Personhood in the digital realm
Archer vs Dreyfus
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.33621/jdsr.v7i341920Keywords:
philosophy of information, concepts of personhood, Archer, Dreyfus, robotsAbstract
In this paper, I will provide a brief overview of Hubert Dreyfus’ and Margaret Archer’s views on the concept of a person, with the question of the possibility of AI-human interactions in the background. My aim is to explore how the contrasting views held by the two thinkers on human-AI relationships might help to map the terrain within which philosophical discussions about this topic are meaningful. Before examining their views, I will contextualise their thinking by focusing on the following questions: Is the traditional definition of the human being as a rational animal tenable from the perspective of AI? What are the scenarios concerning the possible cohabitation of humans and robots? Ought we to modify our views of the human place in the universe if personhood is not restricted to the members of the human species? The comparison of the two thinkers highlights decisive differences in approach: While Dreyfus’ main question is how the digital environment affects human nature, Archer focuses on AI personhood, suggesting the fluidity of boundaries between humans and robots.
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