Temporal and Eternal Goods and the Idea of a Theistic Spirituality

Abstract

In this paper, I consider two objections to the idea of a theistic spirituality, each grounded in a certain conception of eternity: the first maintains that on the relevant notion of eternity, theism issues in a degraded account of the significance of our lives in time, while the second proposes that on a further, related notion of eternity, theism fails to carry any action-guiding import. These objections have some claim to be rooted in Christian traditions of thought, and I relate the first to Augustine’s understanding of eternity and the other to a position that C. S. Lewis appears to endorse. To anchor the discussion, I take as my focus the question of whether there is a properly Christian pattern of grieving following the death of a loved one. In reply to these objections, I sketch a further view of how an idea of eternity may inform an ideal of the spiritual life, one that presents a rather different understanding of the relationship between temporal and eternal goods.