The Free Will of a Sinless Incarnate God

Abstract

The paper considers and rejects three possible ways of resolving the apparent incompatibility of Christ being sinless with him having a human nature. These possible solutions are that (1) it is only a contingent truth that Christ did not sin, (2) some moral compatibilist view of free will is true, and (3) Christ’ s free will was merely a free will to choose whether or not to do a supererogatory good action. It accepts possible solution (4), that, although Christ was necessarily sinless, he felt what normal humans feel when tempted. The paper considers and rejects three possible objections to this solution that (1) one cannot be tempted to do what one cannot do, (2) Christ would not have had the kind of free will that all other humans have in virtue of their human nature, (3) it rules out an objective theory of the Atonement. But it is sympathetic to an objection (4), that this solution requires that Christ sometimes believed (falsely) that he was able to yield to temptation. This extra requirement is contrary to the normal (but not essential) Christian view that (in his human nature) he always believed himself to be God.