Informational self-deception: deconstruction and reconstruction within philosophy of information

Abstract

Introduction. Hannah Arendt argues that, in the twentieth century, there arose diffuse systems of mendacity tied to information communication. Such ‘modern lies’ engendered self-deception among both officials and citizens, allowing the perpetuation of atrocities. In this paper, I examine self-deception from within philosophy of information, confronting and deconstructing a central dichotomy in self-deception research: that between ontological and psychological renderings of the concept.

Method. Derridean deconstruction is used to create and mine tension between ontological and psychological self-deception. Ultimately, informational self-deception is reconstructed within this tension.

Analysis. Ontological self-deception positions deceit as a natural and passive condition of being-in-the-world. As members of an entropic infosphere, we are all subject to self-deception, and we thus have an imperative to continually question ourselves and our information. Psychological self-deception positions such deceit as an active concept; rather than the passive condition of the many, self-deception is the active choice of a few. This opens questions surrounding intentionality, motivation and variances in levels of deceit.

Conclusions. Ultimately, I reconstruct informational self-deception as sustained by the tensions between ontological and psychological self-deception, raising new questions for philosophy of information regarding what it means to be deceived.