The literature has increasingly noted that policies, plans, and strategies for areas characterised by low population density, remoteness, and population decline pay surprisingly little attention to their place-specific conditions. Several scholars have emphasised that in areas where depopulation is a fundamental planning condition, this condition is largely ignored by planners and policymakers (Bontje, 2004; Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2012; Schatz, 2017; Sousa & Pinho, 2015; Wiechmann & Pallagst, 2012). Despite decades of continuous depopulation, decision- makers in such areas continue developing policies focusing on growth. As Schatz (2017, p. 43) notes, many planners and policymakers continue to pursue growth-oriented policies even though they, in the foreseeable future, will face – and are forced to manage – long-term decline.

Among the reasons cited as important for why local governments in geographically disadvantaged, depopulating areas do not develop place-based policies for adaptation and development, we find both the potential benefits of growth, the growth norm, and unrealistic growth expectations. Other reasons cited are the path-dependency of growth policies, lack of professional support and negative symbolic notions associated with demographic decline (Martinez-Fernandez et al., 2012; Schatz, 2017; Sousa & Pinho, 2015; Syssner, 2020). As suggested by Lang (2012) and Wiechmann and Pallagst (2012), there are reasons to believe that the stigma of being associated with decline impedes the development of long-term planning strategies that consider continuous decline. In this paper, we strive to develop a deeper understanding of this phenomenon by delving deeper into the impediments for local actors in geographically disadvantaged areas in fostering genuinely place-based development strategies.

In recent publications (Syssner, 2020), it has been suggested that external pressure is one crucial condition that explains why local governments in depopulating areas may avoid, or defer from, developing strategies for how the community should adapt and develop under conditions of continued depopulation. Examples of external pressures include the shift in regional policy discourse from redistribution through interventions by the state as a core value to competition, growth, and competitiveness in the early 1990s. This shift has been cited as one reason why representatives of local and regional governments have nothing to gain from pointing out the challenges they face but, are expected to present their location as attractive to obtain funding for regional development (Syssner, 2006).

Another less recognised example of external pressure comes from lobbyists or interest groups representing particular and narrow interests. A specific instrument for their work can be that they initiate and present various ranking tools, with which they rate municipalities and measure how well they fulfil some policy – i.e., typically the key interests of the rating organisation. In Sweden, an abundance of rankings and lists are published every year – by magazines, lobby organisations, NGOs, etcetera – in which municipalities are ranked and rated based on, for instance, the housing market, growth rate, business climate, school quality, entrepreneurship, investments, and so forth (Syssner, 2020).

The literature on how rankings influence policy development examines the intricacy and constraints of rankings. Many contributions call for critical reflection, not least on their methodology. Giffinger et al., (2010) sought to improve the utility of rankings as tools to promote economic, social and spatial development. Acuto et al. (2021) also argue for a nuanced understanding of city rankings as a driver of global urban governance. The authors advocate for greater scholarly engagement in ranking- and benchmarking practices to ensure their relevance and effectiveness in addressing urban challenges. Similarly, Zhao et al. (2023) evaluate nine ranking systems and identify ways to improve ranking methods’ transparency, comprehensiveness, and impartiality.

Melo (2019), however, argues that despite the tendency for rankings to minimise opportunities for citizen participation, these tools still play a role in policymaking. Similarly, Aleksandrov et al. (2022) point out that existing rankings cannot consider diverse viewpoints, which hinders meaningful stakeholder participation and democratic governance. The methodological vagueness of city rankings is the focus of Sáez et al. (2020), which points to gaps in data transparency and analytical rigour. Like other critics, the author questions the credibility of these rankings as instruments for guiding effective urban strategies. Despite the methodological and democratic shortcomings of many rankings, there are strong indications that they nevertheless impact policy-making at the local level of government (Erlingsson & Sundell, 2013; Hollander, 2018; Vlachos, 2013).

Against this backdrop, we explore how local government representatives themselves perceive the influence of external rankings on local policy and planning. In the paper, we utilize qualitative data derived from a larger project targeting 39 municipalities identified as having ‘geographical disadvantages’ (see below). The data referred to in the paper was generated through participatory observation, a real-time survey and a joint discussion of the survey with local government representatives. Based on this data, we can confirm that the participant’s experience with the ranking of COSE, do have a noticeable impact on policy and planning in their municipalities.

Based on these results, we maintain that rankings constitute a potential impediment for local actors in geographically disadvantaged areas to foster genuinely place-based development strategies. We conclude by arguing that this influence should be problematised in research and by local, regional, and state government bodies. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly introduce the literature on place-based policy, which forms a basis for our analysis. We then introduce the basics of local government in Sweden and present “Support Area A”, which is the geographical framework of the study. In the same section, we provide a concise description of the COSE ranking and its structure. The following section describes our methodological approach, and the data employed. We then present, analyse, and interpret our results. Finally, we summarise our main findings and arguments and discuss their implications for policy and future research.

The idea that decision-makers should consider place-specific conditions when planning for the future is firmly established (Barca, 2019; McCann, 2021; Tomaney, 2010). A key component of a place-based approach is the idea that places differ in terms of both their resources and their potential. Some have referred to the local context in general (McCann, 2021), to social, cultural and institutional aspects (Barca et al., 2012, p. 139), to the diversity of activities and enterprises (Navaretti & Markovic, 2021, p. 7) or to “social relations, cultural meanings, informal practises and norms” (Randolph & Currid-Halkett, 2022, p. 248). For local development policy to succeed, it is argued that these aspects must be considered in policy design. The notion of a place-based approach is also an integral aspect of decentralisation theories. Local decision- makers are believed to be more attuned to their places and communities’ unique needs, preferences, and challenges. The point of decentralisation and local self-government, then, is that local decision-makers’ intimate understanding of the local context allows them to tailor policies that address specific local challenges more effectively.

The literature on place-based policy has often argued that the recognition of place-specific aspects must be accompanied by holistic approaches to local development, rather than isolated, sectoral approaches. The participation and integration of citizens as well as institutional actors at all levels of governance is therefore often promoted as important (Atterton & Glass, 2021; Bachtler, 2010; Barca et al., 2012; McCann, 2021; Nowakowska et al., 2021). The ability to build partnerships vertically (at multiple levels) and horizontally (across sectors) (Nowakowska et al., 2021, p. 2) is seen as important. Stakeholders, it is argued, need to be able to identify and harness the local potential and mitigate weaknesses and constraints (Nowakowska et al., 2021, p. 2; Rodríguez-Pose & Wilkie, 2017, p. 153). In this context, both locally embedded and external knowledge in various forms has been considered important in shaping successful local development policies (Barca, 2019; Barca et al., 2012; Nowakowska et al., 2021).

Another integral and important component of a place-based perspective is the view that interventions aimed at levelling or equalising geographical inequalities between affluent and less affluent areas are legitimate (Barca et al., 2012; Bentley & Pugalis, 2014, p. 290; Olfert et al., 2014, p. 6; Rodríguez-Pose & Wilkie, 2017; Tomaney, 2010). In this sense, the idea of place- based policies challenges a people-centred policy perspective which tends to suggest that development policies should be “spatially neutral” and thus designed without a specific space or place in mind. Accordingly, the dividing line between a people-centred approach on the one hand and a place-based approach on the other is a different understanding of an appropriate policy object - individuals, sectors or territories (Bentley & Pugalis, 2014, p. 285).

According to a place-based policy approach, policy interventions aiming only to improve the skills, abilities and knowledge of individuals are anything but spatially neutral. For instance, highly productive, skills-oriented firms tend to be located in large metropolitan areas (Sudekum, 2021, p. 8), which encourages the mobility of people towards urban centres, depleting resources in peripheral areas (Barca et al., 2012, p. 140). Accordingly, state-led redistributive policies or targeted interventions aimed at correcting inefficiencies or addressing patterns of uneven spatial development are considered perfectly valid from a place-based perspective (Barca et al., 2012; Bentley & Pugalis, 2014, p. 290; Olfert et al., 2014, p. 6).

Given the rise of place-based perspectives and the many place-specific challenges that geographically disadvantaged areas face, it is crucial to understand the impediments preventing local governments in these areas from developing genuinely place-based development strategies rather than sticking to previous and generic ideas of growth and competitiveness.

Local governments in Sweden enjoy a fairly strong constitutional status, a relatively high degree of political autonomy, and financial independence (Lidstrom & Madell, 2018). The relative autonomy of municipalities and their right to levy taxes is enshrined in the Swedish constitution, giving local governments in Sweden a relatively strong local financial power. They enjoy budget autonomy and can organise their activities relatively independently in many respects – although central state laws, such as the Education Act, the Planning and Building Act and the Social Welfare Act frame many municipal responsibilities.

Over time, Sweden has come to decentralize a broad range of essential welfare state responsibilities to its municipalities. Regardless of size, all municipalities are responsible for implementing social services, elderly care, preschool, and primary and secondary education. In addition, they are responsible for spatial planning and local infrastructure, as well as providing water and sewerage, parks and recreation, and, moreover, some cultural policies. Policy areas such as zoning and planning, inspections and granting of permits, and various public procurements also form part of the municipal duties. Alongside the welfare assignments, these duties are often seen as particularly important for the local business community (e.g Fölster et al., 2016).

Swedish municipalities have the right to tax the income of their residents. The local government determines the tax levels and how the funds are distributed. The municipality can also charge a fee for certain services, e.g., water and sewage, pre-school services, and care for the elderly. Municipal expenditures account for approximately 20 per cent of Sweden’s annual GDP, and they employ circa 900,000 individuals – more than half of all public employees in Sweden, i.e., more than the combined number of employees in both the state and the regions. Consequently, it is unsurprising that Sweden ranks very high when levels of decentralization between countries are compared (e.g Ladner et al., 2021).

In addition to decentralisation, the principle of national equality is important in Sweden. To ensure equal access to services of general interest despite differing conditions in the municipalities, the Swedish state redistributes funds via the fiscal equalisation systems and continuously monitors the quality of the services provided by the municipalities.

The Swedish financial equalisation system has many components and is considered extensive, even compared to other Nordic countries (Söderdahl, 2015). On the one hand, municipalities with a weak tax base are compensated through income equalisation. Here, the state distributes money to municipalities that – for various reasons – have a low tax power compared to other municipalities. On the other hand, municipalities with an unfavourable population structure are compensated through cost equalisation. In this process, the tax revenues of municipalities with many working-age inhabitants are transferred to municipalities with many children and young people or with a high proportion of elderly people in need of care.

In addition to this reallocation of financial resources, the state also continuously assesses the social services provided by municipalities to ensure that quality, accessibility and equality are met. Many municipalities in remote, rural, and depopulating areas need help meeting these state demands despite the financial support (Syssner & Olausson, 2015). They report that these demands are often challenged by the citizens, who often value accessibility over quality in the school sector. This implies that despite the financial equalisation systems, state demands and citizens’ expectations can be hard to meet.

To develop more targeted and tailor-made cohesion strategies, the Swedish government has pinpointed municipalities deemed to need particular support. One such classification includes the so-called “Support Area A”. Support Area A is regulated by law (SFS 1999:138; 2015:431) and includes territories understood to have the most severe geographical disadvantages (Sw. geografiska lägesnackdelar). Hence, the state regarded them as the most disadvantaged from a regional development policy point of view. 39 municipalities from seven counties are included in Support Area A, and these are the counties of Norrbotten, Västerbotten, Västernorrland, Jämtland, Gävleborg, Dalarna and Värmland. The lion’s share of these municipalities is found in the two categories that have experienced the most severe population decline since 1974.¹

Support Area A has been the subject of special government support measures several times. In 2018, the government allocated special funds to develop the business climate and business life in the area’s municipalities (Näringsdepartementet, 2018). Tillväxtverket – The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth – was mandated to pay a government grant to the municipalities to strengthen the work of the municipalities concerned in promoting the business climate and business life in each municipality. The mandate also ensured that lessons learnt from previous interventions were utilised, further developed, and disseminated among participating municipalities and other relevant stakeholders. To this end, The Swedish Agency for Economic and Regional Growth organised a series of workshops and meetings for the municipalities to share experiences. Our research group has followed, observed and contributed to these workshops and meetings for several years. The data presented in this paper originates from one of these workshops.

The specific government assistance for Support Area A should be understood in the context of many years of Swedish urbanisation. Thus, while the Swedish population has increased with close to 2,5 million inhabitants since the mid 1970´s, the population have tended to increase in dense, urban areas but to decline in sparsely populated, rural ones. Almost half of Sweden’s 290 municipalities have fewer inhabitants today compared to the mid-1970s, and – as can be seen from Figure 1 – the decline is most pronounced in the remote and sparsely populated rural municipalities. The 45 municipalities in the ”sparsely populated rural municipalities” category lost 8 per cent of their population in 2022 compared with 1974, and the 15 municipalities in the “very sparsely populated rural municipalities” lost 29 per cent in the same period. Figure 1

Population changes in different kinds of municipalities 1974–2022

The Swedish population is also very unevenly distributed. The five smallest of the country’s 290 municipalities host less than 3,000 residents, whereas the four largest host from 245,000 to almost one million. In addition, the mean area size of a Swedish municipality is one of the largest in Europe (Tavares 2015). Due to having geographically large municipalities, Swedish population density is among the lowest in Europe, and settlements in rural Sweden tend to be very scattered (Niedomysl & Amcoff, 2011, p. 264).

To sum up, many parts of the Swedish municipal sector are faced with the challenges of a small, elderly, and shrinking population that is dispersed over large areas and with a very low population density. Many of these municipalities form part of Support Area A. However, Support Area A also contains somewhat more affluent municipalities – and in addition, some Swedish municipalities with disadvantaged conditions fall outside Support Area A and are found in other parts of Sweden.

This paper aims to stimulate a critical and constructive discussion about the possibilities for local actors in geographically disadvantaged areas to develop and implement policies, plans and strategies tailored to their local conditions. We achieve this by examining one specific external factor that might hamper these opportunities for small and shrinking municipalities in Sweden: the annual ranking conducted by the employers’ organisation COSE. The Confederation of Swedish Enterprises (COSE) is an interest and lobby organisation whose members consist of circa 60,000 companies and 48 business associations. Some members are employers’ organisations representing employers in negotiations with trade unions. COSE carries out a yearly survey, and an accompanying analysis, aiming to gauge what they label “the local business climate” in each of Sweden’s 290 municipalities. How a municipality’s business climate ultimately pans out in the ranking depends on a wide range of factors – some based on survey answers, some on official statistics. Most importantly, perhaps, the business climate is measured by allowing business owners from the various municipalities to answer a survey and assess how they perceive their situation as business owners in the respective municipalities.

The business owners’ overall judgement on the business climate makes up 1/3 of the weighting of the ranking. A second third is derived from the business owners’ attitudes vis-á- vis, for instance, municipal services, infrastructure, and broadband access, and how they perceive the attitudes of politicians and civil servants towards business owners. The last third is based on official statistics on new business start-ups, the proportion of people working in private industry, municipal tax level, how much welfare services are outsourced to private entrepreneurs, the proportion of the labour force, etc. Points are awarded according to a specific system, and the total score determines the position on the ranking list according to the different factors. All indicators – how they are measured and weighed – are described in detail in Appendix A.

In the survey, 30 out of 39 responding workshop participants report that they rely on the ranking to gain insights into their operations. Interestingly, the ranking is prominently underscored as a significantly more valuable information source than data from municipal, regional, state, or academic sources.

When asked about the significance and value of this ranking for their respective organizations, the participants consistently emphasize that it fills a critical void within their organizations due to limited resources for conducting their assessments. In the open-ended answers. the ranking is referred to as being “of relatively great importance since we, at the time, are not conducting our relevant surveys.” The ranking is also referred to as “the only measurable tool we utilize, which gives it substantial significance.” Other open-ended answers highlight that “[The ranking] opens our eyes and makes us think”, and another that the ranking “holds great importance and serves as a comprehensive knowledge base,” deeming it a “valuable and guiding tool”.

In the focused group discussion, the participants recurrently mentioned their active involvement in interpreting and analysing the ranking results. A recurring theme is that the ranking assists them in identifying their organizational strengths and weaknesses, enabling them to prioritize their efforts effectively. In the survey, one participant states, “We analyse the various components to identify the areas where we need to increase our efforts”. Another participant writes that the ranking provides the organisation with “a knowledge base about our strengths, weaknesses, priorities, and how to move forward.” A third stresses that they use the ranking to get information about what “what works [and] what does not work.”

The ranking is, as mentioned earlier above, constructed based on both official statistics and responses from a survey that gauges local entrepreneurs’ satisfaction with municipal services. In the survey, one participant notes, “We always perform an analysis of the results, placing particular emphasis on the survey findings”. At the same time, another adds that “We delve into the data and engage with local companies to uncover the reasons behind their responses, especially in cases of lower rankings”. One participant sums it up by stating, “In summary, we scrutinize the measurements, but the survey questions hold more interest for us than the rest of the ranking.” In the following group discussion, several participants explicitly state their preference for the survey component of the ranking.

When the participants in the workshop are asked to individually rate the importance of the ranking for the local development policy of the municipality they represent, the average score is 3.8 on a scale of 1–5. When asked whether the administrative organisation is actively working to follow up on the ranking results, the average score is 4 on a scale 1 to 5.

In the open answers, the participants were asked to contribute with their perspectives and attitudes towards the ranking and its role in municipal operations. Six respondents uttered that “[The ranking] is very important”. Similarly, one participant articulated that the ranking is “important, [since] it guides efforts both within the municipal operations and in collaboration with the business community.”

Others stressed that the ranking is “of great importance to how we work on developing the business climate”; that it helps the municipal organisation “to know if the business community is satisfied”, “whether the dialogue [with the local business community] works”, and that it helps out to focus on those areas of the municipal organisation that does not perform well. One participant states that the ranking is used to inform the overall operational plan of the municipality, and another that the ranking, “In combination with our local development strategy, is a guide for us.”

Some of the participants in the workshop refer to the ranking as being of minor importance. One respondent judged the ranking “important, but not crucial” and said, “It helps us address problem areas.” Another refers to a change in the significance of the ranking in local development work. “We used to focus a lot [on ranking], but now not so much”, the participant maintains. One participant claims that the ranking is “Not really significant. But it helps us to see if we are on the right track.” Lastly, one respondent states that the ranking is “less important” and that the municipality where s/he operates prefers to “develop the business climate through dialogue with our entrepreneurs.”

Scepticism about the ranking was expressed both in the individual open-ended answers, and in the subsequent focus group discussion. The participants recurrently point out that the survey on which the ranking is based is sent and can thus be answered by respondents who have had no interaction with municipal organisations and are, therefore, not very well placed to judge how well the municipality deals with matters affecting the business sector. They also believe that single events where the municipal organisation is portrayed negatively in the media can have a major influence on how the survey is responded to.

In the open answers, participants reflect upon the quality of the data the ranking relies upon. One participant stressed, “We analyse the problems that the ranking points to, but we are aware that the survey results do not tell the whole truth”. Here, the respondent adds, “It also matters what mood the respondents were in on the day they answered“. One participant states that the ranking indeed is of use for the municipal organisation, but that it is “good to look at other statistics as well.” Another participant states that “single events that gets a lot of media coverage seems to have a disproportionate impact on the ranking”.

Participants also reflect on whether the municipal organisation can influence their ranking. One participant states, “We do not have much influence on the statistical aspect,” whereas another refers to the fact that “There are rather few companies that respond to the survey.” Rather than focusing on their responses to the survey part of the ranking, the participant argues, it is better to “work on the issues that we can influence directly.“

Despite the participants’ t partial scepticism, the ranking is considered de facto important. One participant stated that the “politicians think it is important, but we [i.e. the civil servants] are rather sceptical about its usefulness.” Another noted that the “ranking is of importance for the local media, but it is less important for our work,“ and yet another that the “ranking becomes important mainly when we fall [to a lower position] in the ranking.“

One cornerstone of a place-based approach is that decision-makers should consider place- specific conditions when planning. Although still debated, there is a growing consensus – within economics, as well as within international bodies such as the European Union and the OECD – that states, regions or municipalities should not uncritically adopt the universal ‘recipes’ for development and success but design policies that fit with the planning conditions at hand (Rodrik, 2009; Bachtler, 2010; Barca et al., 2012; Bentley & Pugalis, 2014; Barca, 2019). COSE’s business climate survey, however, is anything but place based. Quite the opposite. Several integral parts of ranking (see Appendix B) and the policy recommendations that accompany it are schoolbook examples of a place-blind, one-size-fits-all policy.

This makes the responsiveness that local government representatives show towards COSE’s ranking problematic. Hence, previous studies in geographically disadvantaged areas suggest that policies poorly adapted to local conditions and circumstances can hinder proactive strategies to address local challenges and even exacerbate the negative consequences of geographical disadvantages. Thus, policies designed with urban growth centres in mind simply do not work in an environment characterised by scarcity, remoteness and demographic decline (Lang, 2012; Wiechmann & Pallagst, 2012).

Given the impact that COSE appears to have with local government representatives, it is crucial for municipalities, regions and state authorities designing and implementing policies in geographically disadvantaged areas to realise that COSE’s policy advice is not place-based but place-blind

A second cornerstone of a place-based approach is that it calls for a holistic, cross-sectoral approach to local development instead of isolated approaches focussing on single interests, groups, or sectors. At this point, it is important to emphasise that COSE is essentially an advocacy and influence group for businesses, industry associations, and employer groups that typically negotiate with trade unions in labour market issues. That COSE prioritises the attitudes and experiences of local businesses, favours tax reductions and the privatisation of service provision privatisation of services does not come as a surprise. This fits well with its role as an organisation that represents the private sector in negotiations with trade unions and public institutions. However, COSE represents only one of several legitimate interest groups within a locality and should be recognised and treated accordingly. Thus, politics is about “who gets what, when and how” (Lasswell 1936), and it is by no means self-evident that more attention should be paid to this particular interest group compared to other or competing interests.

As Rövik (2000: p. 34f) suggests, organisations – such as municipalities – are constantly confronted with socially created norms and expectations about what they should do and achieve. The responses of the local government representatives in our study indicate that the analytical and normative frameworks (Campbell 2002) presented by COSE, along with the solutions they prescribe, are considered valid and are taken seriously in local policy and planning. This suggests that COSE’s ability to influence the understanding of whose interests are important and what constitutes a problem, and a solution (Bacchi 2000, 2012) is an important power resource (Dery 2000, p. 37; Mintrom and Norman 2009, p. 652).

Since COSE’s ranking provides both analytical and normative frameworks, it has the potential to evoke both a “mimetic” and a “normative” isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), thereby creating normative barriers to municipalities’ independent adoption of place - based approaches to policy and planning. It pushes mimetic isomorphism in the sense that, to reduce uncertainty, municipalities try to imitate the most successful peers (i.e. those at the top of the rankings). It creates normative isomorphism in that the ranking identifies certain practises, structures, and measures, thus “best practises” or normatively appropriate in the municipal sector. The local government representatives in our study illustrated this normative isomorphism well. Some of them state that the ranking has a prominent position in their work, even if they themselves are sceptical about it. Informants stress that the media coverage following the launch of the ranking each year, leave them with no choice but to engage with it – even if they do not find it meaningful.

While place-based policy should be holistic, COSE represents and gives voice to the interests of the business community. However, COSE appears to have effectively embedded its perspectives in local government organizations, which either adopt the ranking’s normative frameworks or engage with them out of necessity. At this point, our key message is that while COSE’s ranking and policy advice may be effective in some respects, it must always be considered situated and biased.

A third cornerstone in a place-based policy framework is that local knowledge is utterly important. Actors, it is argued, must be able to recognise and exploit local potential and mitigate weaknesses and limitations (Nowakowska, Rzeńca and Sobol 2021, p. 2; Rodríguez-Pose and Wilkie 2017, p. 153). Different geographies have their unique site-specific conditions and challenges, the argument goes, and this is why it is important that each entity conducts independent and careful analyses of its conditions and considers its own historical, cultural and institutional context when tailoring its development policy instruments to the actual conditions (e.g. Rodrik 2007; Tödtling and Trippl 2005).

The local government representatives in our study, however, repeatedly mention that the organisations they work for have no resources for commissioning consultancies or conducting their own research. Against the background of their weak knowledge infrastructure, they gratefully accept and act on the knowledge provided by COSE. Evidently, the lack of internal knowledge infrastructures makes these municipalities particularly susceptible to external policy pressure, such as that exerted by the ranking in focus. The fact that critics such as Vlachos (2013) doubt that COSEs way of measuring the business climate says anything substantial at all about a municipality’s ability to thrive does not seem to make a difference.

Previous studies have shown that municipalities in geographically disadvantaged areas face significant challenges related to knowledge (anonymous reference). They not only lack resources to conduct their own research but also suffer from a dearth of best practices tailored to their specific local circumstances. At this point, we want to stress that organizations like COSE can become highly influential, not only as policy actors but also as key knowledge providers that promote and supply certain types of knowledge. An organization with a weak knowledge infrastructure is thus more vulnerable to the metrics and indicators of success provided by such external actors. Over time, these metrics and indicators can potentially influence the priorities and objectives of the organization itself. This phenomenon, known as ‘goal displacement’ in institutional theory, is known to be detrimental to an organization’s core assignments (e.g., Bohte & Meier, 2000; see also Campbell 1976).