] In the present article, I will argue that the "angel of Satan" is a reference to Paul's opponents, either in Corinth or in general.[3] This interpretation is not a novel idea, but was in fact presented as early as the fourth century by John Chrysostom.[4] Over the last hundred years different suggestions have been proposed, ranging

[1] I will not not seek to address the unity of 2 Corinthians in the present study, since my analysis will not be affected by any of the major partition theories. For a discussion on the subject, see Murray Harris, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 8–51; Cf. Ralph Martin, *2 Corinthians*, WBC (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1986), xlvi; Victor Furnish, *Second Corinthians*, AB (New York: Doubleday, 1984), 30–48; Margaret Thrall, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, ICC, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994–2000), 1:5–13; George Guthrie, *2 Corinthians*, BECNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2015), 23–32.

[2] This translation is my own. Henceforth I use NIV if nothing else is stated.

[3] It is not necessary for the present article to decide who Paul's opponents are. For a discussion see Furnish, *Second Corinthians*, 54; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 2:667–670, 926–945: Harris, *Second Epistle*, 67–87; Guthrie, *2 Corinthians*, 41–42.

[4] See "Homilies on the Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians" in *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 15 vols., ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans), 12:400.

from interpreting it as Paul's migraine,[5] that he had problems with his eyes,[6] or that the angel refers to his opponents[7]. Although most interpreters have chosen between either opponents or an ailment, disease is overrepresented historically.[8]

By analysing the verse in the larger context of chapters 10–13 within a social-scientific framework, I will attempt to show that Paul uses particular words and phrases in order to label his opponents as deviant from the norms that should govern the Corinthian Christ-following group. In an article from 1999, Lee Johnson states something similar, namely that Paul uses "Satan-language" in order to warn his readers from associating themselves with Paul's opponents.[9] However, Johnson

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[5] So John Thomas, "An angel from Satan: Paul's Thorn in the Flesh (2 Corinthians 12:7–10)," *JPT* 9 (1996): 39–52; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 2:818; Ulrich Heckel, "Der Dorn im Fleisch: Die Krankheit des Paulus in 2 Kor 12,7 und Gal 4,13f," *ZNW* 84/1–2 (1993): 65–92.

[6] So Patricia Nisbet, "The Thorn in the Flesh," *ExpT* 80/4 (1969): 126; T. J. Leary, "A Thorn in the Flesh," *JTS* 43/2 (1992): 520–522.

[7] So Terrance Mullins, "Paul's Thorn in the Flesh," *JBL* 76/4 (1957): 299–303; C. K. Barré, "Qumran and the Weakness of Paul," *CBQ* 42/2 (1980): 216–227; Jerry McCant, "Paul's Thorn of Rejected Apostleship," *NTS* 34/4 (1988): 550–572; Laurie Woods, "Opposition to a Man and His Message: Paul's Torn in the Flesh (2 Cor 12:7)," *Australian Biblical Review* 39 (1991): 44–53; Derek Brown, *The God of This Age: Satan in the Churches and Letters of the Apostle Paul*, WUNT 2/409 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 192; Guthrie, *2 Corinthians*, 592.

[8] Between these, most lean toward a disease without specifying it, or chooses not to identify the ailment. For disease, see n. 5 and 6, but also Furnish, *Second Corinthians*, 549–550; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 2:818; Harris, *Second Epistle*, 859; Sydney H. T. Page, "Satan: God's Servant," *JETS* 50/3 (2007): 449–465. For those who choose not to identify the ailment, see, for example, Rudolf Bultmann, *The Second Letter to the Corinthians*, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1976), 225; Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 416; Paul Barnett, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians*, NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 570; David Garland, *2 Corinthians*, NAC (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1999), 521; Hans Johansson, *Andra Korinthierbrevet 8–13*, KNT 8b (Stockholm: EFS-förlaget, 2003), 346. For a thourough review, see Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 2:809–818; Harris, *Second Epistle*, 851–859.

[9] Lee Johnson, "Satan Talk in Corinth: The Rhetoric of Conflict," *Biblical Theology Bulletin: Journal of Bible and Culture* 29/4 (1999): 145–155 (154).

comes to the conclusion that when Paul is talking about a "thorn..., an angel of Satan," the phrase refers not to the opponents but to a disease.[10] The result is that every case of "Satan" (or cognates) in the Corinthian correspondence is used to defame Paul's opponents, except for in 2 Cor 12:7. I believe Johnson is mistaken and that 2 Cor 12:7 too is used to slander Paul's opponents.[11]

Paul's struggle is not mainly with some kind of disease, as I will show below, but with something else. Lisa Bowens has suggested that the whole passage of 12:1–10 should be placed within the framework of Paul's cosmic battle with Satan, where Satan's main objective is to keep Paul and his fellow Christ-followers from "divine insight."[12] Had Paul reached the highest of heavens in his ascent, he might have received the "divine insight," but he was stopped on his way.[13] In lieu of Bowen's suggestion of a cosmic battle, I propose that Paul's battle with Satan regards the right teaching of the gospel of Jesus the Messiah. Earlier scholars who have proposed to interpret the phrase as referring to opponents have mainly discussed the phrase's linguistic and lexicographical difficul-

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[10] Johnson, "Satan Talk," 152.

[11] Johnson's argument is rather inconsistent. She stresses that Paul's "Satan talk" does not reflect his cosmic worldview, and that it tells nothing of the figure "Satan." She also argues that the main reason why Paul refers to Satan when he speaks about the thorn in his flesh is to scare the Corinthians. Presumably, they were aware of Paul's disease, and when he ascribed the responsibility to Satan, they would surely know that being associated with Satan is very bad (cf. Johnson, "Satan Talk in Corinth," 152–153).

[12] Lisa Bowens, *An Apostle in Battle*, WUNT 2/433 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 190–191.

[13] A similar interpretation is found in Robert Price "Punished in Paradise," *JSNT* 7 (1980): 33–40, and David Litwa, "Paul's Mosaic Ascent: An Interpretation of 2 Corinthians 12.7–9," *NTS* 57 (2011): 238–257. See also David Abernathy, "Paul's Thorn in the Flesh: A Messenger or Satan?," *Neotestamentica* 35/1–2 (2001): 69–79 and Dale B. Martin, "When Did Angels Become Demons," *JBL* 129/4 (2010): 657–677 (674). Abernathy and Martin interpret the angel as an actual demon that buffets Paul, although not in relation to any travels through the heavens. Also, Frank E. Hain, *The Battle is Real: Spiritual Warfare, Discipleship, and the Christian "Soldier,"* (Liberty University: Ann Arbor, 2016), interprets the phrase as conveying a demonic reality.

ties. My contribution to this position is a focus on the sociological implications of Paul's rhetoric. I will argue that by associating his opponents with Satan, Paul tries to convince the Christ-followers in Corinth that the former are not to be trusted, and if they wish to know how a true Christ-follower properly acts, they should follow Paul's example. Since most interpreters in the last two decades have refrained from interpreting the phrase as referring to the opponents, the present study will hopefully provide fresh approach that my result in a further substantiation for the proposed hypothesis.[14]

2 Corinthians 10–13 Within a Social-Scientific Framework[15]

In 2 Cor 10–13, Paul argues for his legitimacy as an apostle and as a consequence also his authority. His defence would not have been neces-

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[14] Since Johnson's article "Satan Talk in Corinth," as far as I can tell, only Derek Brown, *The God of This Age*, and Guthrie, *2 Corinthians*, choose to identify the angel as Paul's opponents (cf. n. 7). Cody Gibson, "A Study of the Apostle Paul's 'Thorn in the Flesh,'" (MA diss: State University of New York, 2015), has recently suggested that the "thorn" refers to the Corinthian congregation.

[15] The social-scientific theories and methods I use are Harold Garfinkel's status degradation ceremony (see Harold Garfinkel, "Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies," *American Journal of Sociology* 61/5 [1956]: 420–424), Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner's self-categorization theory (see Turner, John C., et. al., *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987]), and Howard Becker's sociology of deviance theory (see Howard Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance* [New York: The Free Press, 1991]). These methods are well known in New Testament studies and will not be introduced further here. For an overview, see John Barclay, "Deviance and Apostasy: Some Applications of Deviance Theory to First-Century Judaism and Christianity," in *Modelling Early Christianity: Social-Scientific Studies of the New Testament in Its Context*, ed. Philip F. Esler (London: Routledge, 1995), 114–127; other New Testament scholars who have used them include Lloyd Pietersen, "Despicaple Deviants: Labelling Theory and the Polemic of the Pastorals," *Sociology of Religion* 58/4 (1997): 343–352; Mikael Tellbe, *Christ-Believers in Ephesus*, WUNT 242 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009); Paul Trebilco, *Self-Designations and Group Identity in the New Testament* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

sary if his apostleship and authority was not in question by the Christ-followers in Corinth. Furthermore, it seems as if Paul is being labelled as untrustworthy and deviant by his opponents. Considering these things, it is important to note that Paul is not arguing with his *opponents*, but with the *Christ-followers* in Corinth. He is therefore not trying to convince his opponents that he is right, but the people who are the main body of the social group and who possess the power to include or exclude people.

Prototypes and Antitypes

Throughout 2 Cor 10–13, Paul is trying to establish a prototype of himself by claiming his legitimacy.[16] At the same time Paul is creating a kind of "antitype" of his opponents. What this means is that if Paul is successful with his argument, a member of the social group in Corinth who lives and behaves as an antitype will be labelled deviant and no longer considered a member of the group.[17] The one behaving as a prototype will, on the contrary, be a good example for the rest of the Christ-followers. Paul creates the prototype and antitype by emphasising five different pairs of opposing qualities in order to argue for his legitimacy and authority. The goal is to gain authority so that he can remove his opponents, but more importantly so that the Corinthians' adherence to the right lord is safeguarded.

The first quality Paul emphasises is on whose recommendation one should be considered as an apostle. The antitypes are those who "commend themselves" (10:12), and the prototype is the one "whom the Lord commends" (10:18). Paul does not want to be commended by standards set by himself, but by the Lord (10:12–13).[18] He says that he

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[16] According to Turner's self-categorization theory, a person who wants others to follow their example within a social group has to become a sort of "proto-type" (John Turner et. al., *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987], 51, 53).

[17] Becker, *Outsiders*, 9.

[18] Cf. C. K. Barrett, *A Commentary on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians* (London:

was appointed as an apostle of the gospel to the Corinthians, and since he has done what the Lord commanded, he can boast about himself because of this (10:13–14). However, the one who boasts should "boast in the Lord" (10:17), that is, one should not measure ones right to boast based on their own standards but by the standards set by the Lord, namely listening to the Lord and following his commandments. Paul concludes that "it is not the one who commends himself who is approved, but the one whom the Lord commends" (10:18). In this way, Paul becomes himself the prototype, and his opponents, who "commend themselves" become the antitypes.[19]

The second quality Paul emphasises is that it is not success and strength that qualifies one as an apostle, but being in Christ's service (11:16–33). Paul puts it like the following:

> Whatever anyone else dares to boast about—I am speaking as a fool—I also dare to boast about. Are they Hebrews? So am I. Are they Israelites? So am I. Are they Abraham's descendants? So am I. Are they servants of Christ? (I am out of my mind to talk like this). I am more. (11:21b–23a)

Paul then goes on to list the many failures and misfortunes that happened to him because he is a servant of Christ. The "list" functions as evidence that Paul differs from his opponents in a significant way, since they seem to boast about their success and strength in serving Christ. Paul, on the other hand, much rather boasts about his weaknesses and his misfortunes. The antitype is therefore someone who boasts about their success, strength, and even heritage. Paul becomes the prototype

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Adam & Charles Black, 1979), 262, 269; Johansson, *Andra Korinthierbrevet*, 269; Harris, *Second Epistle*, 704, 727–728; Guthrie, *2 Corinthians*, 498–499.

[19] See also 2 Cor 3:1: "Are we beginning to commend ourselves again? Or do we need, like some people, letters of recommendation to you or from you?" Cf. Matthew Pawlak "Consistency Isn't Everything: Self-Commendation in 2 Corinthians," *JSNT* 40/3 (2018). Although Pawlak shows that Paul is both consistent and inconsistent in his self-commendation throughout 2 Cor, I contend that Paul is trying to refocus the origin of the (self-)commendation (cf. Harris, *Second Epistle*, 414–415).

who, even if he has to endure much suffering, lets his suffering prove that he remains in the service of Christ.[20]

The third quality Paul emphasises is not to be a burden for the Christ-followers. Paul repeats several times that he does not wish to be a burden for the Corinthians (e.g. 11:7–11; 12:13–18). He seems to repeatedly defend himself against accusations that he has not accepted financial and material support from the Corinthians.[21] His opponents, on the other hand, seem to have done this:

> In fact, you even put up with anyone who enslaves you or exploits you or takes advantage of you or puts on airs or slaps you in the face. To my shame I admit that we were too weak for that! (11:20–21a).

Paul ironically admits his shame for being too weak to exploit the Corinthians.[22] It seems as if the Corinthians have not realised that Paul's opponents have in fact exploited them, and they even accuse Paul for not being as willing as his opponents to accept their offerings. Further on, Paul says:

> Now I am ready to visit you for the third time, and I will not be a burden to you, because what I want is not your possessions but you. After all, children should not have to save up for their parents, but parents for their children. So I will very gladly spend for you everything I have and expend myself as well. If I love you more, will you love me less? Be that as it may, I have not been a burden to you. (12:14–16a)

Paul shows the Corinthians that the one who truly serves Christ sacrifices everything for this sake—Paul even sacrifices the Corinthians' love for him. The antitype is therefore the one who exploits the Christ-followers and charges them for the service. The prototype is the opposite,

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[20] Cf. Furnish, *Second Corinthians*, 439; Johansson, *Andra Korinthierbrevet*, 320.

[21] On the support from the Corinthians, see Ryan S. Schellenberg "Did Paul Refuse an Offer of Support from the Corinthians?" *JSNT* 40/3 (2018), 329, who argues that Paul's defence in 2 Cor 10–13 is not that he refused the offer, but that he has the right to demand it, but does not.

[22] See Barnett, *Second Epistle*, 532–536; Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 2:718–721; Guthrie, *2 Corinthians*, 538–542.

the one who, like Paul, is an apostle without charge and withouth being a burden for the Corinthians. The prototype gives everything and expects nothing in return.

The fourth quality Paul emphasises is that it is not one's visions and revelations that gives authority, but what a person says and does (12:1–6). It appears as if Paul's opponents were boasting about receiving visions and revelations from the Lord, and that this would be something that grants them authority. Paul claims that he too received visions and revelations, but that they are reckoned void since he was not permitted to speak about what he heard and saw (12:2–4). He even says that he refrains from boasting regarding these visions, "so no one will think more of me than is warranted by what I do or say" (12:6b). Ironically, Paul in fact just boasted about the vision (12:2–4), but nevertheless refuses to use this as his main reason for boasting. The antitypes are therefore the ones who boast about their visions and revelations to gain authority. The prototype, on the other hand, is the one who gains his or her authority by what "is warranted by what [one] does or says" (12:6).[23]

The fifth and final quality Paul emphasises can be seen as a summary and expansion of the fourth one above. In 12:7–10, Paul says that he would rather boast about his weakness, since he has learned that it is by being weak that the power of Christ can remain in him (12:10). Paul claims that he has been given a "thorn in the flesh," and that "an angel of Satan"[24] has been tormenting him "in order to keep me from becoming conceited" (12:7). Paul pleaded thrice that he may be relieved of this torment but the suffering thaught him what it meant to be a prototypical Christ-believer, that is, imitating Jesus, who also suffered because of the gospel.[25] According to Paul, it is only by enduring the suffering that

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[23] Paul explains that he indeed fulfilled the criteria for this when he says "I persevered in demonstrating among you the marks of a true apostle, *including* signs, wonders and miracles" (12:12, italics mine).

[24] The NIV has "messenger of Satan."

[25] Although Jesus' suffering may be considered a lot greater than Paul's, Jesus is still a

the power of Christ can be made perfect in him, and the same goes for anyone who aspires to be a true Christ-follower.[26] The antitype is, then, someone who condescends to weakness and believes that the right way to live is to demonstrate one's own strength. The prototype is, accordingly, the one who realises that Christ's power is made perfect through his or her weakness (12:9), which is where true joy of life is found (12:10). Paul confirms this at the end of the letter when he claims that "[Jesus] was crucified in weakness, yet he lives by God's power. Likewise, we are weak in him, yet by God's power we will live with him in our dealing with you" (13:4). Paul is ultimately saying that Jesus is the original prototype—he is Paul's example, and should therefore be the Corinthians' example as well (cf. 1 Cor 11:1).

Deviants and Labels

When Paul creates a prototype for the Christ-followers in Corinth he cannot be certain that they will listen to him. Paul's opponents have probably tried to create a prototype of their own, which Paul attempts to dismantle in his defence speech. Since Paul lacks the authority to exclude people from the group of Christ-followers, he has to argue in a way that the Corinthians themselves exclude Paul's opponents. To this end, Paul uses certain expressions to label his opponents as "deviants."[27] According to Paul, his opponents deviate from the group in that they do not follow the correct teaching, but maybe even more so because they try to undermine Paul's authority. It is to be assumed that Paul expects the Christ-followers to understand the values (good or bad) that he attaches to the words and phrases used to label the opponents.[28]

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prototype that one can attempt to imitate in order to be a true Christ-follower.

[26] See especially Susan Garrett, "Paul's Thorn and Cultural Models of Affliction," in *The Social World of the First Christians: Essays in Honor of Wayne A. Meeks*, ed. L. Michael White and O. Larry Yarbrough (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 82–99. Garrett argues that by employing several models of affliction, Paul shows the Corinthians what it means to be a true Christ-follower.

[27] Cf. Garfinkel, "Degradation Ceremonies," 420–424.

The first time Paul mentions his opponents is in 10:11, where he calls them "such people" (ὁ τοιοῦτος).[29] Such a title, as well as "some of those" (τινές) in 10:12, is not very specific. Further on, in 11:5, Paul identifies them as "super-apostles" (τῶν ὑπερλίαν ἀποστόλων). In the verses that precede this identification, Paul expresses his worry for the Corinthians and hopes that they are not going to be deceived as Eve was deceived by the serpent in paradise. Paul then claims that he is not at all inferior to these "super-apostles" (11:5). The label "super-apostles" is not necessarily a degrading label, but in the present context Paul appears to be labelling his opponents ironically, implying that they are actually inferior to him.

The next occurrence where Paul mentions his opponents is in 11:12–15. Here, Paul says that they are trying to boast about being equal to Paul. What then follows is a kind of progression from claiming that his opponents are "masquerading as apostles of Christ" to them being "Satan's servants." A simple structure analysis will make this point clear:

[13] γὰρ
οἱ τοιοῦτοι ψευδαπόστολοι,
ἐργάται δόλιοι,
μετασχηματιζόμενοι[30]
εἰς ἀποστόλους Χριστοῦ.
[14] καὶ οὐ θαῦμα·

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[28] Cf. Becker, *Outsiders*, 9: "*Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infractions constitutes deviance*, and by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders" (italics original).

[29] Cf. Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 2:633–634; Johansson, *Andra Korinthierbrevet*, 269.

[30] It is noteworthy that the verb μετασχηματίζω occurs in the T.Job when Satan transforms himself in order to deceive pious humans. 2 Cor 13–15 however most likely includes a reference to LAE, in which Satan transforms himself in to the "brightness of angels" in order to deceive Eve. For a discussion regarding the present tense of the verb and the verses' relation to LAE, see Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 2:695–696; cf. Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 351; Harris, *Second Epistle*, 773; Guthrie, *2 Corinthians*, 528–529.

γὰρ
αὐτὸς ὁ σατανᾶς
μετασχηματίζεται
εἰς ἄγγελον φωτός.
[15] οὐ μέγα οὖν εἰ καὶ
οἱ διάκονοι αὐτοῦ
μετασχηματίζονται
ὡς διάκονοι δικαιοσύνης·

[13] For
such people are false apostles,
deceitful workers,
masquerading
as apostles of Christ.
[14] And no wonder,
for
Satan himself
masquerades
as an angel of light.
[15] It is not surprising, then,
if his servants also
masquerade
as servants of righteousness

Paul calls his opponents "false apostles" and "deceitful workers," which are serious accusations. He then enforces his name-calling by saying that these people are actually the servants of Satan.[31] Paul introduces the idea that his opponents, according to him, no longer adhere to Christ, but to Satan. By doing so, Paul has labelled his opponents as completely deviant from the social group that is the Christ-followers in Corinth.

After claiming that his opponents are the servants of Satan, Paul argues for his legitimacy as an apostle in an extraordinary way. He lists all his weaknesses and misfortunes and says that in order to not become

[31] That Satan is someone whom the Christ-followers consider to be a bad figure is not hard to argue for. For an in depth analysis of Satan's role in the letters of Paul, see Brown, *God of this Age*. Cf. Mark 1:13; T. Ash. 1:3–9; T. Dan 4:7; T. Jud. 25:3; T. Levi 18:12; T. Naph. 2:6; 3:1; T. Reu. 4:7–8; T. Sim. 5:3.

conceited, he was given a "thorn in his flesh," "an angel of Satan" to buffet and torment him (12:7). I am convinced that this should be interpreted as another reference to his opponents.

Boasting and Conceit

Another theme in 2 Cor 10–13 significant for the present article is Paul's complicated relationship to boasting.[32] Paul states that he could indeed boast (10:8), but refrains from boasting about himself, since he wants people to think highly of him based on what they see him do and hear him say (12:6). He does indeed boast, but reluctantly, and "as a fool," probably because his opponents boast about being like Paul (11:12, 16, 30; 12:4; cf. 1 Cor 9:27–28). Boasting seems to be a problem for Paul, and his opponents seem to be great at boasting. In contrast to boasting, Paul says in 12:7 that he wishes not to be conceited. The verb he uses is ὑπεραίρωμαι, which in this wider context seems to be what may result if one boasts for the wrong reasons. David Litwa argues that the verb ὑπεραίρωμαι should in fact to be translated as "being lifted higher."[33] In his interpretation of 12:7, the verse refers to Paul's unsuccessful ascent to the heavens, which he was unable to boast about because he was beaten by an "angel of Satan" while ascending (12:2–7).[34] However, the passage claims that the reason Paul was unable to boast about it was that he was forbidden to speak about what he saw and heard, not because he did not reach the highest point in the heavens. In LAE, the highest of the heavens is the third heaven, and this is identified with the paradise in Apoc. Mos. 37:5. According to Paul, he did indeed travel to paradise, so that the failure is only in the eyes of Paul's opponents, since they wanted him to boast about everything he heard and saw while being there (12:2–6). It is therefore more reason-

[32] καυχάομαι occurs 16 times in 2 Cor 10–13 (cf. Martin, *2 Corinthians*, 309).
[33] Litwa, "Paul's Mosiac Ascent," 242.
[34] Litwa, "Paul's Mosaic Ascent," 254–257.

able to interpret ὑπεραίρωμαι as "to become conceited," which would be the result of boasting for the wrong reasons.[35]

What Paul tells the Corinthians in 12:7 is that his opponents, who are the "angel of Satan," are the means by which God taught Paul the lesson he recounts in 12:9–10:

> But [Christ] said to me: "My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness." Therefore I will boast all the more gladly about my weaknesses, so that Christ's power may rest on me. That is why, for Christ's sake, I delight in weaknesses, in insults, in hardships, in persecutions, in difficulties. For when I am weak, then I am strong.

Although the preceding verses could be, and have been, interpreted as a bodily ailment, it does seem odd that Paul would complain about a bodily ailment after the long list of sufferings in chapter 11.[36] It makes more sense if the opponents are in view here. This does not mean, however, that it does not include anything physical. For Paul, opposition is neither merely physical nor merely spiritual since it relates to the gospel of Jesus Christ, which is both physical and spiritual. The only thing that matters for Paul is that Jesus Christ is preached as Lord and Messiah to the whole world (cf. Rom 16:25; 1 Cor 1:23; 2 Cor 4:5; 11:4; Gal 2:19–20; 1 Thess 2:9). As a consequence, he will regard anyone who opposes the gospel as a "servant of Satan"; an "angel of Satan." Bowens argues that the heavenly angel beats Paul on his journey through the heavens to keep him from receiving "divine insight," which he was given

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[35] This is the common translation of the only other occurrence of ὑπεραίρωμαι in 2 Thess 2:4.

[36] The phrase σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί continues to puzzle interpreters. For an overview of different suggestions, see Thrall, *Second Epistle*, 2:809–818. I concur with McCant, who claims that the phrase should be interpreted as opponents who disturb Paul. The "angel of Satan" is an appositive genitive in relation to the σκόλοψ. Therefore, the "angel" should serve to explain the "thorn," not the other way around. Furthermore, the word σκόλοψ is used in the Septuagint regarding Israels opponents in Num 33:55 and Ezek 28:24 (see McCant, "Paul's Thorn of Rejected Apostleship," 550–551, where he argues against the common assumption of a connection between this phrase and Paul's words in Gal 4:13).

through suffering instead.[37] But even if one were to take the verb ὑπεραίρωμαι as "being lifted higher" (which is unlikely, see above), Paul's main concern is not whether or not he has "divine insight." Knowledge seems unimportant if it is not knowledge regarding the risen Messiah (Phil 3:10), which Paul seems to have plenty of. Rather, his issues with being beaten and his opponents is that they are a threat towards the Christ-followers in Corinth (2 Cor 11:28).

Summary

Paul shows the Corinthians that to be "weak" is not something to be considered of less worth, but rather as more valuable, as he says in 13:4. Thus, when Paul tells the Corinthians that he has an "angel of Satan" who beats him so that he might not be conceited, he informs the Corinthians that his opponents have served and continue to serve a greater good, regardless of how evil they may seem. In fact, they help Paul to stay on course and not to become conceited, so that he remembers that it is by Jesus' power that he lives and not through his own strengths and features.[38] Understanding the phrase "angel of Satan" as another reference to Paul's opponents, it is the most severe one. He brings together the idea of his opponents as servants of Satan and the idea of such servants as angels. Paul hereby labels his opponents as the worst kind of servants, namely Satan's angels.

In 12:11, Paul once again labels his opponents "super-apostles," although the process of labelling could be seen as reaching a climax when Paul called them "an angel of Satan." He has shown that his opponents are not servants of Christ. By demonising his opponents, he shows the Corinthians that they should exclude these people. Ultimately, it is only the Christ-followers in Corinth that can exclude Paul's opponents, and so, in order to win their confidence, he argues that he is a representative

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[37] Bowens, *An Apostle in Battle*, 112–117.

[38] See Garland, *2 Corinthians*, 522, who notes that it is in this "paradoxical" way that God defeats Satan, by turning a weakened Paul in to an even stronger apostle.

of the group's core values as he proves to be a true prototypical Christ-follower. Although Jesus tells Paul that it is not required for him to have the opponents removed from his life (12:8–9), he nevertheless sees them as a threat to the Christ-followers in Corinth and deems it necessary for them to be removed from their group. Paul realises that opposition will always be present in his life as an apostle, but that it is not required for those in Corinth to suffer from these deviant Satan-followers. Since he himself lacks the authority to remove them, he attempts to convince the Corinthians that they should remove them and argues that it is because these opponents are really prime examples of an antitype of what a Christ-follower should be: Satan's angels.

Conclusion

In this article, I have shown that the social implications of Paul's rhetoric are greater than is commonly argued. When using language such as "super-apostles," "Satan's servants," an "angel of Satan," and "false apostles," Paul labels his opponents and puts them in a relationship with the Christ-followers' greatest enemy: Satan. The main objective for Paul is to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ as Lord, and whoever or whatever sabotages this goal should be appropriately identified with Satan's associates and work. Paul argues for this while at the same time labelling his opponents as Satan's servants and angels. They are thorns in his side, but they serve a greater good. Paul has learned that it is only by enduring the sufferings caused by being a prototypical Christ-follower that Christ might reside in him. It is only in this way that Christ's power might be revealed more fully in Paul. Thus, when Paul uses the name "Satan" in reference to his opponents, the Corinthians are forced to evaluate both Paul's and his opponents' teachings. The Corinthians are forced to choose between two options: either they listen to Paul and strive to become Christ-followers in the same way as him, or they discard his attempt to demonise and transfer his opponents from "insiders" to "outsiders," and in the end exclude Paul instead.

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Recensioner

Anthony Bash
Forgiveness: A Theology
Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015, Inbunden, 168 sidor,
SEK 170, ISBN: 978-1-49820-148-3

Vad är förlåtelse teologiskt sett, och hur går det till att ge och få förlåtelse? Traditionellt sett är ”förlåtelse” något som anses karakterisera kristendomen och något som en kristen förväntas ha som ryggmärgsreflex inför alla motgångar i form av övergrepp, lögner och svek. Intressant nog har #metoo-rörelsen ställt allt detta på ända. Ingen präst eller pastor träder upp i offentligheten och hävdar att kvinnor som utstått förnedrande behandling endast har att ”förlåta och glömma”. Man kan med fog påstå, att förlåtelsebegreppet befinner sig i kris. Men hur skall man då förstå ”förlåtelse” i kristen teologisk mening?

Anthony Bash är nytestamentlig exeget vid Durham University och skriver om interpersonell förlåtelse med utgångspunkt i klassiska och bibliska texter och i relation till teorier inom filosofi, psykologisk terapi, statskunskap och internationella relationer.

Bash beklagar i inledningen att trots att interpersonell förlåtelse allmänt anses vara grundläggande för kristen identitet och lärjungaskap, är den relativt sett försummad i akademisk teologisk litteratur – medan filosofer och psykologer, såväl som jurister och politiska vetenskapare ägnar mycken och nyskapande uppmärksamhet åt ämnet. Varför? Han menar att det kan vara därför att förlåtelse i förstone framstår som enkel och självklar. Dock är det inte så, menar Bash, varken intellektuellt eller i praktiken. Ändå har ämnen som ansetts väsentligare kommit att ta samtalsutrymmet, som till exempel försoning relaterad till gudomlig rättvisa och gudomlig förlåtelse (det vill säga frälsning). Vad man då glömmer är att Gud enligt de synoptiska evangelierna inte förlåter dem som inte förlåter andra människor. Alltså: interpersonell förlåtelse är ett

villkor för frälsning och ett synbarligt bevis därpå. Detta är bakgrunden och anledningen till Bashs bok om förlåtelseteologi.

Boken innehåller tre avdelningar. I den första avhandlar Bash i åtta kapitel begreppsmässiga frågor relaterade till förlåtelse. I den andra hanterar han textrelaterade frågor i sju kapitel, som till exempel hur de nytestamentliga författarna behandlar förlåtelse och andra semantiskt relaterade termer. I den tredje tar Bash upp kvarvarande frågor, till exempel relationen mellan förlåtelse och rättvisa, samt vilka uttryck förlåtelse kan ta sig idag. Varje kapitel har ett par väluttänkta samtalsfrågor som avslutning. Här framkommer att författaren tänkt djupt och länge över vad han skriver om. Boken avslutas med en kortfattad bibliografi, samt ett sak- och skriftindex.

När det gäller begreppsmässiga frågor presenterar Bash en hermeneutisk förförståelse samt en definition av förlåtelse som relaterar till Hannah Arendts uppfattning att det var Jesus som upptäckte och införde mellanmänsklig förlåtelse. Han resonerar dessutom kring hur språk används när vi talar om förlåtelse. Modeller och metaforer belyses genom de centrala nytestamentliga orden *aphiemi*/*aphesis* (”släppa taget”, ”lämna”), *charizomai* (”ge som fri gåva”) samt *apoluo* (”eftergiva”, ”släppa fri”). Bash behandlar sedan hur liv i förlåtelsens metaforer kan gestaltas även tanke- och känslomässigt, vad förlåtelse innebär i relation till omvändelse (ånger, botfärdighet), hämnd (eller revansch) och gottgörelse (ställa tillrätta), respektive förlåtelse som ”provisorium.” Han diskuterar också fem karakteristika för hur förlåtelse uppfattas i västvärlden och hur dessa uttrycker önskan om återställd eller återupprättad gemenskap, liksom försoning, gottgörelse och frågan om huruvida *status quo ante* kan uppnås i ljuset av överträdelsens karaktär. Frågan ”vem kan eller får förlåta vem?” tas upp i anledning av Anne Minas respektive Jacques Derridas påståenden att Gud inte kan förlåta och inte heller människor, vilka Bash avfärdar som byggande på missförstånd, liksom även att vissa ämbeten skulle ha makten att ensidigt lösa från synd, vilket Bash är mycket obekväm med (”I cannot hide my unease about,” 73).

I andra delen om textrelaterade frågor börjar Bash med Paulus brev och utgår från de inom det historisk-kritiska paradigmet sju obestridda Paulusbreven (Rom; 1–2 Kor; Gal; Fil; 1 Thess; Filemon) för att sedan jämföra likheter och utveckling med de sex där paulinskt författarskap är ifrågasatt (Ef; Kol; 2 Thess; 1–2 Tim; Tit).

Han går sedan vidare och pekar på karakteristika för hur Markus, Lukas/Apostlagärningarna respektive Matteusevangeliet hanterar begreppet ”förlåtelse”. Hos Markus ligger fokus på den förfördelades initiativ att förlåta och Bash ställer frågan om detta är rimligt ur teologisk, pastoral och psykologisk synvinkel. Han besvarar själv frågan med: ”Jag tror så, därför att detta att vara ’uppknuten’ av vrede, bitterhet och avsmak kommer att blockera från att mottaga yttringar av nåd, inbegripet förlåtelse. Om vi inte ger förlåtelse, eller söker ge förlåtelse, kommer vi inte att ha sinnesberedskap att söka förlåtelse för egen del” (alla översättningar är recensentens). I kapitlet ”Förlåtelse i de senare kristna skrifterna” finner han att förlåtelse explicit endast omnämns i Johannesevangeliet, 1 Joh, Jak och Hebr.

Bash har i ämnet tidigare utgivit *Forgiveness and Christian Ethics* (2007) och *Just Forgiveness* (2011), samt leder sedan många år ”Forum on Forgiveness and Reconciliation” vid Durhams universitet. Föreliggande bok tycks mig kräva att man, för full behållning, läst de tidigare två, eftersom denna är kortfattat reflekterande, närmast poetisk i sin stil, medan särskilt *Forgiveness and Christian Ethics* är såväl grundläggande som mycket tydlig och klar. Bash refererar också ofta till den, som till exempel i avsnittet ”Unilateral Forgiveness and Self-Forgiveness” (38–39) i kapitlet ”Living the Metaphor of Forgiveness” där två teman behandlas på en knapp sida, medan enbart ”att förlåta sig själv” behandlas på sex djuplodande sidor i det större verket. Att Bash tar upp dessa ämnen är viktigt, eftersom det ger honom anledning att återigen, som så ofta i sina böcker om förlåtelse, framhålla att *syftet med förlåtelse är en återupprättad relation*. Den ensidiga förlåtelsen kan bli en katalys för att hjälpa förövaren till omvändelse, ånger och gottgörelse och kan på så sätt bli tvåsidig. Ensidig förlåtelse kan även vara terapeutiskt välgörande för offret (den förfördelade) när förövaren inte kan identifieras, eller inte

vidkänns brottet eller förnekar att vad som hänt vore fel. På samma sätt kan en ångerfull förövare förlåta sig själv när offret inte vill förlåta, trots att den som gjort fel gjort allt för att ställa till rätta. Bash framhåller dock att ensidig förlåtelse eller självförlåtelse inte kan bli lika mättad och fullständig som när två personer ingår i den.

Exemplet är belysande eftersom författaren i föreliggande bok, liksom i den mellanliggande boken *Just Forgiveness* (observera ordleken i denna titel: ”endast”, ”bara”, ”inget annat än” förlåtelse, respektive ”schysst”, ”rättfärdig”, ”rättmätig” förlåtelse), kritiserar förlåtelse utan moral: ”... det finns många svårigheter kopplade till den omhuldade uppfattningen att det allmänt sett skulle vara ärbart att förlåta den obotfärdige” (44). Något chockerande för den mer oreflekterande (slappare?) uppfattningen om förlåtelse torde Bashs hantering av ämnet ”Forgiveness and Repentance” (förlåtelse och ånger/botfärdighet) vara, att Jesus inte förlät obotfärdiga, inte ens då han på korset ber Gud förlåta sina plågare eftersom de inte visste vad de gjorde. Bash menar här, liksom beträffande stenandet av Stefanus och dennes slutord, att poängen är att Gud inte skall tillräkna vedersakarna vad de gjort. Hade de insett Jesu identitet, och att vad Stefanus predikade var sant, skulle de ha varit moraliskt skyldiga, vilket Paulus småningom kom att inse och därmed bli, med åtföljande ånger och botfärdighet (43).

Den stora poängen hos Bash är, att utan ånger (omvändelse, bekännelse) och bättring (gottgörelse, så långt det är möjligt) är förlåtelse teologiskt sett inte möjlig.

Bo Krister Ljungberg, Knivsta

Joshua A. Berman
Inconsistency in the Torah: Ancient Literary Convention and the Limits of Source Criticism
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, Hardcover, 320 pages,
$75, ISBN: 978-0-19065-880-9

Even if the documentary hypothesis explaining the growth of the Pentateuch, as formulated by H. Graf, A. Kuenen, and J. Wellhausen during the latter half of the nineteenth century, reigned supreme in biblical

scholarship during one century, there have always been dissenting voices and sceptics. Apart from the rejection of the whole methodology from people with fundamentalist inclinations of different kinds, some scholars of the historic-critical school have raised objections as well, among them J. Pedersen, F. Winnett, and I. Engnell. One of their main arguments against the hypothesis has been that the analytical procedure of its adherents, viz. to look for contradictions, different terminology, linguistic variation etc. and explaining them as due to the amalgamation of different, originally independent sources is based on a misunderstanding of what kind of literature the Torah book in fact is. The result is the embarrassing fact that after one century of intense discussion about the history of the Pentateuchal text glaring disagreements on central issues remain. J. Berman's (JB) argument in this volume is that the Pentateuch (and the rest of the Hebrew Bible as well) should be read as a specimen of Ancient Near Eastern literature where the kind of ideological and terminological consistency looked for by these scholars is irrelevant. "When biblicists hypothesize theories of textual development, they do so while situated in a distinctly modern textual culture, and are thus prone to project anachronistic attitudes and practices upon cultures at a great distance from them in time and place" (202).

The book is structured into three main parts with an introduction and a conclusion. Part I—"Inconsistency in Narrative"—takes the example of the report of the battle at Qadesh by Raamses II which exists in three quite diverging versions and compares it to the account of the crossing of the sea in Exod 14–15. According to JB, the differences between the two accounts assumed by traditional source criticism in the account of the crossing ("P" and "JE") are similar to those in the Qadesh text, and since there is no reason to assume that the latter is composed by different "schools" (all versions are assumed to have emerged from the chancellery of the Pharaoh), we could very well assume the same for Exod 14–15. There follows a comparison between the Hittite vassal treaties and the book of Deuteronomy. It is shown that the former often contain different versions of the historical background when a treaty is renewed.

In Part II—"Inconsistency in Law"—the often-noted discrepancy between the different law corpora in the Pentateuch (the "Book of the Covenant," the "Holiness Code," and the laws of Deuteronomy) are discussed. Instead of seeing them as competing law collections emerging from different schools, polemicizing against each other, JB wants sees them as revisions and updates of each other. Here, he makes a quite relevant comparison as he refers to modern-day constitutional laws like the American constitution from 1789. Since the date of its promulgation, the constitution has been continuously updated through thirty-three amendments, and this is done without any cancellation of the original text, the latter is still legally valid and plays an important role in the political rhetoric, despite the fact that several paragraphs are no longer implemented.

Part III—"Renewing Pentateuchal Criticism"–contains "a critical intellectual history of the historical-critical paradigm in biblical studies," which serves as a preamble to a critical analysis of traditional source criticism, as applied to passages about the rescue of Moses (Exod 2:1–10) and the flood story (Gen 6–9). The preamble, which is in many ways the most central part of this book, attempts to show how the very idea of source criticism, as practiced by the Kuenen-Graf-Wellhausen school and its successors is founded upon a specific view of historic testimony originating in the German romantic movement that ultimately uses intuition and imagination as the basic tools for source analysis. According to JB, this makes it impossible to agree on basic matters, such as a definition and dating of the posited documents. In light of this, JB stresses the necessity of developing empirical methods for textual analysis. A main tool for such a process wouldbe the analysis of Ancien Near Eastern texts. By analyzing their narrative techniques and handling of historical evidence, one may be able to establish models that are not based on intuition and imagination but on the structures and characteristics of texts from the biblical world. JB illustrates his point by proposing that one should analyze how the author of 1 Chronicles has handled his main source viz. the books of Samuel and 1 Kings. Such an analysis would then provide empirical facts on which a model can be construct-

ed which, in turn, could be tested on 2 Chronicles without considering the corresponding parts of the book of 1–2 Kings. Last, one could then test such a model of the source of the Chronicler against the source itself (1–2 Kings), as it is documented.

JB illustrates the arbitrariness of interpretation exhibited by "historicists" through an analysis of the story of the rescue of Moses. That the narrative is parallel to the Sargon legend, as documented in Neo-Assyrian sources, is obvious to everybody. But according to JB, the often proposed dating of the Exodus version to the seventh century that is a result of the identification of this parallel ignores a lot of other Egypt, the Hittites, and Old Babylonian evidence of this motif of the exposed child who is the raised and becomes a hero. When all evidence into account, JB argues, the support for the above-mentioned dating is considerably weakened, since the story about Moses could have be told at any time.

Last, through an analysis of the flood account, JB tries to show that the composition of the story as it is preserved in the received text is a chiastic composition which does not fit the traditional division into a J and a P source. Similar compositions are also found elsewhere in the Pentateuch, such as the story of Abraham (Gen 12–22) and the plague account (Exod 6–12). According to JB, the author is dependent on the Gilgamesh version of the flood and the division into two parallel accounts becomes unlikely, since both assumed sources adduce bits and pieces of the Gilgamesh version, and because the chiastic structure becomes visible only if the story is read as one literary composition.

Berman's book contains a lot of things worth thinking about. His criticism of the traditional documentary hypothesis and its prerequisites is definitely to the point. His call for empirically based models of analysis based on studies of other ancient literary texts to replace the intuitive methods so often encountered in traditional Pentateuchal studies is only to be applauded. Nevertheless, Berman must admit that the traditional P-layer in the flood account is in fact an almost completely coherent story, while the J-sections are not. In this case, then, the old supplementary hypothesis seems to be able to provide an account of the structure

of the text that goes well with the continuous revision and completion procedures he advocates for in the law corpora. One can only sympathize with his demand for empirically founded methodology, but why not look into a historiographic tradition that has so far been completely ignored by Old Testament scholar, both documentarians and their critics? I propose that the early Arabo-Islamic history writing can be seen as a laboratory where one can test all models suggested for the Pentateuch. There we find examples of all the well-known hypotheses, not as suppositions but verified black-and-white with source references and all which allows us to follow how tradition literature is handled during centuries. Much more that Graeco-Latin or Medieval historiography, the Arabo-Islamic tradition can give us crucial insights into these issues and provide a solid ground for the methodological renewal looked for by Berman.

Jan Retsö, Göteborgs Universitet

John D. Currid och David W. Chapman (red.)
ESV Archaeology Study Bible
Wheaton: Crossway, 2018, Inbunden, 2048 sidor,
SEK 356, ISBN 978-1-43355-040-9

Den stora fördelen med *ESV Archaeological Study Bible* är att man löpande kan läsa en bibelbok och samtidigt få en exegetisk bakgrundsteckning ur ett arkeologiskt perspektiv. Upplägget är mycket robust och redan innehållsförteckningen vittnar om god ordning i de arkeologiska leden och gedigen redaktionell aktivitet av förlaget. De medverkande författarnas arkeologiska meriter presenteras med ”biografiska skisser” samt vad de bidragit med. Dessa namnges även i samband med djuplodande specialartiklar.

Detta är förvisso en arkeologisk studiebibel men likafullt och samtidigt huvudsakligen en bibel. I ett förord positionsbestäms därför ESV-översättningen (English Standard Version) visavi en ”klassisk huvudfåra” av engelska bibelöversättningar, såsom KJV, ASV och RSV. ESV:s översättningsfilosofi beskrivs, liksom hur dess översättningsprinciper förhåller sig till begreppet stil.

Dessa introducerande sidor åtföljs direkt av två artiklar (innan bakgrunden till Gamla testamentet tar vid), John D. Currids ”vad är arkeologi?” respektive ”tio synnerligen betydande fynd inom bibelarkeologins arbetsfält” (alla översättningar är recensentens). På ett koncist sätt beskrivs fynden och deras betydelse. Currid nämner här Rosettastenen, Dödahavsrullarna, Tel Dan-inskriptionen, Ketef Hinnom-rullarna, Moabstenen, Lachishbreven, Gilgamesheposet, Hiskias tunnel, den korsfäste vid Givat HaMivtar samt texter från Ugarit.

En introduktion till Gamla testamentets böcker innefattar en referensguide till de utombibliska texter som omnämns i noterna (textens namn, datering, beskrivning), en beskrivning av dagligt liv i Israel, den hebreiska kalendern och en tidslinje. För Nya testamentets del består introduktionen av en översikt över den intertestamentala tiden med tidslinje, artiklar angående Dödahavsrullarna, det romerska imperiet och den grekisk-romerska världen, en beskrivning av dagligt liv i Judéen-Palestina under nytestamentlig tid och en detaljerad tidslinje även för NT.

Varje bibelbok i såväl GT som NT har en kort introduktion med tre rubriker: 1) tema (till exempel nämns i anslutning till 1–2 Krön Guds förbund med David som grund för Israels liv och hopp, och hur detta förbund finner uttryck i kungadömet och templet); 2) arkeologins bidrag till bibelboken i fråga (till exempel nämns i introduktionen till 1–2 Krön hur utgrävningar av ett flertal järnålderstempel i Syrien och Israel kastar ljus över det salomoniska templets struktur, inredning och planritning, samt hur det kan bringa klarhet i tekniska termer som länge missförståtts, något som också gäller ikonografi och kulturella sedvänjor); samt 3) bokens innehållsliga uppbyggnad.

Det finns även en större sektion, efter den om Nya testamentet, som behandlar arkeologins hantverk och dess plats som akademisk disciplin, dateringsfrågor, biblisk geografi och arkeologi, inskriptioner, mynt och papyrer, samt ger en kortfattad historia över arkeologi i Mellanöstern.

Under samlingsnamnet ”referenser” gömmer sig en del pärlor. Förutom ordförklaringar och en (för ett referensverk) fyllig bibliografi finner vi index över specialartiklar vilka tacknämligt är placerade i anslutning

till den bibeltext de söker kasta ljus över. En del av dessa är relativt omfattande, till exempel beträffande Hesekiels tempelvision (Hes 40–48). Som komplement till de femton större historiska översiktskartorna i slutet av verket finns även cirka 200 mindre kartor i anslutning till bibeltexten (med index). Detta uppskattas även med tacksamhet, eftersom man här slipper bläddra för att få en visuell geografisk påminnelse. I referensavdelningen ingår även konkordans, tabell över mått och vikter samt en översikt över nord- och sydrikets kungar.

Anakronismen ”Palestina” (karta 11, samt i text) är dock anmärkningsvärd eftersom landområdet aldrig hette så under GT:s tid. Först efter den nytestamentliga tidshistorien sedan länge är avslutad, efter att Bar Kochba-upproret hade krossats 135 e.Kr., sätter romarna det namnet på landet, samtidigt som Jerusalem kallas Aelia Capitolina – allt för att utplåna tanken på judisk närvaro. I en tid av förintelseförnekelse och ökande antisemitism borde även en arkeologisk studiebibel vara aktsammare med terminologin.

ESV Archaeology Study Bible skiljer sig från ESV Study Bible (2008) i det att de drygt 2000 noterna i arkeologistudiebibeln ägnas åt arkeologiska, historiska och geografiska bakgrunder till de händelser som omnämns i texten (medan förstås den vanliga studiebibelns noter ger exegetiska och, för ESV:s del i jämförelse med NIV-studiebibelns, systematiskt-teologiska upplysningar). I förordet framhålles att verket vilar på tre ”pelare”: 1) biblisk ortodoxi: ”samtliga författare bekänner sig till klassisk evangelikalism i reformationens historiska fåra, och bekräftar gudomlig inspiration, sanning och auktoritet för både Gamla och Nya testamentets skrifter i deras helhet som varande Guds enda skrivna ord, utan fel i allt de uttrycker” (vii); 2) akademisk integritet: ”alla som bidrar i detta projekt är synnerligen välkvalificerade forskare (eng. ’scholars’) inom humaniora med stor erfarenhet inom arkeologi och angränsande forskningsfält med anknytning till Bibeln”. Archaeology Study Bible ”distanserar sig från den typ av ’populärarkeologi’ som är sensationsskapande men inte tillförlitlig” (viii); samt 3) tillgänglighet: förhoppningen är att verket kommer att användas brett inom församlingen/kyrkan, av lekfolk, universitetsstuderande och pastorer ”som borde

uppfatta materialet som ett hjälpmedel när de söker uppbygga sina församlingar i skriftens historiskhet och tillförlitlighet" (viii).

Redaktörerna hoppas att läsaren skall slås av Bibelns "jordnärhet" (eng. "earthiness"), alltså hur skriften tecknar en bild av verkliga människor i tid och rum, hur de brukade jorden, byggde sina hus och levde familjeliv. Man hoppas läsaren skall fascineras över att det finns en Gud som skapat universum, som är transcendent, men som även talar och handlar i historien. Framför allt hoppas man läsaren skall slås av faktum att Gud har handlat i tid och rum genom att sända sin son.

Så, vad innebär denna (tros-)deklaration vid bedömningen av arkeologiska data? Erövringen av Jeriko torde vara ett lämpligt test. Man noterar i en specialartikel på sida 292 att ämnet är mycket omdiskuterat, men tar som utgångspunkt att berättelsens historicitet som sådan är förnimbar (eng. "discernible") eftersom en erövring från öster nödvändigt måste hantera knutpunkter för handelsvägar som Jeriko (och Ai). Man konstaterar att Jeriko är svårbedömd som arkeologisk utgrävningsplats. Fyra större utgrävningar har ägt rum, de första när metoder och keramisk datering fortfarande höll på att utvecklas, och olika strata är svåra att särskilja. Staden var väl befäst under tidig- och mellanbronstid, men utsattes för stor förstörelse mot slutet av mellersta bronsåldern, cirka 1550 f.Kr. Mycket litet tyder på att staden byggts upp igen och förstörts under sen bronsålder.

Man stöter på flera svårigheter när man försöker få arkeologiska data att passa den stad Josua hade att göra med. ESV Archaeological Study Bible intar positionen att erövringen av Jeriko fått en långt större betydelse än vad den inombibliskt har: Vandringen i öknen är mer framträdande i GT. I NT nämns Jerikos fall endast i Hebr 11:30–31. Man menar att såväl konservativa som kritiska forskare dragit för stora växlar på ett bristfälligt material, "forskare av idag inser svårigheten med att tolka arkeologiska resultat relaterat till Bibeln och fokuserar istället på att tolka bibeltexten i dess historiska miljö och inte ta arkeologins sköra (eng. 'fragile') landvinningar som utgångspunkt för en diskussion om erövringen".

Positionens innebörd är inte helt klar, och logiken inte helt övertygande, men torde vara ett representativt exempel på verkets attityd i enskildheter.

Bo Krister Ljungberg, Knivsta

PAUL B. DUFF
Moses in Corinth: The Apologetic Context of 2 Corinthians 3
NovTSup 159, Leiden: Brill, 2015, Inbunden, 240 sidor,
SEK 1220, ISBN: 978-9-00428-843-0

I denna bok presenterar Paul B. Duff en genomarbetad analys av Paulus argumentation i 2 Kor 3. Undertiteln vittnar om Duffs syn på denna Paulustext, nämligen att den utgör en del av ett apologetiskt försvarstal från aposteln riktat till församlingen i Korinth. Paulus har stött på motstånd, ett motstånd som oftast har förklarats utifrån rivaliserande apostlar i Korinth. I denna bok argumenterar Duff istället för att motståndet kommer inifrån församlingen. Vidare hävdar Duff även att de till synes negativa uttalandena om Mose och det gamla förbundet i 2 Kor 3 inte är en allmän nedvärdering av dessa. Det handlar snarare om att Paulus, hedningarnas apostel, påvisar hur dessa förhåller sig till specifikt icke-judar. *Moses in Corinth* kan, enligt mig, med fördel placeras inom den forskningstrend som benämns ”Paul within Judaism” (eller “det radikalt nya perspektivet på Paulus”). Vi återkommer till detta.

I bokens inledande kapitel presenterar Duff tre svårigheter som ofta diskuterats i relation till tolkningen av 2 Kor 3: 1) frågan om 2 Korinthierbrevets enhet; 2) Paulus motståndare i Korinth; och C) frågan om varför Mose dyker upp i Paulus argument. Dessa ligger till grund för den fortsatta analysen och diskussionen.

I bokens andra kapitel fokuserar författaren särskilt på frågan om huruvida 2 Kor är ett enhetligt brev eller om det är sammansatt av flera olika brev eller fragment. Duff redogör här för en del av forskningshistorien på området och redovisar de viktigaste diskussionerna och argumenten. Han argumenterar sedan själv för att 2 Kor utgörs av totalt fem olika brev eller fragment, en teori som brukar kallas ”the five-letter hypothesis”. Utöver den del där 2 Kor 3 återfinns (2:14–7:4) delas det

kanoniska brevet upp enligt följande: 1:1–2:13 och 7:5–16; kap 8; kap 9; och kap 10–13. Duff påpekar att den inbördes ordningen är svår att fastslå, men utgår i sin argumentation från att kap 8 skickats först och att 2:14–7:4 följt därpå.

Utifrån denna uppdelning av brevet och med den föreslagna kronologin, resonerar Duff i bokens tredje kapitel kring motståndet som Paulus försvarar sig mot i 2 Kor 3. En vanlig slutsats bland forskare är att motståndet ska kopplas till de ”väldiga apostlar” (ὑπερλίαν ἀποστόλων, 11:5; 12:11) och/eller ”falska apostlar” (ψευαπόστολοι, 11:13) som omnämns senare i brevet. Utifrån slutsatsen att kapitel 10–13 är skrivna efter 2:14–7:4 argumenterar Duff för att dessa apostlar inte ska påverka diskussionen om motståndet i 2 Kor 3. Duffs hypotes är istället att några församlingsmedlemmar tagit illa vid sig av Paulus förmaningar i Första Korinthierbrevet. När de sedan tar emot ett brev gällande insamlingen till Jerusalem (2 Kor 8) ökar missnöjet ytterligare. Från att tidigare beskrivit att några ur församlingen ska leverera insamlingen till Jerusalem (1 Kor 16:3–4) tycks Paulus ha ändrat sig till att han själv, tillsammans med en medhjälpare, ska göra detta (2 Kor 8:18–19). Duff menar att 2 Kor 3 är en del av det försvarstal som Paulus skriver för att bemöta denna kritik.

I bokens fjärde kapitel inleder Duff sin egen analys och diskussion av 2 Kor 3 (eller mer korrekt, 2:14–3:18). Detta kapitel behandlar 2 Kor 2:14–3:6 och utgår från Paulus retoriska fråga: ”Vem förmår något sådant?” (καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα τίς ἱκανός, 2 Kor 2:17). Duff diskuterar de rekommendationsbrev som tas upp i 2 Kor 3:1, vilka Paulus ser som överflödiga då korinthierna själva är hans brev (2 Kor 3:2). Med Israels mottagande av lagen vid Sinai i bakgrunden beskriver Paulus hur detta brev är skrivet ”inte med bläck utan med den levande Gudens ande, inte på tavlor av sten utan i era hjärtan, på tavlor av kött och blod” (2 Kor 3:3). Detta är, enligt Duff, inte en kritik mot Torah utan en kontrast mellan det som är skrivet på köttsliga hjärtan och det som är skrivet ”on normal material” (131). Här anar vi tendensen i Duffs tes om att Paulus inte nedvärderar Mose eller den judiska lagen i 2 Kor 3. Vidare menar Duff att Paulus presenterar sig själv som en tjänare som i sig själv inte

har förmåga att klara av sin uppgift, men att Gud ger honom denna förmåga. Detta, menar Duff, skapar en tydlig parallell till Mose och hans kallelseberättelse i 2 Mos 4; precis som Gud gav Mose förmåga att leda folket har han nu gett Paulus förmåga att vara tjänare av ett nytt förbund (2 Kor 3:6).

I bokens femte kapitel konstaterar Duff att jämförelserna i 2 Kor 3:7–11 oftast har tolkats som att Paulus kort och gott tar avstånd från och nedvärderar det gamla förbundet. Duff påpekar att Paulus här använder ett så kallat *a minore ad maius*-argument (”från det mindre till det större”) och beskriver, utifrån Aristoteles och Cicero, hur ett sådant argument fungerar. Det handlar inte om att skapa en kontrast mellan två objekt, utan snarare om att visa på likhet och kontinuitet dem emellan. Paulus nedvärderar alltså inte Mose och det gamla förbundet, utan använder dem för att visa de positiva likheterna med det nya förbundet och Paulus egen tjänst.

I 2 Kor 3:7–11 beskrivs Moses tjänst som både ”dödens tjänst” (ἡ διακονία τοῦ θανάτου, 3:7) och ”domens tjänst” (ἡ διακονία τῆς κατακρίσεως, 3:9). Duffs förklaring till denna till synes negativa hållning är att församlingen i Korinth består av icke-judar och att det är för dem som Mose tjänst innebär död och dom. Han skriver: ”When Paul speaks of the condemnation and death that accompanied the Mosaic ministry, he does not have in mind condemnation and death in store for Torah-observant Jews” (153–154). Duff styrker sitt argument med att hänvisa till några antika judiska texter som talar om att icke-judar ska bli dömda av Torah (t.ex. T. Mos. 1:12–13; LAB 11:2; 4 Ezra 7:37–38).

I det sjätte kapitlet är Paulus jämförelse mellan honom själv och Mose i fokus. Duff utgår från tre ”porträtt”: ”Moses the veiled envoy” (3:12–13); ”’Moses’ (the text) and Israel” (3:14–15); samt ”Moses the paradigmatic believer” (3:16–18). I den första delen (3:12–13) kontrasterar Paulus sig själv med Mose utifrån temat ”öppenhet” (παρρησία). Mose valde att sätta en duk framför ansiktet (2 Mos 34:33–35) medan Paulus inte döljer något. I den andra delen (3:14–15) skiftas fokus till Mose som ”text”, och slöjan framför Mose ansikte ligger nu istället över läsningen av texten. I den sista delen (3:16–18) argumenter-

ar Duff för att Mose framhålls som en förebild för korinthierna (”the paradigmatic believer”). Här finns bland annat en diskussion gällande subjektet till verbet ἐπιστρέψη i 3:16, där Duff argumenterar för att det är Mose som åsyftas, och inte en obestämd ”någon” eller ”vemhelst”.

I bokens sjunde och sista kapitel presenterar Duff sina slutsatser och vi ska kort utvärdera ett par av dessa. Bokens tes vilar på teorin om att Andra Korinthierbrevet är en sammansättning av fem brev eller fragment. Duff hävdar att många tolkningar av 2 Kor 3 vilar på det felaktiga antagandet att motståndarna i kapitel 10–13 är orsaken till Paulus försvarstal. Genom att göra sig av med dessa menar han sig kunna göra en tolkning som utgår direkt från 2 Kor 3. Problemet är att Duff tvingas till en komplex historisk rekonstruktion som inte övertygar fullt ut. Löftet om en tolkning som utgår direkt från 2 Kor 3 visar sig vara svårt att hålla.

Duff hävdar alltså att de till synes negativa orden om ”dödens” och ”domens tjänst” (3:7, 9) inte nedvärderar Moses tjänst eller det gamla förbundet i sig, utan enbart dess inverkan på icke-judar. Problemet med denna tolkning är att Paulus tydligt skriver om dessa i relation till just judar, både vid Sinai (3:7, 13) och i Paulus egen samtid (3:14–15). Antagandet att Paulus enbart riktar sig till icke-judar, vilket är signifikativt för ”Paul within Judaism”-perspektivet, blir här svårt att upprätthålla och fungerar stundtals som en tolkningsmässig ögonbindel. Duffs bok är, trots detta, intressant och nytänkande.

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Stephen Germany
The Exodus-Conquest Narrative: The Composition of the Non-Priestly Narratives in Exodus-Joshua
FAT 115, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017, Hardback, 515 pages, €139, ISBN: 978-3-16155-518-3

The systematic dismantling of the classical four-document hypothesis of the Pentateuch initiated by scholars like John Van Seters, Rolf Rendtorff, Hans-Heinrich Schmid and their followers in the mid-1970s has stimulated new thinking about the problem of the history of the Torah

book. In spite of the question mark put at the very basic assumption of the classical hypothesis, viz. the existence of four parallel accounts of Israel's pre-history, reflecting different stages in its religious history, it has turned out to be difficult to abandon the documentary hypothesis completely. Most scholars would still admit today that there are three basic components in the Pentateuchal text: the book of Deuteronomy (D), the Priestly Code (P) and the rest (non-P). The identification of D is not problematic since it stands out not only by its peculiar style and theology but also by the fact that it is a separate volume in the Torah book since pre-rabbinic times. The view of Deuteronomy as a composition independent from the rest of the Torah book, launched by Wilhelm Leberecht de Wette in 1806 is still accepted by a majority. But there is also widespread agreement on the delimitation and identification of P. Even modern iconoclasts usually adhere to the definition of the priestly text outlined by Theodor Nöldeke in 1869 and cemented by Julius Wellhausen in 1885.

But the fight about the historical and ideological relationship between these layers and their origins goes on. One important issue in the discussion has been the relationship between the book of Joshua and the assumed Pentateuchal sources. Common opinion since the days of Nöldeke and Wellhausen was that those sources continued into the book of Joshua. This was revised by Martin Noth to whom Joshua is basically a D-composition, using some older sources which, however, are not connected to the non-D layers in the Pentateuch. This hypothesis, which had many followers for a while, seems to have been abandoned by a growing number of scholars who argue for the existence of a pre-P account of the patriarchs and the exodus-conquest, reflected in the Pentateuch. This was in fact even assumed by Noth himself.

Stephen Germany's (SG) study deals with the relationship between the exodus-conquest account in P and non-P as found in Exodus-Numbers and Joshua. Common opinion still is that P is the latest addition to the Pentateuch as was upheld by Rendtorff, to whom the basic outline of the Pentateuch is a D-product to which P has been added. SG now sets out to look in detail for: a) evidence for a continuous non-P ac-

count of the exodus-conquest story; and b) the relationship between such an account and that of P. Since the existence of the Yahwist and Elohist sources is much more doubtful than assumed by the classical documentary hypothesis, SG feels free to look at the non-P texts with fresh eyes. This is a very positive methodological stance which allows a scholar to see new things without having to adapt the text to the procrustean bed of the traditional J and E sources.

SG divides his analysis of the exodus-conquest account into eleven sections: The exodus from Egypt; the wilderness wandering from Egypt to Sinai; the revelation of the Law; the golden calf episode; the wandering from Sinai to Kadesh; the wandering from Kadesh to the plains of Moab; the Balaam episode; preparations for the conquest; the conquest of Jericho and Ai; the conquest of the remainder of the Land. Each section is then divided into smaller parts. The exodus section is, for example, subdivided into the theme of Pharaoh's oppression, Moses' birth and flight, Moses in Midian, the first encounter with pharaoh, the second commissioning of Moses (Exod 6:2–7:7), the plagues, and the departure. Every subdivision consists of a literary-critical analysis, a macro-contextual analysis, and a synthesis. Every section is then rounded off with a summary of the results. The literary-critical analysis consists of a very close reading of the text, paying attention to all possible "tensions" and contradictions. The macro-contextual analysis relates these phenomena to larger contexts, such as narrative threads and parallel phrases in other passages. This very well organized form makes the book readable in spite of its voluminous scope (455 pages, apart from the bibliography and the index).

Based on what is seen as tensions, additions and contradictions SG arrives at a view of the exodus-conquest account as a mosaic of pieces pasted together by different hands and structured into at least six different layers. He arranges these layers in a relative chronology derived from how they are dependent upon each other. He claims that this kind of structuring is possible from his detailed reading. The next step is then to relate the layers belonging to the non-P passages to the "genuine" Priestly Code. According to SG it is possible to discern whether a non-P text

has P as its prerequisite or if there are no traces of acquaintance with P. The arrangement is laid out at the end of each section where the Hebrew text is printed and distributed according to the layers established.

The results of the investigation are the following: It is possible to reconstruct a pre-priestly pre-deuteronomistic narrative from Exodus to Joshua containing YHWH's commissioning of Moses followed by the departure of Israel after three plagues. The people enter the wilderness, travel around the eastern side of Dead Sea where Moses dies and Joshua takes over. He captures Jericho and Ai, makes peace with the Gibeonites and conquers Judaea. Some further pre-priestly passages have been added to this narrative. Since this layer contains the birth story of Moses it is, according to SG, dependent on the Assyrian version of the Sargon legend which indicates a dating to the seventh century BCE. This receives support if the conquest story reflects the time of Josiah whom Joshua may represent. According to SG "one of the most decisive stages in the formation of the Pentateuch is the integration of the priestly literature into [this] pre-priestly narrative thread" (454). This has taken place at a fairly early stage (but after the incorporation of Deuteronomy), which implies that large parts of the non-P texts in Exodus-Joshua are post-priestly. Together with SG's reconstructed pre-priestly account, the "real" P as a rule also offers a continuous narrative whereas the "post-P" layers appear as supplements and commentaries to the main narrative thread(s).

A critical comment is that the way SG reads the text—looking for tensions, cracks etcetera and then explaining them as the sign of several hands—is problematic. It has often been pointed out that this kind of reading stems from a preconceived idea that a narrative has to be completely straight and streamlined without any unevenness or contradictions, and that if such are found, they must indicate different "sources." This kind of consistency is unlikely, however, not the least in texts from antiquity, and SG's reading therefore seems a little old-fashioned. This notwithstanding, his results are quite interesting and as far as to the main division into three main layers—The pre-P; P; and the post-P complements—they are relevant as explanations of several features in

the text. The detailed differentiation within especially the pre-P and post-P layers is probably exaggerated, however, and the cracks can be explained otherwise. One may also doubt the hypothesis of P being a commenting insertion into the pre-P account. Could they not have been independent compositions from the beginning? If Deuteronomy was part of the narrative before the inclusion of P, why are there no traces of P in D (apart from possibly Deut 34:7–8)?

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PETER HALLDORF
Alla himlens fåglar har flytt:
Profeten Jeremia i sin egen tid och i vår
Skellefteå: Artos, 2017, Inbunden, 797 sidor,
SEK 379, ISBN: 978-91-7777-001-5

Denna bok är i grund och botten en kommentar till Jeremia bok, som börjar med ett antal kapitel som ger en historisk och teologisk inledning till läsningen, varefter följande kapitel kommenterar Jeremia från början till slut. Peter Halldorf är en välkänd pastor, skribent och tidigare föreståndare för den ekumeniska kommuniteten i Bjärka-Säby. Han är lekman i förhållande till bibelvetenskapen, men, som det ska visa sig, påläst. Inte minst verkar här finnas en påverkan från Walter Brueggemann, Martin Buber, Abraham Heschel och Daniel Berrigan. Det finns en bibliografi i slutet men det görs inga litteraturhänvisningar, vilket fokuserar läsningen på vad som sägs, samtidigt som man ibland hade önskat att man kunnat ta vissa resonemang vidare.

En viktig ingång i Halldorfs tolkning signaleras i bokens underrubrik ”... i sin egen tid och vår”. Det påminner om Krister Stendahls uppdelning av ”what it meant” och ”what it means”, och boken kan sägas utgöra ett förslag till läsning av Jeremia så att det budskap som finns här också adresserar det samtida Sverige och, inte minst, kristna och kyrkor i Sverige. På det sättet är kommentaren inte helt olik den amerikanska Interpretation-serien. Viktiga jämförelsepunkten i läsningen är treenigheten, inkarnationen, den kristna kyrkans trosbekännelser och ökenfäderna.

Ett första exempel på att Halldorf är påläst kommer i de inledande kapitlen med historisk och teologisk bakgrund, som i stort sett följer standardlösningar för Jeremia bok. Det intressanta med detta i det sammanhang som Halldorf skriver för, är att en vanlig anklagelse mot bibelvetenskap är att man enbart är historiskt intresserade – att man blir arkeologer istället för teologer. Halldorf ägnar 200 sidor åt att visa att det är fel och att historien har mening för förståelsen av både Jeremia och nuet. Det är historieskrivning i Peter Englunds efterföljd där det inte är så att ”det enda vi lär oss av historien är att vi inte lär oss något av historien”. Halldorf skriver visserligen att hans främsta fokus är bokens kanoniska enhet och plats (50), men trots det utgår förvånansvärt mycket av tolkningen från historiska ställningstaganden. Så målas till exempel en mörk historisk period med barnoffer till Molok under kung Manasses tid upp som en viktig resonansbotten för Jeremias kärva budskap, ett faktum som ju varit omdebatterat.

De två första kapitlen tecknar den historiska bakgrunden till Jeremia bok specifikt, medan kapitel tre till fem spårar den profetiska traditionens utveckling i Israel. En viss ojämnhet uppstår här. Halldorf tecknar ett initierat porträtt av Josias reformer, samtidigt som han kan skriva att David skapar ett imperium som sedan aldrig skulle återuppstå (105) och att Salomo skriver om likgiltighet och tristess i Predikaren (111). Men detta är mindre detaljer.

Efter inledningen följer två kapitel som i stort sett är metaforanalyser. Kapitel sex analyserar äktenskapsmetaforen i Jer 3. Halldorf ser den som starkt influerad av Hosea, och utforskar minnets betydelse samt förhållandena mellan andlighet och sexualitet, längtan och begär, och behovet av askes. I kapitel sju står Jer 4:5–6:30 i fokus och Guds omsorg om fåglarna som en metafor för människans förhållande till skapelsen och hennes sökande efter en plats i den. Detta tolkar Halldorf i ljuset av Edward Caseys teorier om platslöshet.

Resten av kapitlen i boken kan sägas vara ett antal fallstudier som undersöker olika motiv, symbolhandlingar, teologiska frågor eller historiska händelser, dock hela tiden genom att följa Jeremia bok från början till slut. Kapitel åtta tittar på motivet om Guds vrede i Jer 6. Kapitel

nio handlar om Jeremias tempelpredikan i Jer 7 och 26. Halldorf menar att ett viktigt historiskt skäl till predikan ligger i att de religiösa reformerna avstannat efter Josias död. Halldorf ser också predikan som en vändpunkt i Jeremias liv, där han under kung Jojakim och framåt möter alltmer motstånd.

I kapitel tio tittar Halldorf på fenomenet profetisk förbön, framför allt i ljuset av hur olika röster kan växla utan markering i texten. Är det Gud, profeten eller folket som talar? Detta vittnar om det nära samspelet mellan profeten och Gud å ena sidan, och profeten och folket, å den andra, menar Halldorf. Kapitel elva behandlar Jeremias bekännelser. Dessa är, menar Halldorf, inte så mycket självbiografiska som allmängiltiga, i det att Guds relation till Israel förkroppsligas i lidande, bön och utgivande. Kapitel tolv handlar om Jeremias symbolhandling med höftskynket i Jer 13 och liknelsen utifrån krukmakarens skiva i Jer 18. Medan det första föregriper exilen, blir det andra en symbol för hopp om hur Gud kan börja om med sitt folk.

Kapitel tretton behandlar striden mellan Jeremia och profeten Hananja i Jer 27–28 och frågan om äkta och falsk profetia. Halldorf noterar här kriterierna i Deut 13 och 18, men också hur Jeremias främsta kritik är att de falska profeterna profeterar sina egna tankar och drömmar. Samtidigt menar Halldorf att Jeremia inte ska uppfattas som en passiv kanal i förhållande till Gud: ”Men att befinna sig under Guds hand är inte ett tillstånd som reducerar profeten till ett passivt instrument.... Mitt under det att inspirationen är över honom kan vi höra profeten i sin dialog med Gud protestera, vädja, invända och be att budskapet ska mildras – eller skärpas” (408). Jag håller med Halldorf i hans vilja att komplicera förståelsen av hur profetiorna kom till. Samtidigt kan man fundera om bibeltexterna kan tas som utgångspunkt för att beskriva den processen. Är en del av de profetior vi har i Jeremia snarare redovisade arbetsprocesser än färdiga slutprodukter? Troligen är de ”färdiga profetior” – och det innebär att brottningskampen som speglas i dem får andra syften.

I kapitel fjorton analyseras Jer 29 och Jeremias brev till judéerna i Babylon i ljuset av att som en religiös minoritetsgrupp överleva i ett an-

norlunda majoritetssamhälle. Sedan följer två kapitel som handlar om trösteboken i Jer 30–33. Kapitel femton handlar om Torahn och det nya förbundet. Halldorf pekar här på Jeremia som en ”påskaftonsprofet”, det vill säga att han mellan katastrof och nystart får predika hopp. Kapitel sexton griper tillbaka på Jer 25 och profetian om Babyloniernas 70-åriga välde, där en ”vredens bägare” nämns. Halldorf gör här en intressant utläggning av motivet om bägaren, som kopplar ihop vredens bägare och välsignelsens, påskmåltiden, nattvarden, brödundret såsom det berättas om det i Joh 6, och slutligen även frågan om nattvarden som det nya förbundets måltid. Framställningen avslutas med en förtjänstfull diskussion av frågan om ersättningsteologi.

Kapitel sjutton diskuterar rekaviterna i Jer 34–35 i ljuset av *Shema'* och vad Halldorf kallar ”lyssnandets askes”. Kapitel arton analyserar symbolhandlingen med åkerköpet i Jer 32. Efter detta följer ett antal kapitel som utgår från exilen och dess betydelse. Kapitel nitton tecknar Jerusalems historia från tidig bosättning fram till exilen, kapitel tjugo händelserna som leder fram till att Jeremia förs ner till Egypten och kapitel tjugoett Jeremias verksamhet i Egypten (Jer 43–45). Vi har då kommit fram till domsutsagorna mot nationerna i Jer 46–51, som behandlas i kapitel tjugotvå och tjugotre. Halldorf läser dessa som en universell förståelse av Jahveh-tron. Han menar att domen mot Babylonien (Jer 50–51) visar att ”... hörsamhet mot Gud ska för Israel aldrig mer vara liktydigt med underdånighet under Babylon” (674). Detta blir ju intrycket av hur domsutsagorna placerats i Jeremia, men kan vi veta att alla domsutsagor uttalades efter exilen?

Kapitel tjugofyra är, möjligen oväntat, en läsning av Klagovisorna. Halldorf utgår inte från att Jeremia skrivit dessa, utan läser dem (i stor utsträckning med utgångspunkt i Kathleen O'Connors arbete) som vittnesbörd om hur exilen bearbetades. Kapitel tjugofem, till sist, är en reflektion över behovet av profeter i vår tid.

Halldorfs bok är inte en kommentar i den meningen att den snabbt kan scannas av för att hitta information. Tvärtom är den skriven för att läsas långsamt och med eftertanke. Därför blir en sådan här sammanfattande översikt orättvis, då läsupplevelsen i sig är ett bärande element i

texten. Boken bygger på ett gediget arbete, även om det finns viktiga luckor och brister i detaljer som en tränad exeget kanske inte hade gjort. Detta gör inte så mycket eftersom bokens syfte inte är att positionera sig historiskt eller språkligt, utan att tala teologiskt till vår samtid. Samtidigt är sådana frågor stundtals så inarbetade i framställningen att läsningen ibland misslyckas (och det handlar inte om att ”de lärde tvistar”). Förhoppningsvis skrivs fler sådana här böcker, också av bibelvetare.

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Craig S. Keener och Edward T. Wright (red.)
Biographies and Jesus: What Does It Mean for the Gospels to be Biographies?
Lexington: Emeth Press, 2016, Pocket, 457 sidor,
SEK 318, ISBN: 978-1-60947-106-4

Att de kanoniska evangelierna ska betraktas som antika biografier är numera väl etablerat inom bibelvetenskapen. Även om genrefrågan fortsatt diskuteras har omfattande studier av Richard Burridge, Dirk Frickenschmidt och Tomas Hägg övertygat de flesta forskarna om att evangelierna lämpligen bör förstås utifrån en vid biografisk genre. Trots det har få studier behandlat implikationerna av en sådan genrebestämning. Följande antologi ger därför ett välkommet bidrag till diskussionerna i denna viktiga fråga. Antologin, som Craig Keener och Edward Wright redigerat, innehåller ett par artiklar skrivna av etablerade forskare men framför allt presenteras forskning av Keeners egna doktorander.

I det första kapitlet ger Keener en informationstät introduktion till antika biografier och antik historieskrivning som förser läsaren med otaliga referenser till både primärtexter och aktuell sekundärlitteratur. Keener klargör att bokens syfte är att diskutera implikationerna av evangeliernas biografiska genre för dess relation till historisk information om Jesus. Genrefrågan ger inte svar på alla historiska frågeställningar men justerar våra förväntningar. Det är rimligt att förvänta sig att författare till antika biografier, till skillnad från till exempel antika noveller, hade historiska intentioner och använde sig av tidigare källor. Samtidigt finns det stora skillnader inom genren när det gäller hur den historiska infor-

mationen behandlas, samt flexibilitet i hur informationen framställs. Läsaren förväntade sig inte att författaren hittade på händelser, men förvånades inte över att denne fyllde ut händelser och tal. Som biografier över en person som nyligen levt kan vi således förvänta oss att evangelierna innehåller mycket betydelsefull historisk information om Jesus, men ska samtidigt inte bli förvånade om den presenteras med en viss flexibilitet.

Keener menar, med all rätt, att det finns substantiella överlappningar mellan antik historieskrivning och antika biografier. Han ger därför även en ingående beskrivning över historikernas tillvägagångssätt. På så sätt visar han på intressanta paralleller till skrivandet av biografier. Samtidigt medför detta angreppssätt en otydlighet som skapar problem, då slutsatser om den biografiska genren delvis dras utifrån historieskrivarnas tillvägagångssätt. Eftersom bokens syfte är att visa på implikationerna av evangeliernas biografiska genre, skulle framställningen tjäna på att ha ett tydligare fokus på biografierna.

Läsaren möter sedan främst artiklar som fokuserar på historisk information och användningen av källor i olika biografier och som diskuterar hur informationen i biografierna förhåller sig till uppgifter i annat källmaterial. På ett detaljerat sätt undersöks biografier skrivna av bland annat Xenofon, Cornelius Nepos, Filon, Tacitus, Plutarchos och Suetonius. Artiklarna är på många sätt influerade av Keeners utgångspunkter och bekräftar i stort hans teser. Flertalet av dem gör förtjänstfulla analyser som är relevanta för förståelsen av evangelierna.

Ett exempel är Fasil Woldemariams undersökning av tre biografier över Agesilaos (kung i Sparta), skrivna av Xenofon, Nepos och Plutarchos, vilka utgör ett intressant jämförelsematerial till synoptikerna. Woldemariam visar på att både Nepos och Plutarchos använde sig av Xenofons biografi, eftersom den var skriven av ett ögonvittne, och att substantiella innehållsmässiga likheter föreligger. Samtidigt finns det skillnader som visar på att de senare författarna (främst Plutarchos) använde sig av fler källor och att levnadstecknare tog sig friheten att återberätta livsberättelsen utifrån sina syften, intressen och övertygelser om vad som inträffat, utan att för den sakens skull äventyra den grundläg-

gande historiska informationen. Det som kan framstå som motsägelser mellan de olika biografierna kan ofta förklaras utifrån det litterära sammanhanget och författarnas selektiva urval utifrån sina intressen.

I en annan artikel gör Esteban Hidalgo en redaktions-kritisk analys av första delen av Filons biografi över Mose. Hidalgo medger att det är svårt att klargöra Filons redaktion, eftersom han använt sig av både Pentateuken och muntlig tradition, men visar ändå tydligt på Filons beroende av det bibliska materialet i sin redogörelse av Mose liv. Filon tolkar ofta materialet i Pentateuken och gör tillägg utifrån sin teologi och ideologi samt tar sig friheten att utbrodera Mose tal. Men enligt Hidalgo gör han inte detta på ett sätt som motsäger de bibliska texterna, utan han härleder sin beskrivning från dessa och är angelägen om att skriva en biografi som håller sig till historiska fakta. Filons biografi över Mose visar således att en författare till en antik biografi kunde ha ambitionen att presentera historiska fakta och samtidigt ta sig friheten att utveckla och omplacera källmaterialet, utifrån sina syften och tolkningar. Hidalgo lyfter fram att Filons biografi är ett intressant jämförelsematerial till Johannesevangeliet.

I slutet av antologin finns ett informativt appendix där Keener adresserar frågeställningar kring hanteringen av information före skrivandet av biografier och där han beskriver minnets och den muntliga traditionens funktion. Keener redogör för delar av minnesforskningen och lyfter särskilt fram att memorering användes utbrett och värderades högt i den antika världen. Memorering var central i antik utbildning och filosofers och andra lärares elever förväntades att memorera undervisningen. Det finns därför goda skäl till att anta att Jesu lärjungar tagit emot och fört vidare hans undervisning på omsorgsfullt sätt, likt lärjungar till andra lärare. Även om vi inte ska förvänta oss att Jesu efterföljare kom ihåg allt han sa eller återgav hans ord bokstavligen, kan vi på goda grunder anta att de förmedlade det väsentliga innehållet av hans undervisning.

Biographies and Jesus förser läsaren med en mängd intressanta paralleller mellan evangelierna och andra biografier, men väcker även frågor. Vilken är relationen mellan antik historieskrivning och antika biografi-

er? Inkluderandet av analyser av till exempel Mackabeerböckerna och avsaknad av en tydlig definition av en antik biografi bidrar till oklarheter. Keener för på många sätt samman de två, vilket redan nämnts, och beskriver Plutarchos och Suetonius biografier som ”the prime examples of biography” (5). Två författare i antologin beskriver biografier som en underkategori till historieskrivningen. Sådana uttalanden gör den biografiska genren snävare än vad den vanligtvis uppfattas och förbiser genrens andra syften. Samtidigt visar antologin i sig på en bredd i genren då den även inkluderar analyser av biografier som är skrivna av till exempel Xenophon och Filon och pekar på att historiska, teologiska och lovprisande intentioner kan vävas samman i en antik biografi.

Bokens undertitel väcker förväntningar om att implikationerna av evangeliernas genrebestämning ska behandlas vitt och brett, men det är istället evangeliernas historicitet som undersöks. Konsekvenser för till exempel evangeliernas syften, karaktärisering och tolkning behandlas inte. Undertiteln är således missvisande, vilket Keener själv påpekar. Antologin behandlar dock på ett förtjänstfullt sätt sitt huvudsyfte, att analysera hur antika biografier hanterar historisk information. På ett övertygande sätt visar flertalet artiklar att antika levnadstecknare vanligtvis var intresserade av historiska fakta och källor och att det var legitimt för författarna att hantera informationen på ett flexibelt sätt utifrån sina syften och intressen. Dessa slutsatser hjälper oss att ha rätt förväntningar på evangelierna; förväntningar utifrån deras egen genre i stället för vår tids sätt att skriva biografier och behandla historisk information.

Daniel Hjort, Lunds universitet

Alan Mugridge

Copying Early Christian Texts: A Study of Scribal Practise

WUNT 362, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016, Inbunden, xx + 558 sidor,
SEK 1710, ISBN: 978-3-16-154688-4, e-bok ISBN: 978-3-16-154760-7

I denna reviderade version av Alan Mugridges avhandling från 2010 vid University of England (handledd av G. H. R. Horsley och G. K. Stanton), publicerad av Mohr Siebeck 2016, argumenterar författaren för att majoriteten av skrivare som kopierade kristna handskrifter var utbildade

skrivare som troligen arbetade i en rad olika kontexter, men att det inte finns någon grund att påstå att de i allmänhet själva var kristna (2). Mugridge vill slå hål på ”trosföreställningen” att kristna kopierade sina texter på annat sätt än hur texter kopierades i allmänhet i omvärlden (149).

Mugridge analyserar nära 550 handskrifter (mestadels skrivna på papyrus) daterade före 400 e.v.t., dels ”kristna papyrer” med undergrupper (GT, NT, apokryfiska, patristiska, hagiografiska, liturgiska, gnostiska, manikeiska och oidentifierade texter), dels en kontrollgrupp (amuletter, magiska, judiska gammaltestamentliga och andra texter, samt skoltexter).

Författaren anger för varje handskrift dess proveniens, innehåll, nuvarande plats, datering, bibliografi och diskuterar handstilen för att avgöra om och i vilken grad skrivaren är tränad. Alla dessa detaljer om varje handskrift finns i den katalog över handskrifter som egentligen utgör huvuddelen av monografin (155–410). Mugridge använder här generella omdömen i kombination med ett eget rankingsystem i sju olika grader (1, 1-, 2+, 2, 2-, 3+, 3) för att kategorisera handstilar, alltifrån professionell kalligrafisk hand med hög kvalitet (1) till mycket oskolad hand (3), till exempel ”a hurried non-professional hand. [3+]” (205), ”the hand of a trained scribe, albeit writing without great care. [2]” (216), ”the hand is that of a professional scribe trained in producing literary texts. [1-]” (229). Det sista omdömet gäller en av de äldsta nytestamentliga papyrushandskrifterna – $\mathfrak{P}^4$ daterad till 150–250 e.v.t.

Efter en kort inledning är det dessa rådata som analyseras ur olika aspekter (11–143). Mugridge kommer inte oväntat fram till att kvaliteten på handstilen har samband med textinnehållet. Det stora flertalet kristna papyrer (hit räknas även tidiga pergamenthandskrifter) kopierades av professionella skrivare i stark kontrast till skoltexter och amuletter, mestadels kopierade av otränade skrivare. Amuletterna kanske inte ens *kopierades* från någon litterär förlaga, utan *komponerades* åt en klient i en viss situation. Undersökningen visar också att antalet papyrer av högsta kalligrafiska standard ökar dramatiskt under 300-talet, särskilt de med bibliskt innehåll, medan liturgiska hymner och böner under samma tid, då de kristnas antal ökade, i högre grad kopierats av otränade skrivare.

Mugridge avvisar däremot den vanliga föreställningen att kristna papyrer kopierades av kristna. Ett vanligt kriterium som ofta använts för att avgöra detta är förekomsten av *nomina sacra* (förkortningar av heliga namn och titlar, såsom Jesus, Kristus, Herre, Gud, etc.). Dessa förkortningar behöver ju inte säga något annat än att de fanns i den förlaga som skrivaren kopierade och att de med tiden spridit sig i handskriftstraditionen. Mugridge argumenterar istället för att kristna anlitade professionella skrivare, kristna eller inte, för att kopiera majoriteten av sina texter och dessa skrivare gjorde i allmänhet ett bra jobb och kopierade texten noggrant (153).

Detta innebär också att Mugridge avvisar Bart Ehrmans tes om att skrivare förvanskat texten genom att medvetet ändra den, särskilt på kristologins område (”orthodox corruption”). Detta skulle vara ointressant för skrivare om de inte själva var kristna. Här hänvisar Mugridge dock till annan forskning än sin egen (153, n. 16), han har alltså inte själv undersökt textvarianterna i fråga, och det är oklart hur Mugridge bestämmer graden av noggrannhet i kopiering, vilken metod han använder för att bestämma skrivfel (138–142).

Det går att ifrågasätta författarens metod och slutsatser på flera punkter: det är tydligt att han inkluderat i stort sett alla tidiga kristna texter som är bevarade, men det är oklart hur han resonerat vad gäller urval för kontrollgruppen av andra texter. Vidare räknas ibland samma skrivare flera gånger på grund av textinnehållet, såsom 248, 265, 265, 299 – fyra skrifter i samma kodex (1–2 Pet; Judas; Salomos Oden 11; 3 Kor) kopierade av samma skrivare.

Jag har personligen forskat på just denna papyruskodex (den nytestamentliga delen betecknas $\mathfrak{P}^{72}$) och den illustrerar ett annat problem med Mugridges metod – det finns nämligen flera tecken på att dessa fyra skrifter kopierats av en kristen skrivare, inte minst genom unika läsarter som speglar en förhöjd kristologi (som i Judas 5 där ”Gud Kristus” är den som fört folket ut ur Egypten), och de speciella kolofonerna som denna och en annan skrivare lagt till efter vissa av skrifterna, ”Frid över den som skriver och frid över den som läser!”

Poängen är alltså att det kan finnas fler tecken på kristna skrivare än just förkortningar av heliga namn (*nomina sacra*) i såväl texter som paratexter. En mycket vanlig typ av ackumulerade textvarianter i evangelierna är så kallade harmoniseringar, vilket förutsätter kunskap om parallella texter som skrivare harmoniserat till. Det är uppenbart att sådana typer av varianter förutsätter kristna skrivare som inte bara kopierar en förlaga. Mugridge antyder denna brist, ”there is no treatment here of the use of harmonisation to remote parallel readings as a means of discovering the Christian conviction of the copyist” (139).

Å ena sidan måste jag ge Mugridge rätt i att förekomsten av *nomina sacra* inte i sig är ett säkert bevis på en kristen skrivare. För min del ser jag detta och liknande fenomen som staurogrammet i kristna handskrifter (när kombinationen *tau-rho* tar formen av Jesus som korsfäst i grekiska ord för kors och korsfästa) mer som indicier. Å andra sidan finns alltså andra mer eller mindre starka kännetecken i handskrifterna som tyder på att kristna texter i högre grad kopierades av kristna skrivare än andra texter även om det är omöjligt att kvantifiera, kännetecken som Mugridge förbiser.

Oavsett om man håller med Mugridge i hans slutsatser är hans studie mycket värdefull bara genom det faktum att han sammanställt detaljerad information om nära 550 tidiga handskrifter på ett förtjänstfullt sätt, vilket gör monografin till en viktig resurs i framtida forskning.

Tommy Wasserman, Örebro teologiska högskola

Katrin Müller
Lobe den Herrn, meine “Seele”: Eine kognitiv-linguistische Studie zur næfæš *des Menschen im Alten Testament*
BWANT 215, Stuttgart: Kolhammer, 2018, Paperback, 259 pages,
€70, ISBN: 978-3-17-034436-5

The present work is a revised version of the author’s dissertation, presented at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Bern in 2016. It aims at defining the Biblical Hebrew word *nepeš*, its use in the Old Testament (OT) and its role for the conception of human beings in the OT.

The study consists of six main parts. The first one (11–18) is the introduction, where Müller spells out the various problems connected with the interpretation of *nepeš*. It is evident from the start the most important conversation partner for Müller is the 1973 work of Hans Walter Wolff, *Anthropologie des Alten Testaments*, where *nepeš* was termed an anthropological "key word" ("Hauptbegriff") of special importance for the conception of human beings in the OT. Müller's overarching research questions (13) are: What position does *nepeš* have in the OT conception of human beings?; Is it connected to or with different functions or aspects of human beings?; Is it in the long run possible to speak of a *nepeš* concept? A discussion of the difference between concept and word turns out to be of central importance throughout the book.

The second part (19–99) is a very ambitious survey of *nepeš* research, starting in "pre-critical" time. The earliest entry mentioned is the dictionary of J. Reuchlin from 1506. It turns out that already Reuchlin criticized the common translation of *nepeš* with "soul," a problem of great importance for Müller's study. I will return to this point. The first "modern" study dealing with *nepeš* was Charles Brigg's study "The Use of *nepeš* in the Old Testament" from 1897. An important work is also the 1920 book of Johannes Pedersen (Israel), which would turn out to be of great importance for Wolff. This also goes for Aubrey Johnson's *The Vitality of the Individual in the Life of Ancient Israel* (1949). Then Müller presents the work of Wolff, as well as a number of later works. Apart from presenting the various conversation partners of Müller's study, the survey aims to show why another study of *nepeš* is motivated. As I understand it, this is mainly because of two flaws in Wolff's work: 1) The idea of a peculiar "Hebrew thinking," where *nepeš* plays a central part, especially in the "stereometrical way of thinking" and the "synthetic body conception"; and 2) Wolff's confusion of "word" and "concept" (which is connected to the first point). The overarching idea here is of course that Wolff's study is of central importance to how the research tradition after him has conceived of *nepeš*, a point I will return to.

In the third part (100–125), a couple of methodological questions are addressed. Here, the critical questions in connection to Wolff are

raised. First and foremost, the idea of a peculiar "Hebrew thinking" is criticized. Müller introduces her main theoretical frame, which comes from cognitive linguistics: "Conceptualization" and "conceptual structures." When it comes to *nepeš*, the idea of conceptual metonyms, such as "body part for person" or "body part for function" is of special importance. In Müller's view, this is an overarching definition of the function of *nepeš* in the OT. It should be noted at as such, it is a *Voraussetzung* for the subsequent analysis of the different meanings of *nepeš*. The conceptual metonyms, Müller notes, are universal, existing not only in Biblical Hebrew but also in present day German or English. This is in itself a strong critique against Wolff's idea of a peculiar "Hebrew thinking," a train of thought which, as Müller to my mind correctly states, goes back to Pedersen and Johnson.

In the fourth part (126–205), the different meanings of the word *nepeš* are outlined. The section consists of a survey of a great number of *nepeš* instances from different OT books. Müller starts with the concrete meanings "throat" ("Kehle") and "breath" ("Atem"), from where various figurative meanings are supposed to have been derived. She then goes on to discuss a number of instances where *nepeš* stands for various emotions. Next, Müller discusses *nepeš* under the heading "body part for person," thus one of the conceptual metonyms outlined in the third part. Then, the much discussed question if *nepeš* can mean "corpse" or "dead person" is addressed, as is the very common rendering "soul" (Müller concludes that the rendering "Seele" ["soul"] should at all times be avoided in a scholarly setting, whereas it might be justified in a confessional setting).

When the different meanings of *nepeš* have been surveyed, the question of the place of *nepeš* in the Old Testament *Menschenvorstellung* is addressed in the fifth and, to my mind, most important part of the study (206–304). Müller first raises the question if there is such a *Menschenvorstellung*, which she hesitantly confirms: there are, after all, certain common traits in the OT, such as the "createdness" ("Geschöpflichkeit") of human beings. But, she warns, it is not self-evident that only by addressing the function and meaning of *nepeš* will one

uncover the *Menschenbild* of the OT. Then, the question of a synchronic vs. diachronic study is addressed. Müller says that since the metonymic use of *nepeš* is so frequent in all parts of the OT, there is no need for a diachronic study. Under the heading "the metonymic use of *nepeš*," *nepeš* is then discussed in its different metonymic uses, such as "body part for person" or "body part for function." In a latter part of the section, the metonymic use of *nepeš* is compared to the metonymic use of other "anthropological words," such as *ruaḥ*, *baśar*, *leb*, *lašon*, and *śapaḥ*. Müller claims that different words stand for different functions of human beings. Based on these findings, she can refute the very common idea that different anthropological words are interchangeable with each other. She also refutes the idea that *nepeš* is an anthropological "key word," since different anthropological words are of equal importance for the *Menschenvorstellung* of the OT. The human functions that *nepeš* designate, for example "vitality" or "neediness," are not per se more important than other such functions.

Müller's study is well written and well researched. She perfectly masters the very wide field of *nepeš* research, clearly arriving at new findings which cannot be overlooked. Still, I want to raise a couple of questions. First, it is not clear why Wolff's work would merit such an status as to be the main starting point for a study on *nepeš*. After all, it is only 25 out of 350 pages (in the 2010 edition) of Wolff's *Anthropologie des Alten Testaments* that focus on *nepeš*. And, as Müller notes, Wolff followed a train of thought already set by Pedersen and Johnson (and, I would claim, both of them focus on *nepeš* much more than Wolff does). Why, then, not start with either of them? It is a bit ironic that Müller herself notes on page 97 that Wolff's main interest was not *nepeš* in itself, but the OT's *Menschenvorstellung*. Secondly, Müller's study reads at parts very much as a response to the question of whether *nepeš* can be translated as "soul." This is obvious from the first part of the book's title: *Lobe den Herrn, meine "Seele."* Furthermore, on the first line on the first page of the introduction, Müller starts out with a quote from Tomas Krüger: "Die Seele ist uns abhandengekommen." To my mind, this is a bit un-

fortunate, since Müller's aim is really not to discuss whether *nepeš* means "soul" or not. By still focusing so much on this question, Müller seems to be stuck in an older discussion, which draws attention from her primary aim. Furthermore, if this question is to be discussed, it is to my mind necessary to compare with other Ancient Near Eastern "soul concepts." But it is only on page 289, when the study is coming to an end, that such concepts are being addressed.

Despite these critical remarks, Müller's study merits attention for its contribution to the questions of the meanings of *nepeš* and the conception of human beings in the OT. No one doing research on *nepeš* can overlook this thoughtful, thought-provoking and well written study.

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DANIEL C. OLSON
A New Reading of the Animal Apocalypse of 1 Enoch: "All Nations Shall be Blessed"
SVTP 24, Leiden: Brill, 2013, Inbunden, xii + 296 sidor,
SEK 1210, ISBN: 978-9-00424-530-3

Olsons bok om djurapokalypsen (hädanefter AnApoc) i 1 Hen 85–90 är ursprungligen hans doktorsavhandling (2010). Olsons vill visa att AnApoc är en ambitiös teologisk tolkning av mänskligheten historia med hjälp av allegorier i ljuset av förbundet med Abraham (14). Denna förståelse av apokalypsen utgår från en *Urzeit wird Endzeit*-model, med en första del från Eden till Isak och en andra del från Jakob till ett återvunnit Eden. Från den jordiske Jakob till en ankommande himmelske Jakob redogörs således för Israels historia. Syftet med Israels historia i AnApoc är, enligt Olson, att visa på det dynamiska i moraliskt ansvarstagande och betydelsen av ett autentiskt möte med Guds härlighet. I slutändan betjänar Israels historia inget annat syfte, och upphör dessutom att existera i slutet av apokalypsen när det sanna Israel uppstår i uppfyllelse av löftena till Abraham om universell välsignelse genom hans avkomma. Detta sista, menar Olson, är den styrande dynamiken i hela allegorin.

Huvudtemat genom Olsons bok är att AnApoc kan läsas både som en avancerad teologisk tolkning av mänsklighetens historia och som ett samtida politiskt dokument (235). Författaren till apokalypsen förser sina läsare med en originell tolkning av det förgångna i kombination med en förutsägelse om framtiden, men med ett politiskt syfte även för de omedelbara behoven i nutid (110–111). Förutom en introduktion och ett appendix argumenterar Olson för sin tes i åtta kapitel indelade i tre huvuddelar. Med dessa tre delar presenterar han tre saker: 1) AnApocs förståelse av frälsningen som universell och därmed en uppfyllelse av det abrahamitiska löftet; 2) en ny läsning av den apokalyptiska texten med textkritiska noter och kommentarer; samt 3) vad AnApoc kan bidra med i en dialog med andra forskningsområden som också fokuserar på den andra tempelperioden.

Olsons introduktionskapitel inleder med en koncis presentation av AnApoc. Därefter tar Olson upp tre problemområden: 1) vad för slags allegori är AnApoc?; 2) oenigheten kring en rad fundamentala frågor om AnApoc trots en bred koncensus om dess historiografi och övergripande ämne; samt 3) förhållandet mellan historia och teologi i AnApoc. Därför menar Olson att det behövs en ny undersökning av visionens ideologi och målsättning, en uppgift han åtar sig genom att fokusera på tre saker: 1) "the scope and focus of the allegory"; 2) "the relationship between human history and divine salvation"; samt 3) "the basis for moral responsibility." För att uppnå detta syfte ger han dessa tre områden var sitt kapitel i bokens första del. Först därefter kan en kommentar skrivas (kapitel 4–7) som inte bara duplicerar andra kommentatorers arbeten. Med tanke på Olsons ambition och de utmaningar han möter lyckas introduktionskapitlet väl med att motivera den intresserade att läsa vidare för att se lösningar på de problem han har presenterat.

Bokens första huvuddel har fått rubriken "The Animal Apocalypse and the Offspring of Abraham." I det första kapitlet, om hur apokalypsens omfattning och fokus pekar på framtiden, ansluter sig Olson till majoritetsuppfattningen att allegorin omfattar hela mänsklighetens frälsning. Olsons särskilda bidrag i detta är att den mystiske vita tjuren i slutet av AnApoc först och främst är den sanne Jakob, patriarken för ett

nytt slags Israel. Den vita tjurens ankomst och förvandlingen av alla djurarter till vita tjurar representerar därmed uppfyllelsen av löftena till Abraham att alla nationer på jorden skall bli välsignade. Olson fortsätter med att argumentera för en nära koppling mellan Henoktraditionen och det abrahamitiska förbundet, mer specifikt mellan Henok och Jakob. Den förste Jakob representerar enligt Olson en viktig vändpunkt i allegorin, då den obrutna linjen av vit boskap från Adam avbryts med honom. När vita tjuren så visar sig i slutet, är det den nye patriarken för en återvunnen och förvandlad mänsklighet. Några av de överensstämmelser som Olson ser mellan Henok och Jakob kan visserligen ifrågasättas, men hans argument är baserade på en samlad bild av dialogen mellan Jakobs- och Henoktraditionerna.

I det andra kapitlet diskuterar Olson det perspektiv som AnApoc anlägger på det förflutna. Huvudfrågan blir om det överhuvudtaget finns en relevant historia i apokalypsen, när ingen röd tråd går att upptäcka i de många händelser som utspelar sig mellan de två Jakobsgestalterna. Med olika teman och i dialog med historisk-kritiska tolkningar bygger Olson vidare på likheterna mellan Henok och Jakob. Hans slutsats om att Israels historia presenteras som en serie morallektioner i relation till det framtida perspektivet om återställandet av människans ursprungliga tillstånd har redan nämnts ovan. Olson erbjuder här nya intressanta tolkningar i konstrast till traditionella läsningar av apokalypsen.

I det tredje kapitlet diskuterar Olson allegorins syn på sin nutid, då det finns flera inslag i AnApoc som kan förklaras utifrån allegorins historiska kontext. Allt i apokalypsen har inte välsignelsen av alla nationer som slutmål, utan författaren visar att det också finns en medvetenhet om den politiska situationen och behoven i nutid. På det viset försöker allegorin övertyga det utbildade ledarskapet i Jerusalem om äktheten apokalypsens uppenbarelser (105). Det nutida perspektivet i AnApoc förtjänar uppmärksamhet, men Olsons analys gör inte lika starkt intryck som hans två första kapitel om Abrahamtraditionens roll i apokalypsen.

Bokens andra del är en översättning av och kommentar till AnApoc (1 Hen 85:2–90:42). I dess första kapitel (kap. 4) introducerar Olson metoden för sin översättning och apokalypsens arameiska, grekiska och

etiopiska texter. I kapitel 5 identifierar Olson de vilda djuren i allegorin utifrån deras arter samt etniska och politiska identiteter. Tabellerna i kapitlet är särskilt värdefulla för läsningen av apokalypsen. Själva kommentaren börjar i kapitel 6, som täcker 1 Mos–Kungaböckerna (1 Hen 85:2–89:58), för att sedan fortsätta i kapitel 7 med perioden från exilen och fram till den sista tiden, *eskaton* (1 Hen 89:59–90:42). Olsons nyöversättning är spännande och utgör ett betydelsefullt bidrag för jämförelse med andra moderna översättningar av AnApoc. Han hänvisar också flera gånger i sin kommentar till diskussionerna i bokens första del, vilket visar att hans slutsatser i de kapitlen är viktiga för hans förståelse av texten. Förutom dessa hänvisningar förblir emellertid kommentardelen ganska fristående från de övriga delarna i boken. En ännu tydligare koppling hade varit önskvärd.

I den tredje delen, som har rubriken "The Animal and the Ongoing Conversation", knyter Olson närmare an till sin huvudtes genom att placera den i ett större sammanhang. Han tar upp tre områden där AnApoc som teologiskt och politiskt dokument kan tillföra något i dialogen om andra tempelperioden: 1) samspelet mellan vishetslitteraturen och apokalyptisk litteratur; 2) mötet mellan tidig judendom och hellenismen under den Mackabeiska konflikten; samt 3) förhållandet mellan upplösningen av historia i allegorin och Paulus tankevärld. Det sistnämnda har två områden med särskilt påfallande likheter: a) relationen jude-hedning och Israels framtid; och b) Messias som både Abrahams avkomma och den nye Adam. Utöver bokens huvuddel har Olson, som nämnts ovan, ett appendix där han diskuterar två texter som anspelar på AnApoc: Barnabasbrevet och den koptiska versionen av Eliaapokalypsen. Båda texterna visar hur viktig AnApoc var för delar av den tidiga kristendomen.

Olsons visar hur avancerad AnApoc är som allegori. Hans metod och tes öppnar upp för spännande tolkningar som en traditionell läsning delvis missar. Boken kan också fungera som en introduktion för den som behöver en uppdaterad forskningsöversikt.

Stefan Green, Åbo Akademi

J. Randall Price och H. Wayne House
Zondervan Handbook of Biblical Archaeology:
A Book by Book Guide to Archaeological Discoveries Related to the Bible
Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2017, Inbunden, 416 sidor,
SEK 292, ISBN 978-0-31028-691-2

Zondervan Handbook of Biblical Archaeology är lättillgänglig genom ett pedagogiskt upplägg. De tre avdelningarna ”Arkeologi och Gamla testamentet” (sex kapitel), ”Arkeologi och den intertestamentala perioden” (fyra kapitel) samt ”Arkeologi och Nya testamentet” (fem kapitel) är konventionellt uppbyggda, med bibelböcker grupperade enligt Septuagintas ordning. Inom varje grupp är framställningen koncentrerad på sådana bibelställen som arkeologiska fynd kan belysa. Att bibelstället anges med bok, kapitel och vers *samt* att textstället direkt citeras (från NIV) är en välkommen fördel. Man slipper slå upp och påminna sig vad som exakt står där, se till exempel sidorna 66–69, som behandlar ”1 Mos 10:8–9: Arkeologiska evidenser för Nimrods identitet” (alla översättningar är recensentens).

Ett antal mindre specialartiklar belyser angelägna ämnen, till exempel ”användningen av ’Palestina’ och ’palestinsk’ inom bibelarkeologin” (där författarna efter lång bakgrundsbeskrivning förordar användningen av ”Israel” respektive ”israelitisk” när fyndplatser inom den moderna staten Israel inklusive omstridda territorier avser gamla israelitiska städer och byar), ”Rosettastenen – nyckeln till egyptiska hieroglyfer” (där Champollions dechiffreringsbedrift begripliggörs mot bakgrund av tidigare försök), eller ”ett ord om okända fyndplatser eller odokumenterade fynd” (med insiktsfull beskrivning från verklighetens handel med sådana objekt).

Inom de olika kapitlen kan följande noteras: i samband med vishetslitteraturen ges en redovisning av vishetslitteratur från Främre Orienten, i relation till profetlitteraturen ges översättningar av ”den messianska festen i Qumran” (1QSa) respektive ”Cyruscylindern” och angående det andra templet återges ”Arkeologiska undersökningar i skuggan av templet” (där man skriver om hur den islamska tempelmyndigheten sedan 1996, när man avsåg bygga Al-Marwanimoskén, dumpat 20 000 ton

material ned i Kidrondalen och hur israeliska arkeologer ur detta vaskat fram tusentals fynd). Vidare framstår kapitel 8 (”det andra templet [Serubbabels])”, kapitel 9 (”det andra templet [Herodes])” samt kapitel 10 (”Dödahavsrullarna”) som ytterst insiktsfulla och synnerligen läsvärda.

Ordförklaringar av arkeologiska termer (351–58), en bibliografi (379–395), index över bibelställen och utombiblisk litteratur samt ämnesordsförteckning gör verket lättnavigerat. 17 sidor kartor i flerfärg som belyser olika tidsepoker ger god hjälp till geografisk orientering. Två kapitel (kap. 6 resp. 15) utgörs av listor över arkeologiska fynd för GT respektive NT och är överskådligt uppställda. Eftersom mycket av den löpande texten är just löpande är denna koncentrerade sammanfattning tacknämlig.

Handboken innehåller även ett flertal introduktioner, till exempel en om bibelarkeologi i allmänhet (17–41), där författarna lyckas göra tillvägagångsätt inom arkeologin lättförståeliga. Här ingår även beskrivning av, och lista över, arkeologiska perioder jämförda med biblisk historia, samt beskrivningar av Gamla testamentets, den intertestamentala periodens, respektive Nya testamentets arkeologi.

Det är dock störande att slutnotsavdelningen är löpande endast *inom* varje kapitel (utan sidreferenser), och dessutom utan någon numrering i sidhuvudet på sidorna i det kapitel man under läsningen befinner sig. Man behöver alltså konsultera innehållsförteckningen varje gång för att navigera till aktuell fotnot, vilket man ofta har anledning till. Detta är klart negativt i ett referensverk som knappast sträckläses (och där man ofta är medveten om kapitelnummer) och en svårförklarad redaktionell miss där pedagogiken annars är föredömlig.

Recensenten har även funderat hur han skall förhålla sig till det faktum att en ”handbok” endast har två författare (varav den ene, Randall Price, uppenbarligen är huvudförfattare), samt till mängden bilder på Randall Price (se sidorna 97, 108, 137, 220, 225, 228, 254, 286, varav tre är från Qumran, där Price ledde utgrävningarna på Qumran-platån mellan 2002 och 2012 och där han nu är med-direktor för ett nytt projekt som år 2017 fann bokrullar med text i grotta 53, den första grotta

med bokrullar funnen på 60 år). Det senare blir dock något man kan och bör ha överseende med eftersom det goda med att en fältarkeolog och inte en skrivbordsarkeolog skrivit handboken överväger tungt. Författaren förmår ge en verklighetsnära beskrivning av arkeologi. Den första invändningen är däremot lite svårare att hantera, men får väl helt enkelt bedömas utifrån framställningens faktapresentationer och den logik som används. Eftersom framställningen är så klar och tydlig torde även en icke-arkeolog kunna bedöma förslagens trovärdighet.

Boken har en *mycket* tilltalande sidlayout. Den är tryckt på ett något plastat papper, vilket gör att de 260 ständigt förekommande högupplösta flerfärgsbilderna ges verklig rättvisa. Även omslaget är plastat, med hårda pärmar. Bindningen gett robust intryck, väl ägnat en handbok. Formatet är stort, 19x24 cm, men känns hanterligt.

För en exeget har det känts uppfriskande att få denna initierade och fräscha arkeologigenomgång. Price lämnar ingen tvekan om sin övertygelse om att Bibelns berättelser vittar om händelser som ägt rum på samma geografiska jord där vi befinner oss och i en tid vars kronologiska förlopp vi själva erfar en senare del av och som alltså vittnar om en Gud som är verksam i historien.

Alla textställen med arkeologisk evidens är intressanta i sig, men för att närmare karaktärisera handboken är det måhända lämpligt att se på sådana texter där det råder delade meningar, som till exempel dateringen av patriarktiden och uttåget ur Egypten. Price redovisar fyra dateringsförslag för patriarktiden:

(1) En tidig datering före och efter 2000 f.Kr. (så Archer, Waltke), där Abraham placeras i mellan-brons (MB) I/II (2166-1991 f.Kr.) utifrån inombiblisk kronologi, och där den arkeologiska evidensen vilar på ålderdomligheten i berättelsen i 1 Mos 14 (kriget mot Sodoms kung och berättelsen om Melkisedek), nomadlivet, person- och platsnamn, utgrävningar i Ur och Ebla, omnämnandet av amoriterna, geopolitiska förhållanden i MB IIA, samt områdets klimat i MB I.

(2) En tidig datering till tidigt 2000-tal, med flera varianter: MB IIA (2000-1800 f.Kr., så Glueck, Albright) utifrån lergods i Negev och Beni-Hasan-muralmålningen (1890 f.Kr.); MB IIA–B (1991-1786

f.Kr., så Kitchen, Millard) utifrån arkeologi och egyptisk kronologi under mellersta riket, samt geopolitik som i 1 Mos 14; och MB II BC (1750-1550 f.Kr., så Mazar) utifrån Mari/Nuzi-arkiven, blomstrande stadskulturer och Hyksos-dynastin.

(3) En sen datering till det andra årtusendet, cirka 1250–1150 f.Kr. (så Aharoni, Herzog) utifrån utgrävningar i Beer Sheba (inga fynd från MB) och anakronismer i 1 Mos.

(4) En extremt sen datering till persisk och grekisk period, mellan 400–165 f.Kr. (så Thompson, Van Seters) utfrån formkritik och strukturalistisk analys, folksägner och JEPD-hypotesen.

Till dessa fyra dateringsalternativ hör också motsvarande förslag gällande nedskrivningen av patriakhistorien, alltifrån Mose (en tidig datering till 1500 f.Kr.) via monarktiden till exil- eller postexilisk tid, dateringar som också får olika konsekvenser vad gäller uppfattningen om patriarkernas relation till historia som verklighet i tid och rum. Tidiga dateringar bekräftar sambandet medan senare ser berättelserna antingen som minnen (med oklar status) eller som resultatet av skapandet av en ”religiös historia” där kopplingen till verklighet i tid och rum inte finns med.

Prices framställning förordar genomgående en tidig datering och han utvecklar denna i detalj. Även den som är disponerad till att inte i förväg hålla med honom torde uppskatta denna klara och jordnära faktapresentation som objekt för begrundan. Den som redan delar hans uppfattning torde styrkas av den.

Bo Krister Ljungberg, Knivsta

Karl Olav Sandnes

Paul Perceived: An Interactionist Perspective on Paul and the Law

WUNT I 412, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018, Inbunden, 260 sidor,
SEK 1341, ISBN: 978-3-16156-101-6

Med denna bok ger Karl Olav Sandnes ett bidrag till den omfattande debatten om Paulus och lagen. Författaren hävdar att diskussionerna om Paulus, inte minst i frågor om lagen, har varit alltför begränsade. Apostelns egna ord har, enligt Sandnes, betraktats som den enda legitima ut-

gångspunkten för en analys av Paulus teologi. I *Paul Perceived* vill han därför komplettera denna diskussion utifrån ett interaktionistiskt perspektiv, vilken kan sammanfattas i frågan: Hur såg andra personer på Paulus?

I bokens inledande kapitel presenterar Sandnes en skiss av de senaste decenniernas utveckling inom Paulusforskningen med fokus på ”det nya perspektivet” och ”Paul within Judaism.” I anslutning till detta skriver han fram sin egen metod. Sandnes framhåller att receptionen av Paulus börjar samtida med aposteln själv och att hans brev i stor utsträckning karaktäriseras av sin ”dialogiska natur” (eng. ”dialogical nature”, 8). Det innebär att vi redan i breven kan uppfatta hur Paulus tolkas och tas emot i sin samtid, både genom direkt polemik och citat av motståndare och mer implicit genom hänvisningar till ”några” (τινες), eller genom bruket av diatriber. Sandnes konstaterar vidare att metoden som används i boken ligger nära frågor inom det sociologiska fältet, inte minst identitetsforskning. Från denna disciplin hämtar författaren insikter om betydelsen av konflikter och relationer i formandet av social identitet. Vidare lyfter han in frågor om multipla identiteter och argumenterar utifrån detta att judendomen vid Paulus tid bör betraktas ur både etniska och religiösa perspektiv.

I bokens andra kapitel skriver Sandnes ut sin egen hållning när det gäller Paulusforskningen. Författaren går i dialog med flera samtida forskare, framförallt inom ”Paul within Judaism.” Här problematiseras bland annat idén om att Paulus enbart riktar sig till icke-judar och att hans budskap därmed inte har någon relevans för judar. Sandnes håller med om att breven framförallt är riktade till icke-judar, men argumenterar för en distinktion mellan *mottagare* och *horisont*. Kortfattat argumenterar han för att Paulus budskap är relevant för såväl judar som icke-judar, med andra ord en relativt klassisk hållning. Sandnes framhåller även Damaskushändelsen som central för formandet av Paulus teologi.

I bokens tredje kapitel riktas fokus mot Galaterbrevet där vi, enligt författaren, hittar de tidigaste reaktionerna mot Paulus syn på lagen. Kapitlet kretsar kring tre texter (Gal 2:17; 3:21; 5:11) vilka diskuteras

utifrån idén om Paulusbrevens dialogiska natur. Här utvecklar Sandnes även sin metod genom att resonera kring möjligheten att *spegelläsa* breven. Han utgår från sju kriterier föreslagna av John Barclay, bland andra frekvens (”frequency”), tydlighet (”clarity”) och historisk rimlighet (”historical plausibility”). Att tillämpa spegelläsning på Paulus brev är i någon mån en nödvändighet för att förstå den historiska och retoriska situationen. Det är samtidigt en grannlaga uppgift som ställer tolkaren inför svåra ställningstaganden. Här finns en av de stora utmaningarna i Sandnes angreppssätt. Avsnittet om Gal 3:21 är ett exempel där Sandnes resonerar om huruvida Paulus citerar motståndare eller uttrycker sig med egna ord. Författaren tonar ned betydelsen av att avgöra detta och konstaterar: ”Galatians 3:21 is less clear than Gal 2:17 on whether it is a citation or Paul’s own inference.... If it is Paul’s inference, he made it because he was confident that this question would arise anyway. Hence, it is hardly of primary importance if Paul here voices what others have said about his theology, or if he only imagines this objection” (81).

Det fjärde kapitlet ägnas åt Romarbrevet, särskilt Rom 3:1–8. Sandnes hållning är att Rom 3:8 ger en inblick i rykten och åsikter som fanns gällande Paulus evangelium. Det är svårt att avgöra om de ”några” (τινες) som nämns syftar till specifika motståndare eller mer allmänt till kritik som florerar. Oavsett fungerar Rom 3:8, enligt Sandnes, som en grund för att förstå resten av brevet som en dialogiskt präglad text. Han resonerar kortfattat om Rom 6–8 och 9–11 innan 16:17–20 diskuteras mer ingående. Verserna anses vara en interpolation, men är ändå relevanta i att ge en bild av reaktionerna mot Paulus. Vidare ses apostelns omsorg om sina judiska stamfränder i brevet som ett argument för att Paulus horisont är vidare än den övervägande icke-judiska gruppen av mottagare i Rom.

I kapitel fem skiftar boken fokus och riktar in sig på Paulus historiska kontext. Sandnes identifierar tre områden där Paulus går i dialog med andra samtida uppfattningar. För det första handlar det om huruvida icke-judar ska omskära sig. Författaren betonar att omskärelsen hade en etnisk betoning, men även var nära sammankopplad med moral.

Detta leder vidare till det andra området, nämligen lagen som ett motgift mot synden. Här betonas att lagen, inklusive omskärelsen, var en förutsättning för självkontroll och god moral. Det tredje området var frågan om Abrahamsberättelsen. I kontrast till den gängse bilden av berättelsen som enhetlig och sammanhållen delar Paulus upp den i, å ena sidan, Abraham som får löftet (1 Mos 12) och räknas som rättfärdig (1 Mos 15) och, å andra sidan, Abraham som omskär sig (1 Mos 17) och är lydig när han prövas att offra sin son (1 Mos 22).

I bokens sjätte kapitel breddar Sandnes bilden av Paulus genom att lyfta in de handlingar som beskrivs i 2 Kor 11:24. Apostelns ord om att han ”fem gånger fått fyrtio minus ett slag” vittnar om bestraffning från de judiska myndigheterna. Sandnes framhåller att beskrivningen i grunden ska betraktas som korrekt och att anledningen till bestraffningarna är lagrelaterade. Han vänder sig emot dem som menar att det handlar om ett straff för apostasi, då de snarare vittnar om att Paulus befinner sig inom det judiska sammanhanget.

Sandnes angreppssätt i *Paul Perceived*, alltså att primärt utgå från andras syn på aposteln, innebär att Apostlagärningarna får en given roll. Kapitel sju ägnas helt åt denna skrift, vilken författaren beskriver som ett försvar för Paulus mot den kritik som fanns, inte minst gällande lagen. Porträttet av Paulus syn på lagen präglas enligt Sandnes av ambivalens (”ambiguity”). Judar ska fortsatt leva efter lagen medan icke-judar bara ska hålla sig till de delar som fastslås i apostlamötet (Apg 15). Frälsningen fungerar samtidigt på samma sätt får båda grupperna, alltså: Kristus är avgörande. Sandnes skriver här ut sin kritik mot ”Paul within Judaism” och framhåller bland annat att Paulus i Apostlagärningarna anklagas för att uppmuntra judar att inte omskära sig. Detta utmanar synen på att han bara riktade sig till icke-judar.

Bokens sjunde och avslutande kapitel presenterar en syntes av bokens innehåll. *Paul Perceived* är på det hela taget en välskriven, intressant och viktig bok. Med hjälp av det interaktionistiska perspektivet belyses frågor rörande Paulus och lagen på delvis nya sätt.

Formatet är koncist och relativt lättillgängligt. Det koncisa formatet är också en utmaning, vilket Sandnes själv noterar vid flera tillfällen.

Ambitionen är inte att summera Paulus syn på lagen, utan att lyfta fram andras röster om aposteln. Boken kan i den meningen beskrivas som heuristisk, vilket öppnar för fortsatta studier och förfining av de metoder som används. Författaren noterar själv att de kriterier för spegelläsning som tillämpas, vilka hämtas direkt från John Barclay, kan ifrågasättas och problematiseras (207). Vidare kan vi notera att en av förtjänsterna med *Paul Percieved*, nämligen att Apostlagärningarna ges en betydande roll, hade behövt en mer omfattande diskussion gällande vilka texter som är relevanta och hur skriften relaterar till Paulus. Sammanfattningsvis är *Paul Perceived* en viktig och intressant bok vilken alla som är intresserade av Paulus och lagen bör läsa.

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MATTHEW J. SURIANO
A History of Death in the Hebrew Bible
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, Hardback, 312 pages
£71, ISBN: 978-0-19084-473-8

The present study is the outcome of long time research by Matthew J. Suriano (University of Maryland). With this book, he emerges as one of the leading experts on the topic of afterlife and death in Ancient Israel. The immensely fascinating study brings together archaeological data as well as study of a number of Hebrew Bible texts.

An introduction (1–38) outlines various problems connected with the study of afterlife in Ancient Israel. One of the keys to understanding the concept of death is that the burial was an act of taking care of the dead, and with this in mind Suriano underlines that we should understand death in Ancient Israel as *relational*. The purpose of the burial and of the care for the dead was to set the dead in relation to both the living and to the ancestors, which the dead would hope to eventually reunite with. The burial also sought to ensure the relation of the dead to YHWH. As such, the burial can be described as a *ritual* with a specific purpose. As an overarching concept, Suriano uses *discourse*, here in the sense of "how the living spoke of the dead," which can be examined through the "language, social institutions, and cultural practices" (35) of

the Levant, and especially Judah. Death was perceived as a transition and was thus *liminal*. Suriano notes that as opposed to our Western concepts of dying, in Ancient Israel a person died *after* death, whereas in our Western thinking, the process of dying is something that occurs *before* death, and when death has occurred, we are dead. In contrast to this, in Ancient Israel the burial and the tomb emphasized the liminality of death. After *the first burial*, when the body was placed on the bench of the tomb, the corpse decayed, which was viewed as an act of dying. After the person had died, that is, after the corpse had completely decayed, *the second burial* was performed, which consisted of gathering the bones and placing them in a repository.

In the first main part of the study (39–128), Suriano gathers a great amount of archaeological data with emphasis on the Judahite rock-cut bench tomb. This part is divided into three chapters: "Death as Transition in Judahite Mortuary Practices"; "The History of the Judahite Bench Tomb"; and "Writing and the Tomb." The first chapter seeks to understand the Judahite tomb as a ritual space, through which death was "ritualized and traced through the movement of the body" (50). The second chapter traces the history of the Judahite rock-cut bench tomb from early Iron Age and onwards. Suriano notes that cemeteries were generally *extramural*, that is, placed outside the cities, which distinguishes them from the intramural cemeteries among, for example, Assyrians and Arameans (91). There was also a difference in mortuary practice as compared to other Ancient Near East practices. In the third chapter Suriano examines funerary inscriptions and Hebrew epigraphs on tombs, a fairly unique feature in a Northwest Semitic setting. The inscriptions sought to set the dead in relation to both ancestors and the living, as well as the deity (YHWH). This last feature marks the idea that, as Suriano importantly notes, the dead was not perceived as being "disconnected from their deity" (127).

The second main part of the study (133–258) has the title "Death and the Afterlife in the Hebrew Bible" and is an examination of a number of different Hebrew Bible texts that speak of the dead and the afterlife in various ways. In the first chapter, "Care for the Dead," Suriano

sets out to understand the Biblical Hebrew word *nepeš* as "defunct soul," which he relates to two features: "Care for the Defunct Soul" and "Feeding the Dead" (133–176). Suriano refutes the older scholarly perception of *nepeš* as "a monistic entity consisting of a unified soul and body" (136). In his discussion of the "soul concept" of Ancient Israel, he draws on the work of Michel Foucault, Mary Douglas, and, a bit surprisingly, Johannes Pedersen. What connects these three is, according to Suriano, their sensitiveness about specific cultural practices. In line with his idea of *nepeš* as an "embodied soul," Suriano notes that the work of both Pedersen and Focault "suggests that cultural concepts of the body can be defined in terms of the soul" (137). In the section on "Feeding the Dead," to my mind one of the most evocative in the entire study, Suriano discusses a number of texts that show how the living fed the dead both food and drinks. Again, this shows how death was *relational*. Suriano's interpretation Hos 9:4 (already outlined in a 2014 article) is fascinating, and it is interesting to note that for example the Hosea commentary by Hans Walter Wolff makes a completely different interpretation, in fact the very opposite of Suriano's. An important piece of information is also the Katumuwa stele, where the inscription mentions the offering of both wine and meat to the *nbš* of Katumuwa. Overall, the chapter "Care for the Dead" makes for a very fascinating read.

Suriano then goes on to discuss a number of other texts under the chapter titles "The Narrative of Bones," "The Tomb and the Identity of the Dead," "Death, Dying, and the Liminality of Sheol" (focusing a number of Psalms), and ending with an epilogue suggestively entitled "The Invisible Tomb."

To conclude, Suriano's work is very well written and well researched, and is also very pleasant to read. One of the biggest merits of the work is, to my mind, Suriano's use of the concept *relational*, which nicely brings together different aspects of death and postmortem existence, enabling the reader to see the overarching lines in both archeological data and texts.

Some questions may be asked, though. For example, why is the archeological data discussed first, and then the texts? There may be good

reasons to do this, but the archeological data discussed only stretches to the end of the Iron Age, whereas the second main part also includes fairly late texts (such as Job). This makes for a certain discrepancy between the two parts. Also, in the first part it is specifically the *Judahite* tomb and mortuary practices that are focused, whereas the perspective is much wider in the second part. Lastly, there is some inconsistency in the use of the terms "Hebrew Bible" and "Old Testament," where the latter is used a number of times, seemingly without any motivation.

However, these are only marginal objections. Overall, Suriano's study has all the qualities necessary to make it a standard work for anyone who wants to study the ideas of death and afterlife in Ancient Israel.

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Paavo N. Tucker

The Holiness Composition in the Book of Exodus

FAT II 98, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017, Paperback, 230 pages,
€79, ISBN: 978-3-16-155190-1

The wide consensus among scholars about the origin and development of the Pentateuch based on the classic exposition by Julius Wellhausen—which summarized the discussion during the latter half of the nineteenth century ending in the hypothesis of the four parallel sources J, E, D, and P composed in that chronological order and put together by several successive redactors—started to crumble definitely in the mid-seventies with the publications by John Van Seters, Hans Heinrich Schmid, and, above all, Rolf Rendtorff. Common to these scholars was the abandonment of the hypothesis of parallel sources and a general lowering of the dating of the composition. The basic outline of the Pentateuch, which implies the whole image of Israel's origins, was seen as the result of the activities of the Deuteronomistic school, thus lowering the date of the composition of the Torah texts in the shape we know them to the sixth century BCE at the earliest.

These scholars, and several of their successors (for example Erhard Blum), saw the so-called Priestly Code, P, the latest of the sources according to the classical hypothesis, as a later supplement to the D-

redacted Pentateuch and not as an independent literary work. This was a definite break with the view of most scholars, going back to Wellhausen and his colleagues and also to Theodor Nöldeke who had defined the Priestly Code in its main outlines as an independent literary work.

One specific part of P has played a role in the argumentation, viz. the so-called Holiness Code (HC), Leviticus 17–26. Most scholars since Karl Heinrich Graf have seen HC as a pre-priestly law-code later on incorporated into P. Some modern scholars (Erhard Blum, Rainer Albertz, Andreas Ruwe), however, have denied the independence of HC, instead seeing it as a part of P from the beginning. This view is partly based on the observation that there are traces of HC terminology in P outside HC. This, in turn, has led some scholars like Israel Knohl and Jacob Milgrom to assume that HC is more or less the kernel of the Priestly code. Knohl assumes the existence of a "Holiness school," responsible for most of the traditional P narrative, datable to the time of Ezekiah, hereby following for example Menahem Haran.

The study by Paavo Tucker follows in the footsteps of Milgrom and Knohl. Tucker's main thesis is that the structure-building passages in the P-narrative, the *Grundschrift*, P^G, viz. Gen 1:1–2:4a; Exod 6:2–8; 29:43–46; 31:12–17, show close relationship with Leviticus 17–26 in terminology and content. This leads to the conclusion that the entire P narrative in fact is a creation by the people behind the Holiness Code. This is what Tucker tries to show through a detailed analysis of Exod 1–14; 16; 20:8–11; 24:15b–18a; 25:1–2a, 8; 29:43–46; 31:12–17; 35:1–3; 39:32, 43; 40:17, 33–35. The P^G should be seen as a Holiness composition, HC. Its main focus is not the priestly cult per se but the relationship between creation, covenant, divine presence and religious practice, especially the sabbath, as a sign of the relationship between YHWH and Israel. The Holiness Code in Lev 17–26 summarizes the whole concept successively presented in the preceding narrative of which this law-collection is the culmination and finish. Tucker thus makes a division between the HC which constitutes the fundament of the traditional priestly code, and the priestly material proper used by the HC and incorporated in it. This material, according to Tucker, is found

mainly in Exod 25–31, 35–40, and Lev 1–16, and is thus earlier than the HC.

Tucker shows himself as a follower of Rendtorff and Blum in seeing the text as a supplementary layer to a "pre-priestly," i.e. pre-HC composition closely connected to the Deuteronomistic school which, according to this view, is the main creator of the outline of the Pentateuch as a whole. We are thus in the exilic period at the earliest and the HC would consequently be later.

Studies of the Pentateuch are notoriously intricate, often making tough reading. This book is well structured and readable and the author shows considerable pedagogical skill. He presents his main conclusions in introductory summaries to each chapter, then follows the detailed analysis of the texts which is a good solution to the problem of how to present the often complicated issues. The introductory chapter presents the problem and PT's solution and gives a survey of the contents of the five following ones. Chapter two is a short but lucid account of the *Forschungsgeschichte* of the relationship between the Priestly Code and the Holiness Code. Chapter 3 is a more detailed discussion of the arguments for and against the unity of P and HC. Chapter 4 contains an analysis of the P and HC elements in Exod 1–14. Chapter 5 is a similar thorough analysis of the same elements in Exod 16–40. A short final chapter summarizes the results of the investigation.

Tucker's command of the secondary literature on the subject is impressive and we get a full survey of the scholarly debate on the Pentateuch after the mid-seventies. It appears that the traditional "P," which always has tended to receive a limited interest from traditional biblical scholarship (to a not so small extent due to a Christian, or Protestant bias against "Spätjudentum"), is more and more moved into the focus, and its importance for the whole structure and history of the Pentateuch is becoming clearer. Tucker is a good guide to the intensive debate on these questions during the last three or four decades.

Even if Tucker stands close to the Milgrom-Knohl school he does not follow it slavishly. As was pointed out above, he agrees with Blum in seeing P and HC as a supplementary layer to a D-redacted text, thereby

deviating from those seeing it as an originally independent literary work. This is a point where some scholars would disagree, but a final consensus seems impossible to reach at the moment. Unlike Knohl, for example, Tucker tunes down the differences between the purely priestly material and the Holiness composition. He also refrains from suggesting a definite dating of his HC. It would have been interesting to have a more detailed argumentation on this question since several scholars (Haran, Knohl) have argued for a much earlier date (end of the eighth century BCE) than the traditional exilic-postexilic one.

All in all, Tucker has given a solid, lucid, and fascinating contribution to the debate on the Pentateuch which has to be seriously taken into account in the future discussion.

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Jermo van Nes
Pauline Language and the Pastoral Epistles:
A Study of Linguistic Variation in the Corpus Paulinum
Linguistic Biblical Studies 16, Leiden: Brill, 2018, Hardcover, 532 pages,
$158, ISBN 978-9-00435-841-6

This revised version of Jermo van Nes's 2017 doctoral dissertation aims at contributing something new to one of the classic problems of New Testament studies, that is, the authorship of the Letters to Timothy and Titus. Noticing that the authenticity debate involves arguments pertaining to the Pastoral Letters' historical circumstances, theological contents and linguistic characteristics, van Nes has made the decision (a wise one, for a dissertation) to deal exclusively with the issue of the language of these writings.

The first part of the study, "The Linguistic Problem of the Pastoral Epistles," begins with a detailed history of early research into the problem of the Pastoral Letters' authenticity (ch. 1). Here, van Nes reviews several famous contributions, but also breaks new—or should we say very old?—ground by tracing the questioning of the authenticity of Titus back to Edward Evanson in 1792, over a decade before German scholars began to doubt Paul's authorship of these writings. He then cat-

alogues the peculiarities commonly said to characterise the language of the Pastorals, sorting them into two categories (ch. 2). The first category contains peculiarities of vocabulary—the frequency of *hapax legomena*, "lexical richness," the infrequency of indeclinables, the frequency of compound words and, finally, semantic deviations. The second category comprises peculiarities of syntax—interclausal relations, the infrequency of structural irregularities, and "miscellaneous constructions" thought to differ from the authentic Paul's language. Van Nes concludes that whether based on scholars' individual impressions or on computer-assisted analysis, the results of earlier research on linguistic peculiarities in the Pastoral Letters are contradictory. So are the various authorship hypotheses, which van Nes discusses next (ch. 3). He demonstrates that the state of the art cannot be reduced to a simple question of authentic vs. inauthentic: there are also different hypotheses of "partial orthonymity." For example, 2 Timothy could be a genuine letter and the two others imitations, a possibility often too quickly overlooked in studies that lump together the data from all three writings.

In the book's second part, "The Linguistic Problem of the Pastoral Epistles Reconsidered," van Nes introduces the method to be used in his investigation of the primary material (ch. 4). He first of all settles for a population model of authorship, which means that the undisputed Paulines form an authentic "canon" to which the linguistic elements of each individual disputed letter are compared. Next, he describes simple linear regression analysis as the method by which the quantitative analysis of the data will be carried out, in order to discriminate between linguistic variation that lies within the prediction interval as established on the grounds of the undisputed letters and variation that is statistically significant. The final step in this methodological outline is a brief description of the road to be taken in the qualitative analysis. Van Nes then moves to his quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Pastoral Letters' vocabulary (ch. 5) and syntax (ch. 6). He finds that the Pastoral Letters do not deviate significantly from the undisputed Paulines in terms of lexical richness, use of indeclinables, interclausal relations and structural irregularities. Only the remarkably high frequency of *hapax*

legomena in 1 and 2 Timothy seems to confirm in part many previous scholars' impression that the language of the Pastoral Letters differs significantly from that of the undisputed letters, and perhaps even this depends on what really counts as *hapax*. The qualitative analysis suggests a number of possible explanations beside pseudonymity for the linguistic variations: the author's emotional state or his age; the topic of the letters; the varying role of orality; and so on.

In his conclusion to the study, van Nes does not claim to have resolved the question of whether the Pastorals were authored by Paul or by someone else, but he does claim that their alleged linguistic peculiarities do not provide any firm ground for considering them pseudonymous. Most if not all of these perceived peculiarities fall within a prediction interval based on language data from the undisputed Paulines and are therefore not statistically significant. Moreover, even when one, two or all three of the Pastoral Letters do exhibit considerable linguistic variation in comparison with the undisputed letters, this variation can be accounted for in a number of ways that need not involve pseudonymity. Thus, van Nes concludes, future discussion of the Pastoral Letters' authenticity should be refocused around the aspects of history and theology rather than that of language. At the end of the monograph come four appendices of just above 250 (!) pages in all.

In the view of the present reviewer, the strongest part of van Nes' study is the quantitative analysis of lexical and syntactic data. The findings follow from the author's solid application of the method of simple linear regression analysis and provide scholarship with a firmer foundation for further discussion of the authorship question than has hitherto been available. Only the suggestion that the frequency of *hapax legomena* in two of the letters can be relocated within the prediction interval if one discounts those *hapaxes* which are proper nouns, occur in quotations or result from "productivity" strikes me as a case of special pleading. Apart from this one attempt to circumvent the one clear indication of statistically significant linguistic divergence, however, van Nes's quantitative conclusions are all sound and need to be taken seriously in all future discussion about the language of the Pastoral Letters.

The qualitative analysis, while also containing many valuable insights and seemingly plausible proposals, is not always as compelling as the quantitative. This is probably due to van Nes's self-imposed (and perfectly understandable) limitation to the linguistic aspect of the authorship question. An author's emotional state, the topic treated in a text, compositional procedures and so on are certainly all factors that might account for differences in language, but these factors are clearly bound up with the issues of history and theological contents that van Nes programmatically seeks to avoid. A telling case in point is the factor of age, which van Nes repeatedly considers as a possible explanation for the linguistic peculiarities of the Pastoral Letters. Pointing to, among other things, an investigation that noted that "Plato's overall use of *hapaxes* grew with his age," van Nes suggests that 1 and 2 Timothy may have been "written by an older person" (154). But whereas Plato was an active writer for at least fifty years, Paul must have written all his extant letters during a period of less than twenty years, when he was about 45–60 years old. The time span of Paul's entire career as a letter-writer is equivalent to, or even shorter than, Plato's "middle period." If the historical circumstances are considered, Paul's increasing age can hardly explain the increase in vocabulary between the undisputed Paulines and the Pastoral Letters.

After all, this point of criticism can be taken as a confirmation of van Nes's observation that linguistic analysis can only take us so far towards a solution to the problem of the Pastorals and that future discussion should be directed towards issues of history and theology rather than issues of language. As an investigation of the language of the Pauline letters and its implications for the authenticity question, this is an excellent book that does offer something new and important to a well-researched topic.

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Svenska Exegetiska Sällskapet (SES)

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Numret innehåller bland annat material från de Exegetiska dagarna på Örebro Teologiska Högskola, Örebro den 4–5 oktober 2019. Inbjuda föreläsare är dr. Juha Pakkala, dr. Annelie Aejmelaeus och dr. Tommy Wasserman.

För program, se www.exegetiskasallskapet.se