Can Conventions Support the Legal Interpretation of Scripture?

Abstract

Scripture seems to command actions that our modern moral sensibilities find immoral, which poses a problem for those who take Scripture to be the word of God. In response, Amir Saemi has proposed the Legal Interpretation of Scripture, according to which Scriptural commands are legal rather than moral. On this view, Scripture does not always prescribe the morally best action, but instead prescribes the rule that yields the morally best attainable outcome, given feasibility constraints. Using a formal account of coordination, I evaluate this solution, and show that resolving the problem requires Scriptural legislation to function not through reward and punishment but instead by creating mutual expectations about what others will do. I further argue that we should not understand moral progress as increased virtue; rather, moral learning explains how legislating non-optimal rules can lead agents to converge on the optimal ones. The resulting account refines Saemi’s proposal while vindicating its central idea. I close by noting some remaining worries.