Increasing Public Debt Collection with Nudging
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.58235/sjpa.v22i4.8701Keywords:
nudging, debt collection, deterrence, tax compliance, natural field experimentAbstract
Using two natural field experiments, we tested whether nudging could contribute as a cost-free instrument to increase voluntary public debt collection. We manipulated standard reminder notices sent to two samples (N = 396 and N = 549) with public debt in a municipality in Denmark, a country with a high tax morale. Results from both studies showed that initial debt payment rates were significantly higher in intervention groups receiving a simplified, kind, and attractive reminder notice as compared to a control groups receiving a standard and complex reminder notice. The results suggest that nudging may contribute to public debt collection in countries with a high tax morale.
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Copyright (c) 2018 Niels Holm Jensen, Lisbeth Fyhn Reuss, Stephan Rasmussen
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Authors contributing to Scandinavian Journal of Public Administration agree to publish their articles under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 license. This means means articles are free for anybody to read and download, and to copy and disseminate for non-commercial purposes as long as appropriate credit is given, a link is provided to the license, and any changes made are clearly indicated. Authors retain copyright of their work.
