How do government and industry work together to foster security in times of normalcy and crisis? Indeed, the relationship between the state and the defense industry has for long been considered vital for national security (DeVore 2017; DeVore & Weiss 2014; Kirkpatrick 2008; Gupta 1997; Weber et al. 1991). The defense industry provides the means for the state to fulfil its security responsibilities. Hence, states need expedient relations between government and industry to effectively promote security (Vestner 2023; Calcara & Marchetti 2022). The state needs reliable sources of weaponry to remain secure, and expedient state-defense industry relations (SDIR) is key to maintaining security of supply (SoS), understood as supply sufficient for the state “to discharge its defense and security commitments in accordance with its foreign and security policy requirement” (EU guidance note 2016). Given the crucial nature of SDIR, it is surprising that the topic has only gained limited attention in the field of public policy and administration (Heidenkamp et al. 2013; Calcara 2017). Academic writing on SDIR has primarily been carried out in the field of defense economics focusing on e.g. cost benefit analysis of actual production (Lundmark 2011; Hartley 2011). Recently, however, the return to geopolitics has increased broader scholarly analyses on policy connections to SDIR (Calcara & Marchetti 2022; DeVore 2019). Most of these studies, however, focus on transnational cooperation within the EU. Fiott analyzed how transnational defense cooperation in the EU developed in the early 2000’s and how governments and industry use EU institutions to amplify national interests (Fiott 2019: 136; 140). Brattberg & Valasek (2019) argued that challenges to expedient relations become particularly pronounced in uncertain times when collaboration and partnership between states and defense industries are even more essential. Calcara & Marchetti (2022) dealt with European cyber security governance and suggested three types of SDIR distinguished by government protection, public-private integration and agency-industry autonomy. Hence, recent scholarship has explored theoretical implications on EU institutions and SDIR. But theory development is still restrained due to a lack of empirical contributions and national case studies (Calcara 2017). This study addresses this research gap by shedding light on a process of national SDIR.

The Swedish case of ammunition SoS is strategically selected. Sweden hosts one of Europe’s most sophisticated defense industries (Lundmark 2022: 399). Traditionally, Swedish SDIR was designed as a public governance ecosystem which, after the cold war, turned into a market oriented private governance ecosystem (Lundberg & Rova 2021). The prevailing system thus draws primarily on procurement, rather than on public private partnership (PPP), understood as a durable cooperative institutional arrangement between public and private actors that rests on jointly developed products or services and shared risks, costs, and resources (Van Ham & Koppenjan 2001; Hodge & Greve 2007). Contrary to PPP arrangements, traditional procurement processes entail a relative neglect of joint development and risk sharing between partners (Wang et al. 2017). The Swedish industry, moreover, is highly internationalized, which also adds complexity to the discussion on SDIR.

In light of the above, the purpose of this study is to address the research gap regarding the lack of empirical studies and national case studies on SDIR in the realm of public policy and administration, and in so doing, present a case study of policy making in the Swedish defense sector focused on the interplay between the defense industry and the national government, the Ministry of Defense and the two main defense authorities in terms of military supply chains – the defense procurement agency (FMV) and the Swedish Armed Forces. The study focuses on ammunition security of supply (SoS), which is an appropriate specialization when engaging with SDIR. Firstly, as ammunition is a sine qua non of kinetic war and defense, and secondly as it is an example of a modern complex policy problem requiring transboundary collaboration over public-private, military-civilian and national-international divides.

The practicalities of the case include tracing the process of national policymaking in relation to ammunition SoS by zooming in on the government decision to make exceptions for ammunition in military procurement due to essential security interests (ESI) in June 2023. The agenda setting process is back tracked from the decision by a process tracing method (Beach & Pedersen 2019) based on official documents and key informant interviews. The empirical data is further analyzed through a Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA), which provides a systematic way of explaining policy making and agenda setting processes without neglecting situational contexts (Bolukbasi & Yildrim 2022; Cairney & Jones 2016). Since John Kingdon presented the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) as an analytical approach some four decades ago, it has been applied to many empirical, sectoral and geographical contexts (Jones et al. 2016; Rawat & Morris 2016). Research applying MSF to defense and security policy, however, is still rare (see Mazarr 2007 for an exception), as are studies on military, defense and national security at large in policy scholarship (Archuleta 2016; Mayland 2024).

The analysis is guided by the following research question: How did the issue of ammunition SoS become prominent on the Swedish government agenda? After the empirical analysis, we move on to the discussion and conclusion, where we examine the insights this case offers on how states can enhance security in times of stability and crisis.

Below is a short expose of previous research needed to situate the study. It includes reviews of the literature on SDIR and agenda setting in the field of policy studies.

Scarcity of reliable data has been identified as a challenge for researchers interested in European defense industry matters (Giacomello & Preka 2023: 528). For this study of how the issue of ammunition SoS became prominent on the Swedish government’s agenda, we draw on policy documents and key informant interviews delivering firsthand impressions of processes difficult to get insight into.

Policy documents include government defense bills from 2000 to 2020. The defense bills are drafted by the government in collaboration with defense agencies and decided by parliament every fifth year. They are manifestations of national defense policy and its future development. Further, policy documents used in the study are parliamentary Defense Committee reports and government reports dealing with SDIR. These documents were collected from the official websites of the Swedish government or the Swedish parliament. Other policy documents were requested directly from the MoD. These include the actual decision to make exceptions for ammunition in military procurement due to ESI taken by the government on June 1, 2023 and other documents and reports that the decision referred to. A key document in this regard was a report (MoD 2021) conducted by representatives of three Swedish defense companies. Most of the content in this report, known in the defense supply chain domain as ‘The Ammunition Study’, was considered classified by the MoD. Hence, insights into the actual content of that document were obtained partly by key informant interviews.

Key informant interviews were carried out in two phases. The first phase in the spring of 2021 was aimed at mapping the policy community in the area of military supply chains and identifying respondents’ understanding of conditions, obstacles, and opportunities for the industry regarding defense materiel supply. The second phase in the spring of 2024 aimed specifically at mapping the process of agenda-setting of ammunition SoS. Thus, the 2021 interviews focused on mapping SDIR in the military supply chain domain, while the 2024 interviews aimed to uncover specific details regarding the security of supply of ammunition as a case that brought the industry into a closer partnership with the state, understood here as the government, the MoD, the and the central authorities for military supply chains FMV and SAF. In all, twelve interviews were conducted with 15 informants (see table 1). Access to informants was provided by the FOKUS research project. Informants were selected as they were central to the policymaking process under study.

Interviews took place at the informants’ workplace, at the workplace of the researcher or remote due to geographical distance. Interviews lasted 41-88 minutes and they were recorded and transcribed. The interviews were semi-structured around themes drawn from the MSA, including mapping out the decision-making, problem representations, indicators, strategies, aims, consequences, risks, alternative specifications, solutions, stakeholders, challenges, reactions, and effects. All informants gave their consent to participate anonymously in the study before the interviews.

The documents and interview transcripts lay the empirical foundation for a chronological reconstruction of the policymaking process by a process tracing method. Process tracing was developed to trace intervening causal mechanisms in real life cases (Beach & Pedersen 2019; George & Bennett 2005). Hence, we do not try to establish causality as experimental designs in quantitative research. Instead, we intend to map out complex phenomena and processes, and generate rich, in-depth insight by tracing mechanisms triggered by several causes (Beach & Pedersen 2019: 3). The process tracing was followed up by detailed dissection and content analysis of the chronological processes. Content analysis is appropriate for reducing original texts by categorizing them according to similar meanings, and in so doing by extracting the most vital parts from each text (Cho & Lee, 2014), without losing subtle or hidden textual meanings (Kuckartz, 2014). This entailed applying a predefined coding scheme operationalizing the key metaphorical MSA concepts, as outlined above, to the selected texts.

Below the Swedish case is contextualized by highlighting processes and events essential to the case. The next section delves into the MSA of how the issue of ammunition SoS became prominent on the Swedish government agenda leading up to the 2023 decision to invoke exceptions for ammunition procurement due to ESI arguments.

The analysis of how the issue of ammunition SoS became prominent on the Swedish government’s agenda shows how agency, structure and contingency interplayed as agenda setting mechanisms. The issue of ammunition SoS became noticed as a policy problem following political shifts due to structural change in the international security landscape. The issue became more prominent on the Swedish government’s agenda as focusing events, including the annexation of Crimea, the Covid-19 pandemic and not least the Russo-Ukrainian war, opened policy windows for policy entrepreneurs from the industry and the public sector to initiate softening up processes and couple the streams. In an effort of policy entrepreneurial collaboration across the public-private divide, alternatives to the dominant procurement policy were suggested. Meanwhile, the government’s options were limited by ownership structures restricting solutions to those involving transnational Nordic collaboration. Structures thus delimited the government’s maneuverability (cf. Winkel & Leipold 2016), while contingencies opened policy windows for policy entrepreneurs from defense authorities and the industry.

What lessons then can this study disclose on how states can foster security in times of normalcy and crisis? Firstly, the study shows that strong institutional and decentralized systems, such as the Swedish one, tend to cloud the visibility of who the exact policy entrepreneurs are. This finding echoes the claim by Bolukbasi and Yildrim (2022: 511) that “Institutions inevitably filter who gets to play the role of policy entrepreneurs, their strategies and chances for success”. The strong institutional setting also had repercussion as entrepreneurs who represented agencies and firms rather than the political level became central to the coupling of the streams. There are at least two reasons why the issue primarily was dealt with on the agency level. First, the institutional structures are of importance yet again. National authorities are relatively independent from the Government Offices and tasked to deal with problems occurring in their practical field. Second, there was little motivation for political elites to make politics of ammunition SoS, as support for enforcing total defense and supplying Ukraine with weaponry was high.

The analysis moreover underlines the importance of sharing risks and rewards in public private collaboration (Wang et al. 2017). When SoS of ammunition is at risk, grand values are at play for the state, but not necessarily for the industry. While the state was struggling to get access to a key defense commodity, the industry could turn to its established customers in international markets. This predicament on account of the state, emphasized the need of moving towards a PPP model with long term contracts and shared resources and risks. The Swedish case provides an example of how government and the private sector can work together to foster security in volatile times by sharing risk and resources. Analyzing these potential implications further highlights the value of policy entrepreneur collaboration. Prerequisites for entrepreneurial collaboration were strengthened as the involved parties shared similar experiences and outlooks. Policy entrepreneurs on both sides of the public private divide had previous experiences of SAF vocation and training (Informant 1; 5; 7; 11). Indeed, industry entrepreneurs related first to their company, but they were also invested in national defense. Previous research has shown that working together for the same goal is required for expedient collaboration (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003: 4). In line with these findings, the study demonstrates how SDIR can benefit from cross-sector collaboration and entrepreneurial initiative.

Arguably the most explicit feature of the study was the role of the policy window opened for increased SDIR by the focusing event of the war in Ukraine. Suddenly the short-term commodity of ammunition became strategic. The sudden change impacted on the SoS of ammunition and the government received feedback regarding the need for the state to invest in the entire supply chain, not just the latter part of it. Such investments are costly, however, and need to be balanced against other essential state tasks and interests. Analyzing such value conflicts calls for research that can cross fertilize defense and security studies with lenses from public administration and public policy. Theoretical lenses that bring issues of public value, interest and ethics to the fore (Rutgers 2008: van der Wal 2016) are beneficial when investigating the defense and security policy domain as it is permeated by value conflict.

The analysis also demonstrates the importance of adaptability in security and defense policy. Essential values are at stake in this policy field, emphasizing the importance of persistent work, adaptability and reimagination in the face of rapidly emerging threats. The policy process analyzed here shows how a prolonged process can be reinvigorated if conducive contextual factors align and if agents act to grease the wheels. Furthermore, adaptability became manifest as the alternative to the current policy caught on. This entailed moving away from the market oriented private governance ecosystems in the area of ammunition, back towards a previously experienced public governance ecosystem (cf. Calcara & Marchetti 2022). This shift, however, can be understood as a relatively short-term solution, and one that does not necessarily deal with the root of the SoS problem, viz. limited state control of an essential security interest in volatile times.

This study answered the scholarly call of e.g. Calcara (2017) and Heidenkamp et al. (2013) to add empirical work to the field of SDIR. The purpose of the study was to address the research gap regarding empirical studies on national cases of SDIR in the realm of public policy and administration and in so doing, present an empirical study of policy making in the Swedish defense sector. To that end, a process tracing of the Swedish government 2023 decision to make exceptions from procurement regulations for ammunition due to ESI was conducted. This defense policymaking process was further analyzed through a Multiple Streams Analysis intended to explain how the issue of ammunition security of supply emerged as a political issue and subsequently gained traction on the Swedish government’s agenda. Applying the MSA to the case of ammunition SoS in Sweden also served to bridge public policy and administration and defense and security studies (cf. Archuleta 2016).

Guided by the MSA’s main metaphorical concepts, the analysis delivered a detailed account of how the issue of ammunition SoS became prominent on the government’s agenda. The MSA tenets were helpful in this regard, assessing the relative influence and interplay of agency, structure and contingency, including the former’s room to maneuver due to restraints and possibilities formed by the latter (Winkel & Leipold 2016).

The analysis highlights the importance of states fostering strong relationships with companies involved in national security and safety. In times of volatility, limited state control over essential security interests poses a significant vulnerability, increasing the risk of dependence on external powers and foreign influence. This is a predicament for the state, rather than for the industry. The case study of Swedish ammunition SoS demonstrates how a move from market-oriented policy to stronger institutional policy, including public-private partnership arrangements, serve as crucial mechanisms to mitigate these challenges. The findings, moreover, underscore the necessity of a broader governmental perspective to proactively identify other sectors and commodities at risk due to supply chain constraints. There may well be other areas or goods in need of prudent and long-term political decision-making and the case of ammunition security of supply can serve as a catalyst for such inquiries.

This empirical account of agenda-setting in Swedish defense policy further demonstrated the conceptual richness of policy theories and potential advantages of bridging the scholarly fields of public policy and administration studies and defense and security studies. Policy theories shed light on important democratic aspects of policy making such as public value, power, interest, and agency, and this is especially useful in turbulent political environments where multiple interests converge (Kingdon 2003). Further, as previous research into military influence has found, the return to geopolitics in defense policy and the war in Ukraine challenge societies in terms of fiscal priorities, military production, public discourse and societal views (Kofroň & Stauber, 2023; Bayer et al. 2023). This real-world development produces a vital call to scholars to shed light on defense policy and governance processes that traditionally have only been given limited attention and insight and where consequently data has been scattered and inconsistent (Giacomello & Preka 2023). Hopefully, this study can inspire future research to engage with the lack of cross fertilization between the fields of public policy and administration and defense and security studies. Broader perspectives from public policy and administration are needed to evaluate choice in security and defense policy and to benefit prudent and balanced navigation among the significant value conflicts inherent to the field.

This research is financed by the Knowledge Foundation (grant number 20200004). The author would like to thank Dan Hansén, Martin Lundmark, Susanne Hertz and two anonymous reviewers for constructive feedback that helped improve the manuscript.